nucleation

embodied-cognition

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106 items with this tag.

Oct 31, 2026
LIT-1908: Always More Than One: Individuation's Dance
Oct 31, 2026
LIT-1918: Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation
Oct 30, 2026
LIT-1851: Nonequilibrium phase transitions in coordinated biological motion: critical fluctuations
Oct 30, 2026
LIT-1873: Dynamics governs switching among patterns of coordination in biological movement
Oct 30, 2026
QUESTION-342: In an independent replication of the 2 × 2 removal of shared music and of visual contact in dancing dyads, or a reanalysis of the public data under another movement decomposition, do the music-driven and partner-driven components stay distinct with an equivalence test bounding their interaction near zero, and does a temporal measure other than periodicity (phase lags, directional measures) still fail to tell them apart while a spatial one succeeds?
Oct 30, 2026
THEORY-1227: Haken, Kelso and Bunz model the switch of rhythmic bimanual coordination from anti-phase to in-phase at a critical frequency as the loss of one stable state of an order parameter, relative phase, derived from two coupled oscillators; Kelso, Scholz and Schöner report the variability of relative phase rising before the switch in the anti-phase pattern only, in a few subjects and with no statistical test
Oct 29, 2026
THEORY-1119: Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde propose that minimal agency requires individuality, interactional asymmetry and normativity set by the system's own organisation, each necessary and together, they say, sufficient; that individuality without the other two is not agency; and that a system optimizing an externally fixed function is not a model of agency
Oct 29, 2026
THEORY-1166: Di Paolo argues that autopoiesis as originally defined entails conservation and not active homeostasis, so it gives a system only an all-or-nothing norm, to go on or to die, which an observer and not the system can use; that a graded norm the system itself has needs adaptivity, a capacity to detect tendencies toward the boundary of its viability and to act so as to reverse them; and that sense-making and agency need adaptivity
Oct 29, 2026
THEORY-1194: Clark and Chalmers argue that if belief is individuated by functional role, an external store that is constantly consulted, directly available and automatically endorsed can carry a standing belief, so that the material vehicles of some mental states extend beyond the skin; the step from coupling to parthood rests on that premise and on a parity principle they state rather than argue
Oct 23, 2026
CASE-149: Dancing to the same or different music, seen or unseen: in dyads facing each other, shared music and visual contact were removed independently, and each synchronized different movements of the pair
Oct 23, 2026
LIT-1424: The geometry of interpersonal synchrony in human dance
Oct 23, 2026
THEORY-891: In dyads of untrained dancers facing each other, shared music and visual contact each raised interpersonal movement synchrony, with no interaction detected, in different movement components: lateral and hand movements synchronized through seeing the partner, anteroposterior movements such as head bobs through the shared music, and vertical bounce through both; which factor drove a component's synchrony was classified from its spatial direction and not from the periodicity of the synchrony
Oct 22, 2026
CASE-130: Gracie jiu-jitsu against luta livre: two Brazilian grappling traditions whose contests were fought over the rules as well as under them, and whose matches placed them in a racial hierarchy as well as ranking them by results
Oct 22, 2026
CASE-136: The doorway effect: memory for an object carried through a doorway into another room is worse than after walking as far within one, returning to the first room does not restore it, and outside the original laboratory's set-up the effect has not always appeared
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 22, 2026
LIT-1377: A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus
- social-science
- embodied-cognition
Oct 22, 2026
LIT-1384: Walking through Doorways Causes Forgetting: Further Explorations
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 22, 2026
LIT-1391: The Unspoken Whiteness of Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu: The Gracies versus Luta Livre
- social-science
- embodied-cognition
Oct 22, 2026
LIT-1392: Walking through doorways causes forgetting: Situation models and experienced space
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 22, 2026
QUESTION-256: What forms of continuity must a person keep to remain capable of governing changes in their own practical organization, and which of those forms can other processes, other people or the environment supply?
