nucleation

free-will

Graph View

78 items with this tag.

Nov 03, 2026
CLAIM-532: Self-formation, in the sense the record holds (the transformation dimension of a will-organization), is the production by an agent's own activity on a discrepancy it cannot yet resolve of a maintained capacity, a new distinction it can make legible or a new channel by which it can act, that outlasts the discrepancy and serves a class of later ones; it is told apart from learning an action by transfer to discrepancies of the same class after the inducing conditions are gone, and from a capacity installed or upheld from outside by interventions on the processes that produce and maintain it
Nov 03, 2026
CLAIM-534: A plural will's motivational integration, a dimension of freedom of will the record names and leaves unanalysed, is the extent to which the demands it maintains are jointly met, within tolerances it can recognize, across the contexts where they interact, and kept so under its own dynamics; it is neither agreement among the demands nor the dominance of one, and its parts come apart: realizability (the tolerance frontier), realization (governance frustration), maintenance (viability) and the allocation of the tolerance each demand gives up
Nov 03, 2026
CLAIM-539: Jennings's attention as the source of a free will has Frankfurt's two-level architecture with its upper level changed from an attitude to a process: the whole collection of an agent's interests, prioritizing, settles which first-order interest becomes effective, as a second-order volition does for Frankfurt, but by metacontrol and not by endorsement; so it inherits unchanged the objection that a manipulated organization can meet the condition, and what it adds to Frankfurt is that the process forms new interests and is a contextually emergent cause
- free-will
- self-governance
Nov 03, 2026
CLAIM-544: If a willed agent is the jurisdiction of its will-organization, then governing one's own governability is in part governing one's own individuation, in the constitutive sense of individuation at that level: a revision of the will-organization that changes which regimes it governs changes which willed agent there is, so a self-forming revision can be a re-individuation and not only a change in an agent's states, and whether the revised jurisdiction continues the earlier agent is a question of continuation, not of resemblance
Nov 03, 2026
LIT-1963: Attention as the Source of a Free Will
Nov 03, 2026
TERM-099: self-formation, of an agent: the production, by the agent's own activity on a discrepancy it cannot yet resolve, of a maintained capacity, a new distinction it can make legible or a new channel by which it can act, that outlasts the discrepancy and serves a class of later ones
Nov 03, 2026
TERM-100: provenance, of a capacity or an organization, and which sense: formation provenance (whose process produced it), maintenance provenance (whose process keeps it), or source provenance (what it was made from, the sense the descent term holds)
Nov 03, 2026
THEORY-1302: Sánchez-Cañizares reinterprets Irruption Theory for binary decisions (IAT*): irruption is the onset of a landscape with one attractor per option and absorption the passage to a single attractor, both correlated in mind and brain, reversing the sign of Froese's variance hypothesis; the mind's causal role is to set the landscape's control parameters by "selecting the relevant physical coarse-graining", not to push the state, so on this account the mind controls which outcomes exist and not which one the state reaches
Nov 03, 2026
THEORY-1321: Froese proposes that irruptions combined with attunement, modelled on Watson et al.'s self-optimization of a Hopfield network by occasional resets to arbitrary states plus Hebbian learning, answer the libertarian's randomness challenge, how behaviour can be effective though underdetermined; but in the model offered the resets are arbitrary, so what makes the behaviour effective is the learned attractor landscape, and nothing in it distinguishes a motivated irruption from noise
Nov 03, 2026
THEORY-1328: Kane answers the luck objection by making indeterminism a hindrance inside goal-directed effort rather than a cause on its own: in a self-forming action the agent makes two competing efforts, each meeting the indeterminacy as interference from the other, so whichever succeeds is a willed success for which the agent is responsible; indeterminism lessens the agent's control but not its responsibility, and what responsibility needs is macro-control of processes involving many neurons, not control of each
- free-will
Nov 03, 2026
THEORY-1329: On Kane's account, self-forming actions occur under motivational conflict, when tension moves the relevant brain regions away from thermodynamic equilibrium, "a kind of stirring up of chaos" that makes them sensitive to micro-indeterminacy at the neuronal level, so that the choice is undetermined
- free-will
- neuroscience
Nov 03, 2026
THEORY-1332: In Bishop's account, chaos is a property of deterministic dynamics, so sensitive dependence is not indeterminism; under determinism it may model deliberation but is not sufficient for incompatibilist freedom, and under indeterminism the incompatibilist (Kane) must still show that agents can harness amplified indeterminism; and amplification itself may fail, since damping, the sign of the local Lyapunov exponents when a perturbation arrives, and the brain's parallel redundancy limit it
- free-will
- philosophy-of-science
Nov 03, 2026
THEORY-1341: In Jennings's hybrid account, attention is prioritization of processing by a subject that is the whole collection of an organism's fixed, formed and fluid interests, separated from filtering by whether selection answers to that collection, marked by feedback from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; when interests are equally weighted, attention breaks the stalemate and updates the chosen option's value, so that a fluid interest becomes a formed one
Nov 03, 2026
