phenomenal-unity

Oct 29, 2026

LIT-1835: Binding and Consciousness

Oct 22, 2026

TERM-072: perspective, and which sense: organizational, represented or phenomenal

Oct 22, 2026

THEORY-875: Phenomenal binding of the parts of an experience can be modelled as agreement, on overlaps, of measured similarity structures assigned to the parts by a presheaf, and the broad quale is fixed by its parts exactly when that presheaf is a sheaf; a sheaf failure may mark disunity, as proposed for binocular rivalry, or context dependence within one unified experience, as in the Ebbinghaus illusion, and the framework does not yet say which

Oct 22, 2026

THEORY-882: Consciousness in an inferring system requires three things: a unified generative model of its world; entry to that model by a precision-weighted competition that coherent inferences win; and epistemic depth, the recursive sharing of the model back through the hierarchy, carried by a hyper-model that predicts and sets precision at every level; awareness then varies with epistemic depth, not with the richness of contents, and a first-person perspective, a self-model and agency are not required

Oct 21, 2026

LIT-1352: Towards a Mathematical Structure of Global Phenomenal Consciousness

Oct 21, 2026

QUESTION-254: What separates an interpretive organization that constitutes an experiential perspective from one that only processes information, or only represents a perspective, when the separation must not require an episode's current contents to be veridically constrained by their referents, must not be drawn from the verdict it gives on groups and machines, and must justify the queries, interventions and timescales by which it individuates a perspective without appeal to the phenomenal unity it is meant to explain?

Oct 21, 2026

QUESTION-255: Can an empirical model that genuinely fails to glue, under a specified cover and correspondence between its contexts, take part in one phenomenally unified process, given that a unified experience can contain conflicting interpretations or demands and that such conflicts are not by themselves gluing obstructions?

Oct 18, 2026

CLAIM-355: In a distributed agent the binding of appraisal, readiness and governance into one response can be real while the single owner a self-model or collective self-description attributes it to is a representational construction, not a further entity; the illusion, where there is one, is in the attribution and belongs to whichever system adopts the representation, and this deflates the self without settling whether experience is real

Oct 18, 2026

LIT-1208: Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness

Oct 18, 2026

LIT-1211: The phenomenal binding problem for neural networks

Oct 16, 2026

THEORY-573: Signals of processing quality from different senses, such as fluency, familiarity and coherence, pool into one content-nonspecific feeling, and that pooled feeling contributes to the unity of conscious experience across modalities, alongside the integration of specific features; in support, coherence in one modality shifts judgments of regularity, familiarity and possibility about unrelated targets in another

Oct 16, 2026

THEORY-644: Panpsychism escapes dualism's problem of mental causation only in its constitutive Russellian form, where micro-experiences constitute macro-experience; that form meets three combination problems, of subjects, qualities and structure, and every response that avoids combining (emergent, autonomous or identity panpsychism) gives back the advantage in mental causation or revised physics, while the combinatorial responses remain unworked

Oct 12, 2026

QUESTION-046: What criterion, applied the same way to a modular mind and to an organized group, would say whether an organized whole is a subject of experience and not only an agent?

Oct 11, 2026

CLAIM-153: Failure of a self to hold together across contexts is a monodromy around a cycle of contexts: any two locally consistent contexts glue, and the minimal model of the obstruction needs three

Oct 03, 2026

LIT-568: Précis: Being No One

Oct 03, 2026

THEORY-063: The unity of experience is the integration of one global world-model into a single functional cluster, and it does not require a self-model

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-395: The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-431: Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-443: Consciousness Explained

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-445: From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-450: Self models

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-451: Of Personal Identity

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-467: Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity

Oct 02, 2026

LIT-469: Reasons and Persons

Sep 26, 2026

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phenomenal-unity

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LIT-1835: Binding and Consciousness

TERM-072: perspective, and which sense: organizational, represented or phenomenal

LIT-1352: Towards a Mathematical Structure of Global Phenomenal Consciousness

LIT-1208: Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness

LIT-1211: The phenomenal binding problem for neural networks

QUESTION-046: What criterion, applied the same way to a modular mind and to an organized group, would say whether an organized whole is a subject of experience and not only an agent?

CLAIM-153: Failure of a self to hold together across contexts is a monodromy around a cycle of contexts: any two locally consistent contexts glue, and the minimal model of the obstruction needs three

LIT-568: Précis: Being No One

THEORY-063: The unity of experience is the integration of one global world-model into a single functional cluster, and it does not require a self-model

LIT-395: The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

LIT-431: Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain

LIT-443: Consciousness Explained

LIT-445: From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0

LIT-450: Self models

LIT-451: Of Personal Identity

LIT-467: Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity

LIT-469: Reasons and Persons

LIT-190: The coherent and fluent mind: how unified consciousness is constructed from cross-modal inputs via integrated processing experiences