Villalobos, M. & Cea, I. (2026). The explanatory ground of the brainbound view of consciousness: A reply to enactive embodied externalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-026-10217-4.
Not read: no lawful copy was reached on 2026-10-22 (see the status note). No abstract was reached either, so the summary rests on the title and on the exchange’s description, and is unchecked.
Why this is here
The owner’s exchange of 2026-10-21, “Experience and interpretation”, asked whether experience is constituted by interpretation or produced by it. The exchange cited this reply for its defence of brain-centred explanation against the enactivist objection that a disembodied brain is physiologically implausible: the neuroscientific strategy is contrastive, and does not need the envatted brain to be possible. That bears on the brain-in-a-vat premise of CLAIM-413.