Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Emotion and affect — emotions, feelings and affect — what they are, their bodily and neural basis (including the homeostatic and interoceptive states feelings are said to report), their role in decision, memory and behaviour, and whether they ground consciousness (group: philosophy; ADR-014).
104 of 2004 LIT documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| LIT-379 v2 | Anger makes fake news viral online | Chuai & Zhao (2020), arXiv:2004.10399. On Weibo 2011–2016, lexicon-scored fake news carries more anger and less joy than true news, and in observational regressions with content, author and topic controls a post’s anger share goes with more retweets and its joy share with fewer (moving 0.1 from joy to anger: about 5.8 retweets across all news, 5.4 within fake news). A survey ties two anger-dominated posts to stronger anxiety-management and information-sharing motives. The paper’s causal reading is not established by its design. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-852) in full; worth reading as a large Weibo study, with English checks, finding that fake news carries more anger and less joy than true news and that a post’s share of anger words goes with more retweets under controls. Read it knowing that its causal language rests on observational regressions with R² of 0.08–0.13, that its fake set is selected for having spread, that its headline 5.8 retweets comes from the all-news model, and that its survey result rests on two anger-dominated posts. The account filed from it is THEORY-329. |
| LIT-383 | Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy | Bechara, H. Damasio, Tranel & A. R. Damasio (1997), DOI-10.1126/science.275.5304.1293. In the four-deck gambling task, 10 controls and 6 ventromedial prefrontal patients were tracked on choices, anticipatory skin-conductance responses and verbal reports. All controls and no patients developed anticipatory responses; controls came to prefer the good decks, significantly from the point they reported a hunch; three patients who could state the correct strategy kept choosing the bad decks. The authors conclude that nonconscious biases guide behaviour before conscious knowledge does. The statistics support the group difference more firmly than the “before knowing” timing. | Active — read in full 2026-10-01 (NOTE-331); worth reading as the experiment the somatic marker hypothesis is usually cited for, and worth reading with its notes, which are weaker than its abstract. With 10 controls and 6 ventromedial patients, the robust results are that every control and no patient developed anticipatory skin-conductance responses, and that three patients who could state the right strategy still chose badly. The headline that controls chose well and responded to risky decks “before they knew” is only partly carried by the statistics: in the pre-hunch period the controls’ preference for the good decks was not significant (note 9), and the reported SCR effect there is a group-by-period interaction, not a bad-versus-good-deck difference (note 8). Controls chose the good decks significantly only once they reported a hunch. Whether the account is true is not this note’s question. |
| LIT-384 | The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex | Damasio (1996), DOI-10.1098/rstb.1996.0125. States the somatic marker hypothesis: ventromedial prefrontal cortex holds learned links between classes of situation and the body states (emotions) that went with them; when a situation recurs, those states are re-enacted, through the body or through an “as if” loop in somatosensory cortex, and mark imagined option-outcome pairs as good or bad, overtly as a feeling or covertly as a bias, so that reasoning works over a pruned space. Evidence summarised: ventromedial patients with intact intellect decide badly in life, lack skin-conductance responses to emotive pictures, and in the gambling task keep choosing the losing decks and show no anticipatory responses. | Active — read in full 2026-10-01 (NOTE-332); worth reading as the shortest statement of the somatic marker hypothesis by its author, with the evidence it then rested on. It is a hypothesis paper: the mechanism (ventromedial prefrontal linkages that re-enact body states, by a “body loop” or an “as if body loop”, which then mark options good or bad) is stated, not shown, and the evidence it reports is lesion and skin-conductance work summarised from other papers, without numbers. Its strongest piece, that ventromedial patients lack anticipatory skin-conductance responses in the gambling task while responding normally to the losses themselves, is reported here in one paragraph; the 1997 Science report filed alongside it is the place to see that result. Whether the account is true is not this note’s question. |
| LIT-386 v2 | Homeostasis and soft robotics in the design of feeling machines | Man & Damasio (2019), Nature Machine Intelligence 1:446–452. A perspective proposing machines organized around homeostasis: a body that must be kept within viable states gives the machine a goal of its own, and something like feeling as a source of motivation and of evaluation. Soft robotics and multisensory abstraction are named as the means. The claimed payoffs are equivalents of feeling, better function across environments, and a platform for studying consciousness. Unread: placed from the abstract. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-01 at the owner’s request; no full text could be reached, so it is placed from the abstract and figure captions only and no NOTE is filed. Nature’s page is paywalled, there is no arXiv version, Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy, and the ResearchGate, Scribd and ProQuest copies did not serve the text. By its abstract it is a design proposal for machines built around homeostasis, not a reported system or result. Flagged anthology-candidate because the anthology’s agents-and-environments topic could hold it; a reading should settle whether it carries an instruction for ML practice. |
| LIT-387 v3 | Feelings Are the Source of Consciousness | Damasio & Damasio (2023), Neural Computation 35(3):277–286. A “view” piece. Consciousness is the spontaneous identification of mind contents as belonging to an organism, and a continuous flow of homeostatic feelings provides it. Those feelings were the first phenomena of consciousness in evolution. They arise from a two-way interaction between the interoceptive nervous system and the viscera and their chemistry, so they are hybrid, at once neural and bodily, which the authors offer as a solution to the mind-body problem. Unread: placed from the abstract. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-01 at the owner’s request; the full text exists as a free (bronze) PDF on MIT Press, but the site refused every automated request with a bot challenge (HTTP 403), and no repository, PubMed Central or preprint copy exists, so it is placed from the abstract only and no NOTE is filed. It is not the “Damasio & Damasio 2023” that NOTE-120 reports as a critic of plant sentience: that is a different work, an Animal Sentience commentary. Free copy: doi:10.1162/neco_a_01521 (MIT Press’s free bronze PDF). |
| LIT-388 | The nature of feelings: evolutionary and neurobiological origins | Damasio & Carvalho (2013), Nature Reviews Neuroscience 14:143–152. Feelings are mental experiences of body states, and they report homeostatic value: a valenced read-out of interoceptive maps that lets an organism learn and anticipate what restores or threatens its physiology. The first integrated whole-body maps are in the upper brainstem (parabrachial nucleus, periaqueductal grey, deep superior colliculus); the insula refines feeling but is not needed for it, since a patient with both insulae destroyed still feels pain, pleasure, hunger and compassion. The authors propose, without evidence of their own, that feeling starts in unmyelinated interoceptive fibres open to ions and ligands along their length. | Active — read in full 2026-10-01 (NOTE-330); worth reading as the shortest statement of Damasio’s account of feeling as the felt read-out of homeostatic body maps, with its two empirical planks: patients whose insulae are destroyed still feel, and the upper brainstem is where whole-body interoceptive maps first assemble. It is an Opinion piece with no new data. The systems-level case rests on lesion and stimulation evidence it cites; the cellular proposal (unmyelinated interoceptive fibres and ephaptic coupling as the root of sentience) is offered as a hypothesis and stays one. |
| LIT-408 | Jokes and the Logic of the Cognitive Unconscious | Minsky (1980), MIT AI Memo 603; in Vaina & Hintikka (eds.), Cognitive Constraints on Communication (Reidel, 1984), pp. 175–200. Commonsense logic cannot be made reliable, so each mind accumulates “censors” that learn the precursors of known-bad thought (paradox, circling, false analogy) and suppress it before it occurs. On that view, humour is censor-learning. Its common element is an “unexpected frame-substitution”, and laughter both stops the absurd line of thought and holds it in focus. Logical nonsense is then as “naughty” as Freud’s forbidden wishes, which removes the gap in Freud’s theory. An essay with no data or program. | Active — read in full 2026-10-01 from the MIT AI Memo 603 text (NOTE-361), not the 1984 book chapter, which was not reachable; worth reading as the society-of-mind programme’s account of humour and of “negative meta-knowledge”. Its argument is that commonsense reasoning cannot be made reliable, so minds learn “censors” that suppress known-bad lines of thought, and that humour and laughter are how those censors are taught and engaged, which dissolves Freud’s puzzle about nonsense jokes. It is an essay: no data, no program, and its evolutionary story is offered as “no plea for this particular scenario”. |
| LIT-429 v2 | The Society of Mind | Minsky (1986), Simon & Schuster. The book-length statement of the Society of Mind programme, begun with Seymour Papert in the early 1970s. A mind is a society of many small agents, each mindless by itself, and intelligence comes from their diversity and organisation, not from one principle. The publisher presents it as a puzzle of self-contained one-page pieces that assemble into a theory. Unread: no lawful full text was reachable, so it is registered from the publisher’s description and the contents list. | Unavailable — seeded 2026-10-01 from the publisher’s description, the Library of Congress catalogue record and the Google Books contents list, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. The Internet Archive copies are lending-only, HathiTrust is search-only, and Minsky’s web page did not post the book. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. Its programme is read here at second hand through Singh’s exposition (LIT-444) and at first hand through the draft of its sequel (LIT-432). |
| LIT-432 | The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind | Minsky (2006), Simon & Schuster, read in the author’s 2005 draft. Emotions are Ways to Think, not a separate faculty. Each emotional state turns some mental resources on and others off, by Selectors that Critics trigger when they recognise a type of problem. The same machinery serves ordinary thinking. The book adds six levels of mental activity, from instinctive reaction to self-conscious reflection. It treats “consciousness”, “emotion” and “pain” as suitcase words for many processes, and the Self as a network of partial self-models. It is a design argued from examples. Against Damasio, it treats the body as one more resource the brain uses, not the stuff of emotion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-01 in the author’s posted draft of 2005 (NOTE-348), not in the published book; worth reading as the late, fullest statement of the Society of Mind programme. It is the one where emotion is put inside thinking: an emotional state is a selection of mental resources switched on and off, made by Selectors that Critics trigger, and so it is a Way to Think. Read it as a design proposal argued by examples, not as evidence. It reports no experiment, Minsky labels several of its central ideas his own conjectures, and it sets the body to the side of emotion, against the bodily account of Damasio (LIT-384, LIT-388) that this record holds. |
| LIT-462 | The Self and the Future | Williams (1970), DOI-10.2307/2183946. One experiment, told twice. A and B enter a machine that exchanges their memories and characters, and choose selfishly which emerging person gets $100,000 and which torture: the outcomes make “changing bodies” the natural description. Told as a series of things that will happen to me (amnesia, changed character, another’s “memories”, then torture), fear stays rational at every step, and the step that completes the swap changes only what happens to someone else. Undecidability and convention make the clash worse, not better. If forced to choose selfishly, pass the pain to the other body, and call it a “risk”. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-387), in a JSTOR copy of the published article posted on a University of Vermont course page; worth reading as the strongest case that first-person concern tracks the body, and the paper that made the reduplication-free body swap a problem for the psychological view. It tells one body-exchange experiment twice. Told third-personally, with choices before and reactions after, it says A and B swap bodies. Told first-personally, as a series of things that will happen to me before I am tortured, it says I am the one tortured. It argues that neither indeterminacy nor convention can resolve the clash, and ends with a “rather shaky” preference for the bodily answer, as a “risk”. An argument from what fear is rational, not a theory. |
| LIT-494 v3 | The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm | Schein & Gray (2018), DOI-10.1177/1088868317698288. By its abstract: harm is an intuitively perceived continuum, not an objective matter, and acts are condemned in proportion to norm violation, negative affect and perceived harm, where harm is dyadic (an intentional agent damaging a vulnerable patient). Harm leads to condemnation and condemnation to perceived harm (the “dyadic loop”). The theory argues against intuitively harmless wrongs and modular foundations. Unread: the argument and evidence are not known here. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-02 from the PubMed abstract and Crossref record, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The SAGE PDF, listed as free to read, sits behind a bot challenge (HTTP 403); the PubMed record has no PMC copy; a University of North Carolina repository file returned by a search for the paper (cdr.lib.unc.edu/downloads/w9505f334) reset every connection, so what it holds is unknown; Semantic Scholar points only to the SAGE PDF, and CORE, OpenAlex and the Wayback Machine had no copy. It is the main harm-based rival to morality-as-cooperation, and what it argues is known here only from its abstract and from how other readings in this batch describe it. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied. Free copy: doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 (SAGE’s PDF, listed as free to read). |
| LIT-499 | Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism | Graham et al. (2013), DOI-10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4. Moral Foundations Theory in full: a nativist, cultural-developmental, intuitionist and pluralist account with five foundations (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity), each tied to an adaptive challenge and an existing evolutionary model. A decade of MFQ work finds liberals rely on Care and Fairness, conservatives on all five, across 12 world regions. Five criteria for “foundationhood” are proposed, and Liberty, Efficiency, Ownership and Honesty are named candidates. Harm monism (Gray) and fairness monism (Baumard) are rejected as Procrustean. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-396); worth reading as the full statement of Moral Foundations Theory and as the text to check morality-as-cooperation’s comparison against. It states the theory’s four claims (nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism, pluralism), reviews a decade of MFQ findings, mostly on political ideology, and offers five criteria for what counts as a foundation. By its own table the Care foundation rests on kin selection and Fairness on Trivers’ reciprocal altruism, and Ownership/theft is already a named candidate, so the claim that MFT omits kin altruism, reciprocal altruism and property does not survive this text. Sanctity, the foundation morality-as-cooperation excludes, is by the same table the one with the least evidence of innate preparedness. |
| LIT-502 | Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues | Haidt & Joseph (2004), DOI-10.1162/0011526042365555. Proposes that people are innately prepared to feel flashes of approval or disapproval at four patterns: suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity and purity, with ingroup the best candidate for a fifth (fn. 15). Each is a module with a proper domain it evolved for (one’s own child in distress; cheating in joint ventures; disease and waste) and a culturally widened actual domain. Cultures build virtues on these intuitions and differ in which they use. The four were chosen by counting which concerns appeared in five surveyed works; the essay reports no data. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-400); worth reading as the founding statement of Moral Foundations Theory, and as the text morality-as-cooperation quotes when it calls purity non-cooperative. It proposes four innately prepared intuition “modules” (suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity), with ingroup as a likely fifth in a footnote, and argues that cultures build virtues on them. The list comes from tallying five books, not from data, and no study is reported. It already grounds the suffering module in care for one’s own children and the reciprocity module in Trivers, so the later charge that the foundations omit kin and reciprocal altruism does not fit this text. |