THEORY-1348: In Froese's Irruption Theory an agent's motivations make a difference to behaviour only as an increase in its material underdetermination, measurable at best indirectly as neural or behavioural entropy, and such irruptions are by the theory's own terms undirected: scaled up by chaos, 1/f noise or criticality, they loosen the current organization but "cannot force the formation of the behavior that is to come", so the theory places behaviour's direction in the body's attunement and not in the irruption
Nov 02, 2026
CLAIM-533: The sensitivity that formal chaos gives a will's dynamics is not control over them: in Kane's self-forming actions, chaotic amplification keeps the outcome open, but it magnifies the agent's efforts, uncontrolled fluctuations and outside inputs alike, so what would make the outcome the agent's is how its own control couples to the amplifying directions, relative to noise and to other parties' inputs and with what feedback, which sensitivity does not supply; and under weak noise what amplification touches lasts only where it reaches the slow modes
Nov 02, 2026
CLAIM-540: The persistence a Dirichlet–categorical hierarchy gives a run of selections is an observer's learning about a fixed mixture, not a change in what selects: under a uniform prior an observed first choice raises the predicted chance of repeating it from 1/2 to 2/3, while the same choice forced leaves it at 1/2, so the hierarchy's reinforcement is not evidence of self-formation or of a maintained will-organization, which need the mixture itself to change under the choice
- probabilistic-modeling
- free-will
Nov 02, 2026
CLAIM-542: Sensitivity does not fix the allocation or the authorship of control: linearized, every input reaches the final state through the same transition operator, ∂x_T/∂w_t = Φ(T, t)B_w(t), so systems with the same Lyapunov spectrum can differ arbitrarily in what an agent's own channel, an outside party's channel and noise each reach and at what least energy; and along one unstable direction a larger exponent λ lowers the least effort to reach a displacement, since W_T = b²(e^{2λT} − 1)/2λ grows with λ, while a constant open-loop input against white noise entering the same direction has terminal signal-to-noise ratio tending to (bu/σ)√(2/λ), which falls as λ grows, so only feedback that observes the state turns cheaper control into reliable direction
Nov 02, 2026
CLAIM-545: Freedom of will, in the operational sense, is an agent's governance of its own governability: the extent to which its own organization makes the relevant distinctions legible, gives the demands they raise practical efficacy, directs its transitions, and revises the relations that govern those three, including under another's interference; openness, sensitivity and controllability of outcomes each fall short of it, and domination is another's capacity to govern those same relations, used or not
Nov 02, 2026
LIT-1961: Chaos
- philosophy-of-science
- free-will
Nov 02, 2026
LIT-1984: Libertarianism
- free-will
Nov 02, 2026
LIT-1985: The Significance of Free Will
- free-will
- agency
Nov 02, 2026
LIT-1992: Decision-making through irruption theory: how to use and interpret the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model
- free-will
- complex-systems
Nov 01, 2026
THEORY-1298: When mental control returns after mind-wandering, the self-model represents the return as the person's own act whether or not the person's control system caused it, because it must bridge to earlier control to keep the autobiographical self-model continuous
Oct 31, 2026
QUESTION-364: When an agent's own processes revise its will-organization, what makes the result the continuation of that agent's will rather than a replacement authored by something else, and how can a history of authorization count when the standards for reading authorization are themselves revised?
Oct 30, 2026
LIT-1867: Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives
Oct 30, 2026
LIT-1868: The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories
Oct 29, 2026
THEORY-1118: McKenna and Coates argue, with Dryden and with Buss and Westlund, that a condition on free agency stated only in the agent's present psychological structure is met by an agent whose structure a manipulator installed, so a mesh account must count that agent free or add a historical condition; Frankfurt, read first-hand, takes the first option
Oct 27, 2026
CASE-181: Frankfurt's unwilling addict: a man who has the desire to take the drug and the desire to refrain, wants the desire to refrain to be his will, and is moved by the craving anyway
- agency
- free-will
Oct 23, 2026
LIT-1429: Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do
Oct 23, 2026
LIT-1432: Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility
Oct 18, 2026
CLAIM-354: Freedom of will and autonomy come in degrees along several dimensions, among them viable reachability, control cost, robustness to disturbance, governance reconfigurability, revisability and motivational integration, and agents compare by inclusion of what they can viably reach under matched conditions: a partial order with incomparable pairs, not a scalar, and a gradient only of a declared measure
Oct 18, 2026
LIT-1229: Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy
Oct 14, 2026
LIT-1045: Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 1: Cases and Arguments
Oct 14, 2026
LIT-1047: Skepticism About Moral Responsibility
Oct 14, 2026
THEORY-310: On a forward-looking justification of blame, a counterfactual capacity condition calibrated to what makes blaming effective is redundant: fixing its parameters presupposes that blaming such agents is good policy, so freedom is ascribed because of blameworthiness rather than grounding it
- free-will
- ethics
Oct 14, 2026
THEORY-316: Frankfurt-style cases defeat alternative-possibilities conditions on moral responsibility but leave standing the incompatibilist condition on an action's causal history, which is the more fundamental one
Oct 14, 2026
THEORY-328: An agent manipulated so that he meets every leading compatibilist condition is not morally responsible in the basic-desert sense, no responsibility-relevant difference separates him from an ordinarily determined agent, and so causal determination by factors beyond the agent's control best explains why neither is responsible
Oct 12, 2026
