Jan Baedke (2025), Cambridge University Press, Elements in the Philosophy of Biology (ed. Grant Ramsey) — DOI-10.1017/9781009495035
Key takeaways
- The organism is a “nexus concept” whose organizational (inward) and relational (outward) dimensions have to be integrated. Baedke argues this is best done by treating organisms as “overcomers” — agents that deliberately destabilize and reorganize their own organization — and not merely as self-maintaining “persisters”. That lets organism-centred biology individuate organisms as distinct causal agents without replacing gene-centred biology.
Seeded from the abstract and a skim, before the reading in NOTE-148. What follows is what the work says about itself.
Organisms are central to biology, yet it is hard to say what an organism is. After decades in which the gene dominated, fields such as epigenetics, niche construction theory and evo-devo again treat the organism as a causally efficacious, autonomous and active unit that shapes its own development and evolution. The Element examines this “return of the organism” as integrated history and philosophy of science. It covers conceptual, biotheoretical, historical, sociopolitical and anthropological dimensions, and proposes answers to the challenges facing organism-centred biology in the twenty-first century.
Standing in the record
Filed from the 2026-09-26 sweep of the papers-feed tracker for philosophy: 0 seconds of active reading over 0 sessions. It was filed Deferred, unread. NOTE-148 is the close reading of 2026-09-26, and it placed the work: Active — worth reading as a compact, open-access and historically well-informed synthesis of the organism/individuality debate, and as the clearest statement of the persister-vs-overcomer distinction. Its positive account is, in the author’s words, drawn “with rough brushstrokes” (p. 51), so cite it for the problem statement and the distinction, not as having settled organism individuation.
When seeded, before the reading in NOTE-148, the entry gave a priority for a deeper reading: medium — t=0, but it is an open-access, book-length synthesis that other notes (agency, individuality, life) could lean on. The skim captures its architecture but not the positive account in detail.
What the seeding asked a deeper reading to check (NOTE-148 is that reading):
- A compact, current reference point for biological individuality and organismal agency, useful to nucleation notes on agency and on individuation. Check the three “overcomer” cases in §4.3 and whether the criterion really picks out organisms uniquely.
- The inward/outward challenge split is a reusable frame for any agency or individuality note, including debates on whether artificial systems are organism-like (compare LIT-211 on definitions of life and LIT-120 on autopoiesis).
- The relational individuation model in §4.3 was not read in detail and should be before it is cited.
Access when seeded: Full open-access PDF (CC BY-NC 4.0, 84 PDF pages) downloaded from Cambridge Core. Read the front matter and abstract, contents, §1 Introduction, §3.3 “Two Conceptual Challenges”, the opening of §4.3, the opening of §5, and the whole §6 Epilogue. Cambridge Core gives “Published online … 10 June 2025”; the Element says “First published online: June 2025”. Page numbers below are the Element’s printed pages.