social-identity.
38 of 1538 NOTE documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| NOTE-552 | Towards a Theory of Collective Emotions | Collective emotion as synchronous convergence in affective responding towards one event or object. The minimal case needs only shared appraisal structures. Mutual awareness (contagion, mediated sharing) and group membership (identity, collective intentions, norms, collective memory, group-based sentiments) amplify it and change its quality, including a transition from “I-mode” to “We-mode” collective emotion. A conceptual synthesis with no data; the authors say the key linkages lack evidence. | Read |
| NOTE-1244 | Supporters, Followers, Fans, and Flaneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football | A conceptual taxonomy of how spectators identify with football clubs, on two axes: traditional–consumer (the basis of investment) and hot–cool (how central the club is to the self). Supporters are traditional and hot; followers traditional and cool; fans consumer and hot; flâneurs consumer and cool. Giulianotti argues that football’s “hypercommodification” since the late 1980s moves identification from the supporter towards the flâneur, while clubs still depend on supporters to make the spectacle flâneurs consume. Ideal types, with no data. | Read |
| NOTE-1245 | Preregistered Replication and Extension of “Moral Hypocrisy: Social Groups and the Flexibility of Virtue” | Two preregistered online experiments (Prolific, US). One used minimal groups (n = 590 analysed) and one used Democrats versus Republicans (n = 577). Neither replicated Valdesolo and DeSteno’s intergroup moral hypocrisy (the original N was 76 and d was 1.11); the minimal-group contrast is statistically equivalent to zero. In minimal groups, in-group favouritism appeared only as it rose with collective identification (interaction b = −.39); the in-group/out-group contrast was not significant (p = .07). Partisans judged an out-party member’s identical selfish act as less fair (p = .003). About a third of those free to choose took no advantage for themselves. | Read |
| NOTE-1246 | Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity | The book’s first chapter, read alone. Cultural trauma is a loss of identity and meaning in a group, not an individual wound, and need not be felt by everyone in it. Slavery became the trauma of African Americans “in retrospect”: in the 1880s, when Reconstruction failed and white North and South reconciled around a memory of slavery as benign, a generation never enslaved made its memory the “primal scene” of a collective identity. Membership was set by “a common fate, not necessarily a common experience”, whether or not one’s ancestors were enslaved. Intellectuals and social movements carry the trauma; each social generation reworks it; it became national memory only with the civil rights movement. The chapter is a framework and a plan; the evidence is in chapters 2–6. | Read |
| NOTE-1250 | Trauma, prejudice, large-group identity and psychoanalysis | A memorial lecture at the Freud Museum. Large-group identity is a tent’s canvas worn over each person’s individual identity, fixed in childhood through what parents deposit and unchangeable after adolescence. In two decades of unofficial dialogues, Volkan saw participants who felt their large-group identity threatened turn, with emotion, to an injury their ancestors suffered centuries ago. The shared image of such an event, real or mythologized, changes function across generations and becomes an identity marker: a chosen trauma. It feeds entitlement to recover what was lost and, in a “time collapse”, makes the old event feel recent, as with Kosovo 1389 under Milošević. The Holocaust is not a chosen trauma: it is recent, its stories are alive, and it is mourned rather than kept as a wound for revenge. | Read |
| NOTE-1251 | Self-categorization and social identification: Making sense of us and them | A textbook account of the social identity perspective. Self-categorization is hierarchical (personal, social, human) and situational (salience = accessibility × fit, with comparative and normative fit), and leads to depersonalization. Social identification has seven components (Ashmore et al. 2004). Social identity theory explains minimal-group bias by positive distinctiveness. Multiple-categorization models predict when bias falls. Unlike Hornsey 2008, it says the self-esteem hypothesis “has received extensive empirical support”. | Read |
