Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Neuroscience — brains and nervous systems — representation, coding and dynamics measured in biological tissue.
3 of 547 CLAIM documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLAIM-337 v2 | Active inference already runs an internal loop: mental action selects among higher-level cognitive states and sets the precision of lower-level observations, structure learning reshapes the generative model without action, and a judgement is behaviour, so a judgement–observation loop may be action and perception one Markov blanket inward | The assistant’s, A1 of the exchange of 2026-10-16, on active inference’s behalf, strengthened at A4. Sandved-Smith et al. cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states; Brouillet and Friston make felt fluency an inference about the precision of one’s own processing; Smith et al. let a generative model grow its own structure by inference and learning alone. With Chalmers’s point that judgements are behaviour, the owner’s judgement is active inference’s action relocated. What it does not reach: the diagram. A redescription with no action on the world concedes that action on the world is not part of the loop. | Proposed |
| CLAIM-411 v5 | Under the broad, nonphenomenal definition of interpretation the constitutive thesis uses, substantial processing that is not independently shown to be experiential meets the definition, blindsight’s apparently unconscious visual discrimination among it, so interpretation alone does not establish experience, and the thesis must say which further organizational properties, if any, make an interpretation experiential | A3’s “most serious challenge” to the owner’s thesis, which every later reply accepted. Once interpretation is defined broadly and without experience, as the thesis requires, it admits much processing that is not shown to be experiential: “Interpretation ⇏ Conscious experience. At least, not under an unrestricted definition of interpretation.” The objection is that the thesis is incomplete, not that it is false. A7 kept it as the theory’s “open sufficiency condition”. The record already separates access from experience (QUESTION-048, THEORY-577), and the candidate conditions the exchange named (global availability, integration, higher-order or recursive modelling, valuation, perspective) are the question QUESTION-254 asks. | Active |
| CLAIM-460 v2 | In the completely locked-in state, evidence of lucid judgement has to cross a channel the patient drives, which is action in active inference’s sense, so such cases can show the judgement–observation loop running down but never running with no action at all, and a null result cannot tell lost judgement from a lost channel | Stated in CASE-107’s “What it can show” (“CLIS is the test, and it is asymmetric”) and held by no claim, found in the audit of 2026-10-27. CLAIM-341’s defeater (b) asks for evidence that lucid judgement fails with every contingency removed, “by evidence that does not itself restore such a contingency”; the case argues that the confirming direction cannot be had either, since any report needs a channel. Chaudhary et al.’s patient communicated only once neurofeedback restored a contingency. The edge: a limit on evidence, not a verdict on CLAIM-341. | Active |