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LIT-1042: Meaning

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Properties4
StatusActive — read 2026-10-13 (NOTE-735) in full; worth reading as the origin of the intention-based account of speaker meaning: A meant something by x if A intended the utterance of x to produce an effect in an audience by means of the recognition of that intention. Read it knowing that it analyses meaning, not illocutionary acts, so the step to individuating teasing or reproach by intention is Strawson's (1964), not Grice's; and that the account is stated as "roughly" and "a first shot" throughout. The first of the four works that CLAIM-221 and QUESTION-073 name as missing.
Tagspragmatics, philosophy-of-language
Cited as “paper” byNOTE-735 — Grice — Meaning
Cited as “source” byTHEORY-444 — To mean something by an utterance, in the non-natural sense, is to intend it to produce an effect in an audience by means of the audience's recognition of that intention, where the recognition is meant to be a reason for the effect and not merely its cause; an intention to produce the effect, or to have it recognised, is not enough, THEORY-511 — Illocutionary acts that are not essentially conventional, such as warning, entreating and objecting, are individuated by a wholly overt, audience-directed intention, Grice's three intentions with a fourth that the audience recognise the second, and are performed when that intention is understood; acts such as verdicts and umpires' calls exist only within rule-governed procedures and fall outside the scheme

Graph View

H. P. Grice (1957), The Philosophical Review 66(3):377–388 — DOI-10.2307/2182440

Key takeaways

  • Two senses of “mean”.
    • Natural meaning, “Those spots mean (meant) measles”: x means that p entails p, and nobody meant anything by it.
    • Non-natural meaning (meaningNN), “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the ‘bus is full’”: it does not entail p, and it supports a conclusion that somebody meant by x that p.
  • The causal theory fails. Stevenson’s account, a tendency to produce an attitude dependent on conditioning, lets the tail coat mean a dance. Saved by “in communication”, it is circular. It also gives no account of what a speaker means on one occasion. Grice takes that occasion meaning to be fundamental.
  • The analysis, in three steps.
    • An intention to induce a belief is not enough: the handkerchief left at the scene of a murder means nothing.
    • An intention that the audience recognise that intention is not enough either: Herod showing Salome the head, the child letting its mother see how pale it is.
    • The recognition must play a part in producing the effect. Showing Mr. X a photograph means nothing, because the photograph would convince him if left by accident. Drawing him a picture means something.
  • The general form. “A meantNN something by x” is roughly “A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention”. The effect can be an action as well as a belief: pointing to the door, a policeman waving.
  • Insult. Cutting someone in the street counts as meaningNN, because “I could not reasonably expect him to be distressed … unless he recognized my intention to affect him in this way”. Failing a candidate does not, even when the distress is intended and meant to be recognised.
  • Intentions are read publicly. “An utterer is held to intend to convey what is normally conveyed”. Context and relevance to an evident purpose decide between candidate intentions.

Standing in the record

Filed on 2026-10-13 at the owner’s request, as one of the four works of the intention-based line that CLAIM-221 and QUESTION-073 name as missing from the record. See the curation entry of that day. Read the same day in NOTE-735.

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