Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Phenomenal unity — the unity of experience — what makes simultaneous experiences one subject’s, and how a self-model or a perspective binds them. One of four unities kept apart (group: philosophy; ADR-024).
3 of 371 QUESTION documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| QUESTION-046 v2 | What criterion, applied the same way to a modular mind and to an organized group, would say whether an organized whole is a subject of experience and not only an agent? | Filed in the fourth synthesis pass to give readings no question asked for a place in the argument. It bears on CLAIM-165, CLAIM-155, CLAIM-003 and QUESTION-032. THEORY-043 and THEORY-063 answer it in part; the body gives each one’s limit. | Open |
| QUESTION-254 v6 | What separates an interpretive organization that constitutes an experiential perspective from one that only processes information, or only represents a perspective, when the separation must not require an episode’s current contents to be veridically constrained by their referents, must not be drawn from the verdict it gives on groups and machines, and must justify the queries, interventions and timescales by which it individuates a perspective without appeal to the phenomenal unity it is meant to explain? | The question the exchange of 2026-10-21 ended each pass on. A3: “What differentiates an interpretation that merely processes information from an interpretation that constitutes a perspective?” A5 proposed it for this line. A6 sharpened it to a class of realized organizations “whose identity and unity are invariant under changes in sensory grounding”, distinguished from systems “that merely simulate or report the same interpretations”. The grounding condition is narrowed here to current veridical grounding, as CLAIM-413 states it, and the question asks for the targets of individuation to be justified too. It narrows QUESTION-046 to the constitutive thesis, CLAIM-412. An answer is that thesis’s missing sufficiency condition, which CLAIM-411 presses. | Open |
| QUESTION-255 v6 | Can an empirical model that genuinely fails to glue, under a specified cover and correspondence between its contexts, take part in one phenomenally unified process, given that a unified experience can contain conflicting interpretations or demands and that such conflicts are not by themselves gluing obstructions? | A7 §10 of the exchange of 2026-10-21, after A6 found a sheaf-theoretic account of global phenomenal unity. The record’s self line already reads a coherent self as a global section (CLAIM-153), and conflict without an overlap as no disunity (CLAIM-198). A7 denied that experiential unity is “the existence of one globally consistent assignment of interpretations”: “the conflict itself can be a unified experience”, and a global assignment “could exist in a merely descriptive model without any corresponding unified process”. A review of 2026-10-22 corrected the example: a felt conflict need not be a gluing failure, since one global state can hold both sides. The question is whether a model that genuinely fails to glue, under a cover and correspondence fixed independently, can be part of one unified experience. | Open |