Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Social identity — the psychology of group membership — social identity and self-categorization theory, how people categorize themselves and others and when a group identity becomes salient, identification and its measurement, in-group bias and intergroup relations, rivalry, recategorization and common in-group identity, group-based emotion, crowds and fandom. What a group is, as ontology, is social-ontology; here it is how people come to see themselves and act as members (ADR-062).
63 of 2004 LIT documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| LIT-696 v2 | Towards a Theory of Collective Emotions | von Scheve & Ismer (2013), Emotion Review 5(4):406–413. Collective emotion is synchronous convergence in affective responding towards an event or object. Three literatures (face-to-face contagion and effervescence, culture and shared knowledge, social identification) are recast as bottom-up mechanisms on three levels: social cognition (shared appraisals; collectively intentional appraisals), expressive behaviour (contagion, “facial dialects”) and symbolic practice (collective memory, group-based sentiments, norms, cultural sharing). Mutual awareness and group membership amplify convergence and can turn I-mode into We-mode collective emotion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-552); worth reading as a compact map of how collective emotion has been theorised across sociology, social psychology and philosophy, and as the source of a working definition: collective emotion is synchronous convergence in affective responding across individuals towards one event or object. Shared appraisal structures give the minimal case. Mutual awareness (contagion, sharing) and group membership (identity, collective intention, norms, collective memory, sentiments) amplify it and can turn “I-mode” into “We-mode” collective emotion. A conceptual synthesis with no data, built bottom-up by methodological choice. |
| LIT-1125 v2 | Memories of ‘The Rivalry’: Differences in How Fans of the Winning and Losing Teams Remember the Same Game | Talarico (2012). Fans of the winning side of the 2008 Lafayette–Lehigh game rehearsed it more and recalled it more accurately and vividly over time than the losers’ fans, while confidence was equal. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-16, not read; a search for a lawful full text on 2026-10-29 reached none. Unpaywall lists it as closed, with no open location; the Wiley version is paywalled. A web search found no author or repository copy, only a 2012 Lafayette College event page for a talk by Talarico on the same study. Botzung et al. (2010, PMC3319676), an open study of Duke and UNC fans’ memories of one game, is the nearest open work; it is not filed. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1131 v2 | ’Who can represent the city?’ Football fandom, derby rivalry and civic identity in Shanghai | Qi (2026). From 30 interviews and online observation, rival Shanghai fan groups claim local authenticity and cosmopolitan identity against each other, and together produce the city’s derby culture. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-16, not read; set Unfetched 2026-10-29. A lawful free copy exists: the article is published open access under CC BY-NC at doi.org/10.1177/10126902261441016 (journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10126902261441016), per Unpaywall. On 2026-10-29 SAGE answered with HTTP 403 (a bot check); a web search found only an index record (metatoc.com). A human reader can likely open the SAGE copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until it is read, not on merit. |
| LIT-1133 v2 | Belonging to a community of European fans? European common in-group identity formation through football fandom | Biel (2026). Surveys in Germany, Spain, Poland and Norway find a distinct European fan identity among a substantial share of fans, associated with youth, education, attachment to Europe and international football consumption. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1299) from the CC BY published article; worth reading as the survey evidence that football fans identify with a European community of fans as well as with club and nation, and that this identification goes with trust in foreign fans and cross-border viewing but not with views of football governance. Single items, cross-sectional; its percentages use a denominator other than the analysed n. Source of THEORY-1116. |
| LIT-1138 v2 | The Social Identity Buffer: How Cognitive, Affective, and Evaluative Ties Sustain Fan Commitment and Loyalty Amidst Club Controversies | Čater (2026). Two cross-sectional studies of reactions to a hypothetical European Super League entry: cognitive identity buffers commitment best, and strong opposition to the decision weakens every buffer. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-16, not read; set Unfetched 2026-10-29. A lawful free copy exists: the article is published open access under CC BY at doi.org/10.1177/10616934261433626 (journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10616934261433626), per Unpaywall, with a further listing in COBISS (plus.cobiss.net/cobiss/si/en/bib/273845507). On 2026-10-29 SAGE answered both curl and a second fetcher with HTTP 403 (a bot check), and a web search found no other copy. A human reader can likely open the SAGE copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until it is read, not on merit. |
| LIT-1140 v2 | Fan response to the identity threat of potential team relocation | Wegner (2020). Facing a possible relocation, fans both change and resist change in what their team identity means; place identity works both for and against them, and identifying with the team does not always put team and fans in one in-group. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-16, not read; a search for a lawful full text on 2026-10-29 reached none. Unpaywall lists it as closed, with no open location. The Elsevier version (Sport Management Review 23(2), pii S1441352318303085) is paywalled. A web search found only index records (RePEc/IDEAS, EconPapers) and no author or repository copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1147 v2 | Enemies with benefits: the dual role of rivalry in shaping sports fans’ identity | Berendt (2016). A survey of 571 supporters at eight Bundesliga clubs: rivalry lowers public collective self-esteem relative to the rival’s fans but raises it relative to others, and raises perceived ingroup distinctiveness and cohesion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1303) from the authors’ accepted manuscript in the Hochschule Hannover repository (CC BY-NC-ND); worth reading as the structural model showing rivalry’s two faces for fans, less regard from the rival’s fans and more in-group distinctiveness, cohesion and regard from others, with the gains carried by perceived reciprocity of the rivalry rather than disidentification. One cross-sectional sample, N = 571, with fans who named no rival excluded. Source of THEORY-1113. |
| LIT-1150 v2 | Supporters, Followers, Fans, and Flaneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football | Giulianotti (2002). Four ideal types of football spectator, supporters, followers, fans and flâneurs, set on hot–cool and traditional–consumer axes. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1244) from the Author’s Original Text deposited in Loughborough’s repository (Figshare 9625841, CC BY-NC-ND), the pre-review version; worth reading as the standard four-type taxonomy of football spectators (supporters, followers, fans, flâneurs) on two axes, hot–cool and traditional–consumer, with a claimed historical drift towards the flâneur. Conceptual, with no data. Source of THEORY-1111. |
| LIT-1408 v4 | Intergroup Contact Theory | Pettigrew (1998). Reviews Allport’s contact hypothesis (equal status, common goals, cooperation, authority support) and names four problems: selection bias in cross-sectional studies, an expanding list of conditions that are facilitating rather than essential, no account of process, and no account of how effects generalize. Proposes four processes (learning about the outgroup, changed behaviour as the precursor of attitude change, affective ties, and ingroup reappraisal, whose outcome it calls “deprovincialization”), three sequential strategies for generalization (decategorization, salient categorization, recategorization), and a longitudinal contact theory in which Allport’s four conditions and a fifth, friendship potential, are essential and other factors facilitating. In the author’s European surveys the path from outgroup friendship to less prejudice is stronger than the reverse. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1408) in full, from an Annual Reviews PDF of the chapter on Serendip Studio, Bryn Mawr College’s science-education site (https://serendipstudio.org/oneworld/system/files/annurev.psych_.49.1.65-2.pdf); worth reading as the review that turned Allport’s contact hypothesis into a theory with four processes (learning, changed behavior, affective ties, ingroup reappraisal), a staged account of generalization and a fifth condition, friendship potential. Read it knowing that its processes are proposed rather than tested, that its causal evidence is mostly the author’s cross-sectional European surveys, that “deprovincialization” occurs once and rests on one unpublished analysis of national pride, and that its model still treats Allport’s four conditions as essential, which the 2006 meta-analysis (LIT-1413) does not bear out. |