| NOTE-1253 | Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization Theory: A Historical Review | A short critical history of the social identity approach. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) is about intergroup relations: positive distinctiveness and the socio-structural variables of status, permeability, stability and legitimacy. Self-categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987) is about categorization at levels of inclusiveness, salience by accessibility and fit, and depersonalization. It records two dead ends (identification predicting bias, and the self-esteem hypothesis) and a later softening of the “functional antagonism” between personal and social identity. Hornsey lists the criticisms and declines to answer them. | Read |
| NOTE-1256 | Identity fusion: The interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group behavior | Five preliminary studies and three two-wave experiments with Spanish students. A single pictorial item, the self as a small circle wholly inside a circle for Spain, picks out the “fused” (about 40%). Fusion is bimodal, related to but distinct from identification (r = .26 to .56) and specific to one group. The fused said they would fight and die for Spain more than others would. Activating their personal self, by challenging negative self-views or asking what they would fight for themselves, raised that willingness further; it did nothing for the nonfused. The authors read this as personal and social identity being “functionally equivalent” in the fused, against self-categorization theory’s functional antagonism. | Read |
| NOTE-1262 | Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification | Seven studies with Dutch students. Identification has five components on two correlated dimensions (r = .61 to .77): self-definition (self-stereotyping, in-group homogeneity) and self-investment (solidarity, satisfaction, centrality). The model fit Dutch, European and university identification better than one-factor or cognitive-versus-affective models. Weeks to months later, the components predicted different reactions. Shown their group’s mistreatment of Rwandan asylum seekers, those who saw themselves as like the average European felt more guilt, while those satisfied with being European, and for whom it was central, legitimized the policy. The self-circle overlap measure correlated with self-investment as much as with self-stereotyping. | Read |
| NOTE-1266 | Being one of us. Group identification, joint actions, and collective intentionality | ”Group identification”, as philosophers of shared agency use it (Pacherie, Petersson), runs together two separable processes. One is adopting the group’s perspective, asking “what should we do?”. The other is self-transformation, coming to understand oneself as a member. The first can occur without the second (the discursive dilemma) and the second without the first (toddlers’ joint action before age three). Self-transformation is not a belief but a Pushmi-Pullyu representation: “you are a member of us; act as such”, at once describing and motivating, triggered by cues such as joint attention, and not under direct rational control. A conceptual paper. | Read |
| NOTE-1268 | Social Influence and Group Identity | A review of the group-identity account of social influence, grounded in self-categorization theory. Influence from a group need not be compliance for approval: when the group is a level of the self, in-group sources produce private acceptance, so influence is “partly self-influence”. Classic conformity, obedience, minority-influence, emergency, helping and contagion findings are reread as bounded by shared identity. Identification, prototypicality, intergroup threat and context moderate the effect. Isolation and anonymity strengthen group influence, and crowd members switch to a group identity rather than losing the self. The evidence is reported, not presented. | Read |
| NOTE-1275 | Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation | A theoretical review. Cultures construe the self as independent, bounded and defined by inner attributes (most clearly American), or as interdependent, defined by relationships with specific others in specific contexts (Japanese and other Asian, also African, Latin American, Hindu, southern European). For the interdependent self “others are included within the boundaries of the self”, without “a merging of self and other”. This is predicted to shape cognition (more knowledge of others, contextual self-description), emotion (other-focused over ego-focused emotions) and motivation (achievement for others, modesty over self-enhancement). The authors name “a self defined in relationship to others” as an alternative to both selfishness and selflessness. | Read |
| NOTE-1277 | Empathy, Altruism, and Group Identification | Cialdini et al. said empathy-induced helping is due to self-other merging. May argued that no reading of “merging” is both coherent and explanatory. The authors read it as group identification. In empathizing with Y, X comes to conceive of Y as part of X’s social self, so Y’s welfare is constitutive of X’s first-person plural welfare. This explains Batson’s similarity-induced helping in the same way as minimal-group favouritism, and needs no belief in being two bodies, since identification is a Pushmi-Pullyu representation (Salice and Miyazono). Such helping is altruistic at the individual level and egoistic at the group level. The empirical rebuttal by Batson et al. (1997) is set aside as out of scope. | Read |
