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LIT-291: Compatibilism

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Properties5
StatusActive — read in full 2026-09-29 (NOTE-270); worth reading as the most complete reachable second-hand statement of Frankfurt's 1971 apparatus and of the two structural objections (higher-order alienation per Watson 1975; manipulation), with Frankfurt's own bullet-biting quotation on manipulation (2002, p. 27). For wantons and persons, read the 2004–2015 revisions (e.g. the Fall 2019 archive edition). Its account of Frankfurt's later replies (supplement §A) dates from 2009, omits "satisfaction" (1992), and dates wholeheartedness to 1994.
Version2
Tagsfree-will, agency, metaphysics, ethics, self-governance
Cited as “paper” byNOTE-270 — Compatibilism
Cited as “source” byTHEORY-029 — A higher-order attitude cannot make a motive the agent's own by its order alone: any attitude specified without presupposing the agent's participation can itself be disowned, and any specified to include it presupposes what it was meant to explain, THEORY-040 — A condition on free agency stated only in present psychological structure is met by a manipulated agent, so the account must count that agent free or add a historical condition, and no historical condition in the record's readings is shown to escape, THEORY-1118 — McKenna and Coates argue, with Dryden and with Buss and Westlund, that a condition on free agency stated only in the agent's present psychological structure is met by an agent whose structure a manipulator installed, so a mesh account must count that agent free or add a historical condition; Frankfurt, read first-hand, takes the first option, THEORY-118 — Praiseworthiness is compatible with being psychologically determined by good reasons, but blameworthiness requires that the agent could have done otherwise, that is, could have acted on the right reasons, THEORY-119 — An agent can be morally responsible for what she did although she could not have done otherwise, when what made the action unavoidable played no part in bringing it about, so the principle of alternate possibilities is false, THEORY-120 — A motive is the agent's own, and she acts of her own free will, when she identifies with it, and that is all the freedom moral responsibility requires: identification is the conformity of the effective desire to a decisive higher-order volition (1971), and later wholehearted acceptance with no conflict at any higher order, THEORY-121 — Moral responsibility requires guidance control, moderate reasons-responsiveness of the agent's own actual-sequence mechanism, and not regulative control over alternative possibilities, so responsibility is compatible with causal determinism, THEORY-122 — Moral responsibility requires the normative competence to recognise and act on the True and the Good, which identification with one's own motives does not supply

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McKenna & Coates (2004), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman, eds.); first published 26 Apr 2004 (McKenna alone); substantive revisions seen: 5 Oct 2009 (McKenna alone), 25 Feb 2015 (McKenna & Coates), 26 Nov 2019, 1 Feb 2024 and 16 Apr 2024 (the version read); archived as https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2026/entries/compatibilism/; the wanton/person text is in e.g. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/compatibilism/ (the 2015 revision); with supplement “Compatibilism: State of the Art” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html) — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

Standing in the record

Filed on 2026-09-29 at the owner’s request, as one of the texts assembled to represent Harry Frankfurt’s account of higher-order volitions, whose 1971 statement is paywalled. published: is the first appearance (ADR-002).

It was filed Deferred, unread. NOTE-270 is the close reading of 2026-09-29, and it placed the work: Active — worth reading as the most complete reachable second-hand statement of Frankfurt’s 1971 apparatus and of the two structural objections (higher-order alienation per Watson 1975; manipulation), with Frankfurt’s own bullet-biting quotation on manipulation (2002, p. 27). For wantons and persons, read the 2004–2015 revisions (e.g. the Fall 2019 archive edition). Its account of Frankfurt’s later replies (supplement §A) dates from 2009, omits “satisfaction” (1992), and dates wholeheartedness to 1994.

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