| LIT-1677 | A comparison of minimal group induction procedures | Two small experiments with US undergraduates (N = 42 and 73) compare four ways of making minimal groups. In the classic one, participants are falsely told their painting preferences put them in a group. In the others, they imagine being assigned, are assigned at random, or only memorize five names from one group, with no categorization at all. On explicit liking and identification, and on a bonus-money allocation between two other participants, all four produced comparable in-group favouritism. On IATs of attitude (pleasant/unpleasant) and identification (self/other), only memorization produced large effects; the classic procedure produced none. Implicit and explicit favouritism correlated weakly. Explicit identification correlated with allocation favouritism (r = .37). The allocation result was carried mostly by one of the two colour groups. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1319), in place of LIT-1697, which could not be reached; worth reading as a direct test of how little it takes to make a minimal group. Merely studying a group’s names ties it to “self” on an implicit measure, and imagined or random assignment yields the same explicit favouritism as the classic procedure. Read in place of Tajfel et al. 1971 (LIT-1697, Unavailable); small samples, one college. |
| LIT-1679 | Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity | Alexander et al. (2004). Cultural trauma is not the direct effect of an event but a social construction: carrier groups narrate an event as a fundamental injury to a collective’s identity, and the claim succeeds when a wider audience takes it up. Cases include the Holocaust, slavery in African-American identity (Eyerman), and Germany after Nazism. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher. University of California Press sells it as an ebook, and no chapter is open at Project MUSE, Luminos or eScholarship. An aggregator copy at CORE was not used, since its source repository could not be traced. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Eyerman 2001, chapter 1 (LIT-1789) and Hirst, Cyr and Merck 2020 (LIT-1787). |
| LIT-1682 | Rival conceptions of rivalry: why some competitions mean more than others | Tyler & Cobbs (2015). From fan interviews and surveys, a definition of a rival as a highly salient out-group that poses an acute threat to the in-group’s identity, and a set of rivalry antecedents (conflict, peer, bias) that explain why some competitions matter more. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-29, not read; set Unfetched the same day under ADR-053: a lawful free copy exists on SSRN (papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2530260, submitted version, listed by Unpaywall). On 2026-10-29 SSRN answered HTTP 403 (a bot challenge). A human reader can likely open it. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until it is read, not on merit. |
| LIT-1685 | Trauma, prejudice, large-group identity and psychoanalysis | A memorial lecture, not a study. Volkan defines a large group as thousands or millions of people who mostly never meet but share sentiments, and pictures large-group identity as a tent’s canvas worn over each member’s individual identity, with the leader as its pole. Membership in ethnic, national and religious groups begins in childhood, through identification with parents’ investment in the group and the images and “ego tasks” they deposit in the child; after adolescence a core large-group identity cannot be changed. From unofficial dialogues between conflicting groups (1980s to early 2000s), he reports that the central psychological factor in large-group conflict is the need to protect large-group identity, and that a participant who felt that identity threatened would speak with emotion of an injury suffered by ancestors centuries before. The shared image of such an event, “real, fantasized or even mythologized”, undergoes a change of function as it passes down the generations and becomes an identity marker: a chosen trauma. Chosen traumas feed entitlement ideologies and, in a “time collapse”, make the old event feel recent, as Milošević did with Kosovo 1389, with dehumanization and purification following. Recent traumas, the Holocaust among them, are not chosen traumas but undigested ones, bound up with large-group mourning. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1250), in place of LIT-1727, which could not be reached; worth reading as Volkan’s late, short restatement of chosen trauma, its trigger in threatened identity and its distinction from the mourning of recent trauma, read in place of his 2001 paper; the evidence is his own clinical and diplomatic observation, without method or measure. |
| LIT-1686 | Being one of us. Group identification, joint actions, and collective intentionality | Salice & Miyazono (2019/2020). Group identification, as the shared-agency literature uses it, conflates adopting the group’s perspective (team reasoning) with self-transformation (understanding oneself as a member). The two dissociate: the discursive dilemma shows perspective without identification, and toddlers’ joint action shows identification before perspective-taking appears. Self-transformation is a Pushmi-Pullyu representation, describing and motivating at once (“you are a member of us; act as such”), and is not under direct rational control. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1266) from the authors’ accepted manuscript in University College Cork’s repository (CORA); worth reading as the distinction between adopting a group’s perspective and the self-transformation of identifying as a member, the second cast as a Pushmi-Pullyu representation that motivates directly, and for its team reasoner versus team benefactor, which sharpens the owner’s thesis (CLAIM-491). Conceptual. |
| LIT-1690 | Group-level emotions | A short review of intergroup emotions theory by its founders. When people self-categorize as group members, the group becomes an aspect of the self and events are appraised for what they mean to the group; the resulting emotions are felt on the group’s behalf. Which emotions are felt shifts with the salient membership; members converge on a group norm for them; they need no personal involvement (guilt for others’ misdeeds); and identification moderates them, the highly identified sometimes reappraising to avoid negative group emotions. Such emotions predict collective action and treatment of out-groups (contempt more than anger predicts extreme violence) and of the in-group, and they can be regulated, which suggests interventions in intractable conflicts. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1285), in place of LIT-1722, which could not be reached; worth reading as the founders’ compact statement that an identified-with group is appraised as part of the self, with self-categorization and identification kept apart. |
| LIT-1695 | An integrative theory of intergroup conflict | Tajfel & Turner (1979). The statement of social identity theory: people seek a positive social identity through favourable comparison of the in-group with relevant out-groups; low-status groups respond by mobility, creativity or competition depending on the permeability, stability and legitimacy of the status hierarchy. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. The Austin and Worchel volume has no Internet Archive copy, Open Library marks it no_ebook, and a copy on an unrelated organization’s library site was not used. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Scheepers and Ellemers 2019 (LIT-1772). |
