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LIT-1403: Knowing others' preferences degrades the quality of group decisions

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StatusUnavailable — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-23; failed on availability as far as this client could tell. The article is closed (APA; Unpaywall and OpenAlex: closed, no repository full text). Göttingen Research Online, the one repository OpenAlex lists, sits behind a bot check, so whether it holds a file is unknown; the Hildesheim repository holds the record with no file; the authors' Göttingen publications page has no file; a web search found no author-posted copy. Only the abstract was read (PubMed 20438225). Registered for QUESTION-089 and CASE-108 from the owner's exchange of 2026-10-23, "Framework Overview Request". No NOTE, CASE or THEORY is filed. It returns to reading when a copy is supplied, not on merit.
Tagssocial-science, cognition, epistemology

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Mojzisch, A., & Schulz-Hardt, S. (2010). Knowing others’ preferences degrades the quality of group decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(5), 794–808. doi:10.1037/a0017627.

Not read: no lawful copy was reached on 2026-10-23 (see the status note). What follows is the abstract’s.

Key takeaways

From the abstract only (PubMed 20438225).

  • The effect. “learning the other group members’ preferences at the beginning of a discussion impedes the solution of hidden profiles.”
  • The manipulation. In Experiments 1–3, “participants who were not informed about their fellow group members’ preferences were more likely to solve a hidden profile than those who received bogus information about the others’ preferences.” The preference information was experimenter supplied, and by the abstract’s wording only Experiment 4 used groups that interacted face to face.
  • Mechanism. The effect “was mediated by participants paying less attention to the information exchanged”; Experiments 1 and 2 “ruled out” bolstering of one’s own position and added informational load.
  • Even a correct proponent. “Experiment 3 showed that learning the other group members’ preferences impedes the solution of hidden profiles even if one of the other members favors the correct alternative.”

Why this is here

The owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23, “Framework Overview Request”, cited it as an external result for QUESTION-089 and for the proposed study CASE-108, beside Schulz-Hardt et al. (2006), LIT-1409. It bears on CLAIM-281.

The two seem to pull apart: one says dissent helps, this one that knowing where others stand hurts, even when one of them is right. By the abstracts they vary different things. The 2006 study varies whether members actually disagree, and finds the benefit runs through more intense discussion. This one varies whether members are told the others’ preferences, and finds the cost runs through less attention to the information itself. Read together, the benefit of disagreement lies in what it does to the handling of information, not in the positions being visible; a stated preference can substitute for the information it should send people to. Whether the 2006 dissent groups exchanged preferences at the start, and whether the 2010 bogus preferences agreed or disagreed with the participant’s own, the abstracts do not say, and the reconciliation waits on reading both.

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