William Lycan (2000; substantive revision 2023), “Representational Theories of Consciousness”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Edward N. Zalta) — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/
Key takeaways
From the reading, NOTE-1068. The SEP has no page numbers; citations are by section.
- Qualities as represented properties. Strong representationalism holds that “sensory qualities are actually intentional contents, represented properties of represented objects” (§1). A hallucinated or after-image green is the green of a nonactual object.
- Representation is not enough. Pure representationalism is held by no one: “representation alone is cheap and ubiquitous” (§2.1). Strong representationalism (Dretske, Tye, Lycan) adds a sensory or functional condition: “systemic”, “poised”, or functional role (§2).
- Wide or narrow, unsettled. Dretske, Tye and Lycan hold qualities wide, so molecular duplicates could differ; Shoemaker, Kriegel, Levine and Chalmers hold them narrow. Against Block’s Inverted Earth memory argument, Lycan replies that memory contents are wide too, so “memory is not after all a reliable check on the sensory qualities”. The verdict: “no one should now find it uncontestable either that sensory qualities are narrow or that they are wide” (§4.6).
- Unconscious representation answered by a split. The objection that representation “can occur unconsciously” refutes only pure representationalism. A quality can occur unnoticed, as for the driver “on autopilot”, and then there is nothing it is like to have it (§4.2).
- “What it’s like” is a further property. It is “itself a property of the quality”, ineffable where the quality is describable, and it “requires awareness” (§5, §5.1). “As always, the representational theory addresses only sense (3)” (§4.5.1), the quality.
- The reverse programme. Phenomenal intentionality makes phenomenology “the fundamental kind of intentionality”, which “poses a general threat of circularity” when joined to representationalism (§4.3).
- Illusionism denies “what it’s like” properties; Kammerer argues that “no previously existing account can explain the strength of the illusion” (§5.3).
Why this is here
The owner’s exchange of 2026-10-21, “Experience and interpretation”, asked whether experience is constituted by interpretation or produced by it. The exchange took strong representationalism (Tye, Dretske, Lycan) as the standing position nearest the constitutive thesis, and noted that the phenomenal intentionality programme (Kriegel, Mendelovici) runs the explanation the other way, from phenomenal character to content. This entry is the reference map of both. Bears on CLAIM-412 and THEORY-095.
Correction from the reading. The exchange’s description holds only in part. Strong representationalism is an identity claim, and it needs a further organizational condition beyond representation, as the constitutive thesis does. But it is a theory of the character of experience, not of its occurrence. It holds that a sensory quality can occur with nothing it is like to have it, and it leaves what makes a state experienced to an account of awareness, the higher-order entry (LIT-1362). Its named defenders also hold qualities wide, which the constitutive thesis, as it reads THEORY-095, cannot. The exchange’s account of phenomenal intentionality is accurate. Filed from the reading: THEORY-879, that representing a sensory quality does not make it experienced.