John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S.J., Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law, Cambridge University Press, 1998 (ISBNs 9780521480550, 9780521775793; online 9780511814594) — DOI-10.1017/CBO9780511814594.
Key takeaways
Registered from the publisher’s abstract, the chapter openings Cambridge displays, Fischer’s own later summary and second-hand reports. Not a reading of the book. Each point says who reports it.
- The thesis, from the publisher’s abstract: “moral responsibility is based on ‘guidance control’”, which has two components: “the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent’s own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons”. The book closes with “a sustained defense of the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism”.
- Guidance versus regulative control, and the Frankfurt-case basis. The opening of chapter 9 (Conclusion), as Cambridge shows it: “Regulative control involves alternative possibilities”; guidance control “does not, by its nature”; “the Frankfurt-type cases show that they are separate and distinct sorts of control”; and responsibility “for actions, omissions, and consequences – simply requires guidance control”. Talbert’s SEP entry Moral Responsibility (LIT-691, §2.3, read in NOTE-548) reports the same structure, citing pp. 29–34, and that the move from agent to mechanism is forced by Frankfurt cases: the agent in one “would have acted the same no matter what reasons they were confronted with”, but the actual mechanism may still respond (pp. 38–39). McKenna and Coates (LIT-291, §4.4.2–4.4.3) give the same argument with their banjo case.
- Moderate reasons-responsiveness. The opening of chapter 3, as Cambridge shows it: chapter 2 had used weak reasons-responsiveness; strong reasons-responsiveness is “too strong” and weak “too weak”; the book separates “recognition of reasons and reaction to reasons” and argues that “the requirements on reasons-recognition are more stringent than those on reasons-reactivity”. Talbert reports (§2.3, pp. 69–85) that the required receptivity is “an understandable pattern of (actual and hypothetical) reasons-receptivity”, a “pattern of regular receptivity” that includes some moral reasons (p. 77). McKenna and Coates (LIT-291, supplement §B.1) give the waltzing-Matilda example: a mechanism may fail to react to a sufficient reason it recognises, so long as it responds to a coherent, stable range of reasons. The usual short form, regular receptivity with weak reactivity, is the summary of these reports; the word “weak” for reactivity is not in any source I read, and the chapter 3 opening states the asymmetry only comparatively.
- Ownership by taking responsibility. Chapters 7 and 8, as their openings show: responsibility is “an essentially historical notion”, and the past must contain a process of “taking responsibility”, “part of the process by which a mechanism leading (say) to an action, becomes one’s own”. McKenna and Coates (LIT-291, supplement §B.2, citing pp. 207–239) report its subjective component: the agent sees her conduct as efficacious in the world and accepts that she is a fit target of the reactive attitudes, and comes to see herself so by an appropriate route, not by deception or brainwashing.
- Semicompatibilism. Chapter 6’s opening: the indirect arguments for incompatibilism fail because responsibility “does not require the sort of control that involves alternative possibilities”, and Frankfurt-style examples lead away from the Direct Argument too. Fischer’s own label for the result, that responsibility is compatible with determinism whatever is true of the freedom to do otherwise, is “semicompatibilism”; the SEP Compatibilism bibliography cites his “Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals” (2012), and LIT-689, which I read, states the thesis without the word.
The chapter list, from Crossref: 1 Moral Responsibility: The Concept and the Challenges (1–27); 2 Weak Reasons-Responsiveness (28–61); 3 Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness (62–91); 4 Responsibility for Consequences (92–122); 5 Responsibility for Omissions (123–150); 6 The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism (151–169); 7 Responsibility and History (170–206); 8 Taking Responsibility (207–239); 9 Conclusion (240–260).
Standing in the record
Filed on 2026-10-03 at the owner’s request. It is moral philosophy with no instruction for machine-learning practice, so no anthology topic holds it.
Why the book is filed, not only a shorter work. The record’s rule is to replace a book with a shorter lawful work by the same author, and to seed the book only if the record would lose something without it. Here it would:
- The shorter lawful work does not carry the account. Fischer’s “Stories and the Meaning of Life” (LIT-689) is the one lawful text by the authors I could read. Its first section lists the framework’s elements, and the rest argues that the value of free action is artistic self-expression. It names moderate reasons-responsiveness and mechanism ownership and does not state either.