| LIT-510 | The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism | Trivers (1971), DOI-10.1086/406755. Altruism between non-relatives can be selected if acts cost the giver less than they benefit the recipient, the same partners meet repeatedly and symmetrically, and altruists stop helping those who fail to reciprocate. Cleaner-fish hosts fit; bird alarm calls are explained instead by self-interest. In humans, friendship, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, guilt, suspicion and their sham versions are proposed as adaptations that regulate exchange, and rules of conduct as a multiparty extension. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-402); worth reading as the source of reciprocal altruism and, for this record above all, of the first adaptive account of moral emotions: moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, guilt and the detection of sham versions of each, with “norms of reciprocal conduct” as a later step. The formal part is slight (a verbal model and Hamilton’s communicated Prisoner’s Dilemma sketch); the human psychology is hypothesis supported by the social-psychology literature of the 1960s. It grounds the exchange domain of morality-as-cooperation and gives that domain its emotions. |
| LIT-511 | The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment | Haidt (2001), DOI-10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814. Moral judgment is usually caused by fast affective intuitions; moral reasoning mostly comes after, to justify the judgment to others, and changes minds chiefly by triggering new intuitions in listeners. Four reasons are offered: two processing systems, motivated reasoning, post-hoc confabulation, and the weak link between moral reasoning and moral action. Intuitions are partly innate and are tuned by culture through custom complexes and peers in late childhood. Harmless taboo violations are condemned anyway, and people are “dumbfounded” when their reasons run out. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-403), from the author’s final manuscript; worth reading as the standard statement of the social intuitionist model, the proximate account of moral judgment that morality-as-cooperation lacks, and as the source of the “harmless wrongs” (consensual incest, sex with a dead chicken) on which the purity and sex objections to cooperative theories rest. Most of its evidence comes from outside the moral domain, which the author says himself: the model is offered as “a plausible alternative”, not an established fact. |
| LIT-514 v3 | Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame | Boehm (2012), Basic Books. By the publisher’s account, the moral sense is “a sophisticated defense mechanism”: group punishment of bullies, thieves, free riders and psychopaths over six million years made social selection favour altruists and bred conscience, virtue and shame. The chapter list adds a “selection-by-reputation hypothesis” and its test. Unread: filed from the description and chapter list. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and the chapter list, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The book is lending-only at the Internet Archive (item moraloriginsevol0000boeh) and sold by Basic Books. What it argues is known here only from the publisher’s description, labelled as such. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-538 | How effective psychological treatments work: mechanisms of change in cognitive behavioural therapy and beyond | Salkovskis, Sighvatsson & Sigurdsson, Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 51(6):595–615, in the special issue “Disseminating CBT: 50 years and beyond” (issue dated November 2023, first published online 5 January 2024). A history of behaviour therapy and CBT as empirically grounded treatment development, an argument that common factors are not mechanisms of change, and a proposal: the mechanism of all effective therapies is a shift from a stuck, threat-laden meaning (“Theory A”) to a collaboratively built and tested alternative (“Theory B”), which the authors call a type of psychological flexibility. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-428), from the open-access (CC BY 4.0) publisher PDF; worth reading as a senior Beckian’s statement of a single mechanism of change for all effective psychological therapy, and for its clear separation of “common factors” from “mechanisms of change”. Its thesis is a proposal argued from the history of CBT and clinical examples, not a tested result: people are “stuck” in an exaggerated negative or threatening meaning (Theory A) kept alive by what it makes them do, and any effective therapy works by helping them build and test a less threatening alternative (Theory B). The paper calls this a particular type of psychological flexibility, without citing the ACT literature that uses that name. |
| LIT-540 | Impulsive action: emotional impulses and their control | Frijda, Ridderinkhof & Rietveld (2014), Frontiers in Psychology 5:518. Impulsive action is non-deliberate but purposive. Automatic appraisal of an event’s pertinence to the agent’s concerns elicits a state of action readiness, a motive to establish, modify or end a relation to the object, with “control precedence” (urgency, persistence, attentional capture). Modes of action readiness are what distinguish one emotion from another. Events usually draw several appraisals and so several states of readiness, and their interaction regulates action: much emotion regulation is itself emotional, not reason overriding passion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-433); filed in place of Frijda’s The Emotions (LIT-546), which could not be read, as the shortest lawfully readable statement of his action-readiness theory in his own words. Appraisal of an event’s pertinence to one’s concerns elicits a state of action readiness, a motive to change one’s relation to the object, which has “control precedence”. Modes of action readiness correspond to emotions (hostility to anger, avoidance to fear). Much emotion regulation is itself one state of action readiness checking another, so “there is no clear distinction between processes of emotion and processes of emotion regulation”. It is a theoretical paper with no data, written for impulsive action, so it states the theory’s core and not its full range. |
| LIT-542 | The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization | Barrett (2017), SCAN 12(1):1–23. The brain runs an internal model of the body in the world for allostasis. Its predictions are “concepts” issued from agranular limbic cortex and refined by prediction error. Interoceptive predictions are felt as affect (valence, arousal). An emotion is an instance of categorizing sensation with an emotion concept, built the same way as any perception. Since instances of an emotion are “created by multiple spatiotemporal patterns” (degeneracy), the categories have no neural essences, and the classical view, basic-emotion and causal appraisal theories included, is rejected. Emotions are “constructions of the world, not reactions to it.” | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-434); worth reading as the shortest complete statement of the theory of constructed emotion and of its link to predictive processing. The brain’s core task is allostasis, run through an internal model whose predictions are “concepts”. An instance of emotion is what happens when the brain categorizes predicted interoceptive and exteroceptive sensation with an emotion concept. On this account emotion categories have no neural “essences”, and causal appraisal theories are “highly doubtful”. The paper is a theoretical synthesis: its own data are a few figures, and the rest is cited evidence and explicitly labelled hypotheses. |
| LIT-545 v3 | Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change | Bandura (1977), Psychological Review 84(2):191–215. The founding paper of self-efficacy theory: psychological treatments, whatever their form, are proposed to work by changing a person’s expectation that they can perform the needed behaviour. Unread: registered from bibliographic metadata, with no lawful abstract reachable. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref and PubMed, not read. The article is closed access at APA. Unpaywall and OpenAlex call it “green” open access, but their one location is a DOAJ record of an unrelated 2020 Jurnal Psikologi article on thalassemia screening that carries Bandura’s DOI by mistake. The copy Stanford hosted with Bandura’s papers (web.stanford.edu/dept/psychology/bandura/pajares/Bandura1977PR.pdf) now returns 403 Forbidden. Its archived snapshots are on the Wayback Machine, which this environment’s egress policy blocks, and the University of Kentucky mirror of the same collection now redirects away. A PDF of the published article is posted by the Sustainable Sanitation Alliance’s library (susana.org), a third party, so it was not read (only its first page was opened, to identify what it was). A human reader with APA access, or one who can open the archived Stanford copy, could promote this. |
| LIT-546 v2 | The Emotions | Frijda (1986), The Emotions, Cambridge University Press, Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction (ISBN 0-521-30155-6 hardback, 0-521-31600-6 paperback), 544 pp. The canonical statement of Frijda’s appraisal and action-readiness theory: emotions are changes in action readiness elicited by appraisal of events as relevant to the individual’s concerns, with control precedence over other activity. Unread here; what is said of it comes from the works that cite it. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from bibliographic records, not read. No lawful open copy of the book (544 pages) was found: it has no Crossref DOI, and Open Library lists no open or lendable scan. Under the owner’s book rule its reading is replaced by Frijda, Ridderinkhof and Rietveld (2014), LIT-540, read in full, which states the book’s central constructs, action readiness, concern and control precedence, in Frijda’s words. The closer substitute, Frijda (1988) “The laws of emotion” (American Psychologist 43(5):349–358, DOI 10.1037/0003-066X.43.5.349), was not lawfully reachable from here. A human with library access could read it, or the book, and either would let this entry say more. On 2026-10-14 a lawful full text of the book was sought again and none was reached. OpenAlex: no DOI to look up, and its title search refused the request (the shared daily budget was exhausted). Unpaywall: no DOI to query. Crossref: still no record for the book. Cambridge University Press’s product page returned HTTP 403; the book is not on Cambridge Core as an open title. UvA-DARE, Frijda’s university repository, holds a metadata record for it with no file attached. PhilPapers returned HTTP 403. Europe PMC: no hit. Internet Archive: no copy of The Emotions; the only Frijda book there, The Laws of Emotion (2007), is a borrow-only lending scan. A web search found only catalogue and bookseller listings. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-550 v2 | Emotion and Adaptation | Lazarus (1991), Emotion and Adaptation, Oxford University Press, New York (ISBN 0-19-506994-3). The book-length statement of Lazarus’s cognitive-motivational-relational appraisal theory; its chapter titles frame emotion through the person–environment relationship, motivation, coping and goal congruence. Eleven chapters run from definition and measurement through motivation and coping, cognition, causality, negative, positive and problematic emotions, development, social influence and health, to research, assessment, treatment and prevention. Unread. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref’s chapter records, not read, and no substitute was read either. The book (Oxford University Press, about 560 pages) is closed at the publisher. The shorter work by the same author that states the same theory, Lazarus (1991), “Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion” (American Psychologist 46(8):819–834, DOI 10.1037/0003-066X.46.8.819), has no lawful open copy. APA does not make it free, and Unpaywall and Semantic Scholar list none. The only full text the web search found is in a bulk upload of Lazarus’s journal articles to the Internet Archive by a private user, which is not a lawful source, so I did not open it. Other Lazarus emotion papers (American Psychologist 1991 46(4); Smith & Lazarus 1993; Psychological Inquiry 1995; Journal of Personality 2006) are also closed. His 1993 Annual Review of Psychology chapter is listed as free at the publisher, but annualreviews.org answered with a bot challenge. A human with library access could read the 1991 American Psychologist paper and file it as the read substitute. |
| LIT-551 v2 | Experiential Avoidance and Behavioral Disorders: A Functional Dimensional Approach to Diagnosis and Treatment | Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl (1996), Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 64(6):1152–1168. Syndromal diagnosis has not found functional pathological processes, and functional analysis has not produced a replicable classification. The paper proposes functional diagnostic dimensions instead, and offers experiential avoidance as one: many disorders are unhealthy efforts to escape and avoid emotions, thoughts, memories and other private experiences. Unread: registered from the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the PubMed abstract and Crossref, not read. The article is closed access at APA, and Unpaywall and OpenAlex list no open copy. Copies found online were all third-party postings: a clinician’s practice site (actmindfully.com.au), an Argentine ACT group’s site (grupoact.com.ar), and a CiteSeerX cache whose source could not be traced because CiteSeerX now redirects to the Wayback Machine, which this environment’s egress policy blocks. None is an author, institutional or publisher deposit, so none was used. The ACBS publication page (contextualscience.org) gives the citation and abstract but no file. A human reader with APA PsycArticles access, or the chapter of the same title in The Act in Context (Routledge, 2015, DOI 10.4324/9781315745138-20; Crossref lists it without authors, so that it is a reprint is an inference), could promote this. |
| LIT-553 | Psychological Flexibility as a Fundamental Aspect of Health | Kashdan & Rottenberg (2010), Clinical Psychology Review 30(7):865–878. Psychological health is not a ratio of positive to negative experience or a set of fixed strengths but flexibility: adapting regulation to the situation, balancing time perspectives and life domains, and acting on values while open to experience. Inflexibility marks depression (rumination, emotion context insensitivity) and anxiety (experiential avoidance), and cardiac vagal control is proposed as an integrating marker. Executive functioning, default states and personality underlie it, and dynamic measurement is needed. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-436), in the NIH author manuscript on PubMed Central; worth reading as the review that took “psychological flexibility” out of the ACT literature and made it a general construct of health. Flexibility is adapting to situational demands, reconfiguring mental resources, shifting perspective and balancing competing desires and life domains. Its absence (rumination, emotion context insensitivity, experiential avoidance, low cardiac vagal control) runs through depression and anxiety. Executive functioning, default mental states and personality are its “building blocks”. It is a narrative synthesis: no meta-analysis of its own, the causal direction between inflexibility and disorder is left open by its own account, and it asks for dynamic measures in place of the global self-reports the ACT line relies on. |
| LIT-554 | The Emerging Field of Emotion Regulation: An Integrative Review | Gross (1998), Review of General Psychology 2(3):271–299. Emotions are response tendencies (behavioural, experiential, physiological) called forth by evaluated situations and open to modulation. Emotion regulation is how people influence which emotions they have, when, and how they are experienced and expressed, and it is distinct from coping, mood regulation and defense. A process model places regulation at five points in emotion generation: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change (reappraisal), and response modulation (suppression). The first four are antecedent-focused, the last response-focused. Dysregulation is said to figure in over half of the DSM-IV Axis I disorders and all of Axis II. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-429); worth reading as the founding statement of the process model of emotion regulation, the five-family scheme (situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, response modulation) that later regulation research and many therapies are organised around. It defines emotion regulation as “the processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” (p. 275) and separates it from coping, mood regulation and defense. It is a conceptual review: no data of its own, and it says the scheme is “a set of working distinctions” (p. 282). |
