Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Moral psychology — morality as a natural phenomenon — moral judgement, emotion and norms, and their evolution, development and variation across cultures; descriptive, where ethics is normative (group: philosophy; ADR-018).
4 of 547 CLAIM documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLAIM-415 v5 | A person can be organized by a judgement they attribute to a collective that does not hold it: the audience in a self-model can be a false unity, and a judgement can shape a person who rejects it, because resisting it makes it consequential | From the owner’s U39 of the exchange of 2026-10-22: how an individual’s perspective is shaped by “the perception of a plurality of opinion where one may not exist (e.g. because of a loud minority)”, and the phrase “I am whatever you say I am”. A39: “An individual’s perspective can be reorganized by what they believe other people’s perspectives are—even when those other perspectives have been misperceived or scarcely exist.” A40 drew the extension of CLAIM-355: “The imagined social audience may also be organized into a false unity.” The edge: the attributed collective attitude itself is already held (List’s falsely attributed common attitudes, CASE-104); what is new is its place in a person’s own organization. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-430 | An interaction can make available a way of relating that its participants’ operative perspectives did not hold, by giving each a role to enact in it, so that taking part can come before, and help produce, the reinterpretation it later seems to express; whether the change stays with the partner, generalizes to a category, or is reproduced beyond the encounter are further questions | From the exchange of 2026-10-22, “Ben Franklin Effect Explained”: the owner’s U2, asking for Franklin’s favour to be read as a “perspectival invitation”, and U4, connecting it to intergroup contact. A3: “A favor request invites its recipient to enact a relational perspective that may not yet be part of their established way of interpreting the requester.” It is CLAIM-275’s intervention before interpretation applied between people, and a candidate answer to the first half of QUESTION-259, how perspectives are generated. The phrase was coined in A3; the record had not used it before. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-432 v4 | A corporation can be an agent fit to be held responsible and the bearer of functional affect in Frijda’s sense, so psychopathy’s affective features can be assigned to it as well as its conduct: it lacks remorse, functionally, when harm it does to others is not among the concerns its own appraisals track and gains precedence over what it does only when a regulator or a market turns it into a threat to the corporation’s concerns; that profile, threat without remorse, is the construct’s, and it is changed by redesigning the corporation’s concerns, not its members’ characters | The record’s reading of Bakan’s “institutional psychopath” (LIT-1430, unread), filed at the owner’s request on 2026-10-23 and revised the same day when the owner pointed out that the record’s framework assigns affect to corporation-like things (CLAIM-039, reopened). On Frijda’s account an emotion is an appraisal of an event’s pertinence to a concern, eliciting action readiness with control precedence; a corporation has concerns, appraisals and readiness. A harm to others reaches its decisions either as one of its own concerns (procedures, role duties: functional concern and remorse) or as a threat to its other concerns (regulators, markets: functional fear). A corporation with only the second is functionally psychopathic across the construct, not in part. Wells Fargo’s sales practices (CASE-151) are its documented case. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-494 v2 | Empathic concern for another produces motivation whose ultimate goal is the other’s welfare, and it does so when perceived self–other merging is controlled, so not all helping is concern for an extended self | The empathy–altruism hypothesis as Batson et al. (1997) defend it against Cialdini et al. (1997): in experiments (two, by the SEP’s account), empathy predicted helping with self–other merging controlled, and merging did not mediate it. Sober and Wilson (1998; LIT-1683) argue on independent grounds that psychological egoism is not established. Filed as the empirical objection to the owner’s thesis; both papers are unread, so the record holds the disagreement, not its resolution. | Proposed |