Oct 22, 2026
THEORY-874: Whether a view of mind is organicist or informationalist is a dimension orthogonal to whether it is cognitivist or embodied, and the enactive approach of The Embodied Mind is set apart from other embodied views by organicism with experiential primacy and reciprocity, not by sensorimotor emphasis
Oct 22, 2026
THEORY-876: Phenomenal consciousness is the coherent functioning of an embodied agent's generative model of its sensorium, coherent in space, time and cause and run either coupled to sense data (perception) or decoupled from it (imagination); embodied grounding, the model's capacity to inform and be informed by action–perception cycles at behavioural timescales and the history of such coupling by which it was learned, is necessary, so that integrated information or a functional global workspace without it does not suffice
- consciousness
- embodied-cognition
Oct 21, 2026
CLAIM-413: Grounding is not a property of an experience but a relation among an interpretation, what it purports to be about, and a process that constrains it independently; its current, developmental and epistemic senses come apart from one another, and in the current sense it comes apart from whether the interpretation occurs, so ungrounded is not unconstrained, and what makes an interpretive organization experiential need not be what makes its contents veridical
Oct 21, 2026
LIT-1345: Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) and the Human Consciousness Hypothesis (HCH)
- consciousness
- embodied-cognition
Oct 21, 2026
LIT-1350: The explanatory ground of the brainbound view of consciousness: A reply to enactive embodied externalism
- embodied-cognition
- consciousness
Oct 21, 2026
LIT-1356: What Is Enactivism?
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1264: No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusion
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1266: Where exactly am I? Self-location judgements distribute between head and torso
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1267: Reply to: No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusion
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1268: No causal link between changes in hand position sense and feeling of limb ownership in the rubber hand illusion
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1271: Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1272: Explaining Away the Body: Experiences of Supernaturally Caused Touch and Touch on Non-Hand Objects within the Rubber Hand Illusion
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1273: Moving a Rubber Hand that Feels Like Your Own: A Dissociation of Ownership and Agency
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1275: What is embodiment? A psychometric approach
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1276: Demand Characteristics Confound the Rubber Hand Illusion
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1280: Serious Problems With Interpreting Rubber Hand “Illusion” Experiments
Oct 20, 2026
LIT-1281: The Rubber Hand Illusion: Feeling of Ownership and Proprioceptive Drift Do Not Go Hand in Hand
Oct 20, 2026
QUESTION-235: When looking and holding are priced independently and timed per person, do people still prefer re-fetching information that stays in view where it costs more total time?
- embodied-cognition
- cognition
Oct 20, 2026
THEORY-765: Brushing a seen rubber hand in synchrony with the hidden real hand makes touch be felt at the rubber hand, makes it be reported as one's own, and shifts the felt position of the real hand toward it; a small asynchrony removes these effects
Oct 20, 2026
THEORY-766: Brushing a seen rubber hand in synchrony with the hidden real hand, against asynchronous brushing, raises reports that touch is felt at the rubber hand and, more weakly and less reliably, that the rubber hand is one's own; the proprioceptive drift toward the rubber hand that accompanies these reports is not a measure of them; the standard comparison conditions do not equalise participants' expectations, so whether the stimulation or the expectation produces the report difference is open
Oct 20, 2026
THEORY-767: Body ownership draws on interoceptive as well as exteroceptive signals: a visual cue synchronous with one's heartbeat increases ownership of a virtual hand and identification with a virtual body, and lower interoceptive sensitivity goes with greater susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion
Oct 20, 2026
THEORY-823: Tetris players rotate pieces more often than planning a placement and then executing it would require, rotate them early and check the column more the higher the drop, because these moves are epistemic actions: physical action that stands in for mental computation at the moment of use
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 20, 2026
THEORY-827: The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion driven by multisensory integration: the difference in reports between synchronous and asynchronous brushing is produced by the stimulation, not by participants' expectations
Oct 19, 2026
LIT-1263: Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Oct 19, 2026
LIT-1274: Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Oct 19, 2026
LIT-1277: Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see
Oct 16, 2026
LIT-1181: Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-461: If a substantial class of mental states, interoceptive, affective, perceptual and bodily-agentive, depends on an animate body, then today's text-only chatbots lack them and their self-ascriptions of such states are systematically untrue, and users can engage them without false belief by make-believe, as a new kind of interactive, self-involving and blended fictional character
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-512: The extended-mind thesis worth disputing is that external entities partly constitute a subject's mental states in virtue of the subject's sensorimotor interaction with them; so stated it can reach standing belief but not consciousness, if consciousness needs information directly available for global control, since perception makes availability indirect
