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LIT-1375: Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

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Properties4
StatusActive — read 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1436) in full, from the JSTOR scan posted on a course page of the Athens University of Economics and Business (eclass.aueb.gr, course DEOS290), read through the OCR text of another download of the same scan at gwern.net/doc/politics/1988-putnam.pdf, the course copy having no text layer; worth reading as the standard statement of two-level games: a negotiator bargains abroad over a deal that must be ratified at home, so the overlap of domestic win-sets decides whether a deal is possible, and their size who gains. Read it knowing that it is a framework illustrated by cases, chiefly the 1978 Bonn summit, with no formal solution, and that it treats one negotiation at a time.
Version3
Tagssociety-and-governance, game-theory
Cited as “paper” byNOTE-1436 — Putnam — Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

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Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460. doi:10.1017/s0020818300027697.

Read in full on 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1436), from the JSTOR scan on a course page of the Athens University of Economics and Business.

Why this is here

The owner’s U28 described states negotiating among themselves while undergoing their own internal struggles. A28 cited Putnam’s two-level games as an existing explanation of much of it. Bears on CLAIM-423. Read in full, it does not state that components’ time horizons decide which of them holds authority (NOTE-1436).

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