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LIT-982: Theories of consciousness

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StatusActive — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-849) in full; worth reading for QUESTION-048 as a map of four families of theory by what each explains and what evidence each cites, and for its argument that report-based evidence cannot test posterior sufficiency, since report needs anterior activity, while no non-report marker has a validation independent of introspection and contested theory. Read it knowing that it is a review, read from the accepted manuscript, which argues these limits rather than demonstrating them.
Version2
Tagsconsciousness, neuroscience, philosophy-of-science
Cited as “paper” byNOTE-849 — Seth & Bayne — Theories of consciousness
Cited as “source” byTHEORY-298 — Report-based evidence cannot test whether posterior cortex suffices for experience, because report itself needs anterior activity, and no marker that bypasses report has a validation resting neither on introspection nor on a contested theory

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Anil K. Seth, Tim Bayne (2022), Nature Reviews Neuroscience 23(7), 439–452.

Key takeaways

From the reading, NOTE-849.

  • Different targets. Theories differ in whether they explain global states, local contents, why a content is conscious, or what it is like; GWTs are explicitly theories of access, IIT the most comprehensive in coverage. Apparent rivals may not compete.
  • Four families. Higher-order (meta-representation, prefrontal); global workspace (ignition and broadcast, frontoparietal); IIT (irreducible integrated information, posterior hot zone, implies some non-biological systems are conscious); reentry and predictive processing (top-down signalling; PP a theory “for” rather than “of” consciousness).
  • Shared data support no one. Every family can explain why the cerebellum is not involved, so that datum favours none unless one explanation is better.
  • Front versus back is about access. Prefrontal and decoding evidence favours HOT and GWT; no-report and dream evidence favours IIT and reentry; the dispute is over whether access is a proxy for consciousness.
  • The report channel limits the test. Posterior-sufficiency claims cannot now be verified because verification relies on report, which requires anterior activity.
  • The measurement problem (Box 3). Markers of consciousness need a validation that is neither introspective nor theory-based; none is uncontroversial.
  • Moving forward. Theories need precision, comprehensiveness (affect, dreaming, infants, animals, AI) and measurement, with adversarial collaborations to test them.

Standing in the record

Filed 2026-10-12 for QUESTION-048 and read in full on 2026-10-14 (NOTE-849). It maps what each kind of evidence is taken to support, by theory, rather than what each can establish about experience as opposed to access; it names that distinction as the disputed point. THEORY-298, filed from it, holds its argument that report evidence cannot test posterior sufficiency and that non-report markers lack an independent validation; it answers QUESTION-048 in part. It is the general form of THEORY-023’s evidential point and sits beside THEORY-094 and the COGITATE readings.

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