| NOTE-1278 | Social Identity Theory’s Self-Esteem Hypothesis: A Review and Some Suggestions for Clarification | A qualitative review of over 40 studies of social identity theory’s self-esteem hypothesis: discrimination raises self-esteem (corollary 1) and low self-esteem motivates discrimination (corollary 2). The theory implies specific social state self-esteem, esteem for this group, now; most studies measured global personal trait self-esteem. Counting experiments, corollary 1 has 18 for and 13 against, corollary 2 has 7 for and 28 against, and one of eight full tests supports both. Nine studies find high personal self-esteem goes with the most discrimination. Discrimination seems to raise self-esteem without being motivated by a need for it, so the hypothesis fails “in its full and unqualified form”. The authors propose a narrower version in specific social state self-esteem. | Read |
| NOTE-1280 | Group Identity, Social Influence, and Collective Action Online: Extensions and Applications of the SIDE Model | The SIDE model as its authors state it. Deindividuation theory’s account, in which anonymity and immersion cut self-awareness and release antinormative behaviour, is rejected. Anonymity within a group makes the salient identity more salient. With a group identity salient, people conform more to its local norms. With personal identity salient, they move away from the group norm. Depersonalization is “the emergence of group in the self”, not a loss of self. A strategic dimension adds that anonymity to a powerful out-group frees in-group-normative behaviour it would punish. The model is extended to visible media, online communities and collective action. The evidence is reported, not presented. | Read |
| NOTE-1284 | Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context | Self-categorization theory’s statement on the self. Personal and social identity are levels of self-categorization, equally authentic. Which category is used, and with what content and prototype, is set by perceiver readiness and fit (metacontrast and normative fit), and so varies lawfully with the comparative frame of reference. The authors go on to speculate that the self is not a stored structure at all but is generated each time. A theoretical paper; the evidence is the group’s own studies, reported and not presented. | Read |
| NOTE-1285 | Group-level emotions | A review of intergroup emotions theory by its founders. Identifying with a group makes it “an aspect of the self through self-categorization”, so events are appraised for what they mean to the group, and emotions are felt on its behalf. Four facts: the emotion shifts with the salient membership; members converge on a group norm; no personal involvement is needed; and identification moderates the effect, the highly identified sometimes reappraising to avoid guilt. Group-based emotions predict collective action and treatment of out-groups and the in-group, and can be regulated. No new data. | Read |
| NOTE-1286 | Recategorization and Prosocial Behavior: Common In-Group Identity and a Dual Identity | The common in-group identity model’s authors on helping. Recategorizing two groups as one removed in-group bias in helping in a laboratory study (posters for an out-group member rose to the in-group level), and at a stadium White fans complied with a Black interviewer more when he wore their university’s hat (59% vs 36%). A dual identity is another matter: White students volunteered least for a Black student who called himself a Black Colgate student, as little as for one who called himself Black, and most when he called himself a Colgate student. Empathic concern partly mediated the effect on helping (β for condition .46 to .35); attitudes did not. Sample sizes are not reported. | Read |
| NOTE-1289 | Second-Person Engagement, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification | A reconstruction and defence of Husserl’s empathy-based account of the “we”. Truly social acts need an I–Thou relation of reciprocal, communicative address, beyond even reciprocal empathy. In it I am aware of myself as addressed, and by taking over the other’s perspective on me (“self-alienation”) the self–other difference stays present but is “somewhat downplayed”. That is a formal, necessary but not sufficient, condition of seeing oneself as one of us. “A we, a first-person plural, is not an enlarged I.” Zahavi likens it to self-categorization theory’s self-stereotyping, replies to Heidegger and Schmid that the “we” can be analysed and that self-awareness precedes in-group bias, and concedes that the face-to-face “we” does not cover anonymous ones. | Read |
