Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Game theory — strategic interaction and its equilibria — evolutionary stability, repeated games, bargaining, coordination, signalling and conventions — in biology, economics and philosophy (ADR-019).
6 of 547 CLAIM documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLAIM-375 | Under one-hop allocation within an epoch, an operator that endorses an ally whose policy is nearer its own than the collective decision is raises how far its preferred policy is realized while its own authority stays fixed, so the two conditions of the endorsement scheme hold together | The demonstrated core of CLAIM-285. Under A3’s one-hop rule I_j = I_j⁰ + Σ_(k≠j) b_k E_kj, with budgets and baselines fixed within an epoch (CLAIM-282), an operator’s authority does not respond to its own endorsements. If the collective decision is the authority-weighted mean of the operators’ policies, then endorsing an ally whose policy is nearer one’s own than the decision is moves the decision strictly toward one’s policy. So the reward for realized policy, and not for held authority, pays for delegating. It does not say operators behave so, or that any rule beyond one hop keeps both conditions. | Active |
| CLAIM-434 | On a finite set of outcomes, some function rises with every move that wins one of a negotiation’s conflicts exactly when no chain of winning moves returns to where it began, and the length of the longest such chain ending at an outcome is one such function; a perfectly transitive record of which side won each pair, in a complete tournament contesting every pair once, leaves a cyclic share of (n − 2)/3n under the Hodge decomposition, a baseline that does not carry to sparse records; the Hodge gradient can reverse a comparison the wins settle, netting a record erases alternation, a record fixes a class of potentials rather than one, a coherent record is not yet one aligned with any single perspective’s ordering, a best-fitting ordering of a cycle is no Lyapunov function, the sign a class of potentials gives can be set-valued, and an ordering fitted to a record overstates its agreement there | The formal core of the rename of 2026-10-23 from “ascendancy” to “potential” (TERM-076). Part 1 is the finite case of Monderer and Shapley’s equivalence between the finite improvement property and a generalized ordinal potential, proved here because the record has not read their paper (LIT-1462). Part 2 is a calibration of the Hodge decomposition (Candogan et al.; Jiang et al.) for binary conflict records, computed here: even a perfect ranking leaves a cyclic residual. Part 3 separates coherence from alignment. Parts 9 to 11 were added after a second review. Parts 4 to 8 were added when a review of the pull request found that the measures built on parts 2 and 3 confused ordinal and cardinal structure; each is checked in scratch/formal/valence.py. | Active |
| CLAIM-448 v3 | An ordinal potential describes only the winning-move relation it is computed on; where an organization’s legibility regime selects which contests are admitted or recorded, an acyclic record, even a persistent potential, can be the product of selective contestation, so observed coherence is not evidence that the organization’s perspectives are integrated, and an intervention that improves its self-governance may at first increase the disagreement observed | From the exchange of 2026-10-24 (workbench entry of 2026-10-24, U19–U21), after the owner pointed to CASE-124 (“i think we already have a three variable system somewhere, where the third component is described as legibility”) and asked for the synthesis to be tied back: if the legibility regime decides which objections are registered, the record of wins on which CLAIM-440 reads valence can be acyclic for the wrong reason. Objects to reading a prevailing potential as an integrated organization’s valence without a check on what was admitted. | Active |
| CLAIM-451 v3 | When an organization’s record of winning moves cycles, the failure is organizational nonintegrability, distinct from a perspective’s own preference instability and from switching of the governing regime; it becomes organizational tension only when realized as costly reversal against demands the organization maintains, and cognitive dissonance only when that tension is detected and appraised as aversive; learning can relieve it by accommodation, by entrenched precedence or by cheap periodic coordination, which observed coherence does not tell apart, and ambivalence and nonintegrability entail neither one another | The owner’s, 2026-10-23, quoting “A potential exists exactly when the finite relation of observed wins is acyclic”: “rather than asserting potentials always have to exist, could we characterize cycles as a kind of internal tension or cognitive dissonance? preference/perspective/will instability?” Worked through the same day (workbench entry of 2026-10-24, U13). The record never asserted that potentials exist (TERM-077, CLAIM-434); this says what a cycle is when one does not, and keeps the structural fact apart from tension and from dissonance. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-546 | Negative frequency dependence that keeps two types in coexistence does not make their interaction cooperative: in Hawk–Dove with cost C above value V each type increases when rare and they coexist at the interior equilibrium of V/C Hawks, with Hawks still taking the whole resource from Doves, and on the Black Queen account producers of a leaked good and the cells that use it without paying coexist at a frequency set by the community’s need; so whether types persist together and whether they cooperate are separate questions, and a coexistence criterion answers only the first | From §3 of the synthesis “The Evolution of Cooperation: From Coexistence to Symbiosis to Morality”, which the owner supplied on 2026-11-04: “stable coexistence of strategies is not necessarily the same as stable cooperation: cooperators and defectors can coexist without eliminating exploitation”. The record held the ecological half, invasion growth when rare (CASE-118), and a case of the point (the Black Queen, THEORY-1048). It did not hold the point itself. Hawk–Dove makes it exact. The wording is the reader’s; adopting it is the owner’s call. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-547 | Cooperation within groups and the coexistence of groups are distinct targets that can trade off: in the group-selection rule of Nowak’s five, b/c > 1 + n/m, cooperation spreads because a group that grows to size n splits and another group is driven extinct, so the mechanism that stabilizes cooperation inside groups works by removing groups; cooperation local to a group, the persistence of several groups whose interests are opposed, and concern for those outside one’s group are three achievements, and none of them secures the next | From §7 of the synthesis “The Evolution of Cooperation: From Coexistence to Symbiosis to Morality”, which the owner supplied on 2026-11-04. It calls this “the most important tension”: cooperation within groups can undermine coexistence between groups. The synthesis separates local cooperation, system-level coexistence and impartial moral concern. Nowak’s group-selection model, which the record holds (THEORY-567), turns out to be an exact instance: there, cooperation within groups is bought by group extinction. The wording is the reader’s; adopting it is the owner’s call. | Proposed |