- The record already cites it. LIT-291 and NOTE-270 cite pp. 194–206
and 207–239 for the manipulation and ownership arguments, NOTE-269 cites
the dual-control driving instructor at p. 32, and THEORY-040 names the
book in its
promote_whenas a first-hand mesh account the record lacks. Without this entry those citations point nowhere in the record. - The précis is closed too (see the status note).
The relation. It extends Fischer’s 1987 chapter (LIT-687). McKenna
and Coates (LIT-291, §4.4 and supplement §B) report that the view Fischer
stated in 1987 and 1994 was refined in this book, and that the book was
written to fix that account’s two problems: weak reasons-responsiveness set
the bar too low, and the account had no ownership condition. The book
builds on the chapter and keeps its core, so this is a bibliographic fact
two lawful reports establish, not a reading of the argument.
How it bears on Wolf’s Reason View. Wolf’s “Asymmetrical Freedom”
(LIT-688) is usually stated in this book’s terms: McKenna and Coates
(LIT-291, §4.3) put her asymmetry as “only blameworthy conduct requires
regulative control. Guidance control is sufficient for praiseworthy
conduct.” So the two accounts agree that praise needs no alternatives and
disagree about blame. This book’s thesis is that responsibility for
actions, omissions and consequences requires only guidance control, so it
denies Wolf’s blame condition. Talbert (§2.3) counts Wolf (1990) and
Fischer and Ravizza among the reasons-responsiveness views, and his §3.2
lists both as holding that impaired moral competence undermines
responsibility, which is the sanity condition of Wolf’s “Sanity”
(LIT-690). No relation to the Wolf entries is declared. Both sides are
unread, and I found no lawful report saying the book argues against Wolf.
The rivalry over blame is declared between the THEORY documents that state
the two accounts, where it is a fact about the claims, not about these
texts. A reader of the book should check whether it discusses the
asymmetry. Its chapter 2 on weak reasons-responsiveness and chapter 3 on
moral receptivity are where it would. If it argues against the asymmetry,
rivals LIT-688 is the relation to declare. Freedom Within Reason
(LIT-685) is the same pairing at book length.
How it bears on the PAP map. Robb’s SEP entry on alternative possibilities (LIT-294, read in NOTE-269) names Frankfurt’s identification view and Fischer and Ravizza’s guidance control as the two compatibilist accounts that grew from Frankfurt-style cases (§5.1). It also reports Fischer’s replies to the dilemma defence and his robustness requirement, and the dual-control driving instructor (p. 32) as an everyday Frankfurt-style case. This book is the full form of the second account. LIT-294 is a survey, so no relation is declared to it.
How it bears on the record’s theories. THEORY-040 holds that a condition stated only in present psychological structure is met by a manipulated agent, and that no historical condition in the record is shown to escape. This book’s taking-responsibility condition is the main historical condition in the literature. McKenna and Coates (LIT-291, supplement §B.2) report that it handles instant manipulation such as Mele’s Beth, and that Pereboom’s four-case argument can be rebuilt to manipulate the taking of responsibility itself. That is the second half of THEORY-040, still at second hand. THEORY-029 asks what makes an attitude the agent’s own. The book answers in history, not in the order of an attitude. Whether that escapes the regress or only moves it to the self-conception that taking responsibility involves is my question, not the sources’.
Priority for a reading: high. It is the account the record’s free-will theories keep naming at second hand. The précis first, then chapters 2, 3 and 8.
Access when seeded:
- Crossref records for the book (with the publisher’s abstract) and its nine chapters (titles, pages).
- Cambridge Core chapter pages: each shows its opening paragraphs as a summary, read for chapters 1–9; the rest behind purchase or institutional access.
- Unpaywall and OpenAlex: no open-access location for the book or the précis.
- JSTOR (précis, stable 2653660): “Client Challenge” page.
- Talbert, “Moral Responsibility”, SEP (LIT-691), read in full and filed in the same batch.