Contribution
A five-page review of intergroup emotions theory and the work it has generated. It states the theory’s core in a paragraph, lists four established facts, surveys consequences for out-groups and the in-group, and points to emotion regulation as the new direction.
Key insight
Appraisal theory said an emotion needs an object appraised as “affecting me personally as an individual” (Arnold 1960, quoted p. 3). Intergroup emotions theory replaces “me” with the group, by way of the self: “when people identify with a group, the group identity becomes an aspect of the self through self-categorization. Like any aspect of the self, the group then becomes imbued with affective significance” (p. 3). The group’s fortunes are then appraised as one’s own, and emotions follow.
Assumptions
- The social identity perspective (p. 3): self-categorization makes a group membership part of the self.
- Appraisal theory of emotion: an emotion follows from appraising an event’s implications, and the group can stand where the individual did.
- Self-categorization and identification are distinct. Categorization “sets the stage”; identification (“the importance and centrality of a group membership to the individual”) moderates (p. 4).
Key results
- Definition (p. 3): a group-based emotion is “experienced by individuals on behalf of a group to which they belong and with which they identify” (Niedenthal and Brauer 2012).
- Four facts (pp. 3–4).
- Emotions follow the salient membership: more pride and less disgust thinking of oneself as a student of an admired university than as a citizen of a disliked country.
- Members tend to share a profile, which acts as a norm they converge on; but sharing is not part of the definition.
- Appraisals are group-level: people feel guilt for in-group misdeeds they did not commit (Doosje et al. 1998).
- Identification moderates. The highly identified converge more on group norms, but may reappraise to avoid guilt, disappointment or fear about their group.
- Toward out-groups (pp. 5–6).
- Group-based emotions predict collective action better than cognitive perceptions do.
- Anger is the most studied and predicts aggression; contempt predicts it as strongly, and more often extreme, violent action, where anger predicts protest and exclusionary policy.
- Positive emotions matter: a composite of positive emotions mediated contact’s effect on prejudice more than negative ones (Miller et al. 2004); admiration and respect mediated it more than anger in a US representative sample (Seger et al., unpublished).
- Group-based emotions mediated apology’s effect on forgiveness.
- Toward the in-group (pp. 6–8).
- Members feel anger, fear or guilt when they disagree with the group’s action, and these dissipate when the group acts as they wished.
- The highly identified appraise in-group aggression as more justified and feel less guilt (Maitner et al. 2007).
- Identification is multidimensional (Leach et al. 2008; Roccas et al. 2008). Centrality should encourage group appraisals of all kinds; superiority or idealization should encourage positive in-group emotions and avoidance of negative ones.
- Ties may be to the group as a whole or to its members (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Prentice et al. 1994), with possibly different emotions and actions; untested.
- Regulation (pp. 8–10).
- Emotion-regulation interventions reduced support for punitive policies in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Halperin et al.).
- Ideal levels of group anger shaped later experienced anger and policy support (Porat et al.).
- Told that other in-group members felt little guilt for an in-group misdeed, participants felt more (Goldenberg et al. 2014).
- Misattribution reduced group anger; manipulated norms moved members’ emotions toward them.
Claims
| id | claim | strength | support |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | Self-categorization makes a group part of the self, so events are appraised for the group and emotions are felt on its behalf | moderate as the field’s consensus; asserted here, evidence cited not shown | pp. 3–4 |
| C2 | Which group-based emotion is felt depends on which membership is salient | moderate: several cited experiments | p. 3, refs 12–14 |
| C3 | Identification moderates group-based emotion, and high identification can lower negative ones by motivated reappraisal | moderate: cited studies, direction depends on the emotion | pp. 4, 7 |
| C4 | Contempt, more than anger, predicts extreme intergroup violence | weak to moderate: two cited studies | pp. 5–6 |
| C5 | Group-based emotions can be regulated, and regulating them can change conflict attitudes | weak to moderate: a few recent studies | pp. 8–10 |
Concepts
- group-based (group-level) emotion: an emotion felt on behalf of a group one belongs to and identifies with.
- group-based appraisal: appraising an event for its implications for the group rather than for oneself.
- identification: the importance and centrality of a membership, distinct from being self-categorized in it.
- emotional self-stereotyping: converging on the group’s typical emotion profile as a norm.
- ties to the group versus ties to members: a bond with the group’s symbolic meaning, or through relationships with members.
Connections
- Smith 1993 (LIT-1722), unread. Cited as reference 3 for the founding idea: group-based appraisal producing anxiety, anger or hope for the group, and differentiated reactions to out-groups.
- Self-categorization theory (THEORY-1114). The theory’s mechanism; salience shifts the emotion with the membership.
- Collective emotion (THEORY-126). Von Scheve and Ismer make convergence the definition. Smith and Mackie make it a frequent consequence: “this sharing is not part of the definition” (p. 4).
- Leach et al. 2008 (read in this batch, NOTE-1285) is cited for multidimensional identification; Brewer and Gardner 1996 (LIT-1757) and Ashmore et al. 2004 (LIT-1795) stand behind the group-versus-members and component distinctions.
- The group entity versus a category (TERM-096). The contrast between ties to the group as a whole and ties to its members is near it, though Smith and Mackie draw it within one group.
Bearing on the record
- The owner’s thesis (CLAIM-491). These are inferences; the
paper does not discuss selflessness.
- The theory’s core is the thesis’s mechanism stated for emotion. The group is “an aspect of the self”, and so its fortunes are appraised as one’s own. Group guilt for misdeeds one did not commit is the clearest case: a self-directed emotion follows the group, not the individual.
- It separates two things the thesis runs together. Self-categorization fixes whose fortunes are appraised; identification, how much they matter. Both are needed for the emotion. The thesis’s “larger self” is the first; caring about it is the second.
- The triviality objection (CLAIM-492). The paper offers the separation the objection asks for: salient self-categorization as the self’s extent, identification as caring, with distinct effects. The salience result is the useful one: the same person feels different emotions as the frame changes, with no change in what they care about. But the highly identified reappraise to avoid negative group emotions, so caring shapes the appraisal too, and the two are not independent.
- A dated note could be added to CLAIM-492 (or to CLAIM-491). Proposed text: “Intergroup emotions theory, as Smith and Mackie (NOTE-1285) restate it, keeps self-categorization and identification apart: categorization makes the group ‘an aspect of the self’ and sets which events are appraised for it; identification, the membership’s importance, moderates how strongly. Emotions shift with the salient category, which is a criterion of the self’s extent that moves without a change in caring. But the highly identified reappraise group misdeeds to avoid guilt, so caring also feeds back into the appraisal.”
- No THEORY filed. Intergroup emotions theory could be one, but the primary studies (Smith, Seger and Mackie 2007 on four criteria) are not held.
- No ML instruction.
Limitations
- A short review with no data. The evidence is cited, not shown.
- Not the 1993 chapter. What Smith argued there, including his case against prejudice as attitude, is not restated.
- Manuscript, not the published text; pagination is the manuscript’s.
- Typos.
- Reference 35 gives the European Journal of Social Psychology 2006 volume as 42; Leach et al. 2008 cite the same paper as volume 36.
- Reference 28’s DOI is truncated (“0058-”).
- Reference 13 has no pages; references 29 and 43 are “in press”.
- Reference 34: “Pederson” for Pedersen.
Open questions
- Is a group-based emotion felt when a membership is salient but the person does not identify with it? The four facts imply yes, weakly; a study holding salience fixed and varying identification would show how far the two come apart.
- Do people feel group-based emotions for a close-relationship “we” in the same way, or only for categories?