Revonsuo, A. (1999). Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8(2): 173–185. doi:10.1006/ccog.1999.0384. Not to be confused with Revonsuo, A. & Newman, J. (1999), “Binding and Consciousness”, the issue’s introduction, doi:10.1006/ccog.1999.0393.
Read in full on 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1406), from the publisher’s PDF on hedweb.com. It is the paper that draws the distinction, in its own terms (stimulus-related against consciousness-related binding) and crediting Smythies; the issue introduction was not read.
Why this is here
A27 of the exchange gave it as the longer history of the distinction between functional and phenomenal binding. Bears on CLAIM-355 and CASE-114. A reading should first confirm that this paper, not the issue introduction, is the one that draws the distinction.