Contribution

The paper gives active inference a template for structure learning that uses only its existing machinery. “Expansion” is inference plus Dirichlet learning into pre-allocated hidden-state levels with uninformative likelihoods. “Reduction” is Bayesian model reduction applied to the learned prior over states. It demonstrates both on a toy concept-learning task, shows one-shot generalisation, and derives neural and dopaminergic predictions from the active-inference process theory.

Key insight

A model does not need a separate mechanism to decide that something new exists. If it carries a few blank hypotheses that predict every observation equally, a pattern that none of its learned hypotheses fits will be better explained by a blank one, and learning will then shape it. What it does need is a way to give back blanks it filled for no good reason. Asking whether a simpler prior over states would have had more evidence does that, after the fact, without refitting.

Assumptions

  • Generative model (Figs. 1, 3): one hidden-state factor of up to eight animals (four birds, four fish) and one factor for the agent’s report; three outcome modalities with two values each (size, colour, wings/gills); identity B for the animal factor; two time points (observe, report).
  • Learning: Dirichlet concentration parameters on A (the likelihood) and, for the reduction runs, on D (the prior over initial states), accumulated as co-occurrence counts.
  • Unsupervised exposure: during learning, reporting policies are disabled, so there is no feedback. Preferences C favour correct specific reports over correct general ones, and disfavour incorrect ones.
  • Symmetry breaking: Gaussian noise of variance 0.001 is added to flat columns (footnote 3), because exactly equal Dirichlet updates could otherwise stall learning.
  • Reduced models for BMR: priors over states in which the concepts to be removed are made less likely than those retained.

Key results

  • Recognition baselines. With a fully precise A, 32 trials gave 100% correct specific reports. With only wings/gills known, 100% correct general reports and no specific ones.
  • Adding one concept (sturgeon), Fig. 4. From a flat sturgeon column and 2,000 unsupervised exposures, reporting reached 100% after about 50 exposures to all eight animals, stable over eight runs. Two new concepts: mean accuracy 98.75% (SD 2%) after 2,000 trials. Four new birds: six of eight runs reached 92.50–98.8%, two stalled at 72.50% by overgeneralising (parrot taken for hawk). New concepts often landed in different columns from the generative process, as unsupervised learning allows.
  • No duplicate states, Fig. 5. With seven concepts known and one spare, 80 trials of known animals left the spare unused, and 20 trials of hawk engaged and filled it. The same held with six, five or four known.
  • Granularity, Fig. 6. From basic categories only: 93–98% in seven of eight runs, one failure at 84.4% (pigeon and parakeet merged into “small birds”). From nothing: mean 81.21% (SD 6.39%, range 68.80–91.30%).
  • Reduction, Table 1 (100 runs each, 250 exposures per presented animal; “Retain k” is the winning reduced model):
    • 7 presented: retained 8 in 5 runs, 7 in 56, 6 in 31, 5 in 8.
    • 6 presented: 8 in 4, 7 in 18, 6 in 69, 5 in 8, 2 in 1.
    • 5 presented: 7 in 4, 6 in 16, 5 in 80.
    • 4 presented: 7 in 2, 6 in 23, 5 in 30, 4 in 45.
    • 3 presented: 6 in 10, 4 in 1, 2 in 89. The true model was second-best in 55 runs.
    • 2 presented: 5 in 57, 4 in 43. Where the winner was wrong, it usually learned a coarser concept (“large bird”), and the log-evidence gap to the second-best was small (mean −0.40 to −1.23, and −1.64 for three animals). With A given and only D learned, the correct reduced model won in 100% of runs.
  • One-shot generalisation, Fig. 8. Asked “could this be seen from a distance?” (yes only for large and colourful animals), the agent with parrot unknown answered yes in 20 of 20 trials, and with minnow unknown answered no in 20 of 20, with learning disabled.
  • Neural predictions, Fig. 9. Simulated firing rates of the “parakeet” population rise over learning while the other bird populations fall below baseline. Simulated phasic dopamine (changes in policy precision) rises as confidence in specific reports grows, after an early dip when general and specific reports compete.