| LIT-1697 | Social categorization and intergroup behaviour | Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament (1971). Schoolboys assigned to groups on trivial criteria (dot estimation; Klee versus Kandinsky) allocated money to favour anonymous in-group members over out-group members, sometimes at the cost of absolute gain: mere categorization sufficed for discrimination. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; the Sussex Henri Tajfel project page lists it without a file. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Otten 2016 (LIT-1711) and Pinter and Greenwald 2011 (LIT-1677). |
| LIT-1701 | International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma | Danieli (1998). The clinical handbook of multigenerational trauma: chapters on the descendants of Holocaust survivors, Armenian genocide survivors, Japanese-American internees, Native Americans, war veterans and others, with Danieli’s account of the “conspiracy of silence” between survivors and those around them as a route of transmission. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher; it is Springer subscription content. A 2016 article by Danieli, Norris and Engdahl that tests the handbook’s framework is posted as the APA publisher PDF on a University of Minnesota page under APA’s personal-use notice; the owner approved that route the same day, and it was read in place of the handbook. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Danieli, Norris and Engdahl 2016 (LIT-1736). |
| LIT-1703 | Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation | Markus & Kitayama (1991). A theoretical review. Cultures differ in how they construe the self. The independent construal, most clearly American and western European, is a bounded self defined by internal attributes. The interdependent construal, found in Japan and other Asian cultures but also in African, Latin American, Hindu and southern European ones, is a self defined by relationships with specific others in specific contexts: “others are included within the boundaries of the self” (p. 245), though it “does not result in a merging of self and other” (p. 228). The authors predict, and review evidence, that interdependent selves know more about others and describe themselves by context. They expect them to feel and express “other-focused” emotions (shame, sympathy, amae) more and “ego-focused” ones (anger, pride) less. They expect them to pursue achievement for others and to show modesty, not self-enhancement. They name a third option between selfishness and selflessness: “a self defined in relationship to others” (p. 247). | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1275) from the published APA scan posted by Markus on her own website (hazelmarkus.com/research); worth reading as the classic statement that cultures construe the self as more or less inclusive of others. For the owner’s thesis (CLAIM-491) it supports the premise, a self that includes others, and names the thesis’s middle term, “an alternative to selfishness … besides selflessness” (p. 247). It does not support the step to self-interest: the authors deny merging and allow “genuine, other-oriented, altruistic” motives. The evidence is mostly cross-national contrasts, often second-hand or unpublished, with culture standing in for an unmeasured construal. |
| LIT-1705 | Group Identity, Social Influence, and Collective Action Online: Extensions and Applications of the SIDE Model | An overview of the SIDE model by two of its authors. Deindividuation theory held that anonymity and immersion in a group cut self-awareness and so released antinormative behaviour. SIDE reverses this. Anonymity within a group makes whichever identity is salient more salient. When that identity is a group identity, people conform more to its local norms, and behaviour is more socially regulated, not less. A second, strategic dimension concerns anonymity to an audience: being unidentifiable to a powerful out-group frees members to act on in-group norms it would punish. The model is applied to text chat and email, webcams, online communities and online collective action. The chapter argues that online and offline action share the same predictors: shared identity, efficacy and anger at injustice. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1280), in place of LIT-1744 and LIT-1731, which could not be reached; worth reading as the SIDE model’s own authors’ statement of its cognitive and strategic dimensions and their evidence, and as the record’s second-hand access to Reicher, Spears & Postmes 1995 and Postmes & Spears 1998. |
| LIT-1709 | The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias | Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust (1993). States the common in-group identity model: the conditions of the contact hypothesis reduce bias by transforming members’ representations from “us and them” to a more inclusive “we”, with laboratory and field support. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; a second search with all five authors found abstracts only (scilit, bohrium). No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Dovidio, Gaertner et al. 2009 (LIT-1766). |
| LIT-1710 | Reducing intergroup bias: The benefits of recategorization | Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio (1989). Members of two laboratory groups induced to see themselves as one group (recategorization) or as separate individuals (decategorization) both showed less intergroup bias than those kept as two groups, by different routes: recategorization raised regard for former out-group members. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; the Princeton prejudice-reduction database has a record only. A copy on SPARQ (Stanford), not the authors’ site, was not used. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Dovidio, Gaertner et al. 2009 (LIT-1766). |
| LIT-1711 | The Minimal Group Paradigm and its maximal impact in research on social categorization | A short review of the minimal group paradigm (MGP) after 45 years. Its defining features are a novel, arbitrary and anonymous categorization in which no personal self-interest is served by the allocations. Tajfel’s first studies found that fairness guided allocations strongly, but in-group favouritism appeared reliably, and maximizing the in-group’s lead over the out-group sometimes beat maximizing its gain. The effect replicated with revised matrices. Critics say it may come from reciprocity expectations or from projecting a positive self onto the new group. It is largely confined to positive resources. When participants can also pay themselves, they take the most for themselves and still favour the in-group with what is left. The paradigm is now used mostly to study other effects of mere categorization: implicit attitudes, face processing, trust, communication. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1301), in place of LIT-1697, which could not be reached; worth reading as the record’s only account, at second hand, of what Tajfel et al. 1971 (LIT-1697, Unavailable) designed and found, and as a map of the critiques. Two of them bear on the owner’s thesis: favouritism may come from projecting the personal self onto the group, and personal gain comes first when it is on offer. |
| LIT-1719 | I Belong, therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias | Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino & Sacchi (2002). One experiment with 48 Italian students. Those who wrote about the emotions their own death aroused, rather than about reading a book, then identified more with Italians (6.19 vs 5.09), saw Italians as more of an entity (5.40 vs 4.77) and showed more in-group bias against Germans (1.01 vs 0.45), the last entirely through rating Italians higher. Identification and entitativity, which a factor analysis separates (r = .59), each mediated the effect on bias, through what they share. The authors propose, without testing it, that a group seen as a real, lasting entity lets people project themselves beyond their own death; the standard reading, defence of a worldview the group shares, is not ruled out. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1297) from the published version on co-author Yzerbyt’s UCLouvain page; worth reading as the study that joins terror management to social identity, and as the clearest statement of the idea that a group seen as a lasting entity lets the self outlive death. Read it knowing that it is one small study of an effect, mortality salience, whose replicability is now in question, and that it does not test its own proposal against the worldview-defence reading. |
