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LIT-718: The Conversable, Responsible Corporation

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Properties5
StatusActive — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-569): in full, from the manuscript Pettit circulated for a master class at the European University Institute. Worth reading as the short statement of his case that corporations are fit to be held responsible. A corporation is a conversable agent: it speaks for itself through authorised spokespersons and commits itself, rather than reporting its members' attitudes. It must correct for the inconsistency any mechanical aggregation produces, so it has a mind of its own. Conversable agents meet the three conditions of fitness to be held responsible. The chapter stands in for the unread 2007 paper LIT-742.
Tagssocial-ontology, agency, free-will
ExtendsLIT-742 — Responsibility Incorporated
Cited as “paper” byNOTE-569 — The Conversable, Responsible Corporation
Cited as “source” byTHEORY-139 — A corporation that forms its judgments through authorised avowal and corrects the inconsistency any mechanical aggregation of its members' views produces has a mind of its own, and as a conversable agent it meets the conditions for being fit to be held responsible: a significant choice, the capacity to judge its options normatively, and control over acting on that judgment

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Philip Pettit (2017), “The Conversable, Responsible Corporation”, in E. W. Orts & N. C. Smith (eds), The Moral Responsibility of Firms, Oxford University Press, pp. 15–35 — DOI-10.1093/oso/9780198738534.003.0002

Key takeaways

  • Corporations are agents. By “evidential and executive reliability” in normal conditions they maintain purposes, form representations and act on them. The “nexus of contracts” objection is invalid: being composed of contracts no more stops a corporation being an agent than being composed of cells stops an animal (§1).
  • And conversable. Authorised spokespersons avow the corporation’s attitudes and make promises in its name. Members have authorised them, and live up to their words on pain of the benefits of incorporation. Avowal forgoes the “misleading-mind” excuse; a promise forgoes the “changed-mind” excuse too (§1).
  • With a mind of its own. Majority voting on “p”, “q” and “p&q” can be inconsistent (the discursive dilemma), so a conversable corporation cannot follow any mechanical rule. It must check and correct its aggregate, for example by a straw-vote procedure. That makes its voice “relatively autonomous” from its members’ (§1). Pettit thinks Hobbes was wrong to deny this.
  • Fitness to be held responsible (§2) needs three things. The first is a significant choice. The second is the capacity to make a normative judgment about the options. The third is the capacity to choose as that judgment requires, because it requires it. Holding someone responsible is a regulative practice addressed to a conversable agent. It does not need contra-causal freedom.
  • Corporations meet them (§2). A corporation claiming it cannot judge right and wrong commits a performative contradiction. A corporation that claims it cannot police its members can give itself that capacity, so over time it has it.
  • Not instead of individuals (§3). Members can be responsible too. Where they have excuses, holding only them responsible leaves “a loophole for people to incorporate for socially harmful but selfishly rewarding ends”.

Standing in the record

Filed on 2026-10-05 at the owner’s request, as a supplement to the essay on organizational will. It is the nearest thing in the literature to what the essay’s §8 does with Wolf: normative competence attributed to an organization. It also offers §7.1 a non-regressive route to corporate endorsement. What makes an attitude the corporation’s own is the authority of its spokespersons and the procedures that correct its aggregate, not a higher-order attitude. The account is THEORY-139.

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