| LIT-555 | Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Model, Processes and Outcomes | Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis (2006), Behaviour Research and Therapy 44(1):1–25. The ACT model: psychopathology is psychological inflexibility, produced when language (cognitive fusion) and experiential avoidance dominate direct contingencies, and ACT restores flexibility through six processes. A review of correlational, component, mediational and outcome studies finds the model “broadly supportive” but the literature immature, and the evidence suggests ACT works through different processes from traditional CBT. Read in an early author manuscript whose numbers differ from the published paper’s. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-431), but in an early manuscript, not the published text; worth reading as the canonical statement of the ACT model of psychopathology, “psychological inflexibility”, and of the six processes ACT targets. Cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance (from LIT-551) narrow behaviour, and acceptance, defusion, present-moment contact, self as context, values and committed action restore flexibility. The copy read is an author manuscript in Georgia State University’s repository that still carries “xx” placeholders, and its numbers differ from the published paper’s as Kashdan and Rottenberg report them (21 studies against 32; an AAQ correlation printed “.030” against “.42”). Use its model and argument, not its numbers. Its own verdict on the evidence is “broadly supportive” but “not mature”. |
| LIT-583 v2 | Breakdown of Will | Ainslie (2001), Cambridge University Press. The book-length statement of picoeconomics: hyperbolic discounting makes a person a population of bargaining interests, and will is the recursive bundling of choices into precedents. Unread: registered from the publisher’s description and the précis, LIT-586, which stands in for it. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the publisher’s description and from the outline of the book given in its précis, not read. Not open access: Unpaywall reports no open copy, and no author deposit of the book was found (the author’s site, picoeconomics.org, carries the précis and articles, not the book). The owner suggested the précis instead, and it is read and filed as LIT-586 (NOTE-443), which follows the book’s three sections and twelve chapters. The book is kept as the citation others reach for. A human with library access could read chapters 5-8 (the bargaining model and its evidence) against the précis. |
| LIT-584 | Model-based and model-free Pavlovian reward learning: Revaluation, revision, and revelation | Dayan & Berridge (2014), Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 14(2):473-492. Pavlovian prediction is not only model-free. A cue that had predicted disgusting salt became instantly “wanted” when a never-experienced salt appetite was induced, before the salt was retasted, which needs a prediction of the outcome’s identity revalued against the current bodily state. Over-training may “defocus” outcome representations rather than hand control to a model-free system. Dopamine may carry model-based evaluations. No algorithm for the revaluation is given. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-463), from the PubMed Central author manuscript. Worth reading as the argument that Pavlovian prediction, usually modelled as purely model-free, is also model-based. In the “Dead Sea salt” experiment a lever that had predicted a disgusting salt solution became, on first presentation after a novel sodium appetite was induced and before any salt was retasted, nearly as attractive as a sucrose lever, with mesolimbic activation. A cached value cannot do that. The CS must predict the outcome’s identity, and its value must be recomputed against the current bodily state. The paper adds “defocusing” of outcome representations as a model-based route to apparent habit, and argues that dopamine can carry model-based evaluations. |
| LIT-586 | Précis of Breakdown of Will | Ainslie (2005), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(5), the précis of Breakdown of Will (2001). People and other animals discount delayed rewards hyperbolically, so preferences reverse as a smaller, sooner reward comes near, and a person becomes a population of reward-seeking “interests” that must forestall one another. Willpower is the bundling of future choices by treating the present one as a precedent: an intertemporal repeated prisoner’s dilemma, not an organ or a top-down ego. The same recursion predicts the will’s costs: legalism, circumscribed “lapse districts”, motivated blindness to lapses, and rules that favour countable goals over subtle ones. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-443), as the substitute for the 2001 book (LIT-583), which the owner suggested and which the précis follows chapter by chapter. Worth reading as the shortest complete statement of picoeconomics in Ainslie’s own words. Hyperbolic discounting makes preference reverse as a smaller, sooner reward draws near, so a person behaves like a population of “interests” that bargain across time. Will is not a faculty above them but a recursive self-prediction: treating each choice as a precedent “bundles” future rewards, an intertemporal repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which “credibility is power”. The same mechanism predicts the will’s side effects: legalism, “lapse districts”, motivated misperception and compulsive over-control. |
| LIT-626 | Three types of phenomenal consciousness and their functional roles: unfolding the ALARM theory of consciousness | Newen & Montemayor (2025), Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 380:20240314. The ALARM theory: phenomenal consciousness has two levels of experience and three functions. Basic arousal, realisable without cortex, alarms the body when a homeostatic variable leaves its tolerance range, overriding slow regulation with no choice involved; it adds lasting care for the injury and one-shot, generalised avoidance learning. General alertness, cortical and attention-guided, enables flexible learning and decision-making. Reflexive self-consciousness is general alertness with metacognitive self-relational content, not a third kind of experience, and enables long-term planning that accounts for one’s own and others’ mindsets. IIT, higher-order theories and GNWT are faulted for tying consciousness to neocortex and leaving basic arousal out. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-489); worth reading as the shortest statement of the ALARM theory: phenomenal consciousness has two levels of experience, basic arousal (subcortical, an alarm that overrides slow homeostatic regulation) and general alertness (cortical, attention-guided, for flexible learning and choice), plus reflexive self-consciousness, which is general alertness with metacognitive self-relational content and its own function, long-term planning. Its evidence is a short list of cited findings (hydranencephaly, decorticate cats, central lateral thalamus stimulation in macaques), and the functional claims are argued, not tested. |
| LIT-628 | Homeostatic feelings and the biology of consciousness | Damasio & Damasio (2022), Brain 145(7):2231–2235, an Essay. Consciousness occurs when mind contents are spontaneously identified as belonging to their organism, and a continuous flow of homeostatic feelings (hunger, pain, well-being, plain feelings of existence) supplies that identification and “lends” consciousness to exteroceptive images. Feelings are hybrid: interoceptive pathways are unmyelinated, partly non-synaptic and unprotected by a blood–brain barrier, so the body and its neural map interact directly. Posterior brainstem lesions abolish consciousness where large cortical ones may not; consciousness needs “a partnership of nervous systems with the bodies they serve”. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-03 (NOTE-507): every section was covered, but through a fetch tool that returned section-by-section accounts with short quotes, not a verbatim copy, so the quotes are unchecked; worth reading as the shortest complete statement of the Damasios’ claim that consciousness is the spontaneous identification of mind contents as one’s own, supplied by a continuous flow of homeostatic feelings, which are hybrid: in interoception the map and the body it maps interact and “commingle”. It is a five-page Essay with no data. Its evidence is clinical and cited (brainstem coma versus cortical lesions, general anaesthesia), and its mechanism is the cellular contrast in Table 1: unmyelinated, non-synaptic, barrier-free interoceptive pathways. |
| LIT-696 v2 | Towards a Theory of Collective Emotions | von Scheve & Ismer (2013), Emotion Review 5(4):406–413. Collective emotion is synchronous convergence in affective responding towards an event or object. Three literatures (face-to-face contagion and effervescence, culture and shared knowledge, social identification) are recast as bottom-up mechanisms on three levels: social cognition (shared appraisals; collectively intentional appraisals), expressive behaviour (contagion, “facial dialects”) and symbolic practice (collective memory, group-based sentiments, norms, cultural sharing). Mutual awareness and group membership amplify convergence and can turn I-mode into We-mode collective emotion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-552); worth reading as a compact map of how collective emotion has been theorised across sociology, social psychology and philosophy, and as the source of a working definition: collective emotion is synchronous convergence in affective responding across individuals towards one event or object. Shared appraisal structures give the minimal case. Mutual awareness (contagion, sharing) and group membership (identity, collective intention, norms, collective memory, sentiments) amplify it and can turn “I-mode” into “We-mode” collective emotion. A conceptual synthesis with no data, built bottom-up by methodological choice. |
| LIT-697 v2 | The feeling of being a group: Corporate emotions and collective consciousness | Schmid (2014), in von Scheve & Salmela (eds.), Collective Emotions (OUP), pp. 3–16. Unread. By summaries of its abstract: against the view that groups cannot have emotions because they lack consciousness, it argues that a group with proper intentional attitudes has consciousness, as plural pre-reflective self-awareness, and so meets a precondition for emotion. Groups probably cannot have “fast” emotions but can have “slow” ones such as confidence, happiness or grief. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-04, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The chapter is paywalled at Oxford Academic, Unpaywall finds no open copy, and the University of Vienna’s research portal refused the request; the author’s preprint is posted only on ResearchGate and academia.edu, which this record does not use. What is said of it comes from summaries of its abstract returned by a search service, labelled unverified. A person could supply the chapter from the OUP volume or ask the author; a reading would move this to Active and should test whether its “corporate emotions” are corporate attitudes in List’s sense. |
| LIT-698 v2 | Collective Guilt | Isaacs (2011), ch. 3 of Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (OUP), pp. 71–94. Unread. By a summary of its abstract, it takes collective guilt to be blameworthy collective moral responsibility, a feature of collective agents that does not distribute to members; separates being guilty, believing oneself guilty and feeling guilty, and personal, membership and collective guilt; and, engaging Gilbert, concludes that collectives may be guilty without having guilt feelings. The review in NDPR confirms the non-distribution claim (pp. 81–83). | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-04, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The work the owner means is chapter 3, “Collective Guilt”, of Isaacs’s Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (OUP, 2011); no Monist paper of that title exists. The book is paywalled, and none of Isaacs’s shorter papers on collective responsibility (Midwest Studies 2014, New Criminal Law Review 2013) has an open copy. What is said here comes from Matt King’s review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (read in full) and from a search-service summary of the chapter abstract (unverified). A person with the book could supply the chapter; a reading would move this to Active. |
| LIT-699 v3 | Emotional Aperture and Strategic Change: The Accurate Recognition of Collective Emotions | Sanchez-Burks & Huy (2009), Organization Science 20(1):22–34. Introduces emotional aperture, the ability to recognise the composition of diverse emotions in a collective such as a group or business unit, and argues that a leader’s ability to respond to the patterns of shared emotion that arise in strategic change depends on it. Describes cultural, psychological and contextual enablers and impediments, and extends emotional competencies beyond the individual level. Unread: from the abstract. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-04 from bibliographic records and the publisher’s abstract, not read. No lawful full text was reachable. Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy. The 2006 working-paper version (Ross School of Business Paper No. 1047, “Emotional Aperture and Strategic Renewal”, SSRN 931492) is on SSRN, which returned 403 to this session, and a Deep Blue item the search found, “Emotional Aperture and Emotional Sequencing” (handle 2027.42/48737), sits behind a bot challenge, which I did not try to pass. ProQuest’s open preview carries the citation only. A human with library access, or anyone opening the SSRN working paper in a browser, could read it, and that reading would move this to Active. Free copy: ssrn.com/abstract=931492 (the 2006 working paper). |
| LIT-701 v3 | Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings | Gilbert (2002), The Journal of Ethics 6(2):115–143. Unread. As read sources report it: it distinguishes personal, membership and collective guilt feelings, and defines collective guilt feelings by joint commitment, so that for us collectively to feel guilt over our action is for us to be jointly committed to feel guilt as a body. A plural subject can thus be in a collective emotion, and since emotions are separable from feelings, such emotions need no phenomenology of their own. Reprinted in Gilbert’s Joint Commitment (2013), ch. 11. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-04, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. Springer and the OUP reprint are paywalled, Unpaywall finds no open copy, and the PhilArchive record (GILCGA) and SSRN abstract 1071254 both answered automated requests with a bot challenge or a block, which I did not try to get past. What the record says of it comes from Huebner’s read paper, which quotes it with page references, and is labelled second-hand. A person with PhilArchive or library access could supply the text; a reading would move this to Active and should test Huebner’s charge that a plural subject’s emotion reduces to individual commitments. Free copy: philarchive.org/rec/GILCGA (PhilArchive). |
| LIT-702 | Genuinely collective emotions | Huebner (2010), European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1(1):89–118. Against the received view that only individuals have emotions, it argues that some groups have the computational complexity and informational integration that emotion requires. Emotions are integrated, action- oriented representations built from subpersonal routines; a distributed system can integrate routines the same way. It answers the objection from consciousness (some individual emotions are non-conscious, so collective ones need not be felt) and from homology (emotion kinds are functional, “like vodka”, not “like bourbon”). A navy crew turns out to detect danger without fear; a failing election campaign is offered instead. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-553); worth reading as the distributed, computational case for collective emotion, and the clearest statement of what it would take. An emotion is an integrated representation with indicative content and imperative force, built from subpersonal routines; a group whose routines are integrated the same way can be in one, without feeling it. The test case fails on the author’s own terms (the USS Palau crew detects danger without fear) and the replacement (a 2008 presidential campaign) is offered as intuitively plausible pending anthropology, so the paper establishes a possibility and a research programme, not an instance. |
| LIT-703 v2 | Emotion in the Workplace: A Reappraisal | Ashforth & Humphrey (1995), Human Relations 48(2):97–125. Organisations treat emotion as the antithesis of rationality, and so regulate it through four institutionalised mechanisms: neutralizing, buffering, prescribing and normalizing emotion. Against this, emotionality and rationality are “interpenetrated”, emotion is an inseparable part of organisational life and often functional for the organisation, as shown for motivation, leadership and group dynamics. Unread: from the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-04 from bibliographic records and the publisher’s abstract, not read. No lawful full text was reachable. Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy. A web search found only ResearchGate (not used) and a 2014 Arizona State syllabus that lists the paper but does not carry it. SAGE does not make the article open. A human with library access could read it (29 pages) and move this to Active. |
