Source
- Caruso (2018), SEP “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility”, LIT-1047, §2.2, read in full in NOTE-862. Case 2 is quoted there from Pereboom 2014a: 77.
- De Marco and Cyr (2024), Philosophy Compass, LIT-1045, §§2, 5 and n. 23, read in full in NOTE-856. Case 1 is quoted there from Fischer et al. 2024: 98.
- Pereboom (2001), LIT-1006, read in part in NOTE-823. The Introduction says that “causal determination presents in principle no less of a threat to moral responsibility than does covert manipulation”. The cases are in Chapter 4, not read.
What was actually shown
An argument with three steps, reported by two surveys, with two of its four cases in Pereboom’s words.
Step 1: the manipulated agent is not responsible (No-FR). In Case 1, neuroscientists press a button “just before he begins to reason about his situation”, producing “a strongly egoistic reasoning process, which they know will deterministically result in his decision to kill White” (LIT-1045, §2). He is “stipulated to satisfy various compatibilist conditions”: reasons-responsiveness and conformity to higher-order attitudes. In Case 2, Plum is “programmed … at the beginning on his life”. He engages in “the egoistic reasons-responsive process of deliberation”, has “the set of first and second-order desires that result in his decision”, and has “the general ability to regulate his actions by moral reasons”. He does not decide “because of an irresistible desire” (LIT-1047, §2.2). Case 1 features “the most radical sort of manipulation consistent with all the leading compatibilist conditions”. The premise is an intuition: Plum is not responsible in the basic-desert sense.
Step 2: no relevant difference (No-Diff). In Case 3 an egoistic society “instills in him the very same tendencies”. Case 4 is an ordinary deterministic world “without any manipulators in the picture” (LIT-1045, §5). Pereboom argues “there is no relevant difference between any two adjacent cases”. “It is simply irrelevant whether Plum’s psychological states ultimately trace back to intentional agents or non-intentional causes” (LIT-1047, §2.2).
Step 3: best explanation. “The best explanation of the Plums’ lack of responsibility for their decisions is that the decisions were causally determined by factors outside of the Plums’ control” (LIT-1045, n. 23).
The dialectic it creates. A compatibilist must either accept that Plum in Case 1 is responsible (a hard line) or name a difference (a soft line). Any difference named so far has been met by a revised case. Original design (Mele’s Ernie, and Pereboom’s Case 2) defeats bypassing conditions. A natural force (Natalie) defeats manipulator conditions (LIT-1045, §§4–5; LIT-1047, §2.2).
What could have come out otherwise: Step 1 rests on an intuition that hard-liners reject (Frankfurt, McKenna’s reversal from Case 4). De Marco and Cyr name experimental studies of it (n. 50) without reporting their results. Step 2 is open to a soft-line condition that manipulated agents cannot meet “in principle”, and the surveys name attempts (Deery and Nahmias 2017) without assessing them.
What this does not say
- Not that determinism is true. The argument is about compatibilism. Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism adds separate arguments against libertarianism (the luck objection, and the lack of evidence for agent causation), which this account does not hold.
- Not that manipulation is what undermines responsibility. The argument says the manipulator is irrelevant and determination by outside factors is what matters. Soft-line views that blame the manipulator are the opposite position.
- Not the 2001 cases. Case 1 is quoted in its 2024 wording and Case 2 in its 2014 wording. The 2001 text, and any version rebuilt to manipulate Fischer and Ravizza’s taking of responsibility, were not read.
- Not a settled result. Both surveys present it as contested, with hard-line, soft-line and dilemma replies standing.
- Held at survey strength. The quotations are first-hand text of Pereboom’s cases, but the argument from them is known through summaries.
Connections
- THEORY-121 (Active) holds that responsibility is compatible with
determinism, given guidance control. This account’s conclusion
contradicts it, so
rivals:is declared. THEORY-121 names a version of this argument as its refuter, and that version is still unread. - THEORY-040 holds that structural conditions are met by manipulated agents and that no historical condition in the record is shown to escape. Step 1’s stipulations, reasons-responsiveness and hierarchical conformity, are the first half applied. The Ernie and Natalie dialectic is the second half, as the field states it. THEORY-040 is neutral between biting the bullet and adding history. This account takes neither option: it argues that, given No-Diff, the bullet bites every determined agent.
- THEORY-316 (Pereboom’s condition (3), causal history) is the conclusion of Step 3. That account says its truth is argued in Chapter 4. This account is that argument, as reported.
- QUESTION-071 asks whether manipulation is visible in present structure and what history would tell a manipulated will from one that is merely effective. Step 2 is the claim that no difference, present or historical, separates them in a way that matters. If it holds, the question’s part 2 has the answer “none”, for responsibility. That leaves open whether some recordable history separates them for other purposes, such as ownership in CLAIM-022’s sense.