Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Phenomenal unity — the unity of experience — what makes simultaneous experiences one subject’s, and how a self-model or a perspective binds them. One of four unities kept apart (group: philosophy; ADR-024).
2 of 547 CLAIM documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLAIM-153 | Failure of a self to hold together across contexts is a monodromy around a cycle of contexts: any two locally consistent contexts glue, and the minimal model of the obstruction needs three | Dual-filed from MOM-CLM-165 (ADR-037). Model contexts (roles, personas, sub-agents) as a cover, and the offsets that reconcile neighbours as a cochain. A global section, one coherent self, exists exactly when the monodromy Φ around a cycle vanishes. Two contexts always glue, so compartmentalization needs a loop. The frustrated XY or Kuramoto energy finds the obstruction: its minimum is 0 exactly when Φ ≡ 0. Abelian case only; re-checked here. | Active |
| CLAIM-355 v7 | In a distributed agent the binding of appraisal, readiness and governance into one response can be real while the single owner a self-model or collective self-description attributes it to is a representational construction, not a further entity; the illusion, where there is one, is in the attribution and belongs to whichever system adopts the representation, and this deflates the self without settling whether experience is real | The owner’s, U26 and U27 of the exchange of 2026-10-17: at U26 whether, “adopting an illusionist/fictionalist position”, the record can make claims about subjecthood; at U27, “illusory binding-type phenomena in distributed agents”, starting from the record’s emotion material. A26 answered with a selective fictionalism, “the imagined substantial owner, not the organized agent”; A27 located it: “The illusion might concern the owner, not the binding”, and an illusion requires “which system constructs or adopts the misleading representation”. The two are filed as one claim. It rests on no claim: the organizational-affect claim it would rest on, CLAIM-039, is Deferred, and whether that line reopens is the owner’s decision, not made here. The sharp edge: it says nothing about whether the integrated state is felt. | Proposed |