| LIT-704 v2 | The laws of emotion | Frijda (1988), American Psychologist 43(5):349–358. Frijda’s short statement, in ten pages, that emotions obey laws, and the article the record names as the efficient way into his theory. Unread: no lawful copy was reachable. What the record says of it comes from the read works that cite it, which use it for mood as information and for the flexible modulation of emotion. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-04 from bibliographic records, not read; a second attempt at the copy LIT-540 could not reach. APA does not make the article open, and Unpaywall, OpenAlex and PubMed list no open copy and carry no abstract. The one copy a web search finds, a course upload on a University of Crete student server, now fails TLS verification with an expired certificate; WebFetch got a 503 from it. I did not disable verification. Every other hit was Scribd, academia.edu, ResearchGate or a commercial book site, none of them usable under the record’s rules. A human with library access could read its ten pages, and that reading would move this to Active and LIT-546 with it. |
| LIT-706 | The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and its Influence on Group Behavior | Barsade (2002), Administrative Science Quarterly 47(4):644–675. Two studies of mood contagion in a leaderless group negotiation. In Study 1 (94 undergraduates, 29 groups) a trained confederate showed pleasant or unpleasant, high- or low-energy mood. Members’ mood moved with the confederate’s valence, by self-report and by blind video-coders, and pleasant contagion predicted more cooperation, less conflict and higher self-rated performance. Study 2 (113 MBA students, 26 groups, no confederate) found mood convergence (ICC .00 to .24) with the same process correlates. Members recognised that others influenced how pleasant they felt, but not that their mood shaped their judged effectiveness. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-551), from the August 2001 revise-and-resubmit manuscript Wharton deposited in Penn’s repository, not the published version; worth reading as the first causal test of emotional contagion in groups. A trained confederate’s pleasant or unpleasant mood spread to the members of 29 work groups (self-report and blind video-coders agree), and the more pleasant mood spread, the more cooperative and the less conflicted the group (coder-rated) and the better members rated their own performance. A second study without a confederate found members’ moods converging (ICC .00 before, .24 after). Members related their pleasantness to others’ conduct but showed no awareness of their mood’s bearing on how effective they judged themselves (manuscript p. 37). Valence and energy hypotheses failed or came out mixed. |
| LIT-915 | One Giant Leap from Mouse to Man: The Microbiota–Gut–Brain Axis in Mood Disorders and Translational Challenges Moving towards Human Clinical Trials | Forssten, Ouwehand, Griffin & Patterson (2022), Nutrients 14(3):568. A narrative review of how gut microbes may affect mood, through the vagus, the immune system, the HPA axis and metabolites, and of why results in mice translate poorly to people. Faecal transplant from depressed humans partly transfers the phenotype to rodents. Human probiotic trials are mixed, with some reductions in subjective stress in healthy volunteers and several clean nulls. Written by employees of a probiotics manufacturer. | Active — read in full 2026-10-11 (NOTE-703) from the open-access text in Europe PMC (PMC8840472). Worth reading for the gap between mouse and human in microbiota–gut–brain research on mood: strong rodent effects, partial transfer of a depressive phenotype by faecal transplant into rodents, and repeated failures of preclinical probiotic effects to replicate in human trials. Note the source: all four authors were employed by a company that sells probiotics, and the review is narrative. |
| LIT-957 v2 | Relative fluency (unfelt vs felt) in active inference | Brouillet and Friston (2023), Consciousness and Cognition 115:103579. A perspective essay. Fluency, the felt ease of processing, is read as the brain’s recognition of the precision of its own predictions. Unfelt fluency is a subpersonal change in precision that orients attention; felt fluency is a hierarchically deeper inference about it, reached by endogenous attention, and is attributed to the stimulus because its cause is internal. The case rests on reviewed discrepancy-attribution experiments (the hension effect and its successors). No model and no new data. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-785) in full; worth reading as a short statement of how fluency research could be put into active inference: fluency as the recognition of the precision of one’s own predictions, registered first as a change against expectation and misattributed to the stimulus because its cause is internal. Read it knowing that it is a perspective essay with no model and no new data, that its experiments are reviewed second-hand, and that its “felt” fluency means fluency made reportable by endogenous attention, not a separation of experience from function. |
| LIT-996 v2 | It’s not the thought that counts: Allostasis at the core of brain function | Theriault et al. (2025), Neuron 113(24):4107–4133. A review arguing that the brain’s core function is allostasis, the predictive regulation of competing bodily demands, rather than thinking. Its evidence: an intrinsic system of visceromotor and interoceptive regions that reproduces tract-traced anatomy and contains the default-mode and salience hubs; a limbic-to-sensory laminar gradient read as a prediction hierarchy; and respiratory, cardiac and vagal effects on brain-wide signalling. It hypothesises that cognitive decline in Alzheimer’s disease trades cognition for waste clearance and pH. The authors do not claim the hypothesis is correct. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-761) in full; worth reading as the Barrett group’s current case that the brain’s core function is allostasis: an intrinsic system of visceromotor and interoceptive regions that matches tract-traced anatomy and contains the default-mode and salience hubs, a limbic-to-sensory laminar gradient read as a prediction hierarchy, interoceptive rhythms shaping brain-wide signalling, and a hypothesis that cognitive decline in Alzheimer’s disease is an allostatic trade-off. Read it knowing that it is a review of mostly the group’s own work, that the authors do not claim the allostasis-first hypothesis is correct, and that it says nothing about why or whether allostatic states are felt. |
| LIT-1185 v2 | Map-like representations of emotion knowledge in hippocampal-prefrontal systems | Ma & Kragel (2026). In fMRI of 29 people passively watching 14 emotional films (Emo-FilM), decoders predicted an independent online sample’s consensus ratings of 13 emotion categories better from hippocampus than positions in a two-dimensional affective space (an MDS of rating co-occurrence), and vmPFC the reverse; posterior hippocampus carried finer distinctions. Brain patterns could also be decoded into a Tolman–Eichenbaum Machine that learned the emotion grid by random walk, hippocampus favouring its small-scale conjunctive layer and vmPFC its large-scale structural layer. Prediction–outcome correlations are about 0.04–0.10; no learning in the participants is measured. | Active — read 2026-10-16 (NOTE-950) in full, from the publisher’s open-access PDF, supplementary material not read; worth reading as a naturalistic-viewing fMRI dissociation in which hippocampus carries more about emotion categories and vmPFC more about positions in a two-dimensional affective space, lined up with the two layers of the Tolman–Eichenbaum Machine. Read it knowing that participants only watched; that the decoded emotions are an independent sample’s consensus ratings; that the effects are small; that the “transitions” are a model’s random-walk steps on a grid built from rating co-occurrence; and that no learning in people, and no effect of the map on later reading, is measured. The model that learns the map does so by acting. |
| LIT-1205 v2 | Radically Open-Dialectical Behavior Therapy for Disorders of Over-Control: Signaling Matters | Lynch, Hempel & Dunkley (2015). RO-DBT treats disorders of maladaptive over-control, such as anorexia nervosa, chronic depression and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, and holds that their core problem is emotional loneliness from low openness and deficits of social signaling, not emotion dysregulation. | Unfetched — searched 2026-10-29 for a lawful full text; one is listed but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Europe PMC’s record (PMID 26160620) lists, from Unpaywall, a free copy at the publisher: https://psychotherapy.psychiatryonline.org/doi/pdf/1 0.1176/appi.psychotherapy.2015.69.2.141. On 2026-10-29 it returned a Cloudflare 403 challenge to curl and to WebFetch, so the failure is on access, not availability. OpenAlex reports the work closed, with no repository copy, which disagrees with Europe PMC’s listing; a browser fetch of the publisher’s PDF would settle both. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1221 v2 | Dialectical Behavioral Therapy: A Cognitive Behavioral Approach to Parasuicide | Linehan (1987). Introduces Dialectical Behavior Therapy for chronically parasuicidal individuals, on a biosocial theory that treats parasuicide as problem-solving behavior for psychic distress, maintained by low distress tolerance and environments that reinforce it. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-18, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports it closed, with the Guilford DOI as its only location and no repository copy; Crossref carries no licence or full-text link. The Linehan Institute’s list of her published work gives no copy, and web searches for the title found only bibliographic records. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1263 v2 | Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self | Seth (2013), Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17(11):565–573, an Opinion article. Emotions are “interoceptive inference”: felt states are the content of hierarchical top-down predictions of the causes of interoceptive signals, compared with bottom-up prediction errors in the anterior insula. Prediction errors are also cancelled by action, as descending predictions set the reference points of autonomic reflexes, the visceral counterpart of active inference in motor control. The same scheme is applied to the experience of body ownership. The rubber hand illusion is a revision of the multisensory self-model under precision-weighted error. Low interoceptive sensitivity goes with greater susceptibility to it, and a virtual hand pulsing in time with the heartbeat is owned more. No direct test of the model is claimed. | Active — read in full 2026-10-19 (NOTE-1000); worth reading as the short statement that put emotion and body ownership under one predictive-coding mechanism: felt emotion is the content of top-down predictions of the causes of interoceptive signals, the anterior insula is the comparator, and the experience of body ownership is what the brain infers to be “most likely to be me” from interoceptive and exteroceptive signals together. It is an opinion article with no new data. Its evidence is indirect and cited, and its one figure is a study by the author’s own group, an augmented-reality rubber hand illusion whose virtual hand flashed in or out of time with the heartbeat. The record’s bridge from its interoception cluster to body ownership. |
| LIT-1270 | Is the folk concept of pain polyeidic? | Borg, Harrison, Stazicker & Salomons (2019/2020), Mind & Language 35(1):29–47. Experimental philosophers (Sytsma, Reuter and others) argue that the folk think of pains as bodily, not mental, because lay participants deny pains privacy, subjectivity and incorrigibility. Borg et al. raise six objections. The samples are small and skewed; only acute pain was probed; asking whether pain is “in the mind” carries a pejorative implicature; means sit near neutral; denying Cartesian marks shows at most a non-Cartesian mental view; and the data support only a partly bodily concept. Pilot vignettes of their own (damage that never hurt) drew mind-centred answers (means 5.70 and 5.79 on a disagree-high scale). They propose that the folk concept of pain is “polyeidic”: an amalgam of dimensions (mental/bodily, public/private, conscious/unconscious, aversive, purposeful, motivational) on which people hold latent, framing-sensitive positions, with possible uses in clinical communication. | Active — read in full 2026-10-20 (NOTE-994) from the “revise and resubmit” manuscript in Reading’s CentAUR repository; worth reading as the clearest statement of the case against the experimental philosophers’ “bodily view” of pain (Sytsma, Reuter and colleagues), and as a proposal that the folk concept is “polyeidic”: several dimensions, mental/bodily among them, along which judgements move with framing. Four of its six objections are methodological (samples, acute pain only, the loaded “in the mind” probe, means near neutral), and two are structural: the data fit a non-Cartesian mental view as well, and they show at most that the concept is in part bodily. Read it as argument, not data. Its own evidence is two pilot vignettes reported in a footnote, with means and no sample size, and the polyeidic view is a research programme without a test. It is folk-concept evidence and does not bear on the record’s rubber hand THEORYs. |
| LIT-1353 v2 | The Theory of Constructed Emotion: More Than a Feeling | Barrett et al. (2025). A reply to van Heijst et al., who proposed that basic emotion theory explains emotions as bodily states and the theory of constructed emotion explains the feelings that arise from them. The authors argue that this split misrepresents constructed emotion through three simplifications, and that the two theories rest on incommensurate assumptions and cannot be reconciled. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1067) from the publisher’s text in PubMed Central (PMC12164598, CC BY-NC 4.0); worth reading as the theory’s architects saying plainly that feeling is not a second phenomenon that represents the body’s regulation: the same allostatic signals that regulate the body make feeling, an instance of emotion is one whole-brain event, and splitting it into an objective bodily state and a subjective feeling is a premise of basic emotion theory, which they call incommensurable with theirs. It is a reply with no data; its evidence is cited lists, much of it from the authors’ own groups, and basic emotion theory is described by its opponents. It does not discuss emotion regulation, reappraisal or therapy. |
| LIT-1359 v2 | A systems identification approach using Bayes factors to deconstruct the brain bases of emotion regulation | Bo, Kraynak, Kwon, Sun, Gianaros & Wager (2024). Across two fMRI studies (n = 182 and 176), Bayes factors identify four reappraisal-related systems: an anterior prefrontal one selective for reappraisal, a fronto-parietal-insular one engaged by reappraisal and emotion generation alike, a largely subcortical one (amygdala, hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray) active in negative emotion but unaffected by reappraisal, and a posterior cortical one downregulated by it. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1061) from the bioRxiv preprint, version 2 (10 May 2023), not the closed version of record; worth reading as the first imaging study of reappraisal large enough (n = 182 and 176, replicated in both) to give evidence for nulls, which lets it say which regions are engaged only by regulating, which are shared with generating negative emotion, and which emotion-responsive regions reappraisal leaves unchanged. Most of the reappraisal network is shared with generation, a smaller anterior prefrontal and temporo-parietal set is selective for it, and every subcortical emotion-responsive region, amygdala and PAG included, was unchanged while reported negative affect fell. One instructed strategy, one picture task, BOLD means and one rating per trial; its talk of “subcortical-level affective experience” goes beyond what was measured. |
| LIT-1405 v3 | How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-Analytic Tests of Three Mediators | Pettigrew & Tropp (2008). Tests meta-analytically the three most studied mediators of contact’s effect on prejudice, over 54 studies through June 2005: knowledge about the outgroup (17 samples), reduced anxiety about intergroup contact (60) and increased empathy and perspective taking (14). All three mediate (Sobel Z = 3.87, 26.6 and 12.4), but knowledge is much less strong than anxiety reduction and empathy, which in nine samples measuring both together account for about half of the contact–prejudice covariance. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1405) in full, from the published article’s PDF in a University of Washington course’s readings folder (https://courses.washington.edu/pbafhall/563/Readings/pettigrew.pdf); worth reading as the meta-analytic test of how contact reduces prejudice: knowledge of the outgroup, intergroup anxiety and empathy all mediate, knowledge much the most weakly, and anxiety and empathy together carry about half the association. Read it knowing that the mediation is statistical, on pooled correlational data, over a different set of samples for each mediator (17, 60, 14), that empathy and perspective taking could not be separated, and that Table 3 misprints the empathy Sobel statistic (4.38 for 12.43). |
