Wolpert, D. H. & Tumer, K. (2001). Optimal payoff functions for members of collectives. Advances in Complex Systems 4(2–3): 265–279. doi:10.1142/S0219525901000188. Reprinted in F. Schweitzer (ed.), Modeling Complexity in Economic and Social Systems (World Scientific, 2002), pp. 355–369.
Not read. The summary is drawn from the abstract. The authors’ NASA report of the same programme (LIT-1506, read in NOTE-1153) states the factoredness condition, the Wonderful Life Utility and an optimal clamping parameter, with a near-identical abstract. This paper’s abstract adds a new mathematical framework, the Aristocrat Utility and a comparison with endogenized externalities, none of which the report contains; a reading should start there.
Why this is here
Registered 2026-10-24 for difference rewards, the Wonderful Life Utility: the world utility minus its value with one member’s contribution removed. The lead read it as answering “what if this process had not acted”, for CLAIM-446’s identifiability and QUESTION-270’s unheeded processes. COMA (LIT-1517) cites it as the source of its counterfactual baseline and of the “aristocrat utility”. What the report shows about the question is in NOTE-1153.