phenomenology

Nov 01, 2026

LIT-1943: The Elephant and the Blind: The Experience of Pure Consciousness: Philosophy, Science, and 500+ Experiential Reports

Nov 01, 2026

LIT-1946: Minimal phenomenal experience: Meditation, tonic alertness, and the phenomenology of “pure” consciousness

Nov 01, 2026

THEORY-1295: Metzinger 2024 calls consciousness without an egoic self or first-person perspective "empirically established" on the strength of retrospective, self-selected reports from meditators, while its own methods chapter grants that a remembered report of a selfless state is "highly dubious" evidence that the state was selfless when it occurred, and leaves that problem open

Nov 01, 2026

THEORY-1299: Pure awareness, on Metzinger's account, is the content of a temporally thin model of the organism's own tonic alertness, its capacity to know; experience in this minimal form lacks an egoic self-model, a first-person perspective, time, space and even phenomenal oneness, but not self-modelling, and tonic alertness that is not so modelled is not experienced

Oct 30, 2026

LIT-1871: Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research

Oct 30, 2026

THEORY-1241: Experienced Transcendental Meditation practitioners report more pure awareness than matched counting controls, and multivariate EEG separates the meditation period from counting and from rest, but the reports are not shown to track any EEG feature

Oct 30, 2026

THEORY-1246: The so-called contentless goal-states of Shamatha, Transcendental and Stillness Meditation are neither truly contentless nor identical: they lack thoughts, perceptions, images and memories but keep wakefulness, calm, stillness, a non-conceptual knowing and the like, and they differ across the practices in attentional stability

Oct 29, 2026

LIT-1758: Second-Person Engagement, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification

Oct 28, 2026

LIT-1721: Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory

Oct 25, 2026

THEORY-959: Perceptual constancies are invariants of transformations that act within experience, not only of physical transformations or planar projections, since perceived shape and depth match no linear projection and the transformations can be realized with no physical change; on Isaac's structuralist account, after Cassirer, it is these invariants, co-present in experience with the varying appearances they abstract from, that make experience represent an objective world and so distinguish subject from object

Oct 22, 2026

THEORY-866: Expert texts of Shamatha, Transcendental and Stillness Meditation describe their so-called contentless goal-states as lacking thoughts, perceptions, images and memories but keeping many forms of content, and as differing across the practices in attentional stability and vividness

Oct 22, 2026

THEORY-867: The geometry of the colour similarity space does not mark the four unique hues, nor the difference between the black–white axis, along which every grey is a mixture of both ends, and the opponent axes, along which each half shows only one end; so a structuralism on which phenomenal character is fixed by similarity relations alone cannot account for how colour experiences are composed

Oct 22, 2026

THEORY-868: The structuralist methods and evidence in consciousness science support only that experiences have structure or stand in relations to other experiences, not that an experience is nothing but its relations; the stronger, metaphysical thesis implies that relational knowledge fixes what an experience is like, that every new experience changes all the others, and that a system with a single experience is impossible, and each consequence is doubtful

Oct 22, 2026

THEORY-870: In one study of 33 experienced Transcendental Meditation practitioners and 33 matched controls who counted instead, the practitioners rated their session higher on a retrospective pure-awareness scale whose top was defined for them as free from content (d = 0.77), and a classifier on EEG separated meditation from counting at 65% balanced accuracy on held-out subjects and, within practitioners, meditation from rest with 88% sensitivity; the authors found no robust association between the ratings and the EEG features

Oct 22, 2026

THEORY-880: The specific phenomenal character of an experience is fixed by its place in a quality space, the structure of all the discriminations a sensory system can make, and that structure is mirrored many-to-one in neural feature maps; whether the state is conscious at all is left to a separate general mechanism; so experiences are holistic, a change anywhere in the space can change every experience in it, and spectrum inversion is excluded actually by the asymmetry of colour space and nomologically by its ties to the other senses

Oct 21, 2026

LIT-1351: Evidence synthesis indicates contentless experiences in meditation are neither truly contentless nor identical

Oct 21, 2026

LIT-1354: Distilling the Neurophenomenological Signatures of Pure Awareness during Transcendental Meditation

Oct 21, 2026

LIT-1356: What Is Enactivism?

Oct 21, 2026

LIT-1361: Phenomenal structure: What is it and what is it for?