Claims

idclaimstrengthsupport
C1Spare hidden-state levels with flat likelihoods let an active-inference agent acquire new concepts without feedback, and only when a stimulus is novelmoderate: shown in one toy domain, repeated over 8 runs per conditionFigs. 4–5
C2Learning basic categories first improves later learning of subordinate onesweak to moderate: two conditions, 8 runs each, one feature spaceFig. 6
C3Bayesian model reduction on the learned state prior can remove unneeded conceptsmoderate for 4–7 true concepts (45–80%), fails for 2–3; perfect only with a given likelihoodTable 1, Fig. 7
C4Reduction failures come from imperfect likelihood learningweak: inferred from the given-A control, not isolated furtherp. 14
C5The agent generalises one-shot to an unseen animalweak: two variants, 20 trials each, a hand-built question that is a conjunction of two learned featuresFig. 8
C6The brain holds “reserve” cortical columns or silent synapses that play the role of spare slotsweak: a prediction; the authors say no direct evidence for unused columns existsPotential Advantages section
C7Sleep and rest implement the reduction stepweak: cited theory (Hobson & Friston 2012; Tononi & Cirelli 2014), not testedDiscussion

Method

Belief updating by variational message passing in SPM’s spm_MDP_VB_X.m. Learning accumulates Dirichlet counts in A (and D in the reduction runs). After learning, BMR compares the posterior D counts with the full prior (flat over eight) and with reduced priors that drop subsets of concepts (Fig. 2, lower left: ΔF from beta functions of prior and posterior counts), and the reduced model with most evidence is selected. Generalisation runs swap the report factor for a yes/no answer.

Concepts

  • effective state-space expansion: engaging a previously unused level of a hidden-state factor. The formal dimension of the state space does not change.
  • spare capacity / reserve states / open slots: hidden-state levels whose likelihood columns start (near-)flat.
  • structural prior: the built-in upper bound on how many hidden causes there may be (here eight).
  • model reduction (here): BMR on D, licensing a reset of A and D for the dropped levels.

Connections

  • Bayesian model reduction (LIT-614) is cited for the post hoc model optimisation, and its Dirichlet form is what is applied.
  • Friston & Penny (LIT-620) is cited as the origin of BMR.
  • Non-parametric Bayes (Chinese restaurant and Indian buffet processes; the paper calls the first the “Chinese Room” process) is the stated alternative. The paper frames its scheme as a bounded version, and argues it is more biologically plausible because it uses only Hebbian-style count updates.
  • Category-learning models (Anderson’s rational model, SUSTAIN, ART, ALCOVE, EBRW, DIVA) are discussed as related, without quantitative comparison.
  • Sophisticated Inference (LIT-577) shares the MDP formalism and expected-free-energy policy selection. This paper uses only two time points, so planning depth plays no role.

Bearing on the record

  • It would be one source for a THEORY that structure learning in a bounded generative model can be done as inference into spare capacity plus evidence-based pruning. Table 1 is also the record’s only measurement of how often BMR picks the generating structure when the parent model was itself learned. That number is far from perfect.
  • It bears on cognition as a formal account of category formation, and on the Raja et al. critique (LIT-598): the structure the agent “learns” is bounded by slots and features the modeller supplied.
  • No ML instruction. Nothing here belongs in the anthology.

Limitations

  • Scale. Eight concepts, six binary features, two time points. The authors call it deliberately simple and leave scaling untested.
  • Variance across initialisations. Table 1 is from one initialisation of the symmetry-breaking noise. The authors report that other initialisations changed the pattern, which they call “some sensitivity to initial conditions”.
  • Expansion is not model comparison. New slots are engaged by state inference, not scored by evidence. Only removal uses BMR.
  • No empirical data. The neural predictions are simulated from the process theory and have not been tested.
  • Citation slip. BMR is described as generalising “the Savage Dickie ratio”, with Cornish & Littenberg (2007) as the citation.

Open questions

  • How should the number of slots and the feature dimensions themselves be learned? The authors name this and propose merging states with similar likelihoods by BMR, as future work.
  • Does reduction improve if likelihood learning is allowed to settle before the prior over states is learned? The given-A control suggests it would.
  • How should an agent choose actions that maximise information gain about the structure of its own model? The authors pose this and do not answer it.

Corrections

  • none (there was no seed)