THEORY-1328: Kane answers the luck objection by making indeterminism a hindrance inside goal-directed effort rather than a cause on its own: in a self-forming action the agent makes two competing efforts, each meeting the indeterminacy as interference from the other, so whichever succeeds is a willed success for which the agent is responsible; indeterminism lessens the agent's control but not its responsibility, and what responsibility needs is macro-control of processes involving many neurons, not control of each

Source

Kane (2009), LIT-1984, pp. 39–44; read in NOTE-1518.

The argument, from analogies:

Indeterminism as obstacle: the mathematician despite neural noise, the assassin whose arm may waver, the husband and the table (pp. 39–40), and a Morse message despite static (p. 42).
In the SFA, “the indeterministic noise which is providing an obstacle to her overcoming temptation is not coming from an external source … but is coming from her own will” (p. 40), and the agent is “endeavoring to make both choices, and one is going to succeed” (p. 41).
“Diminished control in such circumstances does not entail diminished responsibility when agents succeed in doing what they are trying to do” (p. 43), with three assassins at 50, 80 and 100% chance equally guilty (p. 44).
“What we need when we perform purposive activities, mental or physical, is macro-control of processes involving many neurons” (p. 43).

That the agent controls which effort wins. Kane denies the agent needs to and concedes it does not fully.
That the analogies carry over. In them there is one aim and an outside obstacle; in the SFA two aims are each the other’s obstacle.