Oct 20, 2026

THEORY-768: Minimal selfhood is identification with the whole body, located where that body is felt to be and seen from inside it; owning a body part does not reach it, and bodily agency enables it causally without being part of it

Oct 16, 2026

LIT-1191: Towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference

Oct 16, 2026

LIT-1193: Le scaphandre et le papillon

Oct 16, 2026

THEORY-458: Within the minimal self, the sense that a movement or a thought is mine and the sense that I am its source are distinct and come apart, as in involuntary movement and thought insertion; on Frith's comparator model the sense of agency depends on a forward model that precedes action and ownership on sensory feedback, so failed forward monitoring would explain thought insertion and, by the same mechanism, why first-person reference ordinarily cannot misidentify its subject

Oct 16, 2026

THEORY-498: A mathematical structure whose domains are aspects of experience and whose axioms hold there is not thereby a structure of experience, because that test passes incompatible topologies on one set and every rescaling of a metric without consulting experience; requiring, for each relation, an aspect that changes exactly when a variation of experience breaks the relation removes those automatic passes, and has so far been met only by relative similarity and a visual topology, each on an assumed premise

Oct 16, 2026

THEORY-597: Meditation-related experiences that Western Buddhist practitioners report as challenging span 59 kinds in seven domains, from fear and sleep change to altered self-other boundaries, and they are reported in daily practice, at under an hour a day and in the first days of practice, not only on intensive retreat; the frequencies come from a sample chosen for difficulty, and the causal link is the practitioners' own attribution

Oct 11, 2026

LIT-910: Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action

Oct 11, 2026

LIT-914: The Concept of Flow

Oct 04, 2026

LIT-697: The feeling of being a group: Corporate emotions and collective consciousness

Oct 03, 2026

LIT-568: Précis: Being No One

Oct 03, 2026

LIT-571: Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition

Oct 03, 2026

THEORY-044: In relational frame theory the self is verbal behaviour's content, its process and its context, and the self as context is a perspective learned from deictic relations that cannot itself be found as content

Oct 03, 2026

THEORY-064: What is experienced as a self is the content of a self-model the system cannot recognise as a model, and nothing beyond such models is a self

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-443: Consciousness Explained

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-445: From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-453: Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-463: Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

Sep 26, 2026

LIT-209: The Phenomenology of Ritual Resistance: Colin Kaepernick as Confucian Sage

Sep 25, 2026

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LIT-1943: The Elephant and the Blind: The Experience of Pure Consciousness: Philosophy, Science, and 500+ Experiential Reports

LIT-1946: Minimal phenomenal experience: Meditation, tonic alertness, and the phenomenology of “pure” consciousness

LIT-1871: Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research

THEORY-1241: Experienced Transcendental Meditation practitioners report more pure awareness than matched counting controls, and multivariate EEG separates the meditation period from counting and from rest, but the reports are not shown to track any EEG feature

LIT-1758: Second-Person Engagement, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification

LIT-1721: Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory

THEORY-866: Expert texts of Shamatha, Transcendental and Stillness Meditation describe their so-called contentless goal-states as lacking thoughts, perceptions, images and memories but keeping many forms of content, and as differing across the practices in attentional stability and vividness

LIT-1351: Evidence synthesis indicates contentless experiences in meditation are neither truly contentless nor identical

LIT-1354: Distilling the Neurophenomenological Signatures of Pure Awareness during Transcendental Meditation

LIT-1356: What Is Enactivism?

LIT-1361: Phenomenal structure: What is it and what is it for?

THEORY-768: Minimal selfhood is identification with the whole body, located where that body is felt to be and seen from inside it; owning a body part does not reach it, and bodily agency enables it causally without being part of it

LIT-1191: Towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference

LIT-1193: Le scaphandre et le papillon

LIT-910: Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action

LIT-914: The Concept of Flow

LIT-697: The feeling of being a group: Corporate emotions and collective consciousness

LIT-568: Précis: Being No One

LIT-571: Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition

THEORY-044: In relational frame theory the self is verbal behaviour's content, its process and its context, and the self as context is a perspective learned from deictic relations that cannot itself be found as content

THEORY-064: What is experienced as a self is the content of a self-model the system cannot recognise as a model, and nothing beyond such models is a self

LIT-443: Consciousness Explained

LIT-445: From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0

LIT-453: Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

LIT-463: Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

LIT-209: The Phenomenology of Ritual Resistance: Colin Kaepernick as Confucian Sage

LIT-066: The varieties of contemplative experience: A mixed-methods study of meditation-related challenges in Western Buddhists