LIT-1006: Living without Free Will
Oct 12, 2026
LIT-991: Beyond the Moral Influence Theory? A Critical Examination of Vargas’s Agency Cultivation Model of Responsibility
- free-will
- ethics
Oct 12, 2026
QUESTION-068: Would settling whose a will-organization is settle the agent's accountability for what it does, or does accountability need conditions, such as normative competence and avoidability, that ownership does not supply?
Oct 11, 2026
CLAIM-159: The record's rival accounts of will are claims about drive profiles in different cells: Ainslie's interests are aggregate or emergent, the expected value of control is top-down, and will-organization is the maintained organization that governs how the drive profile changes
Oct 05, 2026
LIT-718: The Conversable, Responsible Corporation
Oct 05, 2026
LIT-728: Précis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Oct 05, 2026
LIT-742: Responsibility Incorporated
Oct 05, 2026
LIT-747: Responsibility, Moral and Otherwise
Oct 05, 2026
THEORY-139: A corporation that forms its judgments through authorised avowal and corrects the inconsistency any mechanical aggregation of its members' views produces has a mind of its own, and as a conversable agent it meets the conditions for being fit to be held responsible: a significant choice, the capacity to judge its options normatively, and control over acting on that judgment
Oct 05, 2026
THEORY-147: Deep responsibility is not limited to the moral, and attributability and accountability are independent kinds of it rather than two levels: accountability needs only that the agent acted as she ought not to, was in a position to know it, and that acting so was up to her, while what makes a self a fit target of the reactive attitudes is plausibly that it can perceive, understand and appreciate the world as we do
Oct 04, 2026
CLAIM-047: Possessing an action-generating regime is not the same as its being practically effective
- agency
- free-will
Oct 04, 2026
CLAIM-062: That every regulator with a higher-order attractor counts as having a will is acceptable once agency is kept apart from phenomenal experience
- agency
- free-will
Oct 04, 2026
LIT-686: The Importance of What We Care About
Oct 04, 2026
LIT-692: Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Oct 04, 2026
LIT-693: The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
Oct 04, 2026
LIT-694: Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Oct 04, 2026
LIT-695: The Faintest Passion
Oct 04, 2026
THEORY-119: An agent can be morally responsible for what she did although she could not have done otherwise, when what made the action unavoidable played no part in bringing it about, so the principle of alternate possibilities is false
Oct 04, 2026
THEORY-120: A motive is the agent's own, and she acts of her own free will, when she identifies with it, and that is all the freedom moral responsibility requires: identification is the conformity of the effective desire to a decisive higher-order volition (1971), and later wholehearted acceptance with no conflict at any higher order
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-560: Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will?
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-605: An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-Initiated Movement
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-684: Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-685: Freedom Within Reason
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-687: Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-688: Asymmetrical Freedom
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-689: Stories and the Meaning of Life
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-690: Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Oct 03, 2026
LIT-691: Moral Responsibility
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-059: The readiness potential does not show that a neural decision to act precedes awareness of the urge to act
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-065: The unity that makes a movement an agent's action is achieved by conformity to the constitutive norms of agency, not given by the causal unity of a mind, so collective agents are agents in the same sense as individual ones
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-067: Self-control over time needs no faculty of will: interests that dominate at different delays bargain, and resolve is the recursive staking of expected future choices on the present one
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-118: Praiseworthiness is compatible with being psychologically determined by good reasons, but blameworthiness requires that the agent could have done otherwise, that is, could have acted on the right reasons
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-121: Moral responsibility requires guidance control, moderate reasons-responsiveness of the agent's own actual-sequence mechanism, and not regulative control over alternative possibilities, so responsibility is compatible with causal determinism
Oct 03, 2026
THEORY-122: Moral responsibility requires the normative competence to recognise and act on the True and the Good, which identification with one's own motives does not supply
Oct 02, 2026
LIT-431: Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain
Sep 30, 2026
THEORY-029: A higher-order attitude cannot make a motive the agent's own by its order alone: any attitude specified without presupposing the agent's participation can itself be disowned, and any specified to include it presupposes what it was meant to explain
Sep 30, 2026
THEORY-040: A condition on free agency stated only in present psychological structure is met by a manipulated agent, so the account must count that agent free or add a historical condition, and no historical condition in the record's readings is shown to escape
Sep 29, 2026
LIT-291: Compatibilism
Sep 29, 2026
LIT-293: I. Taking Ourselves Seriously; II. Getting It Right
Sep 29, 2026
LIT-294: Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Sep 26, 2026
LIT-197: The Enigma Unveiled: How AI Compromises Free Will in Decision-Making

Created with Quartz v5.0.0 © 2026

Repository
Quartz