| LIT-1433 | Demystifying Emotions: A Typology of Theories in Psychology and Philosophy | Moors (2022), Cambridge University Press. A typology of emotion theories in psychology (evolutionary, network, appraisal, goal-directed, psychological constructionist, social) and philosophy (feeling, judgmental, quasi-judgmental, perceptual, embodied, motivational), compared with tools from the philosophy of science. It also proposes Moors’s own skeptical “goal-directed theory”, “based on the central idea that all kinds of behaviors and feelings are grounded in goal-striving”. Unread beyond the front matter: the theory is read in her 2017 article LIT-1434. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref and the publisher’s free front matter, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex lists the book as closed, with no repository copy; Cambridge Core offers no open chapter; no Lirias or author-posted copy was found. The front matter and table of contents, which Cambridge hosts openly, were read. Filed as the book-length statement of Moors’s goal-directed theory of emotion, the theory whose 2017 article (LIT-1434) is the nearest prior statement of the record’s reading of appraisal as negotiation. Its Chapter 7, on response evaluation theories and her goal-directed theory, is the part to read first. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1434 | The power of goal-directed processes in the causation of emotional and other actions | Moors, Boddez & De Houwer (2017), Emotion Review 9(4):310–318. Standard dual-process models make stimulus-driven processes the default and give goal-directed ones a late, regulatory role, in action research and in emotion research alike. The authors reverse the default. Goal-directed processes, which select the action option with the highest expected utility, can be fast and automatic too, so most of the competition that decides behaviour is between goal-directed processes, settled by the values and expectancies of outcomes. Emotional action tendencies can be caused this way. Appraisal-to-action-tendency links are sophisticated stimulus-driven processes. Evidence for stimulus-driven control rests on null results open to hidden goals. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1117): in full, from the submitted manuscript deposited in Ghent University’s repository. Worth reading as the shortest statement of Moors’s goal-directed account of emotional action, and as the nearest prior statement of the record’s reading of appraisal as negotiation. Goal-directed processes, which weigh the utility of action options by the values and expectancies of their outcomes, are the default cause of action, emotional action included. Most of the competition that decides behaviour is between goal-directed processes, and its winner is fixed by values and expectancies. Control precedence is what high goal relevance produces, so an emotional episode is a decision process with higher stakes. The competition is run on a common currency, expected utility, which is the point where the record parts from it. |
| LIT-1436 | Toward an integrative psychometric model of emotions | Lange, Dalege, Borsboom, van Kleef & Fischer (2020), Perspectives on Psychological Science 15(2):444–468. An integrative psychometric model of emotions must allow distinct emotions (affect-program theories), variation between and within persons (constructionist theories) and causal relations among components (appraisal theories). Reflective and formative latent-variable models do not; a psychometric network model, in which “the network constitutes the emotion”, does. Distinct emotions are weakly emergent small-world communities of components. Strongly connected networks sustain their own activation, which predicts hysteresis and longer emotions. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1098): in part, from the published version (CC BY-NC) deposited in the University of Amsterdam’s repository. Worth reading as the proposal that an emotion is a network of causally interacting components, the move Borsboom made for mental disorders (LIT-547) applied to emotion. Affect-program, constructionist and appraisal theories each demand one property: distinct emotions, variation between and within persons, and causal relations among components. Reflective and formative latent-variable models fail at least one. A network model meets all three, with a distinct emotion as a weakly emergent small-world community. Strong connectivity predicts self-sustaining activation and hysteresis, so longer emotions. The persistence it gives is a network state’s, not an ordering’s, and the model is unsigned. |
| LIT-1437 | The World of Emotions is not Two-Dimensional | Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch & Ellsworth (2007), Psychological Science 18(12):1050–1057. Against two-dimensional valence–arousal models: in three languages, four dimensions are needed to represent the meaning of emotion words, rated on 144 features covering six emotion components. In order of importance they are evaluation-pleasantness, potency-control, activation-arousal and unpredictability. Unread: known from the abstract and from later papers of the same group. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists but this client could not reach it. The University of Geneva’s Archive ouverte holds the published version (unige:97776) restricted to UNIGE/HUG users. The University of Reading’s repository (CentAUR, eprint 30302) and Ghent University’s bibliography (418787) list it without a public full text. The SAGE PDF refused this client behind a bot check, and the Geneva E3 Lab’s publications page does not post it. A web search found no author or course posting. OpenAlex points to a CiteSeerX cache, which was not used because its source could not be traced. Its four dimensions are read from the PubMed abstract, and its “potency-control” dimension is glossed as “dominance” by Shuman, Sander and Scherer (LIT-1458). Filed because the record renamed its “dominance” to “potential” to avoid the PAD homonym, and this is the study that places the PAD axis among the component process model’s dimensions. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1438 v2 | The current status of research on the structure of evaluative space | Norris, Gollan, Berntson & Cacioppo (2010), Biological Psychology 84(3):422–436. A review of the evaluative space model. The affect system has separable positive and negative channels whose joint output is a bipolar predisposition to approach or avoid. They can be activated reciprocally, independently or together. Coactivation, simultaneous or by fast oscillation, is ambivalence, rare and arousing. Asymmetric activation functions give a negativity bias and a positivity offset, and recalibrate with context. Levels of the neuraxis can override one another. Clinical implications for depression and anxiety. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1101): in full, from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC2894997, NIHMS165251). Worth reading as the evaluative space model’s own later summary, written with Berntson and Cacioppo. Positivity and negativity are separable systems, whose combined output is a bipolar predisposition to approach or withdraw. They can be activated reciprocally, independently or together, and coactivation is ambivalence. Ambivalence and neutrality give the same middling output from different underlying states. Negativity has the higher gain and positivity the higher intercept. It stands in for the unread 1994 and 1997 papers (LIT-1453, LIT-1456). |
| LIT-1440 | Induction and Profiling of Strong Multi-Componential Emotions in Virtual Reality | Meuleman & Rudrauf (2021), IEEE Trans. Affective Computing 12:189–202 (online 2018). Passive induction yields weak emotions that do not engage all components, so componential hypotheses cannot be tested with it. In VR, 53 participants played seven games (154 balanced observations) and rated componential items after each. Item clustering gave fear and joy clusters spanning appraisal, motivation, physiology, feeling and regulation. Appraisal predicted fear and joy intensity best. Game differences in fear were absorbed by appraisal and regulation, subject differences in joy were not. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1097): in full, from the authors’ accepted manuscript in the Archive ouverte UNIGE (unige:112041). Worth reading as an argument, with data, that passive induction (pictures, film) cannot test componential hypotheses such as synchronization, because it does not engage all components, and that virtual reality can. 53 participants played seven commercial VR games and rated appraisal, motivation, physiology, feeling and regulation items after each. Clustering found multi-componential fear and joy patterns, and appraisal items predicted fear and joy intensity best. Componentiality is assessed across observations, one retrospective self-report per game. Nothing is measured within an episode, and there is no synchronization index. |
| LIT-1441 | Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: A control-process view | Carver & Scheier (1990), Psychological Review 97(1):19–35. The paper usually cited for the control-process account of affect: a second feedback loop monitors the rate at which the action loop reduces its discrepancy, and affect is that loop’s error signal, positive when progress beats a reference rate and negative when it falls short. Unread: the account is read in Carver’s 2018 restatement (LIT-1449). | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (APA, Psychological Review) is closed. A web search found the APA record, DeepDyve (paid), ERIC (EJ494079, record only), a Widener University file that is a reference list citing it, and Carnegie Mellon’s KiltHub record of a later Carver and Scheier chapter (2012, no file attached). The only full text seen was an author upload on ResearchGate, which this record does not use. Europe PMC has no open copy of it or of any other Carver statement of the model before 2018. The model is read first-hand, briefly, in Carver’s 2018 author manuscript in PubMed Central (LIT-1449), which restates that affect tracks the velocity of goal attainment against a reference value. Filed for the record’s account of valence as an ordering serving as the negotiation’s potential (CLAIM-440), whose sign clause this paper anticipates. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1443 | A Multi-Componential Approach to Emotion Recognition and the Effect of Personality | Mohammadi & Vuilleumier (2022), IEEE Trans. Affective Computing 13:1127–1139 (online 2020). Crowdworkers rated 39 CoreGRID items and 10 discrete emotions after watching film clips (1,567 surveys, 99 clips). Clustering of emotion profiles in componential space separates positive from negative, then five clusters. PCA gives six dimensions beyond valence and arousal. Ordinal regression on all components predicts discrete-emotion ratings best; no single component suffices. Personality correlates more with componential items than with feelings or discrete emotions. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1118): in full, from the authors’ arXiv preprint (2010.11370v1, October 2020). Worth reading only as the behavioural groundwork for the later fMRI study (LIT-1444). Crowdworkers rated 39 CoreGRID items and 10 discrete emotions after whole film clips (1,567 surveys, 99 clips). Six principal components emerged (action tendency, pleasant feeling, novelty, norms, arousal, goal relevance). Ordinal regression from all components predicted discrete-emotion ratings better than any single component. Personality traits correlated with componential items more than with feelings. It does not mention synchronization and measures nothing within an episode. |
| LIT-1444 | Brain networks subserving functional core processes of emotions identified with componential modeling | Mohammadi, Van De Ville & Vuilleumier (2023), Cerebral Cortex 33:7993–8010. Twenty participants watched 40 film clips during fMRI and rated 119 salient events (12 s each) on 32 CoreGRID features, and heart and respiration rate were recorded. Partial least squares correlation between event-wise brain maps and feature ratings yields six latent variables, the “functional core processes”: valuation (wanting-like), novelty, hedonic impact (liking-like), goal monitoring, caring for others (“being moved”) and approach/avoidance. No arousal process emerges, and the processes mix components rather than mapping one to one. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1107): in full, from the published version (CC BY 4.0) in the Archive ouverte UNIGE (unige:170302). Worth reading as the first attempt to recover the component process model’s components from brain and behaviour together. Twenty participants watched 40 film clips during fMRI and then rated 119 salient 12-second events on 32 CoreGRID features. Heart and respiration rate were recorded. Partial least squares correlation found six brain–behaviour latent variables, read as valuation, novelty, hedonic impact, goal monitoring, caring for others and approach/avoidance. For the record, the result is two distinct valence-like networks: a “wanting”-like valuation process and a “liking”-like hedonic one. Each event gets a feature vector, but no within-episode synchronization is computed. |
| LIT-1445 v3 | Pleasure as a sign you can attend to something else: Placing positive feelings within a general model of affect | Carver (2003), Cognition and Emotion 17(2):241–261. By its title, it places positive feelings in a control-process model of affect as a sign that one can attend to something else. Unread: registered so that the claim that positive affect releases a goal’s priority, which bears against reading valence intensity as the potential’s strength, is checked against the paper. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports it closed with no repository copy; Europe PMC has the PubMed record (PMID 29715724) with no full text; Taylor & Francis is paywalled. Carver’s University of Miami page lists no publication PDFs, and its older local.psy.miami.edu host failed TLS and returned 503. The academia.edu upload (https://www.academia.edu/3044771/Pleasure_as_a_sign_you_can_attend_to_something_else_Placing_positive_feelings_within_a_general_model_of_affect), which counts as a lawful copy under ADR-064, returned a Cloudflare challenge (HTTP 403) to curl and to WebFetch on 2026-10-29, so it could not be checked or read; the epdf.pub page still does not count. It is Unfetched (ADR-053) until a copy is supplied; the claim that positive affect lowers a goal’s priority, which bears on CLAIM-440, is still unchecked against the paper. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1446 | The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model | Scherer (2009), Cognition and Emotion 23(7):1307–1351. The component process model’s evidence review. Emotion is “an emergent, dynamic process based on an individual’s subjective appraisal of significant events”, and the paper gives special emphasis to the sequence of appraisal checks and the synchronisation of response systems. Unread: the model is read in the companion paper LIT-1451. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists but this client could not reach it. The University of Geneva’s Archive ouverte holds the published version (unige:97810), with access restricted to members of the UNIGE/HUG community. The Taylor & Francis article is paywalled. The Geneva E3 Lab’s publications page posts many of the group’s 2009 papers but not this one, and a web search found no other author or course posting. Its argument is read first-hand in Scherer’s companion paper of the same year, “Emotions are emergent processes: they require a dynamic computational architecture” (LIT-1451), which restates the component process model and cites this paper, then in press, for the evidence. Filed because the record’s proposal needs a measurable analogue of potential, and this is the review usually cited for response synchronization. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1447 | EMA: A process model of appraisal dynamics | Marsella & Gratch (2009), Cognitive Systems Research 10(1):70–90. EMA (EMotion and Adaptation), after Smith and Lazarus. Appraisal is one fast, parallel, automatic process over the agent’s causal interpretation, a decision-theoretic plan representation of its beliefs, desires, intentions and plans. Emotional dynamics come from the time course of the perception, inference and action that change that interpretation, so no multi-level appraisal is needed. Each proposition gets an appraisal frame. Frames compete for coping, and the most recently accessed one with the highest mood-adjusted intensity wins. Coping changes the world or the agent’s beliefs, desires and intentions, which drives reappraisal. Illustrated with an actor’s reaction to a pigeon. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1100): in full, from the published version on a University of Kentucky course reading list, checked against the authors’ manuscript on Gratch’s USC page. Worth reading as the worked computational case of appraisal as a continuous process over the agent’s causal interpretation, with an explicit arbitration rule. Appraisal is a single, fast, parallel mapping from that interpretation to appraisal variables. Its dynamics come from the slower perception, inference and action that change the interpretation, and from coping, which alters beliefs, desires and intentions and so drives reappraisal. Appraisal frames, one per proposition, compete for the coping response. The winner is the most recently accessed frame with the highest mood-adjusted intensity, and intensity is a decision-theoretic product of likelihood and utility. That is arbitration on a common currency among concerns, not a negotiation among perspectives. |