| LIT-1721 | Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory | León (2023). A we-identity is one a subject has as a group member, is at times aware of, endorses, and cares about. Self-categorization theory explains we-identities by depersonalization, and phenomenologists (Zahavi, Salice) have adopted it as an account of the “we” in general. But the we-identities of close relationships arise by mutual individualization: partners grasp each other as non-substitutable and complementary. León proposes a socially extended account, drawing on Husserl and integrationist extended-mind criteria. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1309) from the open-access published article; worth reading as a philosopher’s limit on self-categorization theory: the we-identities of close relationships (long friendships, romantic partnerships) rest on mutual individualization and non-substitutability, the opposite of depersonalization, so the theory cannot be the general account of the “we” that phenomenologists have taken it to be. It proposes a socially extended account of such identities. An argument from cases and from relationship research, with no data of its own. Source of THEORY-1115. |
| LIT-1722 | Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice | Smith (1993). Founds intergroup emotions theory: when a social identity is salient, people appraise events in terms of their group’s interests and feel emotions on its behalf, and prejudice is better understood as such group-based emotion than as an attitude. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; nothing on Smith’s Indiana pages or the volume editor’s lab site. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Smith and Mackie 2016 (LIT-1690). |
| LIT-1723 | Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory | Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell (1987), Blackwell. The founding statement of self-categorization theory: personal and social identity are levels of self-categorization, a category becomes salient by meta-contrast and fit, and group behaviour follows from depersonalization, self-perception as an interchangeable exemplar of the ingroup prototype, rather than from attraction or interdependence among members. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-28; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. The Internet Archive holds the 1987 Blackwell printing (rediscoveringsoc0000turn, 266 images) only as a controlled-lending item (access-restricted), which this client cannot borrow. The book has no DOI and no open edition was found. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied: a lawful copy exists, as a lending item (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Turner et al. 1994 (LIT-1794), Skorich’s critique (LIT-1765), which quotes chapter 3 with page numbers, León (LIT-1721), Hornsey 2008 (LIT-1742) and Reimer et al. (LIT-1790). |
| LIT-1726 | Perceiving people as group members: The role of fit in the salience of social categorizations | Oakes, Turner & Haslam (1991). Subjects watching a staged discussion among arts and science students saw the arts/science categorization as most salient when the students disagreed along category lines and in the stereotype-consistent direction: comparative and normative fit together. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; UQ eSpace’s API refused the request (HTTP 403) and ANU Open Research had no match. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Spears 2021 (LIT-1771). |
| LIT-1727 | Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity | Volkan (2001). A large group’s shared mental representation of a trauma its ancestors suffered, a “chosen trauma”, is passed down the generations and becomes a marker of the group’s identity, reactivated in conflict; the Serbs’ memory of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 is his central example. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher. Volkan’s site is a parked domain, and the University of Virginia’s archive lists the paper by title only. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Volkan 2021 (LIT-1685). |
| LIT-1731 | Deindividuation and antinormative behavior: A meta-analysis | Postmes & Spears (1998). A meta-analysis of 60 studies finds little support for deindividuation as reduced self-awareness causing general antinormative behaviour; deindividuating conditions increase adherence to situation-specific group norms. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; Groningen’s Pure has the record without a file. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Spears 2021 (LIT-1771) and Spears and Postmes 2015 (LIT-1705). |
| LIT-1734 | Mental Hoop Diaries: Emotional Memories of a College Basketball Game in Rival Fans | Botzung et al. (2010). Twenty-three male Duke and UNC fans watched an archived 2001 Duke–UNC game three times in the lab, then under fMRI recalled whether each of 64 shots went in. The same shot was positive for one side and negative for the other, so valence was set by allegiance with the stimulus held fixed. Shots good for one’s own team were recalled more accurately and confidently and rated more intense. Emotional intensity, not valence, modulated amygdala, hippocampus, striatum and cortical midline regions; positive shots added dorsal fronto-parietal and sensorimotor activity. Fan groups did not differ in accuracy or intensity. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1313) from the NIH author manuscript (NIHMS176990, PMC3319676) from the PMC Cloud open-data service, cited by section; worth reading as the one study the record holds in which a fan’s allegiance alone decides whether the same remembered play is good or bad, and in which fans remember their own side’s successes better; it says nothing about how a rivalry’s history is handed on. |
| LIT-1735 | Identity fusion: The interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group behavior | Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales & Huici (2009). A single pictorial item picks out people “fused” with their country (about 40% of Spanish students): fusion is bimodal, distinct from identification and specific to one group. The fused said they would fight and die for Spain more than other members would, and challenging or activating their personal self raised that further, with no effect on the nonfused. Personal and social identity act together, against self-categorization theory’s functional antagonism. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1256) from the published version on the site of co-author Gómez’s IDENFUSION group at UNED; worth reading as the record’s closest empirical work to the owner’s thesis (CLAIM-491): a measured self–group overlap in which the personal self is kept, not depersonalized, and in which a challenge to the personal self raises willingness to fight and die for the group. Self-reported intentions, Spanish students only. |
| LIT-1736 | Multigenerational legacies of trauma: Modeling the what and how of transmission | A web survey of 422 adult children of Holocaust survivors, a convenience sample recruited through survivor and Jewish organizations, tests Danieli’s 1998 framework, Trauma and the Continuity of Self, as a path model. The children rated their parents’ posttrauma styles (victim, numb, fighter), their own “reparative adaptational impacts” and their family’s history. Parents’ Holocaust experiences, internment above all, were linked to the children’s impacts only indirectly, through the parents’ victim style, and those indirect effects were small (.05 to .06). Post-war family milieu mattered more than wartime history. Settling in Israel rather than North America, surviving grandparents, larger surviving families and religious continuity went with milder impacts. Broken generational linkages (rarely thinking of one’s murdered grandparents as one’s own, and remembering the family’s history “only in bits and pieces”) had the largest total effect, and the only direct one. There was no comparison group and every measure came from the child. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1307), in place of LIT-1701, which could not be reached; worth reading as the clinical tradition’s own quantitative test of the parenting route, and for its finding that descendants who count their murdered grandparents as their own fare better, not worse; read in place of the 1998 handbook (LIT-1701). |
| LIT-1742 | Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization Theory: A Historical Review | Hornsey (2008). A critical, historical review of the social identity approach, social identity theory and self-categorization theory, from the early 1970s: their core principles, how they were elaborated, reinterpreted and sometimes misread, their effect on the field, and their strengths and limitations. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1253) from a copy of the published article supplied by the owner; worth reading as a map that tells social identity theory (intergroup relations, positive distinctiveness, status and legitimacy) apart from self-categorization theory (levels of self-categorization, fit, depersonalization), and records the strands later dropped or softened: identification as a predictor of bias, the self-esteem hypotheses, and strict functional antagonism. An insider’s review that lists the critiques and declines to answer them. Co-source of THEORY-1114. |