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-520: When coordination between two autonomous agents and the continuation of their encounter shape each other, the interaction gains an autonomy of its own, a precarious self-sustaining organization that lasts only while both agents stay autonomous; coordinating movement then coordinates sense-making, so some social understanding, such as recognising a partner, is a property of the interaction's dynamics and not of either individual
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-528: The cases offered for extended cognition are explained at least as well by embedded cognition, on which the organism leans heavily on external props, and memory research finds that external stores lack the interference, generation effect and power-law learning and forgetting of internal memory, so a kind spanning both does no explanatory work and conservatism favours the embedded account
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-579: If belief is individuated by functional role, an external store that is constantly consulted, directly available and automatically endorsed can carry a standing belief, so the material vehicles of some mental states extend beyond the skin; the step from coupling to parthood rests on that premise and a parity principle the authors state rather than argue
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-582: Causal coupling between a process and something outside it does not by itself make that thing part of the process, so an argument from coupling to extended cognition needs a further premise saying what makes a process cognitive
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-591: Cognition has two necessary marks, involving non-derived content and a distinctive kind of causal processing, and as a contingent fact only processes in the brain have both, so notebooks, screens and tools coupled to a thinker are not parts of cognition, and human-plus-tool systems will support no science of their own
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-628: Self-production alone gives a system only an all-or-nothing norm, to go on or to die, and that distinction is available to an observer, not to the system; a graded norm the system itself has, by which viable states are better or worse for it, needs adaptivity, a further capacity to detect tendencies toward the boundary of its viability and to act so as to reverse them, and sense-making and agency need adaptivity
Oct 16, 2026
THEORY-666: A system that produces itself, a network of production that regenerates the components which produce it and constitute it as a distinguishable unity, has by that fact an intrinsic purpose, the maintenance of its identity, and with it a point of view, valence and a world as distinct from an environment, so that teleology in organisms is real and not an observer's as-if; the account is stated for the cell, and a multicellular organism is not itself autopoietic
Oct 15, 2026
CLAIM-296: What a system has, what it knows it has, and what it can deploy within a task's deadline are different, and the last is a relation among the resource, the agent, its environment, the task, the deadline and the cue, not a property of any one of them
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1054: On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1057: Adapting the Environment Instead of Oneself
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1059: Cognitive Offloading
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1060: Cognition in the Wild
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1065: The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
- embodied-cognition
- cognition
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1066: How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1075: Deictic codes for the embodiment of cognition
Oct 15, 2026
LIT-1076: The intelligent use of space
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 15, 2026
QUESTION-095: Is leaving the result of a computation where it can be cheaply retrieved the same trade as amortizing the computation, and does one account of when it pays cover a crew's speed bugs, a record's filed arguments and a reasoner's reused inferences?
Oct 15, 2026
THEORY-334: In copying a pattern of coloured blocks that stays in view, seven subjects told to work quickly looked back at the model about 1.3 times per block, and their commonest cycle, which looks at the model both before picking up a block and before dropping it, was the slowest per block in the authors' observed tallies (about 3 s, against 1.5 s for a cycle that copies from memory); looks fell to 1.0 per block with model and copy 70° apart and to 0.7 with one-colour patterns that could be chunked, and in three subjects a colour change made during a saccade raised fixation time by about 129 ms after pickup against about 50 ms before; no statistics are reported
- embodied-cognition
- cognition
Oct 15, 2026
THEORY-343: In laboratory choice tasks, people offload cognition more as a task's internal demand rises, but the choice follows their evaluation of the demand rather than its benefit: they offload where it gives no gain and more when less confident at equal ability, and offloading can lower memory for what was offloaded
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 15, 2026
THEORY-346: When information stays in view at a known place, people consult it less and rely on memory more as the time to reach it rises, in a graded trend across added delays from 0 to 3.2 seconds, even where the memory is weak and the display perfect; in one copying task a model that prices memory and display access in time alone, with no preference for either source, fits how many items people encode per look
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 15, 2026