| LIT-1448 | Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility | Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin (1997), Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2):375–405. “Utility” has two meanings: decision utility, an outcome’s weight in choice, and experienced utility, its hedonic quality. Experienced utility is instant (the pleasure or distress of the moment, reported in real time) or remembered (a retrospective evaluation). Remembered utility follows the Peak-End average and neglects duration. Choices follow remembered utility, so subjects repeat a longer cold-water trial that dominates the shorter one in pain. Axioms on ordinal instant utility with a neutral zero make total utility the time integral of a value transform. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1105): in full, from the published article as deposited in Erasmus University Rotterdam’s repository (RePub, hdl 1765/23011). Distinguishes decision utility (an outcome’s weight in choice) from experienced utility (hedonic quality). Experienced utility divides into instant utility, reported in real time, and remembered utility, a retrospective evaluation. Remembered utility follows a Peak-End rule and neglects duration. Choices follow remembered utility, so people choose dominated, longer painful episodes. Axioms on ordinal instant utility with a neutral zero yield total utility as a time integral. Filed for the record’s three-layer operationalization of felt valence (CLAIM-440). |
| LIT-1449 | Control Theory, Goal Attainment, and Psychopathology | Carver (2018), Psychological Inquiry 29(3):139–144, a commentary on DeYoung and Krueger. Problems arise wherever a feedback loop’s input, reference value, comparison or output is extreme or biased. The five factors are read as sensitivities to classes of goals, not as loop parameters. Valence tracks the velocity of goal attainment against a reference value, so approach and avoidance can each yield either sign. Doubt and disengagement sit outside the loop itself. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1102): in full, from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC6707771, NIHMS1512534). A short commentary on DeYoung and Krueger’s cybernetic theory of psychopathology, and the nearest lawful first-hand statement found of Carver and Scheier’s control-process account of affect. Valence is read off the velocity of goal attainment against a reference value. An approach system and an avoidance system can each produce either sign. Many goals are in play at once, and their priorities are juggled. It stands in for the unread 1990 paper (LIT-1441). |
| LIT-1450 | Pain experience in hermit crabs? | Elwood & Appel (2009), Animal Behaviour 77(5):1243–1246. Hermit crabs given small shocks inside their shells. Only shocked crabs evacuated, and fewer did so from a preferred shell species, which the authors read as a motivational trade-off. Crabs that stayed were later quicker to take a new shell. “The results are consistent with the idea of pain in these animals.” Unread beyond the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read beyond the abstract: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex lists it as closed; Queen’s University Belfast’s research portal has the record and abstract but no file; the Elsevier article is paywalled; a web search found no author or course posting. Filed because it is one of the two hermit-crab trade-off studies usually cited for the criterion THEORY-101’s promotion names, an animal accepting a noxious cost for a resource, and the bumblebee study (LIT-1466) cites it as such. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1451 | Emotions are emergent processes: they require a dynamic computational architecture | Scherer (2009), Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364:3459–3474. Emotion is a bounded episode of synchronization among organismic subsystems, driven by a fixed sequence of appraisal checks (relevance, implications, coping, normative significance) and aimed at control precedence. The feeling component monitors the process by integrating a representation of all components and their coherence, and the degree of synchronization is hypothesised to generate conscious experience. Proposes nonlinear dynamic modelling: emotions as attractor basins of coupled oscillators, with hysteresis and cusp-catastrophe jumps. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1113): in full, from the PubMed Central text (PMC2781886). Worth reading as Scherer’s own compact statement of the component process model, the same year as the evidence review LIT-1446, which it cites as in press. Emotion is a bounded episode of component synchronization, driven by sequential appraisal checks and aimed at control precedence. The feeling component monitors the process by representing the other components and their coherence. The degree of synchronization is hypothesised to generate conscious experience. Emotions are attractor basins of coupled oscillators, with hysteresis and catastrophe-surface jumps. It stands in for the unread review. |
| LIT-1452 | Conscious emotional experience emerges as a function of multilevel, appraisal-driven response synchronization | Grandjean, Sander & Scherer (2008), Consciousness and Cognition 17(2):484–495. Componential appraisal models explain feelings better than basic-emotion or dimensional models. Appraisal runs in parallel at sensory-motor, schematic and conceptual levels and stops at the first conclusive result. Consciousness of an emotion emerges when lower levels cannot cope, especially when component synchronization reaches a critical level and duration, so that conscious, representational regulation is required. Conscious feeling needs, besides component synchronization, local and distant neuronal synchronization that integrates the components’ representations. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1115): in full, from the copy the authors’ laboratory (the Geneva E3 Lab) posts on its publications page. Worth reading as the component process model’s fullest account of when emotion becomes conscious. Appraisal runs in parallel at several levels and stops when a lower level reaches a conclusive result. Consciousness is recruited when it does not: when component synchronization reaches a critical level and duration that cannot be regulated automatically, so that higher-level regulation, which needs explicit representations, must take over. The feeling is a central representation built by neuronal synchronization, local and distant. Its measures are EEG gamma and beta activity in felt versus unfelt episodes, and phase coherence between brain regions. It partly rivals and partly supports the record’s self-model condition for felt valence (CLAIM-439). |
| LIT-1453 v2 | Relationship between attitudes and evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the separability of positive and negative substrates | Cacioppo & Berntson (1994), Psychological Bulletin 115(3):401–423. The review that introduced the evaluative space model. Attitudes have been measured on one bipolar scale. The positive and negative evaluative processes behind them are separable, and can be activated reciprocally, independently or together. Unread: the model is read in Norris et al. 2010 (LIT-1438). | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists, but this client could not fetch it, so it failed on access, not availability. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Cacioppo posted the paper on his University of Chicago reprint page (psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/cacioppo/jtcreprints/cb94.pdf). That URL now returns 404, and the Internet Archive’s capture of 2012-05-16 (timestamp 20120516001838) could not be fetched: web.archive.org reset the connection, and the fetch tool refuses the domain. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (APA, Psychological Bulletin) is closed. A ResearchGate copy was seen and not used. The model is read first-hand in its authors’ 2010 review in PubMed Central (LIT-1438), whose Figures 2 and 3 are adapted from this paper. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1455 | Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling | Lewis (2005), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(2):169–194, with open peer commentary. Appraisal and emotion are not cause and effect but constituents that organize one another, through positive and negative feedback and circular causality, into an emotion–appraisal amalgam, an “emotional interpretation”. Trigger, self-amplification and self-stabilization phases. Interpretations are attractors, one converging at a time, with abrupt phase transitions between them. Their neural basis is nested corticolimbic loops, neuromodulation, vertical integration, action monitoring and theta-band synchrony, and stable states drive learning on a developmental timescale. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1119): the target article in part, from the BBS treatment posted on the University of Geneva E3 Lab’s publications page with Sander and Scherer’s commentary. Worth reading as the fullest dynamic-systems account of appraisal and emotion. Appraisal and emotion constituents organize each other into one “emotional interpretation” through bidirectional feedback, in trigger, self-amplification and self-stabilization phases. Emotional interpretations are attractors, one at a time, and switch by phase transition. Vertical integration gives them momentum and selects among them. Stable states drive learning across a slower timescale. It contains the dynamics of one organization coming to prevail, but what prevails is an interpretation, not an ordering of the system’s own states. |
| LIT-1456 v2 | Beyond Bipolar Conceptualizations and Measures: The Case of Attitudes and Evaluative Space | Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson (1997), PSPR 1(1):3–25. The full statement of the evaluative space model for attitudes. Bipolar measures fold together states that a bivariate measure keeps apart, among them ambivalence (high positivity and negativity) and indifference (low both). Unread: the model is read in Norris et al. 2010 (LIT-1438). | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists, but this client could not fetch it, so it failed on access, not availability. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Cacioppo posted the paper on his University of Chicago reprint page (psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/cacioppo/jtcreprints/cgb97.pdf). That URL now returns 404, and the Internet Archive’s capture of 2012-05-16 (timestamp 20120516012547) could not be fetched: web.archive.org reset the connection, and the fetch tool refuses the domain. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (Personality and Social Psychology Review, SAGE) is closed. A web search found only bibliographic records and secondary accounts. The model is read first-hand in its authors’ 2010 review in PubMed Central (LIT-1438), which names this paper and its 1999 sequel as the statement of the evaluative space model. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1457 | The Emotion Process: Event Appraisal and Component Differentiation | Scherer & Moors (2019), Annual Review of Psychology 70:719–745. A review of experimental evidence on the emotion process, organised by five appraisal criteria (novelty, intrinsic and extrinsic valence, agency, control or power, fairness) and three paths from appraisal: to action tendencies, to physiological responses and to facial, vocal and gestural expression. Appraisal criteria have more stable response correlates than emotion categories do. Proposes that coherence among components above a threshold marks an episode, and above a second threshold awareness. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1106): in full, from the PDF Annual Reviews serves to guest readers. Worth reading as the latest review of the component process model’s evidence, organised by appraisal criterion rather than by emotion category. Its paths run from appraisal to action tendencies, to physiological responses and to expression. It separates intrinsic valence from goal congruence and reports the few studies that pull them apart: they have partly different physiological signatures and combine multiplicatively. It ends with a two-threshold proposal: coherence among components above one threshold starts an episode, and above a second it becomes aware. It does not describe appraisal as a negotiation among perspectives. |
| LIT-1458 | Levels of valence | Shuman, Sander & Scherer (2013), Frontiers in Psychology 4:261. Valence exists at two levels. Micro-valences are the valenced outcomes of separate appraisal checks (pleasantness, goal conduciveness, power, self-congruence, moral goodness), and they can conflict, which explains mixed feelings. Macro-valence is one-dimensional, always present, and the common currency for choice. It is integrated from micro-valences and other inputs by rules ranging from weighted sums to lexicographic and elimination-by-aspects strategies. Intrinsic pleasantness and goal conduciveness are dissociable, citing Berridge. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1108): in full, from the publisher’s open-access PDF (Frontiers, CC licence). Worth reading as the component process model’s own statement that valence is several things. Five appraisal checks are each valenced (pleasantness, goal conduciveness, power, self-congruence, moral goodness), and these “micro-valences” are integrated, by weighted sums or by lexicographic and elimination rules, into a one-dimensional “macro-valence” that serves as the common currency for choice. It separates intrinsic pleasantness from goal conduciveness and grounds the split in Berridge. It bears directly on the objection that the record’s potential account tracks ‘wanting’, not ‘liking’ (CLAIM-438). |
| LIT-1459 | Pleasure systems in the brain | Berridge & Kringelbach (2015), Neuron 86(3):646–664. Reward is three separable components: ‘liking’ (hedonic impact), ‘wanting’ (incentive salience) and learning. ‘Liking’ can be measured without report, by orofacial taste reactivity, which is homologous from rats to human infants. It is generated by cubic-millimetre opioid and endocannabinoid hotspots in nucleus accumbens, ventral pallidum and perhaps cortex and pons. Mesolimbic dopamine and most “pleasure electrodes” raise ‘wanting’ without raising ‘liking’. Incentive sensitization makes an addict want a drug that has become less pleasant. Objective ‘liking’ can occur without any felt pleasure. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1110): in full, from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC4425246, NIHMS664561). A review of the affective neuroscience of pleasure. Reward splits into ‘liking’ (hedonic impact), ‘wanting’ (incentive salience) and learning, with separable mechanisms. ‘Liking’ is measured without report by taste reactivity, which is homologous across rats, apes and newborn humans. It is generated by small opioid and endocannabinoid hotspots. Mesolimbic dopamine and most “pleasure electrodes” raise ‘wanting’ without raising ‘liking’. Objective ‘liking’ can occur without felt pleasure. Filed for the record’s account of valence as potential (CLAIM-440), which wanting-without-liking puts under pressure. |
| LIT-1461 | Liking, wanting, and the incentive-sensitization theory of addiction | Berridge & Robinson (2016), American Psychologist 71(8):670–679. ‘Wanting’ (incentive salience, mesolimbic and dopamine-related) and ‘liking’ (hedonic impact, small opioid and endocannabinoid hotspots) are dissociable. Repeated, especially intermittent high-dose, drug use can sensitize the ‘wanting’ system, making it hyper-reactive to drug cues and contexts, lastingly and perhaps permanently, while ‘liking’ need not rise and may fall. Sensitized ‘wanting’ can oppose cognitive desire, run without report, and grow during abstinence. Its scope is said to extend, on emerging evidence, to behavioural addictions and to the compulsions of dopamine dysregulation syndrome. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1109): in full, from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC5171207, NIHMS816820). Worth reading as the authors’ own short statement, a quarter-century on, of the incentive-sensitization theory of addiction. Drugs, and perhaps unpredictable non-drug rewards, can make mesolimbic ‘wanting’ systems lastingly hyper-reactive to cues and contexts, and ‘liking’ need not rise with it. Sensitized ‘wanting’ can oppose a person’s cognitive desire, operate without report, persist for years and grow during abstinence. It is a review of the authors’ programme. Filed for the record’s question whether potential of a proxy for maintenance is valence, and the form addiction and metric fixation share (QUESTION-267), to which it gives a mechanism on the personal side. |
| LIT-1463 | Interaction and threshold effects of appraisal on componential patterns of emotion: A study using cross-cultural semantic data | Meuleman, Moors, Fontaine, Renaud & Scherer (2019), Emotion 19:425–442. Re-analyses the GRID cross-cultural data on the meaning of 24 emotion words (34 samples, 27 countries) to test whether appraisal acts on motivation, physiology and expression through interactions and nonlinear effects. PCA reduces items to 7 appraisal and 11 response factors. Multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) select third-order interactions and hinges. Goal compatibility is the main effect, agency and norm compatibility pure modifiers. The strong hierarchy of appraisal decision trees is not found. Simulated patterns matched to words form a coherent map. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1104): in full, from the authors’ accepted manuscript in Ghent University’s repository (biblio.ugent.be 8560097). Worth reading as the one study here that tests whether appraisal acts on the other emotion components linearly. It re-analyses the GRID data, culturally shared semantic profiles of 24 emotion words rated in 34 samples from 27 countries. It fits multivariate adaptive regression splines from seven appraisal factors to eleven motivation, physiology and expression factors. Goal compatibility is the main effect. Agency and norm compatibility act only in interactions, and some responses need splines. Its “threshold effects” are hinges in a continuous piecewise-linear fit. The data are word meanings, not episodes, and have no time, so they cannot bear on continuity or hysteresis in choice. |
