Stephanie Collins (2019), Oxford University Press — DOI-10.1093/oso/9780198840275.001.0001
Key takeaways
Registered, not read. The abstract asks “(i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members”, and defends a “Tripartite Model”:
- Combinations, “collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common”, cannot bear duties; each member has a duty to “I-reason”.
- Coalitions, groups “whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures”, cannot either; members have duties to “we-reason”.
- Collectives “have group-level procedures for making decisions” and “can bear duties”. Their duties “imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.”
Standing in the record
Filed on 2026-10-23 at the owner’s request, with the works on corporate psychopathy. French (THEORY-131) and Pettit (THEORY-139) say a corporation can be responsible; Velasquez says it cannot. Collins’s third category says what follows for members if it can: a member’s duty is to use their role toward the corporation doing its duty. That bears on the record’s claim that a corporation registers the costs it imposes only through what its procedures supply: on Collins’s model, members’ role duties are one such supply. Her line between collectives and coalitions also matches the record’s line between an organization with a decision structure and a mere perspective (CLAIM-418).