Kirsh, D. and Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science 18(4), 513–549. DOI 10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
Key takeaways
Read in full (NOTE-878). Kirsh and Maglio define an epistemic action as a physical action whose primary function is to reduce the space, time or unreliability of the agent’s own mental computation, and argue from Tetris keystroke data that players rotate and translate pieces for that reason: zoids are rotated more than plan-then-act would need, rotation starts within a few hundred milliseconds of a zoid appearing, and a translate-to-wall check is used more the higher the drop. The computational saving is argued, not measured: physical rotation of 90° takes as little as 100 ms against an estimated 800–1200 ms mentally (a three-player pilot), and fewer attentional probes and less working memory are needed. The trade is physical action in place of internal computation at the moment of use, not precomputation or caching; the paper explicitly sets it against caching and chunking accounts of skill, and mentions amortized complexity only in passing for everyday cases such as sorting bolts before assembly. It says the choice fits a Stigler-style cost–benefit model in outline but that such models fail in detail, because an epistemic action’s value depends on the particular internal computation it serves.
Why this is here
The owner, after the cockpit reading (LIT-1066): “amortized retrieval is actually a kind of amortized computation. there’s probably a clearer relationship here that I imagine has likely been clarified/formalized at some point in the 30 years since the cockpit essay was published.” Registered with six others for QUESTION-095.
The founding case of offloading computation into action on the world. The reading (NOTE-878) narrows the first link drawn here: Tetris epistemic actions offload at the moment of use, once, with no upkeep, while the cockpit’s speed bugs store a result computed earlier. The paper argues against caching as the explanation.