| LIT-1464 | The Nature and Dynamics of Relevance and Valence Appraisals: Theoretical Advances and Recent Evidence | Scherer (2013), Emotion Review 5(2):150–162. Discusses three open issues in appraisal theory: varieties of relevance detection, varieties of valence appraisal, and the sequential-cumulative effects of appraisal results, with an update on research into the sequence of appraisal and emphasis on its nonverbal signatures. Unread: the varieties of valence are read in Shuman, Sander and Scherer 2013 (LIT-1458). | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy. The SAGE article page and PDF refused this client behind a bot check, and the journal is subscription-only. The University of Geneva’s Archive ouverte holds two other papers from the same issue with public access (the issue’s introduction by Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer and Frijda, and Scherer and Ellsworth’s reply), but no record of this one was found, and the Geneva E3 Lab’s publications page does not post it. A web search found no author or course posting. Its subject, the varieties of valence appraisal, is read first-hand in Shuman, Sander and Scherer’s “Levels of valence” (LIT-1458), published two months later. Filed because the record’s potential account needs the component process model’s distinction between kinds of valence. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1466 | Motivational trade-offs and modulation of nociception in bumblebees | Gibbons, Versace, Crump, Baran & Chittka (2022), PNAS 119(31). Bumblebees chose between two 40% sucrose feeders, heated to 55 °C in the test phase, and two unheated alternatives of 10–40%. They avoided the heated feeders when the alternatives were also rich and fed from them more as the alternatives got poorer, guided by learned colour cues. The authors read this as a centrally mediated motivational trade-off, consistent with a capacity for pain. Corrected in 2025 for a misreported model. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1114): in full, from the published version (CC BY 4.0) in LSE Research Online, with the 2025 correction and the authors’ deposited data. Worth reading as the cleanest published motivational trade-off in an insect. Bees chose between heated (55 °C) and unheated feeders. They took the heated, high-sucrose feeders less as the unheated alternative got sweeter, and more steeply than when nothing was heated. The trade-off relied on learned colour cues, so it is central. At this one cost the data are graded, not thresholded, and the design varies only the resource, so it cannot show a threshold in cost. |
| LIT-1467 | Pleasure: the common currency | Cabanac (1992), Journal of Theoretical Biology 155(2):173–200. On the PubMed abstract: physiologists have no common currency for comparing the strength of the drives behind different regulatory needs, yet an organism must rank its priorities when they conflict. Pleasure is proposed as that currency, measured by choice in animals and by rated pleasantness in humans, and trade-offs are made by maximizing it. Unread. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref and PubMed, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. Looked for on 2026-10-23. OpenAlex records it as closed, with no repository copy. The publisher (Elsevier, Journal of Theoretical Biology) returned a 403 to this client, and no open-archive copy is offered. PubMed (PMID 12240693) carries the abstract only, and there is no PubMed Central record. A web search found no author-posted or institutional copy, only the later Ramírez and Cabanac abstract (2003). Unpaywall was not queried, because it requires an email address. The thesis is known here from the PubMed abstract and from citations in Berridge and Kringelbach 2015 (LIT-1459) and Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997 (LIT-1448), which cite other Cabanac papers on alliesthesia. Filed because it is the standard source for pleasure as the common currency of motivational trade-offs, which CLAIM-440 recasts as an ordering. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1468 | Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference | Hesp, Smith, Parr, Allen, Friston & Ramstead (2021), Neural Computation 33(2):398–446. Valence is a state of self, inferred at a hierarchically deeper level from changes in the expected precision γ of one’s action model, which weights preference-driven expected free energy against a habitual prior in policy selection. The update to γ, affective charge, is positive when outcomes raise confidence in the action model and negative when they lower it. The valence level sends priors on γ back down. A simulated rat in a T-maze with context reversal infers negative and then positive valence, and adapts better than an agent without that level. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1111): in full, from the publisher’s CC BY PDF as deposited in Aarhus University’s repository (pure.au.dk), checked against the University of Amsterdam deposit. A deep active-inference model of valence. A precision term γ sets how far the agent’s preference-driven action model, rather than a habitual prior, governs policy selection. Its update, “affective charge”, is positive when outcomes raise confidence in the action model and negative when they lower it. A second, slower level infers a binary valence state from affective charge and sends priors on γ back down. Simulated in a T-maze with reversal, the agent with the valence level adapts faster than one without it. “Felt” means explicitly represented, which the authors take as necessary for self-reportable experience of valence. Filed for the record’s candidate that a valence regime is felt when the system models its own potential (CLAIM-440). |
| LIT-1469 | Feelings change: Accounting for individual differences in the temporal dynamics of affect | Kuppens, Oravecz & Tuerlinckx (2010), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99(6):1042–1060. DynAffect: individual differences in how feelings change over time come from three processes, an affective home base (“a baseline attractor state around which affect fluctuates”), variability in response to internal or external perturbation, and the attractor strength that ties affect back to the home base. Tested with a diffusion model in two experience-sampling studies of core affect, and related to personality and emotion dispositions. Unread beyond the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref and the PubMed abstract, not read: a lawful copy exists but this client could not fetch it. OpenAlex lists the article as closed (APA). A copy is posted on co-author Zita Oravecz’s University of California, Irvine site, apparently among course readings, but its certificate chain ends in a root this client does not trust, so the TLS connection failed. The fetch tool returned 503 for the same address. Failed on access, not availability. Filed for the record’s question of how to measure whether an ordering prevails and returns after interruption (QUESTION-268). DynAffect’s attractor strength, the pull that ties affect back to a home base after it is perturbed, is the nearest established operational measure of Frijda’s resumption mark, though it measures the return of an affective state, not of a ranking’s authority. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1470 | Motivational trade-offs and potential pain experience in hermit crabs | Appel & Elwood (2009), Applied Animal Behaviour Science 119:120–124. Hermit crabs in preferred or less preferred shell species were given shocks “of gradually increasing intensity”. The first observable response did not depend on the shell, but crabs in preferred shells evacuated at a higher shock level. The authors read this as a trade-off between keeping a good shell and avoiding the noxious stimulus, consistent with pain rather than a nociceptive reflex. Unread beyond the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read beyond the abstract: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex lists it as closed; Queen’s University Belfast’s research portal has the record and abstract but no file; the Elsevier article is paywalled. Filed with its companion (LIT-1450) because it is the hermit-crab study that varies the cost: shock rising until the crab leaves its shell, in preferred and less preferred shells. That is the nearest published design to the test CLAIM-435 proposes. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1471 | An Appraisal-Driven Componential Approach to the Emotional Brain | Sander, Grandjean & Scherer (2018), Emotion Review 10:219–231. A perspective article. Major emotion theories agree that emotion has five components, so the emotional brain should be studied as five functionally defined networks: elicitation (appraisal), expression, autonomic reaction, action tendency and feeling. Appraisal drives the changes and the synchronization in the other four. Synchronization is proposed to be neuronal phase or cross-frequency coupling within and between components, and feeling to emerge when it passes a threshold. No measure is given and no data are reported. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1103): in full, from the published version deposited in the Archive ouverte UNIGE (unige:109591). Worth reading as the Geneva group’s programme statement for taking the component process model into the brain. It splits the emotional brain into five functionally defined networks (elicitation, expression, autonomic reaction, action tendency, feeling). It proposes that component synchronization is neuronal phase or cross-frequency synchronization, within and between components, and repeats Scherer’s hypothesis that feeling arises when the degree of synchronization passes a threshold. It names control precedence as priority among action tendencies. It gives no measure of synchronization and reports no data of its own. |
| LIT-1474 v3 | An Action-Based Model of Cognitive-Dissonance Processes | Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Levy (2015). The action-based model extends dissonance theory by saying why inconsistency causes dissonance and its reduction. Many perceptions and cognitions impel action; the negative state of dissonance arises not from all cognitive conflict but when cognitions with action implications conflict, making it hard to act. Dissonance signals that the inconsistency must be resolved so that behaviour can proceed. Behavioural and neuroscience tests of the model are reviewed. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-24 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23/24, shared at https://chatgpt.com/share/6adc1ece-bb28-83e9-a8f6-cadf0f8b7113, where it is cited at turn U13; a reading was attempted on 2026-10-24 and failed on availability. The article is closed at SAGE (Unpaywall: not open access; OpenAlex: closed, no repository full text; Semantic Scholar: closed), and the publisher’s PDF links returned 403. Europe PMC has no record. The University of New South Wales repository (UNSWorks) holds Levy’s PhD thesis and other papers of the group but not this one, and the Western Sydney University research portal has a record with only a DOI link. Web searches found no author manuscript; the one full-text copy found is a third-party repost on an unrelated journal’s site, not a lawful source. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1478 v2 | Routines die hard: Ontological security and audience agency in securitisation | Ku & Finch (2024). Alongside the political agency the Copenhagen School grants a securitising audience, drawing on Giddens they propose ontological agency: control over the stability of one’s everyday routines, exercised to minimise disruption by securitisation. Because routines bracket anxiety, people may ignore securitising moves and emergency measures that would undermine ontological security. Unstructured observations of South Koreans’ responses to military practices securitising North Korea show latent anxiety, ranging from inaction while routines are undisturbed to emotional outbursts when they are disrupted. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1133) from the CC BY version of record; worth reading for the concept of ontological agency, an audience’s maintenance of its routines, which often means ignoring securitisation rather than accepting or contesting it. Its South Korean illustration is chance observation of routine missile launches ignored in Gangneung, and tweets of fear and blame after a malfunction under a news embargo. The authors read the inaction as coping that lets securitisation reproduce itself, with anxiety latent and its management delegated to elites, not as resistance to the security narrative. |
| LIT-1479 v3 | Anxiety as a disorder of uncertainty: implications for understanding maladaptive anxiety, anxious avoidance, and exposure therapy | Brown, Price & Dombrovski (2023; preprint 2022). A narrative review and proposal, with no new data or model run. Cognitive-behavioural accounts put exaggerated threat expectancy behind maladaptive anxiety, but the learning literature (seven computational studies, chosen without a systematic search) fits better a disorder of uncertainty learning: altered adjustment of learning rate to noise and volatility, mostly for aversive outcomes. They propose that in aversive settings avoidance of uncertain states keeps their uncertainty high and so perpetuates itself, that anxiety feeds this by misreading noise as change, and that exposure therapy works by reducing the uncertainty. For fear-based disorders, not GAD. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1120) from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central, not the typeset version of record; worth reading as the clearest statement that anxious avoidance can be kept going by uncertainty that avoidance itself leaves unreduced, with no excess of learned threat needed. A narrative review and proposal: seven computational studies, chosen without a systematic search, show altered adjustment of learning rate to uncertainty, mostly for aversive outcomes; the avoidance loop and the account of exposure are argued in words and schematic figures, not modelled or tested. For fear-based disorders; by the authors’ statement it does not explain GAD. |
| LIT-1483 v3 | The influence of anxiety on exploration: A review of computational modeling studies | Chou, Wilson & Smith (2024). A narrative review of computational modelling studies of how anxiety influences exploration, mostly in reward tasks and sub-clinical samples. In reinforcement-learning tasks directed, but not random, exploration may be raised by trait or cognitive anxiety and lowered by state or somatic anxiety; in foraging tasks anxiety is consistently associated with less exploration, including, in one study, less checking for a predator. Some differences may come from how anxiety modulates learning rates. Results are inconsistent and unreplicated, and tasks, anxiety measures and methods need to be made consistent. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1127) from the CC BY PsyArXiv preprint, not the closed version of record, whose abstract differs; worth reading as the map of how anxiety relates to exploration once both are split into kinds. In reward bandits directed exploration tends to rise with trait or cognitive anxiety and fall with state or somatic anxiety, random exploration shows no link, and in foraging, and in one task with a predator to check for, anxiety goes with less exploration. A narrative review of mostly sub-clinical, unreplicated studies with inconsistent tasks and measures. |
