nucleation

THEORY-1118: McKenna and Coates argue, with Dryden and with Buss and Westlund, that a condition on free agency stated only in the agent's present psychological structure is met by an agent whose structure a manipulator installed, so a mesh account must count that agent free or add a historical condition; Frankfurt, read first-hand, takes the first option

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Properties5
StatusActive
Tagsagency, self-governance, free-will, metaphysics
SourceLIT-291 — Compatibilism, LIT-297 — Autonomy, LIT-296 — Personal Autonomy, LIT-692 — Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, LIT-293 — I. Taking Ourselves Seriously; II. Getting It Right
ExtendsTHEORY-040 — A condition on free agency stated only in present psychological structure is met by a manipulated agent, so the account must count that agent free or add a historical condition, and no historical condition in the record's readings is shown to escape
Cited as “grounds” byCLAIM-364 — Processes conditioned never to object coordinate without override at the same behaviour and supervisory cost as processes that negotiate, so the two part only under intervention, when a constituent dissents, or in their history

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Source

  • McKenna & Coates, SEP Compatibilism, LIT-291, §§4.2.2, 4.3 and supplement §A, read in full in NOTE-270.
  • Dryden, IEP Autonomy (2010), LIT-297, §2.a.ii, read in full in NOTE-266.
  • Buss & Westlund, SEP Personal Autonomy (2018 revision), LIT-296, §3, read in full in NOTE-267.
  • Frankfurt (1971), LIT-692, read in full in NOTE-545: p. 20 and note 10.
  • Frankfurt (2004), LIT-293, the Tanner Lectures, read in full in NOTE-264: p. 172.

The argument

A “mesh” or “snapshot” account makes free agency a relation among the agent’s present attitudes, and says nothing about how they came to be there. A manipulator who installs the right mesh therefore produces an agent the account must call free. LIT-291 argues this holds for every mesh compatibilism it surveys (Frankfurt, Wolf, Fischer & Ravizza, Haji, Wallace, Bok and Mele): each must say what is wrong with manipulation cases or “bite the bullet”. LIT-297 makes the same objection against hierarchical autonomy (the hypnotist case), and LIT-296 argues that coherence is not sufficient for minimal autonomy because the endorsement itself can be manipulated.

Frankfurt takes the first option, first-hand. In 1971 his conception “appears to be neutral” on how the will came to be, and note 10 says that if the willing addict “has been made an addict by the deliberate and calculated work of another”, it “may be that both the addict and this other person are fully responsible” (p. 20). In 2004: “What counts is our current effort … and not the story of how we came to be” (p. 172). LIT-291 also quotes his 2002 reply to Fischer, second-hand, to the same effect.

What this does not say

  • That manipulated agents are unfree. That is the premise the manipulation argument needs, and Frankfurt denies it. The argument forces a choice; it does not settle which option is right.
  • That historical conditions fail. Whether any historical condition in the record escapes the argument is THEORY-040’s second half, Proposed, held back for want of a first-hand reading of Pereboom’s four-case argument or Mele’s zygote argument.

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