Lines of inquiry — A named line of the record’s own argument, so that a line can be set aside as a whole and what depends on it can be found. Retracting a line is a status change on its members, never a deletion (ADR-032).
Evidence for experience — what could show that a system, organized, non-biological or without a cortex, has experience and not only access or function, and what each kind of evidence (report, deficit, architecture, behaviour) can and cannot establish.
7 of 547 CLAIM documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLAIM-355 v7 | In a distributed agent the binding of appraisal, readiness and governance into one response can be real while the single owner a self-model or collective self-description attributes it to is a representational construction, not a further entity; the illusion, where there is one, is in the attribution and belongs to whichever system adopts the representation, and this deflates the self without settling whether experience is real | The owner’s, U26 and U27 of the exchange of 2026-10-17: at U26 whether, “adopting an illusionist/fictionalist position”, the record can make claims about subjecthood; at U27, “illusory binding-type phenomena in distributed agents”, starting from the record’s emotion material. A26 answered with a selective fictionalism, “the imagined substantial owner, not the organized agent”; A27 located it: “The illusion might concern the owner, not the binding”, and an illusion requires “which system constructs or adopts the misleading representation”. The two are filed as one claim. It rests on no claim: the organizational-affect claim it would rest on, CLAIM-039, is Deferred, and whether that line reopens is the owner’s decision, not made here. The sharp edge: it says nothing about whether the integrated state is felt. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-411 v5 | Under the broad, nonphenomenal definition of interpretation the constitutive thesis uses, substantial processing that is not independently shown to be experiential meets the definition, blindsight’s apparently unconscious visual discrimination among it, so interpretation alone does not establish experience, and the thesis must say which further organizational properties, if any, make an interpretation experiential | A3’s “most serious challenge” to the owner’s thesis, which every later reply accepted. Once interpretation is defined broadly and without experience, as the thesis requires, it admits much processing that is not shown to be experiential: “Interpretation ⇏ Conscious experience. At least, not under an unrestricted definition of interpretation.” The objection is that the thesis is incomplete, not that it is false. A7 kept it as the theory’s “open sufficiency condition”. The record already separates access from experience (QUESTION-048, THEORY-577), and the candidate conditions the exchange named (global availability, integration, higher-order or recursive modelling, valuation, perspective) are the question QUESTION-254 asks. | Active |
| CLAIM-412 v9 | Experience is constituted by interpretive organization, not produced by it: an appropriately organized process in which signals acquire significance for a system is the experience, so whether a system can have experience becomes whether it can sustain that organization | The owner’s, U1 and U2 of the exchange of 2026-10-21. At U1 the owner argued that if sensory apparatus is necessary for grounded experience, ungrounded experience is possible and “experience is fundamentally an interpretive act”, and proposed recasting the possibility of experience as the possibility of interpretation. A1 asked whether experience is constituted by interpretation or produced by it; at U2 the owner chose “former reading” and named the brain in a vat, the rubber hand illusion and CBT. A1–A7 refined the thesis without changing it. Interpretation is defined without experience, and it is organization, not judgement. The step from organization to experience is an identity to be defended, not a theorem. Its open edge is the sufficiency condition, which CLAIM-411 presses and QUESTION-254 asks for. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-413 v3 | Grounding is not a property of an experience but a relation among an interpretation, what it purports to be about, and a process that constrains it independently; its current, developmental and epistemic senses come apart from one another, and in the current sense it comes apart from whether the interpretation occurs, so ungrounded is not unconstrained, and what makes an interpretive organization experiential need not be what makes its contents veridical | The owner’s premise at U1, that sensory apparatus is necessary for grounded experience, as A1, A3, A5 and A7 restated it. A1: “grounding is fundamentally relational, whereas interpretation can, in principle, be internally realized.” A5, after reading CLAIM-342: “Sensory grounding may concern the independence of the constraints on interpretation, rather than the existence of interpretation itself”, and “Ungrounded ≠ Unconstrained”. A7 separated current, developmental and epistemic grounding. The epistemic sense is CLAIM-342’s, so the claim rests on it. The occurrence half is the owner’s. A7: “What makes an interpretive organization experiential is not necessarily what makes its contents veridical.” | Active |
| CLAIM-414 v4 | Matched ordinary trajectories can conceal differences in an interpretation’s efficacy, in the allocation of that efficacy, and in the maintenance of its enabling constraints: in two finite constructions, systems that agree under ordinary operation differ in each, and a specified intervention exposes the difference that passive observation of the matched trajectories does not | A10 of the exchange on experience and interpretation, re-run here. Three one-bit systems behave alike when the interpretation is 0. Under an intervention that sets it to 1, the first never acts on it, the second acts at once, and the third acts one step late, because its own interpretation opens the gate. Two two-constraint systems have the same trajectory, (1,1) throughout. A single perturbation runs one into (0,0) and leaves the other restored to (1,1): one maintains its constraints by CLAIM-395’s minimal slow–fast closure, the other is reset from outside. These are CLAIM-407’s lesson about governance and CLAIM-194’s about boundaries, applied to interpretation. | Active |
| CLAIM-439 v3 | A regime of valence is felt, in the sense of attended and available to the system’s other processes, when the system that is in it also models it: when a deeper process infers which ordering wins its negotiation, which way the system is moving along it and how strongly it prevails, and the inference is used elsewhere in the system; unfelt valence is the potential without that model, as unfelt fluency is a change in precision without the inference about it | Filed at the owner’s direction, 2026-10-23, as a candidate for when the functional regime of CLAIM-440 is felt. It extends Brouillet and Friston’s distinction (THEORY-662), unfelt fluency as a change in precision and felt fluency as a deeper inference about it, from fluency to valence, and Hesp et al.’s affective precision, a belief about how reliable one’s own policies are. It is a candidate for CLAIM-411’s open sufficiency condition, for affect only, and it adopts THEORY-662’s sense of “felt”: attended and available, not a further phenomenal fact. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-460 v2 | In the completely locked-in state, evidence of lucid judgement has to cross a channel the patient drives, which is action in active inference’s sense, so such cases can show the judgement–observation loop running down but never running with no action at all, and a null result cannot tell lost judgement from a lost channel | Stated in CASE-107’s “What it can show” (“CLIS is the test, and it is asymmetric”) and held by no claim, found in the audit of 2026-10-27. CLAIM-341’s defeater (b) asks for evidence that lucid judgement fails with every contingency removed, “by evidence that does not itself restore such a contingency”; the case argues that the confirming direction cannot be had either, since any report needs a channel. Chaudhary et al.’s patient communicated only once neurofeedback restored a contingency. The edge: a limit on evidence, not a verdict on CLAIM-341. | Active |