| LIT-1743 | Preregistered Replication and Extension of “Moral Hypocrisy: Social Groups and the Flexibility of Virtue” | Robertson, Akles & Van Bavel (2024). Two preregistered experiments (minimal groups n = 590; partisans n = 577) did not replicate intergroup moral hypocrisy; the minimal-group contrast is statistically equivalent to zero. In minimal groups, in-group favouritism in fairness judgments rose with collective identification and was not significant overall (p = .07); partisans judged out-party members’ identical selfish acts less fair (p = .003). | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1245) from the authors’ accepted manuscript on OSF; worth reading as the record’s only preregistered evidence on minimal-group favouritism. Valdesolo and DeSteno’s intergroup moral hypocrisy did not replicate; minimal-group favouritism appeared only as it rose with identification, and partisans derogated the out-party. |
| LIT-1744 | A Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Phenomena | Reicher, Spears & Postmes (1995). The SIDE model: anonymity in a group does not remove identity, it shifts it from the personal to the social level, so people become more responsive to the salient group norm, prosocial or antisocial; strategic effects depend on visibility to the in-group and out-group. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; Groningen’s Pure and UvA-DARE have records without files. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Spears and Postmes 2015 (LIT-1705). |
| LIT-1752 | Economics and Identity | Akerlof & Kranton (2000). Adds identity, “a person’s sense of self”, to the utility function: U = U(own actions, others’ actions, I), where I depends on one’s assigned social categories, how well one’s own traits match the category’s ideal, and how far one’s own and others’ actions follow the category’s prescriptions. Violating one’s prescriptions costs utility (Is); others’ violations cost it too (Io), and the loser may pay to “respond”, harming the violator. A two-person game shows when such responses deter. Applied to occupational segregation by sex, to “oppositional” identities chosen by the socially excluded, and to wives who earn more yet still do most of the housework, it yields predictions standard models do not. Evidence is illustrative: ethnographies, a 70-household vignette survey, census shares and a Panel Study of Income Dynamics regression. Identity is modelled as self-image to be maintained, not as concern for a group’s welfare. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1311) from the journal’s typeset text deposited in Duke University’s repository DukeSpace (hdl.handle.net/10161/1993; Unpaywall labels it the submitted version, but it carries the journal’s pagination and copyright line), fetched through the repository’s own API; worth reading as the founding statement of identity economics: identity as self-image in the utility function, with prescriptions and identity externalities, applied to gender at work, exclusion and the household. Read it knowing that its evidence is illustrative, that two of its models are solved only in appendices “available from the authors upon request”, and that the self it puts in utility is a self-image to be kept, not a self that takes in the group’s welfare. |
| LIT-1755 | The Psychology of Rivalry: A Relationally Dependent Analysis of Competition | Kilduff, Elfenbein & Staw (2010). Rivalry is a subjective competitive relationship that raises the psychological stakes of competing with one opponent, independently of objective stakes. Across 71 NCAA basketball teams, half the variance in rated rivalry belongs to the pair, not either team; rivalry grows with proximity, similarity, games played and above all a history of even contests, is largely reciprocated, and goes with bigger crowds and slightly better defence. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1292) from the published version on first author Kilduff’s NYU Stern pages; worth reading as evidence that rivalry belongs to the pair of competitors (half its variance) and to their history of even contests, and that it is mostly reciprocated, which bears on CASE-098 and QUESTION-298. |
| LIT-1757 | Who is this “We”? Levels of collective identity and self representations | Brewer & Gardner (1996). Distinguishes three levels of self-representation, personal, relational (interpersonal) and collective (group), each with its own basis of self-worth and frame of reference, and shows that priming “we” shifts self-descriptions and social comparison. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; nothing on Ohio State or Northwestern pages; only a Scribd copy, not used. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Brewer 2007 (LIT-1775). |
| LIT-1758 | Second-Person Engagement, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification | Zahavi (2016/2019) reconstructs and defends Husserl’s empathy-based account of the “we” against Heidegger and Hans Bernhard Schmid. Truly social acts need a second-person relation: an I–Thou relation of reciprocal, communicative address, in which I am aware of the other and of myself as addressed by them. Taking over the other’s perspective on oneself, a self-apprehension Husserl calls “self-alienation”, lets the difference between self and other stay present but be “somewhat downplayed”, and that is a formal condition of coming to see oneself as “one of us”. A we is “not an enlarged I”: it preserves plurality and is not fusion. Zahavi likens the condition to self-categorization theory’s self-stereotyping, while noting that Husserl attends far more to the interpersonal encounter beneath it. Against Schmid he argues that the sense of “us” can be analysed, that not every social relation is a we, and that children’s self-awareness precedes their in-group bias. He concedes that an account built on the dyadic face-to-face “we” does not cover anonymous, institutional “we”s. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1289) from the peer-reviewed accepted manuscript in the University of Copenhagen’s repository (curis.ku.dk); worth reading as the phenomenologist’s case that coming to see oneself as one of us is a change in how one apprehends oneself, through another’s eyes, and that the resulting “we” is a plurality, not an enlarged I. |
| LIT-1765 | Reconceptualizing Individuals, Categories, and the Social Group: Self-Categorization Theory 2.0 | Skorich (2025, v2 2026), preprint. Five critiques of self-categorization theory as stated in Turner et al. 1987: categorization into equivalence classes is neither sufficient nor necessary for perceiving a group as an entity; “self-categorization” is underspecified and should mean categorization of intentional agents; the person level is underexamined; meta-contrast is computationally intractable as a basis for entity formation and rests on prototype semantics; and comparative relations are overemphasized. Proposes SCT2.0 (self-conceptualization theory): groups are perceived from cues to collective intentionality, and represented as atomic concepts with object files in a language of thought. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1295) from the PsyArXiv preprint, v2; worth reading as a sympathetic insider’s critique of self-categorization theory that quotes the 1987 book’s chapter 3 assumptions and hypotheses verbatim with page numbers, so it stands in for the unread book’s core statement. It argues that categorization yields interchangeability, not a group entity; that meta-contrast is computationally intractable as a basis for entity formation; and that groups are perceived from cues to collective intentionality. Unreviewed; its key experiments are under review. Source of THEORY-1112. |