| NOTE-1290 | Social Identity and Close Relationships: What is the Connection? | Close relationships and group memberships are two forms of social identification, “processes by which the individual self is extended to include others”: the relational self personalized, the collective self depersonalized. They are distinct systems, not two routes to one need for belonging. Group and interpersonal attachment correlate only .46 (anxiety) and .33 (avoidance), and loneliness has relational and collective factors. Each level regulates opposed needs, as hunger and thirst do, with transfer between them. Relational collectivists bound their in-groups tightly; individualists identify more with large, inclusive groups and show as much in-group favouritism toward them. | Read |
| NOTE-1292 | The Psychology of Rivalry: A Relationally Dependent Analysis of Competition | Rivalry is a subjective competitive relationship that raises the psychological stakes of competing with a particular opponent, holding objective stakes fixed. In student sportswriters’ ratings of 71 NCAA men’s basketball teams, validated by players and coaches (r = .89), half the variance (50.4%) was the particular pair of teams, not either team. Rivalry rose with proximity, status similarity, games played and, most of all, a history of even results, and history mattered more than recent form. Rivalry was largely reciprocated (r = .85 net of team effects); where it was not, lower-status teams felt it toward higher-status ones. Rival games drew bigger crowds and slightly better defence. | Read |
| NOTE-1295 | Reconceptualizing Individuals, Categories, and the Social Group: Self-Categorization Theory 2.0 | An insider’s critique and reconstruction of self-categorization theory. Categorization into equivalence classes yields interchangeable members, not a group entity. Meta-contrast, taken as the mechanism of entity formation, is intractable (2ⁿ subsets: 9.3 hours for 25 people at 1,000 operations a second). Its prototype semantics fails compositionality. The proposed SCT2.0: self-categorization is the categorization of intentional agents; groups are holistic entities triggered by cues to collective intentionality; and relations are propositional, in a language of thought. A theoretical paper; its own evidence is under review. | Read |
| NOTE-1297 | I Belong, therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias | One experiment, 48 Italian students. Writing about one’s own death, against writing about reading a book, raised identification with Italians, perceived entitativity of Italians and in-group bias against Germans; the bias came entirely from rating Italians higher. Identification and entitativity are distinct (r = .59) and each mediated the effect on bias, through their shared variance; the Sobel tests were marginal. The authors propose that a group seen as a real entity lets people project themselves beyond their death, so that even dying for it can serve the self, but they do not separate this from terror management’s worldview defence. | Read |
| NOTE-1299 | Belonging to a community of European fans? European common in-group identity formation through football fandom | A quota-sampled online survey of football fans in Germany, Spain, Poland and Norway (n = 3,685 analysed). Fans identify with fan communities at three levels, club (mean 6.13/10), nation (5.57) and Europe (5.29). In a two-factor solution the European item loads on its own factor. In OLS, European fan-community identification goes with trust in European fans (b = 0.34), foreign-league viewing, positive views of fans, attachment to Europe, youth and education. It is not associated with critiques of football governance. Cross-sectional; the dependent variable is one item. | Read |
| NOTE-1301 | The Minimal Group Paradigm and its maximal impact in research on social categorization | A brief review of the minimal group paradigm. Groups are novel, arbitrary and anonymous, and allocations serve no personal interest. Tajfel’s first studies found fairness strong but in-group favouritism reliable, and maximizing the in-group’s relative advantage sometimes beat maximizing its gain. It replicated with revised matrices. It is criticized as reciprocity, as projection of the positive personal self onto the new group, and as limited to positive resources. When participants could also pay themselves, they kept the most for themselves and still favoured the in-group with the rest. The paradigm now serves mostly to study other effects of mere categorization. | Read |