| LIT-1486 v2 | Target validation in dialectical behavior therapy skills group: Emotion regulation, mindfulness, and distress tolerance as mediators of outcome | Amestoy, Gulamani & Uliaszek (2025). Fifty-four university students were randomly assigned to a 12-week DBT skills group or a positive psychotherapy group. In mediation models of borderline personality disorder symptoms, impulse control and access to emotion-regulation strategies mediated the effect of group, more strongly for DBT, as did acting with awareness among the mindfulness facets; the other mindfulness facets and distress tolerance did not. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-24 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23/24, shared at https://chatgpt.com/share/6adc1ece-bb28-83e9-a8f6-cadf0f8b7113, where it is cited at turns U10 and U11; a reading was attempted on 2026-10-24 and failed on availability: no lawful full text was found. The article is closed at Taylor & Francis (the full-text page answered 403). Unpaywall and OpenAlex list no open copy; the PMC ID converter finds none for PMID 40601564; Europe PMC marks it subscription only and lists no preprint; Semantic Scholar gives no open PDF; OSF Preprints has no matching title; the University of Toronto repository (TSpace) holds other work by the first and last authors but not this article; and the last author’s faculty pages link no copy. Web searches found no author-posted version. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1492 v3 | DBT Skills Training Manual | Linehan (2014). The second edition of the treatment manual for the skills-training component of dialectical behavior therapy: how to run skills groups, and the teaching notes for the four skills modules (mindfulness, interpersonal effectiveness, emotion regulation and distress tolerance), with the handouts and worksheets published alongside. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-24 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23/24, shared at https://chatgpt.com/share/6adc1ece-bb28-83e9-a8f6-cadf0f8b7113, where it is cited at turn U9; a reading was attempted on 2026-10-24 and failed on availability: the manual is a commercial book in copyright and no lawful full copy is open. Guilford sells it (print and e-book) and offers only a sample chapter and the author’s “How to Use This Book” free, which is not the work. The Internet Archive holds a scan of the 2015 printing restricted to print-disabled users, which this client cannot borrow; a separate upload there of the handouts and worksheets is not the publisher’s and was not used. Web searches for an open copy found only sale listings, library records and download sites of unknown standing, none used. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, for example through a library. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1689 | The Concept and Psychological Consequences of Symbolic Immortality | An ANU master’s thesis in psychology testing Otto Rank’s idea that people need to feel they will transcend death, in three modes (children, an afterlife, creative work), to which Lifton added two (nature and experiential transcendence, an expansion of the self). It reviews ethnographic, ancient and modern evidence that all five modes are expressed. Then it surveys 440 Australian adults aged 18 to 88, recruited through Christian, Yoga, Spiritualist and secular groups, using vignettes rated as imagined consolation in terminal illness. Having a mode in one’s life and religious affiliation predict accepting it; education predicts accepting the modes less. The modes predict personality only weakly; Rank’s links to neuroticism and to sex differences fail. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1312), in place of LIT-1714, which could not be reached; worth reading as a review of how Rank’s and Lifton’s modes were measured by 1991, and as one survey showing that the secular modes go with accepting death as final. It is a modest test that found little; skim chapters 1, 4 and 10. |
| LIT-1690 | Group-level emotions | A short review of intergroup emotions theory by its founders. When people self-categorize as group members, the group becomes an aspect of the self and events are appraised for what they mean to the group; the resulting emotions are felt on the group’s behalf. Which emotions are felt shifts with the salient membership; members converge on a group norm for them; they need no personal involvement (guilt for others’ misdeeds); and identification moderates them, the highly identified sometimes reappraising to avoid negative group emotions. Such emotions predict collective action and treatment of out-groups (contempt more than anger predicts extreme violence) and of the in-group, and they can be regulated, which suggests interventions in intractable conflicts. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1285), in place of LIT-1722, which could not be reached; worth reading as the founders’ compact statement that an identified-with group is appraised as part of the self, with self-categorization and identification kept apart. |
| LIT-1722 | Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice | Smith (1993). Founds intergroup emotions theory: when a social identity is salient, people appraise events in terms of their group’s interests and feel emotions on its behalf, and prejudice is better understood as such group-based emotion than as an attitude. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; nothing on Smith’s Indiana pages or the volume editor’s lab site. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Smith and Mackie 2016 (LIT-1690). |
| LIT-1853 | Investigating the “Flow” Experience: Key Conceptual and Operational Issues | Abuhamdeh (2020), Frontiers in Psychology 11:158. Across 42 recent studies flow was operationalized in 24 ways: mostly as a continuous score, 17 times without enjoyment, and often mixed with its proposed conditions. He argues flow should be measured as Csikszentmihalyi defined it, a discrete, highly enjoyable optimal state distinct from its conditions, and that lesser absorption is task involvement, which is not inherently enjoyable. He rejects the view that flow is emotionless. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1429), from the open-access published article (CC BY) in PubMed Central, PMC7033418, fetched as XML through the Europe PMC REST API. A conceptual review: 42 studies from 2014–2019 operationalized flow in 24 ways, 17 of them without enjoyment. Abuhamdeh argues that flow, as Csikszentmihalyi defined it, is a discrete and highly enjoyable state, distinct from its conditions, and that ordinary absorption is task involvement, “not inherently enjoyable”. It reports the dispute the record needs: Seligman’s “absence of emotion” in flow, and Csikszentmihalyi’s own remark that flow experiences may not be “particularly pleasurable at the time”. It answers them by definition and by appraisal theory, not with data on how flow feels during the episode. |
| LIT-1854 | Positive affect as informational feedback in goal pursuit | Orehek, Bessarabova, Chen & Kruglanski (2011), Motivation and Emotion 35(1):44–51. After promising to do something for someone close, students shown positive rather than neutral pictures had a less active goal (slower lexical decision on its word; weaker stated intentions) when competing goals had been made salient, and a more active one when they had not (n = 76 and 78). Positive affect is read as information that can signal either progress or commitment, and competing goals decide which. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1450), from the open-access published article (CC BY-NC) in PubMed Central, PMC3045658, fetched as XML through the Europe PMC REST API. Two laboratory experiments (n = 76, 78) in which students promised to do something for someone close to them, then saw positive or neutral pictures. With competing goals made salient, positive affect slowed recognition of the goal word and weakened stated intentions; with none, it sped recognition and strengthened intentions. The affect was incidental, induced by pictures and not by progress, and goal activation in Experiment 1 rests on one reaction time per person. For the record, positive affect lowers a goal’s priority only when another goal competes for it, and raises it otherwise. |
| LIT-1860 | Pushing and Coasting in Dynamic Goal Pursuit: Coasting Is Attenuated in Bipolar Disorder | Fulford, Johnson, Llabre & Carver (2010), Psychological Science 21(7):1021–1027. In 21 days of experience sampling on three self-chosen goals (n = 24), progress beyond what was expected was followed by less effort on that goal and progress short of it by more. People with bipolar I disorder in remission coasted less than controls. The paper states Carver’s (2003) view that positive affect lets a goal take lower priority, but measured no affect and no shift to other goals. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1442), from a JSTOR download of the published article posted on a Boston University research group’s page (https://sites.bu.edu/amplab/files/2024/06/Goal-pursuit.pdf), a copy that counts under ADR-064. An experience-sampling study of 24 people, 12 with bipolar I disorder in remission, rating effort, progress and expected progress on three of their own goals three times a day for 21 days. Progress beyond expectation was followed by less effort on that goal (coasting) and progress short of it by more (pushing); the BD group coasted significantly less. Affect was not measured: the paper restates Carver 2003 (LIT-1445) that positive affect lets a goal take lower priority, and tests only the progress-to-effort link it predicts. |
| LIT-1872 | The Appraisal Basis of Anger: Specificity, Necessity, and Sufficiency of Components | Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits & De Boeck (2003), Emotion 3:254–269. In two studies people recalled unpleasant situations in which goal obstacle, other accountability, unfairness, control or an antagonistic action tendency was present or absent, and rated or named their emotions. Anger was associated with other accountability (specific to anger) and unfairness, but none of the components was singly necessary or sufficient for it: people were angry without each, and had each without anger. The authors propose a contingent association, with anger needing at least one of the components; no causal claim is made. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1423), from the published PDF deposited in KU Leuven’s repository Lirias (lirias.kuleuven.be/retrieve/96184). Two recall studies (110 school students, 100 university students) in which people described unpleasant situations where an appraisal or action tendency was present, or absent, and rated their emotions. Anger went with other accountability and unfairness, but no appraisal, nor the antagonistic action tendency, was singly necessary or sufficient for it; every anger report in study 2 had at least one of the components. The authors conclude for a “contingent association”. The design manipulates which memories are recalled and measures by self-report, and the authors make no causal claim. |
| LIT-1878 | On the mechanics of goal striving: Experimental evidence of coasting and shifting | Thürmer, Scheier & Carver (2019 online; Motivation Science 6(3):266–274, 2020). In a lexical decision task with a speed goal and an accuracy goal, false feedback that one goal was ahead of target lowered later performance on it (coasting) and raised it on the other (shifting), in 151 online workers and 222 students. Overshoot feedback left mood higher than undershoot feedback, and an if-then plan to ignore one’s feelings removed both effects. Small effects, one-tailed planned contrasts, and no manipulation check on the plan. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1438), from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC8022896), fetched as XML through NCBI’s E-utilities. Two online experiments with a lexical decision task and two goals, speed and accuracy. False feedback that one goal was ahead of target was followed by worse performance on that goal (coasting) and better on the other (shifting). In Experiment 1 (n = 151) the feedback moved self-rated mood; in Experiment 2 (n = 222) an if-then plan to “ignore my feelings” removed both effects. The record’s first experimental evidence that affect after running ahead lowers a goal’s hold on performance and moves it to a rival goal. Effects are small, tests one-tailed, and Experiment 2 has no check that the plan changed affect. |
| LIT-1900 | L’individuation psychique et collective: À la lumière des notions de forme, information, potentiel et métastabilité | Simondon (1989), the psychic and collective half of the 1958 thesis on individuation. As read here at second hand (LIT-1911, LIT-1901): information is the meaning that arises when an individuation resolves a disparity between two domains; affectivity and emotion mark a subject’s encounter with the pre-individual charge it has not exhausted, which it resolves by joining a collective, the transindividual. Unread. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-31, not read. The book is in copyright and sold by its publisher, and no lawful free copy is known. Open Library lists the 1989 and 2007 Aubier printings with no e-book. An Internet Archive search for creator Simondon found only other works (On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, and a school text). OpenAlex was out of its daily budget for this client. Its second half is quoted at length, in translation, by Iliadis (LIT-1911) and by Bencherki (LIT-1901). The whole thesis is translated in LIT-1648, also Unavailable. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1905 | Of Microperception and Micropolitics: An Interview with Brian Massumi, 15 August 2008 | Massumi, interviewed by Joel McKim, Inflexions 3 (2009); reprinted as ch. 2 of Politics of Affect (2015). Affect, after Spinoza and Deleuze, is an ability to affect and be affected that “governs a transition, where a body passes from one state of capacitation to a diminished or augmented state of capacitation”, and the transition is felt. Massumi offers this as “a proposition”, not “a general definition that you can apply”. Microperceptual shocks prime bodies differentially (“affective attunement”); affect “is not a content that can be transported from one event to another”; micropolitics modulates a situation’s unacted-out potential. | Active — read in full 2026-10-31 (NOTE-1488), from the journal’s own open copy at inflexions.org, HTML and PDF (20 pp.). This is the interview that Massumi’s Politics of Affect (LIT-1907) reprints as its second chapter, and it carries, word for word, the definition of affect that Bencherki, Brummans & Vézy (LIT-1902) quote from that book. Worth reading as the shortest statement of Massumi’s account of affect, microperception and micropolitics. |
| LIT-1907 | Politics of Affect | Massumi (2015), Polity. Six interviews (2002–2014) on affect and politics. Affect is the capacity to affect and be affected, a felt transition in a body’s capacities; the book builds on it “differential affective attunement”, “collective individuation”, “micropolitics” and “ontopower”. Unread beyond the publisher’s sample; its ch. 2 is read in its first printing, LIT-1905. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31, not read: no lawful full text was found. Polity gives it no DOI, and no open copy turned up in OpenAlex or web search. The publisher’s reading sample (content.e-bookshelf.de, 27 pp.: preface, contributors, sources, and the opening of ch. 1) was read. Chapter 2, where the parent’s quotations sit, first appeared as an open interview in Inflexions 3 (2009), filed and read as LIT-1905. |
| LIT-1909 | Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts | Massumi (2011), MIT Press. A process philosophy of the event, after Whitehead and James, applied to the arts: experience as occurrent, the “semblance” as the felt abstract dimension of an event, and “activist philosophy” as thought that starts in the midst of what is happening. Unread: registered from metadata and the standard citation. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31, not read: no lawful full text was found. The MIT Press Direct copy (10.7551/mitpress/7681.001.0001) is closed, and OpenAlex reports no open location. A whole-book PDF on Monoskop was not used, since an upload of a whole in-copyright book does not count (ADR-064). |
| LIT-1910 | The Principle of Unrest: Activist Philosophy in the Expanded Field | Massumi (2017), Open Humanities Press, open access. Three pieces: an interview with Krystian Woznicki on movement and capitalism (ch. 1), a filmed interview with Adrian Heathfield (ch. 2), and an essay on collective expression (ch. 3). Movement is qualitative transformation in relation; capitalism is an ontopower that captures “bare activity”; there is always “an excess of activity over action”. Micropolitics aims at “a maximally inclusive co-patterning of contrasting tendencies, co-habiting the field in a way that facilitates each fully realizing itself” (p. 64), which Massumi calls aesthetic. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-31 (NOTE-1486), from the publisher’s open-access PDF (Open Humanities Press, CC BY-SA 4.0). The passages Bencherki, Brummans & Vézy (LIT-1902) lean on were read in context and their quotation checked; most of the book was not read. A book of three long interviews and essays on movement, capitalism, micropolitics and SenseLab practice. |
| LIT-1918 | Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation | Massumi (2002), Duke University Press. Essays on movement, affect and sensation, built on “The Autonomy of Affect” (ch. 1), arguing that cultural theory must start from the body in movement and from affect as intensity rather than from positioned subjects and signification. Unread: registered from metadata and the standard citation. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31, not read: no lawful full text was found. Duke’s copy (10.1215/9780822383574) and its De Gruyter and JSTOR copies are closed, and OpenAlex reports no open location; the 2021 twentieth-anniversary edition (10.1215/9781478021971) is closed too. Only chapter 1, “The Autonomy of Affect”, sits on a course page, and a single chapter does not count (ADR-053); that essay is filed as LIT-1919. The passage the parent paper quotes (pp. 218–219) is not in that chapter. |
| LIT-1919 | The Autonomy of Affect | Massumi (1995), Cultural Critique 31:83–109. The essay that launched the “affective turn” in cultural theory, standardly cited for the claim that affect, as unqualified intensity, is distinct from emotion, which is intensity owned and qualified, and that affect is “autonomous” of meaning and signification. Unread: this summary follows the standard citation and should be checked against the text. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-31, not read. A copy of the published article (the JSTOR scan of Cultural Critique 31, pp. 83–109) sits on a faculty site, http://www.davidbardschwarz.com/pdf/massumi.pdf, a lawful copy under ADR-064. A reprint as chapter 1 of Parables for the Virtual sits on a University of Tartu course page, https://sisu.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/sites/172/massumi._the_autonomy_of_affect-1.pdf. On 2026-10-31 this session’s permission system refused the download of both, and the refusal was not worked around. JSTOR (10.2307/1354446) is closed; OpenAlex reports no open copy. A browser and a minute should reach the first address. |