| LIT-1766 | Recategorization and Prosocial Behavior: Common In-Group Identity and a Dual Identity | A review of the common in-group identity model applied to helping. Recategorizing two groups as one removes in-group bias in helping: in a laboratory study, help to an original out-group member rose to the in-group level; at a football stadium, White fans complied with a Black interviewer’s request more often when he wore their university’s hat (59% vs 36%). Commons-dilemma studies show the same for cooperation. But the form of the shared identity matters. White students helped a Black student least when he called himself a Black person or a Black Colgate student (a dual identity), and most when he called himself a Colgate student. In the second study, empathic concern partly mediated that effect on helping; attitudes did not. The authors trace the dual identity’s cost to majority members projecting their group’s standards onto the superordinate category, and to identity threat. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1286), in place of LIT-1710 and LIT-1709, which could not be reached; worth reading as the model’s authors’ own account of how an enlarged “we” extends helping across group lines, with the qualification that the “we” which helps is the helper’s version of it. |
| LIT-1767 | Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 1: The effects of intergroup relations as mediated by social change and frame of reference | Haslam et al. (1992), the “Iraq” study. Australian students’ stereotypes of Americans changed with the comparison set (the Soviet Union, Britain, Iraq) and over the course of the Gulf War: the content of a category is constructed relative to the frame of reference. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; UQ eSpace’s API refused the request (HTTP 403) and ANU Open Research had no match. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). A search on 2026-10-29 for an open work that reports it found none: Spears 2021 (LIT-1771), the nearest review, does not cite it. |
| LIT-1771 | Social Influence and Group Identity | A review, by one of the SIDE model’s authors, of the self-categorization account of social influence. Group influence is not only compliance for approval (normative influence). Because a group can be a level of the self, influence from in-group members can be true private acceptance (“referent informational influence”). Classic findings are reread this way: Asch and Sherif conformity, Milgram obedience, minority influence, emergency crowds, bystander helping, emotional contagion and riots. Influence is moderated by identification, prototypicality, intergroup threat and context. Isolation and visual anonymity strengthen group influence rather than weakening it, as the SIDE model predicts. Crowd members do not lose the self; they switch to a group identity. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1268), in place of LIT-1726 and LIT-1731, which could not be reached; worth reading as the most recent overview, by an author of the SIDE model, of how self-categorization theory treats influence, norms and deindividuation, and as the record’s second-hand access to Postmes & Spears 1998. |
| LIT-1772 | Social identity theory | A textbook chapter. Social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from knowledge of membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value or emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978). The theory has two parts. In the first, categorization is always self-relevant, and the motive for a positive social identity drives comparison with out-groups. That identity serves needs for certainty, self-esteem and meaning. In the second, members of low-status groups choose individual mobility, collective action or social creativity, depending on the permeability of group boundaries and the legitimacy and stability of status differences. Identification has cognitive, affective and behavioural components. Applications: identification improves health behaviour and buffers stress; at work it matters more than instrumental interdependence and motivates volunteers. An imagined common in-group raised Italian children’s willingness to help an immigrant classmate. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1315), in place of LIT-1695, which could not be reached; worth reading as a current statement of social identity theory by two of its principal researchers, read in place of Tajfel & Turner 1979 (LIT-1695, Unavailable). It is the record’s clearest source that the theory builds caring into the definition of social identity while measuring it as a separate component. Uncritical, with no effect sizes. |
| LIT-1775 | Social Identity and Close Relationships: What is the Connection? | Brewer argues that close relationships and group memberships are two distinct forms of social identity, each a way the individual self is extended to include others: the relational self is personalized (particular, non-interchangeable others), the collective self depersonalized (a symbolic group). They are not two routes to one need for belonging. Measures of group and interpersonal attachment (r = .46 and .33) and of loneliness separate them, and men and women weight them differently. She models each level as a regulatory system balancing opposed needs (uniqueness and similarity; autonomy and intimacy; separation and inclusion), with transfer between them. The model predicts two collectivisms: relational collectivists draw tight in-group boundaries, while individualists identify more readily with large inclusive groups. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1290), in place of LIT-1757, which could not be reached; worth reading as the tripartite self’s author restating it in her own words, with the claim that both relationships and groups extend the self, in two different ways. |
| LIT-1780 | Social Identity Theory’s Self-Esteem Hypothesis: A Review and Some Suggestions for Clarification | Rubin & Hewstone (1998) review over 40 studies of social identity theory’s self-esteem hypothesis, in Hogg and Abrams’s two corollaries: successful intergroup discrimination raises self-esteem (1), and low or threatened self-esteem motivates discrimination (2). They sort the measures by three distinctions, global or specific, personal or social, trait or state, and argue the theory implies specific social state self-esteem, while most studies used global personal trait measures such as Rosenberg’s scale. Counting experiments, 18 support and 13 do not support corollary 1, but only 7 support and 28 do not support corollary 2; only one of eight full tests supports both. Nine studies find people with high personal self-esteem the most discriminatory, the reverse of corollary 2. So discrimination seems to raise self-esteem without being motivated by a need for it, which leaves the theory’s motivational explanation without support. The authors attribute this to imprecision and propose a version in specific social state self-esteem, which the two studies that measured it support. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1278) from the authors’ final version self-archived in the University of Newcastle (Australia) repository (figshare 28979180); worth reading as the review that both sides of the record’s self-esteem disagreement cite, and as the evidence on whether group-serving bias is motivated by the esteem of a social self. |
| LIT-1783 | Empathy, Altruism, and Group Identification | A conceptual paper. It takes Cialdini et al.’s claim that empathy-induced helping is due to self-other merging and asks what “merging” could coherently mean. May argued that every reading either attributes absurd beliefs or fails to explain helping. The authors answer that merging is group identification: in empathizing with Y, X comes to conceive of Y as part of X’s social self, so Y’s welfare becomes constitutive of “our” welfare. They argue that this reading is behaviourally adequate, because it explains Batson’s results in the same way as minimal-group favouritism, and psychologically plausible, because it posits a non-doxastic self-representation rather than a belief in being two bodies. Helping so motivated is then altruistic at the individual level and egoistic at the group level. The empirical dispute with Batson et al. (1997) is set aside. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1277), in place of LIT-1728 and LIT-1700, which could not be reached; worth reading as the only work in the record that states the owner’s thesis for empathic helping in a precise form: concern for another’s welfare is non-instrumental, and that welfare is constitutive of the helper’s first-person plural welfare. It offers no measure of group identification apart from empathy. |
