Fischer, J. M. (2010). The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories. The Philosophical Review, 119(3), 315–336. doi:10.1215/00318108-2010-002.
Key takeaways
- The lesson of the Frankfurt cases is conditional: if determinism rules out responsibility, it is not by eliminating alternatives. It does not by itself establish compatibilism.
- A deterministic Frankfurt case need not beg the question: assume determinism, stay agnostic on whether it removes alternatives, and let determinism plus Black’s device remove them together.
- What matters is robust alternatives; a mere flicker, such as showing a different involuntary sign, does not ground responsibility.
- Fischer concedes that causal determination may matter to responsibility in another way, “lack of ‘sourcehood’” (p. 331).
Why this is here
THEORY-316 states Pereboom’s causal-history incompatibilism from a partial reading of Living without Free Will (LIT-1006, Unavailable) and waits on the rest of its Chapter 1 and on a reply from the leeway side. This paper reports Pereboom’s buffer case and Widerker’s dilemma, and is the compatibilist’s statement of what the cases do and do not show.