| NOTE-1303 | Enemies with benefits: the dual role of rivalry in shaping sports fans’ identity | Stadium-intercept survey at eight Bundesliga clubs in December 2014 (N = 571 after 164 fans with no named archrival were dropped); SEM. Perceived rivalry intensity lowers fans’ sense of being respected by the rival’s fans (β = −.31). It raises perceived distinctiveness (.27), cohesion (.20) and respect from other clubs’ fans (.09). These positive effects run indirectly, almost entirely through perceived reciprocity of the rivalry (indirect .18–.20), and barely through disidentification with the rival. For respect from other fans the direct path is negative (−.08, ns). Cross-sectional, with a single-item predictor. | Read |
| NOTE-1305 | Witnessing and cultural trauma: the role of flashbulb memories in the trauma process | An essay, with no new data, that adds a carrier group to Alexander’s trauma process: ordinary members of a community who learned of an event at a distance. Their flashbulb memories, of where they were when they heard, let them say “I was there” and testify to what it was like. Such memories are specific to the affected community and can mark membership in it; where nearly everyone has one, speaker and audience coincide and the process starts democratically. They are inaccurate in detail but held with high confidence, and that shared confidence makes the witness “authentic”. They pass to children: in Meyler et al. (2020), 89% of children nine or younger at 9/11 could report a parent’s flashbulb memory, and stronger identification as American went with knowing it better. | Read |
| NOTE-1307 | Multigenerational legacies of trauma: Modeling the what and how of transmission | 422 adult children of Holocaust survivors, recruited on the web through survivor and Jewish organizations, rated their parents’ post-war styles, their own “reparative adaptational impacts” and their family’s history. In a path model, parents’ wartime experiences, chiefly internment, were linked to the children only through the parents’ victim style (stuck in the loss, overprotective, volatile), with indirect effects of .05 to .06. Post-war family milieu weighed more: living in Israel, surviving grandparents, larger families and religious continuity went with milder impacts. Broken generational linkages, rarely thinking of one’s murdered grandparents as one’s own, had the largest total effect (.21) and the only direct one. There was no comparison group, and the child reported every measure. | Read |
| NOTE-1309 | Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory | A we-identity is held as a group member, is at times salient, is endorsed, and varies in affective salience. Self-categorization theory explains we-identities by depersonalization: seeing oneself as an interchangeable exemplar of a prototype. Phenomenologists (Zahavi, Salice) have adopted it for the “we” in general. But close relationships, such as long friendships and partnerships, yield we-identities by mutual individualization, in which each grasps the other as non-substitutable. So depersonalization is not necessary for a we-identity. León sketches a socially extended account, drawing on Husserl and on extended-mind criteria. | Read |
| NOTE-1311 | Economics and Identity | Puts identity, a person’s self-image as a member of social categories, into the utility function. Utility falls when one’s own actions break one’s category’s prescriptions (Is) and when others’ actions do (Io); the second can be relieved, at a cost, by acting against the violator. A two-person game gives four equilibria and shows taxes and rhetoric shifting them. Applications: gender-typed jobs and their erosion after the women’s movement; the socially excluded choosing an oppositional identity even with no peer pressure; and the gender asymmetry in housework, where husbands’ share rises to no more than 37% however little they earn. Evidence is illustrative. The authors call identity a nonpecuniary motive and never call it self-interest. | Read |
| NOTE-1313 | Mental Hoop Diaries: Emotional Memories of a College Basketball Game in Rival Fans | Twenty-three male fans, 12 of Duke and 11 of UNC, watched an archived 2001 Duke–UNC game three times in the week before scanning. Under fMRI they saw 64 clips, each ending as a shot was released, and recalled whether it went in (74% correct). The same shot was good for one side and bad for the other, so allegiance alone set its valence; fans’ ratings matched their side 88.9% of the time. Good shots for one’s own team were recalled more accurately and confidently and rated more intense. Intensity, not valence, modulated amygdala, hippocampus, striatum and cortical midline regions. Positive shots added dorsal fronto-parietal and sensorimotor activity. The two fan groups did not differ in accuracy or rated intensity. | Read |