| LIT-1786 | Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification | In-group identification has five components on two correlated dimensions. Group-level self-definition is individual self-stereotyping (seeing oneself as like the average member) and in-group homogeneity; group-level self-investment is solidarity, satisfaction and centrality. In confirmatory factor analyses of Dutch, European and university identification in two cohorts (N = 464, 363), this model fit better than one-factor, two-factor and cognitive-versus-affective alternatives; the two dimensions correlated .61 to .77. Prospectively, the components predicted different things: centrality predicted perceived threat, homogeneity perceived intergroup difference, and, facing evidence of their group’s misdeeds, self-stereotyping predicted group-based guilt while satisfaction and centrality predicted legitimizing the misdeeds. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1262), in place of LIT-1795, which could not be reached; worth reading as the direct test of whether identification splits into a self-definition and a caring dimension: it does, and they can work against each other. |
| LIT-1787 | Witnessing and cultural trauma: the role of flashbulb memories in the trauma process | Hirst, Cyr and Merck (2020). An essay joining Alexander’s trauma process to the psychology of flashbulb memory. People who learned of an event at a distance keep vivid, confident memories of where they were, and these let them claim to have been “there” and to testify, like eyewitnesses, to what it was like. Such memories are community-specific and can be community-defining, so where nearly everyone holds one, carrier group and audience coincide and the trauma process can start among equals. The memories are inaccurate in detail but held with high confidence, which is what makes them count. They pass to children: in a study of children young at the time of 9/11, 89% could report a parent’s flashbulb memory, and those who identified more strongly as American knew it better. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1305), in place of LIT-1679, which could not be reached; worth reading as the one work in the record that ties knowing a parent’s memory of a public trauma to the child’s identification with the group. |
| LIT-1789 | Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity | Eyerman (2001), chapter 1 read. Cultural trauma is not a wound to individuals but “a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric” of a group, which need not be felt or experienced by all its members. Slavery became the trauma of African Americans “in retrospect”: after the failure of Reconstruction, a generation that had not been enslaved made its memory the “primal scene” of a new collective identity, against a white memory of slavery as benign. Membership was set by a shared fate, not shared experience or descent. Carrier groups, chiefly intellectuals and social movements, articulate the trauma; each social generation reworks the memory; it moved from group memory to national memory only with the civil rights movement. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1246), in place of LIT-1679, which could not be reached; worth reading as the chapter that states the cultural trauma framework for slavery, and says plainly that the injured collective self is fixed by shared fate, not by descent or experience. |
| LIT-1790 | Self-categorization and social identification: Making sense of us and them | Reimer, Schmid, Hewstone and Al Ramiah (2020), preprint of a textbook chapter. Self-categorization is social categorization applied to oneself, hierarchical in level and situational in salience (accessibility × fit); social identification is multidimensional (Ashmore et al.’s seven components); social identity theory explains in-group bias by positive distinctiveness, moderated by status, permeability, stability and legitimacy; and multiple categorization (crossed, common in-group, dual identity, in-group projection, complexity) predicts when bias falls. It concludes that identity processes alone do not explain negative intergroup attitudes. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1251) from the authors’ PsyArXiv preprint of a textbook chapter; worth reading as a plain, current exposition of the social identity perspective: self-categorization (accessibility, comparative and normative fit, depersonalization), Ashmore et al.’s seven dimensions of social identification, social identity theory’s minimal-group and status findings, and the multiple categorization models (crossed categorization, common in-group, dual identity, in-group projection, social identity complexity). A secondary source; its account of self-categorization theory is two pages. |
| LIT-1791 v2 | Explaining the nature of power: a three-process theory | Turner (2005). Reverses the standard theory of power: group formation produces influence (persuasion, through shared identity and prototypicality), influence is the basis of power (persuasion, authority, coercion), and power produces control of resources, rather than resources producing power. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-29, not read; set Unfetched the same day under ADR-053: the publisher’s own free copy exists (Unpaywall: bronze, onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/ejsp.244). On 2026-10-29 Wiley answered HTTP 403, and again on 2026-10-30, when the 403 came with a Cloudflare challenge (cf-mitigated: challenge), which was not retried. The copy in ANU Open Research, the Australian National University’s repository, is restricted until 2037, so it is no lawful free copy now. A human reader can likely open the Wiley copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until it is read, not on merit. Free copy: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/ejsp.244. |
| LIT-1793 | Cultural trauma and epigenetic inheritance | Lehrner & Yehuda (2018). Connects the sociology of cultural and historical trauma, shared by groups such as indigenous peoples and Holocaust survivors’ communities, with biological findings on intergenerational effects, and argues that a group’s narratives about its trauma and any biological transmission interact in how descendants come to carry it. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher; it is not in PMC, Cambridge Core is paywalled, and Mount Sinai Scholars lists it without a file. The authors’ open restatement of 2018 (Yehuda, Lehrner and Bierer, Environmental Epigenetics, PMC6051458) was refused this client: Oxford’s PDF by a Cloudflare challenge, the PMC page by a reCAPTCHA, Europe PMC with HTTP 500, and NCBI’s E-utilities because the publisher does not allow full-text XML. So no work was read in its place. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). |
| LIT-1794 | Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context | Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty (1994). Self-categorization theory’s account of self and collective: personal and social identity are different levels of self-categorization, the emergent properties of group processes come from a shift in self-perception from the one to the other, and self-categories are inherently variable and context dependent because they are social comparative and relative to a frame of reference. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1284) from a scan of the published article supplied by the owner; worth reading as the shortest statement, by its authors, of self-categorization theory’s view of the self: personal and social identity are equally authentic levels of self-categorization, salience is readiness times fit (metacontrast and normative fit), and the level, kind, content and prototype of self-categories vary with the comparative frame. It goes on to speculate that the self is generated in context rather than stored. A theoretical paper whose evidence is the group’s own studies, reported without data. Source of THEORY-1114. |
| LIT-1795 | An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality | Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe (2004). Proposes that collective identity has separable elements, self-categorization, evaluation, importance, attachment and interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioural involvement and content and meaning, which need not covary, and reviews their measures. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists no open copy and an exact-title web search found none posted by an author or publisher; nothing on Rutgers or CUNY pages. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Leach et al. 2008 (LIT-1786). |
