Peter Kuppens, Iven Van Mechelen, Dirk J. M. Smits & Paul De Boeck (2003). Emotion 3(3), 254–269. DOI 10.1037/1528-3542.3.3.254.
Key takeaways
From the reading, NOTE-1423.
- A test of necessity and sufficiency. Componential theories assume strong links between emotions and appraisals, and some (Smith and Lazarus; Roseman and Smith; Frijda’s definition of emotion as change in action readiness) imply necessity. Instructing people to recall situations where a component was absent allows a test.
- Anger has a distinctive pattern. Other accountability (specific to anger), unfairness and, in study 2, wanting to express opposition go with anger; control does not.
- No component is necessary or sufficient. Asymmetric phi indices were well below 1 for every component, in both studies and under every dichotomization.
- At least one is needed. In study 2, every situation reported as angry had at least one of the five components present.
- Self-report throughout. The manipulation is an instruction about what to recall; appraisals, action tendency and emotion are all self-rated.
Standing in the record
Filed on 2026-10-30 for THEORY-055, Frijda’s appraisal account. Its
promote_when says correlations between appraisal reports and emotion
labels “cannot settle it”; this paper’s design is a sharper version of that
kind of evidence, not an escape from it. It carries no instruction for
machine-learning practice.