nucleation

QUESTION-068: Would settling whose a will-organization is settle the agent's accountability for what it does, or does accountability need conditions, such as normative competence and avoidability, that ownership does not supply?

2 min read

Properties4
StatusDeferred
Tagsfree-will, ethics, agency
Lineauthenticity
Answered byTHEORY-118 — Praiseworthiness is compatible with being psychologically determined by good reasons, but blameworthiness requires that the agent could have done otherwise, that is, could have acted on the right reasons, THEORY-119 — An agent can be morally responsible for what she did although she could not have done otherwise, when what made the action unavoidable played no part in bringing it about, so the principle of alternate possibilities is false, THEORY-122 — Moral responsibility requires the normative competence to recognise and act on the True and the Good, which identification with one's own motives does not supply, THEORY-147 — Deep responsibility is not limited to the moral, and attributability and accountability are independent kinds of it rather than two levels: accountability needs only that the agent acted as she ought not to, was in a position to know it, and that acting so was up to her, while what makes a self a fit target of the reactive attitudes is plausibly that it can perceive, understand and appreciate the world as we do

Graph View

The question

QUESTION-011 asks what makes a will-organization the agent’s own. This question asks what an answer to it would buy. If ownership were settled, would accountability follow? Or does accountability need further conditions, such as being able to recognise the right reasons or having been able to act otherwise, which ownership does not give? Filed Deferred, as its line is.

Why the record needs it

CLAIM-022 disclaims ownership: explaining practical efficacy does not settle whose the will is. CLAIM-016 tried to supply ownership and was deferred. Both assume that ownership is the missing piece that would make a will-organization something an agent answers for. If accountability comes apart from ownership, two things follow. Reopening the authenticity line would not by itself deliver responsibility. And the disclaimer in CLAIM-022 would leave less open than it seems to.

What the record holds

  • THEORY-122: identification is not enough. JoJo “meets the structural conditions” and is excused for lacking normative competence. Limit: second-hand, and the primary texts are unread.
  • THEORY-147: attributability and accountability are “independent kinds” of responsibility. Accountability needs only that the agent acted as she ought not, was in a position to know it, and that it was up to her. Limit: the positive view is Wolf’s “hunch”.
  • THEORY-118: blame needs the ability “to have acted on the right reasons”, and praise does not. So any avoidability condition applies to blame alone. Limit: second-hand, and it gives no answer to Frankfurt cases of wrongdoing.
  • THEORY-119: responsibility needs no alternative possibilities when “what made the action unavoidable played no part in bringing it about”. Limit: the record has read the dilemma defence and the replies only in survey.

What would answer it

A case in which an agent’s will-organization is plainly her own and she is still not accountable, or the converse, whose verdict survives the dispute between THEORY-118 and THEORY-119. Or an argument that ownership already contains the competence and control conditions. A further survey of Frankfurt cases would not answer it.

Backlinks