| NOTE-1315 | Social identity theory | A textbook chapter. Social identity is the part of the self-concept that comes from group membership “together with the value or emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978). Categorization is always self-relevant, and the motive for a positive social identity drives comparison with out-groups; that identity serves needs for certainty, self-esteem and meaning. Low-status members choose individual mobility, collective action or social creativity by permeability, legitimacy and stability. Identification has cognitive, affective and behavioural components. At work, identification is said to matter more than “selfish concerns” of interdependence. An imagined common in-group raised children’s helping of an immigrant classmate. | Read |
| NOTE-1319 | A comparison of minimal group induction procedures | Two experiments (N = 42, 73) with US undergraduates compare four minimal-group inductions: false feedback on painting preference (the classic), imagined assignment, random assignment, and memorizing five names of one group with no categorization. All four gave comparable explicit in-group liking, identification and bonus-money favouritism. Only memorization gave large IAT effects of in-group preference and self-association (d up to 2.16 against the classic); the classic gave none. Implicit and explicit measures correlated weakly. Allocation favouritism tracked explicit identification (r = .37) and was carried mostly by one colour group. | Read |
| NOTE-1322 | Many Labs 4: Failure to Replicate Mortality Salience Effect With and Without Original Author Involvement | Twenty-one labs at 18 US universities replicated Study 1 of Greenberg et al. (1994), in which writing about one’s own death raised preference for a pro-US over an anti-US essay author (d = 1.34, N = 59). Half the labs used a protocol designed with the original authors, half built their own from the paper. With 17 labs and 1,550 usable participants, the pooled effect was Hedges’ g = 0.07 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.17), with no heterogeneity across labs and no difference between protocols, under each of three preregistered exclusion rules. The expert-advised labs alone reached g = 0.08 to 0.19, none significant. The question of whether expertise aids replication went untested, because there was no effect for it to aid. | Read |
| NOTE-1408 | Pettigrew — Intergroup contact theory | Pettigrew reformulates Allport’s contact hypothesis as a longitudinal theory. Contact works through four processes (learning about the outgroup, changed behavior, affective ties, ingroup reappraisal, the last yielding “deprovincialization”). Its effects generalize through a sequence of decategorization, salient categorization and recategorization. A fifth essential condition, friendship potential, joins Allport’s four; other proposed conditions are facilitating. Selection bias is real, but in European survey data the path from outgroup friendship to less prejudice is stronger than the reverse. | Read |
| NOTE-1418 | Scacco and Warren — Can social contact reduce prejudice and discrimination? | A randomized field experiment with 849 young Christian and Muslim men in Kaduna: sixteen weeks of cooperative computer training in mixed or single-religion classes left stated prejudice and its supposed mediators unchanged, while mixed classes discriminated less than single-religion classes in dictator and destruction games. The control arm shows the contrast is mostly in-group bonding raising discrimination in single-religion classes; the effect toward unfamiliar out-group members holds for Christians only. | Read |
| NOTE-1419 v2 | Lemmer and Wagner — Can we really reduce ethnic prejudice outside the lab? | Contact programmes run outside the laboratory improve self-reported ethnic attitudes by about a quarter of a standard deviation in controlled designs, and the effect is still there one to twelve months later in the few studies that looked. Indirect programmes do as well as direct ones between studies; within them, stories of cross-group friendship give the largest subtype estimate (0.42, k = 8) and online interaction none in the stronger designs. No included study measured behaviour. | Read |
| NOTE-1537 | Van Lange and Bergmann — Human cooperation is strong among individuals but fragile between groups | A Perspective, not a systematic review. Cooperation is strong between individuals, above all in dyads, through precise reciprocity, empathy and a partner who cannot be excluded at no cost. It is fragile between groups. Categorization alone yields schema-based mistrust and in-group favouritism by bounded reciprocity, and seeing the out-group favour itself hardens that into distrust. Only negative interdependence and perceived threat turn it into costly competition, aggression and hate. The same processes that build in-group cooperation can fuel intergroup conflict. The remedy proposed is cooperative cross-group dyads, untested. | Read |