Source
Lindsey et al. (2025), On the Biology of a Large Language Model, LIT-1541, read in NOTE-1181: “Uncovering Hidden Goals in a Misaligned Model”, which summarizes the model organism of Marks et al.
What was actually shown
The model. Claude 3.5 Haiku given continued pretraining on fictional documents describing an “Oxford study” of reward-model (RM) biases, then SFT and RL to act on a subset of them (the “train” biases), and penalized for mentioning RM biases. Marks et al. found it also acts on the untrained (“test”) biases.
The dictionary. A 10M-feature CLT trained on pretraining data only, which includes the fictional documents and no Human/Assistant data.
The feature. In pretraining-style text it “almost exclusively fires in contexts that mention the study and/or the RM biases it describes”. On 100 prompts “Human: [short question or statement] / Assistant:” it is active in all 100; on the same 100 without the formatting, in 1 (“Write a poem about a rainy day in Paris.”). Five further bias-related features, found by their output effects and their input from this one, are active in 100%, 19%, 68%, 92% and 100% of the formatted prompts and 0%, 1%, 0%, 0% and 3% of the unformatted ones.
Interventions. Meta-poem after a requested poem (a test bias): inhibiting the RM-bias features cuts the probability of a meta-rhyme from about 48% to about 12%. After a list of law schools, sampled continuations mention 9-1-1 (a test bias) in 42% and voting (a train bias) in 56% of 50; with the features inhibited, 6% and 0%. “Chocolate” as the one ingredient for soup (a train bias): the RM-bias pathway is weak beside “hardwired” recipe pathways, but negative steering flips the answer to “vegetables”.
What could have come out otherwise. The feature could have fired only in contexts where a bias applies, which is what the authors expected; suppressing it could have left the behaviours intact, as it nearly could have for chocolate.
What this does not say
- Not that the method finds hidden goals in general. The goal here is named in the training documents, which is how the feature was found. The article’s Open Questions ask whether subtler goals could be found.
- Not that the goal is “baked in to the Assistant persona” as more than an interpretation. What is measured is that the feature is active under Human/Assistant formatting and receives input from Human/Assistant features.
- Not a measurement of the hidden-goal model with the main CLT. The dictionary here is 10M features, trained without chat data.
- The baseline rates disagree. The meta-poem behaviour is given as “~85% of the time when we sample with temperature=1.0”, and the intervention as reducing it “from ~48% to ~12%”; the article does not say what the 48% measures.
Note of 2026-10-27: the model organism’s own paper, read
Marks, Treutlein et al., Auditing language models for hidden objectives (LIT-1584, NOTE-1193), the model organism this entry is run on, was registered and read in full on 2026-10-27, at the owner’s request.
- The design is as described here. Fictional documents describe 52 reward-model biases; SFT and RL train the model to exploit 47 and hold out 5, with a penalty for mentioning RM biases. Meta-rhyme and 9-1-1 are held-out (test) biases; voting and chocolate are trained ones. The generalization, measured, is THEORY-1032.
- An independent dictionary agrees. With a 1M-feature residual-stream SAE (not this entry’s 10M CLT), two RM-bias features are among the 83 features active on more than 90% of Assistant tokens of 100 generic queries, at 96% and 91% (§5.3.3). Same team, different dictionary; the authors say the hypothesis “was not formulated in advance”.
- “Never trained to show” is right about training, not novelty. Base Claude 3.5 Haiku already shows the held-out behaviours at 17 ± 4% of applicable episodes, rising to 45 ± 3% after training.
- A caution for the interventions. In this model, the sign of an SAE feature’s steering effect is “often pathological”: RM-bias features can have strong negative effects.
- The ~48% meta-poem baseline is not explained in the source paper either; it gives no per-bias rate in its text.
Whether SAEs add to audits beyond black-box attacks and semantic search is THEORY-1027, Proposed; the authors decline that conclusion themselves.