THEORY-351: In a two-pilot airliner cockpit, setting the approach speeds as bugs on the airspeed indicators, prepared 25 to 30 minutes ahead in a low-workload phase from a card selected by the displayed gross weight, turns recall and scale reading at the moment of use into a judgement of spatial proximity, so the cockpit system remembers the speeds without either pilot's memory being improved; this is argued by task analysis of mandated procedure, not measured
Oct 15, 2026
THEORY-355: Agents arrange their surroundings so that perception and choice take the place of internal search, changing how much thinking a task needs without changing what can physically be done; the set-up is paid once and recovered over the later choice points the arrangement serves, so an arrangement whose scope is the whole task can repay a large set-up and a narrow one must repay within the next few actions, and the arrangement decays unless maintained; the savings are argued and piloted, not measured
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 15, 2026
THEORY-360: In Kirsh and Maglio's Tetris keystroke data, rotation began in earnest by 400 to 600 ms after a piece appeared, sometimes before it was fully in view, and at each of three skill levels drops preceded by a move to the wall and back were longer than ordinary drops, about 19 to 20 squares against 13 to 16
- cognition
- embodied-cognition
Oct 14, 2026
THEORY-302: Coordinated action is controlled by tuning relatively autonomous coordinative structures, not by commanding muscles: a higher level specifies an equivalence class of acceptable states and sets the parameters of self-regulating units, leaving the realized details to them
Oct 13, 2026
LIT-1017: Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency
Oct 13, 2026
LIT-1018: Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality
Oct 13, 2026
LIT-1027: Genealogies of organizational closure: from logical paradox to mind in life
Oct 13, 2026
THEORY-221: Organizational closure is a circular organization of efficient causes by which a system produces the conditions of its own existence, distinct from feedback, self-organization and catalytic cycles; systems whose loops do not regenerate the constraints that make them possible approximate closure without instantiating it
Oct 12, 2026
LIT-992: How the conception of control influences our understanding of actions
Oct 11, 2026
CASE-045: Measuring the dancing couple: is the pair a nearly decomposable block during the dance and not after it?
- embodied-cognition
- individuation
Oct 11, 2026
CASE-046: A partner-dancing couple, lindy hop, tango or salsa, while they dance
Oct 11, 2026
CLAIM-157: Relative to a stated target, a combined form is one system while its joint dynamics are nearly decomposable with the form as a block whose gap beats the Occam factor, and it lasts as long as that block persists; the unit is the gap-isolated block, not any member
Oct 11, 2026
CLAIM-165: A combined form constituted by mutual entrainment is not thereby a self in the subject sense: two dancers in phase are one coordination, an autonomous process, and still two subjects
Oct 11, 2026
CLAIM-172: Mutual entrainment is a sufficient mark of a combined form, and marks it as one of peers: when each side adjusts the other's timing the pair carries a collective variable neither has alone; one-way drive also makes a combined form, with a hierarchical architecture
Oct 11, 2026
CLAIM-173: The threshold criterion measures coupling strength, and coupling is not constitution: a metronome driving a musician, or a nerve driving a muscle, forms a strongly coupled block that clears the threshold without being one system
- individuation
- embodied-cognition
Oct 11, 2026
CLAIM-175: A partner-dancing couple, while dancing, is one combined cognitive form on the extended-mind thesis's own terms, more clearly than Otto and his notebook, and merits a name of its own
Oct 11, 2026
LIT-902: Functionally specific articulatory cooperation following jaw perturbations during speech: Evidence for coordinative structures
Oct 11, 2026
LIT-904: Preliminaries to a theory of action with reference to vision
- embodied-cognition
- behavioral-integration
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-566: Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-571: Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-578: Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-588: A theoretical model of phase transitions in human hand movements
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-601: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz (HKB) model: from matter to movement to mind
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-069: Rhythmic bimanual coordination switches from anti-phase to in-phase through a nonequilibrium phase transition in relative phase, captured by the HKB equation, with critical fluctuations and critical slowing as early warning
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-071: Minimal agency requires individuality, interactional asymmetry and self-generated normativity, and individuality without the other two is not agency
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-403: Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-412: Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-415: Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-421: Foreword
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-422: Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-436: Intelligence without representation
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-438: The bounds of cognition
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-455: Defending the Bounds of Cognition
Oct 01, 2026
LIT-383: Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy
Oct 01, 2026
LIT-384: The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex
Oct 01, 2026
LIT-386: Homeostasis and soft robotics in the design of feeling machines
Sep 26, 2026
LIT-097: The Extended Mind
Sep 26, 2026
LIT-207: Talkative AI and the fiction of artificial minds

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