| LIT-1796 | Many Labs 4: Failure to Replicate Mortality Salience Effect With and Without Original Author Involvement | A preregistered multisite replication of Study 1 of Greenberg et al. (1994), the standard mortality-salience test: writing about one’s own death, against writing about watching television, was to raise preference for a pro-US over an anti-US essay author. Seventeen US university labs contributed 1,550 usable participants. Seven ran a protocol designed with the original authors; ten built their own. The pooled effect was Hedges’ g = 0.07 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.17), against the original d = 1.34, and no exclusion rule, protocol type or subset of TMT-knowledgeable labs produced a significant effect. Effects did not vary across labs more than chance allows, so the test of whether expert involvement helps replication was left without an effect to act on. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1322), in place of LIT-1687, which could not be reached; worth reading as the best-powered direct test of terror management theory’s worldview-defense prediction, and as the fullest record of how its original authors think the effect must be produced. |
| LIT-1829 | Extended Contact Effects: Is Exposure to Positive Outgroup Exemplars Sufficient or Is Interaction With Ingroup Members Necessary? | Cernat (2011), The Journal of Social Psychology 151(6), 737–753. An experiment with 108 Romanian students, who read the same story of a close friendship between a Roma and either a Romanian (ingroup member) or a Bulgarian (another outgroup), against a control. Per the abstract, the outgroup–outgroup story was enough to improve attitudes toward Roma and reduce intergroup anxiety; the ingroup–outgroup story had stronger and broader effects, mediated by group emotions rather than anxiety or norms. Every arm receives information; none takes part. Unread. | Unfetched — searched 2026-10-29 for a lawful full text; one appears to exist but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The ResearchGate publication page (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/51971721_Extended_Contact_Effects_Is_Exposure_to_Positive_Outgroup_Exemplars_Sufficient_or_Is_Interaction_With_Ingroup_Members_Necessary) is indexed by web search with text from the article’s method section (sample, sex and age, and the three conditions’ sizes), so it seems to carry the full text as an upload, which counts under the owner’s ruling of 2026-10-29; it returned 403 to curl and to WebFetch. The publisher’s page (tandfonline.com) returned 403 and is subscription-only; Europe PMC lists only the subscription DOI, Semantic Scholar marks it closed, the Princeton prejudice-reduction database’s pages returned 403, and no course, faculty or academia.edu copy was found. OpenAlex was over its shared daily budget and was not consulted. A browser fetch of the ResearchGate copy is the cheapest way to read it. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1831 v2 | Can Social Contact Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria | Scacco & Warren (2018), APSR 112(3). 849 randomly sampled Christian and Muslim young men in Kaduna, Nigeria, were randomized to a sixteen-week computer course or a survey-only control, then to a mixed or single-religion class and to a same- or other-religion partner. Four to six weeks after it, no arm changed stated prejudice, but the course raised giving to everyone, and mixed classes discriminated less than single-religion classes in a dictator game (about 70% less) and a destruction game. Against the control, the single-religion classes discriminated more and the mixed classes about the same. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1418) in full, from the published version deposited by the WZB on EconStor (https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/194860/1/f-21548-full-text-Scacco-et_al-Contact-v3.pdf); worth reading as a randomized field test of intergroup contact in a conflict city that measured attitudes and behaviour separately and found that sixteen weeks of cooperative contact left stated prejudice unchanged while reducing discrimination in two incentivized games. Read it knowing that its behavioural measures are games played at home four to six weeks after the course, that the contact effect is mostly a rise in discrimination in the single-religion classes rather than a fall in the mixed ones, that the effect on unfamiliar out-group members holds only for Christians, and that its “pre-analysis plan” was registered in August 2015, after the endline survey, though before the authors had the outcome data. |
| LIT-1836 v2 | Can we really reduce ethnic prejudice outside the lab? A meta-analysis of direct and indirect contact interventions | Lemmer & Wagner (2015), EJSP 45(2). 129 comparisons from 73 evaluations of contact programmes run in schools, universities and other field settings. In controlled designs, attitudes improve by g = 0.28 immediately (k = 79) and 0.23 one to twelve months later (k = 8). Direct and indirect programmes do not differ (0.29 against 0.23); among subtypes, extended contact through stories of cross-group friendship gives 0.42 (k = 8) and virtual contact 0.08, not significant. Effects are larger for majorities and reach the whole outgroup. No study measured behaviour. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1419) in full, from the authors’ accepted manuscript (“In press: European Journal of Social Psychology”) posted on bildung-diversity.ch (https://bildung-diversity.ch/fileadmin/dokumente/Can_We_Really_Reduce_Ethnic_Prejudice_Outside_the_Lab.pdf); worth reading as the meta-analysis of contact interventions run outside the laboratory, which separates direct (face-to-face) from indirect (extended and virtual) programmes and finds them about equally effective on ethnic attitudes. Read it knowing that the comparison of types is between studies, not within them; that “indirect” pools extended contact, which is reading or watching stories of cross-group friendship, with virtual contact, which is online interaction and showed no effect in the stronger designs; that every outcome is a self-reported attitude, since the authors found no behavioural studies to include; and that the copy is the manuscript, not the typeset article, whose tables were not compared with it. |
| LIT-1855 | Relevance of social categories, depersonalization and group processes: two field tests of self-categorization theory | Voci (2006), European Journal of Social Psychology 36(1):73–90. By its abstract (the only source used here): two field studies, of football fans and of employees, with new meta-contrast-based measures of comparative fit and depersonalization, report that fit drove ingroup bias and other outcomes through depersonalization, and only when the category was highly accessible. Expected to supply field evidence for THEORY-1114’s metacontrast-to-depersonalization chain, and, through its football fans, a case for CLAIM-493. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-30, not read. The publisher’s own free copy exists (bronze): onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/ejsp.259. On 2026-10-30 Wiley answered HTTP 403 with a Cloudflare challenge (cf-mitigated: challenge). The challenge was not retried. A human reader can likely open it. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. Free copy: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/ejsp.259. |
| LIT-1862 | Contrast effects in stereotype formation and change: the role of comparative context | Wyer, Sadler and Judd (2002), Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38(5):443–458. Unread, and no abstract was available, so nothing is said here of its content beyond its title: contrast effects in forming and changing stereotypes, and the role of comparative context. Expected to supply, for THEORY-1114, evidence on whether a group’s stereotype shifts with the comparative frame, from authors outside the self-categorization group. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-30, not read. A lawful green copy was located in the University of Plymouth’s repository, PEARL: https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/context/psy-research/article/1866/viewcontent/wyer_sadler_judd_2002.pdf (also reached through hdl.handle.net/10026.1/2959). On 2026-10-30 that address redirected (HTTP 302) to pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?…, which answered HTTP 403 with a Cloudflare challenge (cf-mitigated: challenge). The challenge was not retried. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. Free copy: pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/context/psy-research/article/1866/viewcontent/wyer_sadler_judd_2002.pdf. |
| LIT-2002 v2 | Human cooperation is strong among individuals but fragile between groups | Van Lange & Bergmann (2026), doi:10.1038/s44159-026-00580-z. A Perspective. Cooperation is strong in dyads and fragile between groups. Categorization alone yields mistrust and in-group favouritism by bounded reciprocity. Only conflicting interests, real or perceived, turn that into costly competition and hate, and the processes that build in-group cooperation can fuel intergroup conflict. Source of THEORY-1352, read in NOTE-1537. | Active |