Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Social science — economics, psychology, anthropology and sociology — empirical and theoretical work on people and societies that is not law or policy.
279 of 2004 LIT documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| LIT-035 v2 | The ergodicity solution of the cooperation puzzle | Peters & Adamou (2022), DOI-10.1098/rsta.2020.0425. If N entities’ resources follow GBM (drift μ, volatility σ, independent noise), then pooling and sharing equally every step leaves the drift at μ, cuts the volatility to σ/√N (Eq. 3.9), and raises each member’s time-average growth rate from μ − σ²/2 to μ − σ²/(2N) (Eq. 4.1). The premium is (σ²/2)(1 − 1/N) (Eq. 4.2). With pairwise correlation ρ the effective volatility is σ√((1 + (N−1)ρ)/N), and the large-N limit is μ − σ²ρ/2 (Eqs. 5.12–5.13). | Active — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-059); worth reading as the clearest short derivation of the risk-pooling (geometric-mean) advantage of sharing under multiplicative noise. The mathematics is correct and self-contained. The framing claim, that this “solves” the cooperation puzzle and makes cooperation the default, rests on the model’s zero-cost, no-cheating assumptions, and the paper’s own citations (McCloskey, Winterhalder, Uitdehaag, Kennedy et al.) show the core result was already known. |
| LIT-047 v3 | Is It Good to Cooperate? Testing the Theory of Morality-as-Cooperation in 60 Societies | Curry et al. (2019), DOI-10.1086/701478. Coding 3,460 eHRAF paragraphs on the 60 Probability Sample Files societies found 962 morally valenced mentions of seven cooperative behaviours, 961 of them positive. The one negative is Chuuk admiration of open theft as dominance. Presence varied widely by domain: property 54/60 (90%), kin 47 (78%), group 44 (73%), reciprocity 43 (72%), respect 35 (58%), bravery 32 (53%), fairness 9 (15%). Presence correlated with ethnographic coverage (r = 0.43). The design can detect a morally positive mention but has almost no way to register a negative one, so the 99.9% is weak evidence for universality. | Proposed — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-034); the clearest statement of morality-as-cooperation, with an unusually good commentary set (Bloom; Smith & Kurzban; Wong) that states the objections exactly. Its empirical test is weakly diagnostic: the codebook defines the behaviours in virtue terms, the authors’ footnote 3 recodes conflicts as cooperation-vs-cooperation, and the first-pass selection was not blind. It would be settled by blind coding of all moralized content in the same sample, testing whether non-cooperative domains (purity, sex, harm) are moralized as often. |
| LIT-055 v2 | Who Goes Nazi? | Thompson (1941), https://harpers.org/archive/1941/08/who-goes-nazi/. Thompson’s answer is that susceptibility to Nazism is “something in them”, not race, nationality, creed or class. She argues it through fourteen character sketches of guests at an imagined New York party. People with an inner code, security or happiness “never go Nazi”. The humiliated intellectual, the scared speculator, the spoiled son, the labour boss and the success-chaser “would all go Nazi in a crisis”. It is a journalist’s typology from experience in Germany, Austria and France, and no data supports it. | Active — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-056); A primary historical text, and the source of a still-circulating heuristic, worth reading as what one experienced anti-fascist observer believed in 1941. It is not evidence for what predicts fascist support. |
| LIT-066 v3 | The varieties of contemplative experience: A mixed-methods study of meditation-related challenges in Western Buddhists | Lindahl et al. (2017), DOI-10.1371/journal.pone.0176239. This is a qualitative taxonomy, not a prevalence estimate. Sixty Western Buddhist meditators were recruited for having had meditation-related difficulties, and 32 teachers/clinicians were interviewed. Their accounts were coded into 59 experience categories in 7 domains and 26 influencing-factor categories in 4 domains. The most frequent category was fear/anxiety/panic/paranoia (82%). 73% reported moderate-to-severe impairment in at least one domain, 17% suicidality and 17% inpatient hospitalisation. Median symptom duration was 1–3 years. All of these are frequencies within a sample selected for difficulty, as the authors state. | Active — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-036); the reference taxonomy of challenging meditation-related experiences and worth reading for its codebook and its explicit limits. Its frequencies and its “causality” scoring do not support prevalence or causal claims, and the authors say so. |
| LIT-067 v2 | A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem | Debreu (1952), DOI-10.1073/pnas.38.10.886. Debreu proves existence of an equilibrium for an “abstract economy” (generalized game), in which each agent’s feasible set A_ι(ā_ι) depends on the others’ actions. The conditions: each action set 𝔄_ι is a contractible polyhedron; A_ι has a closed graph with non-empty compact values; f_ι is continuous on the graph into the extended reals; the value function φ_ι(ā_ι) = max f_ι is continuous; and each best-response set M_ā_ι is contractible. The proof applies the Eilenberg–Montgomery/Begle fixed-point theorem to the product best-response map. A Remark replaces the joint continuity of φ_ι with continuity (lower hemicontinuity) of A_ι plus a compact graph. A Corollary gives a saddle-point theorem that contains Kakutani’s and von Neumann’s. | Active — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-037); the original existence theorem for generalized (constrained) games, underlying Arrow–Debreu (1954). Short, fully self-contained, and still the canonical citation. Later results (Shafer–Sonnenschein 1975; the generalized-Nash literature) weaken its hypotheses but do not supersede it as the source. |
| LIT-079 v2 | Causal Claims in Economics | Garg & Fetzer (2024), ARXIV-2501.06873. GPT-4o-mini is run in nine passes per paper over the first 30 pages of 44,852 NBER/CEPR working papers. Edges kept in at least 4 of 9 passes, JEL-mapped, give “claim graphs” in which the share of edges backed by DiD/IV/RCT/RDD/synthetic control rises from 7.7% (1990) to 31.7% (2020). In year-fixed-effect-only regressions, doubling causal edges is associated with +1.36 pp top-five probability and +11.2% citations, while non-causal counterparts are flat or negative. The validation checks paper-level method labels, and only weakly: RCT and field labels have precision ≤ 0.10. It never checks the edges themselves against human labels. | Proposed — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-083); a promising, openly released claim-extraction infrastructure whose headline associations rest on edges never validated against human labels and on regressions with year fixed effects only. An edge-level human-annotated audit, and outcome regressions with field and method controls on a common sample, would settle it. |
| LIT-087 v2 | Assessing grand narratives of economic inequality across time | Feinman et al. (2025), DOI-10.1073/pnas.2400698121. Across a global archaeological house-size compilation (SiteGiniLevel: 1,176 sites, 47,019 houses), site Gini coefficients rise only weakly with the number of political levels (r² = 0.16 all sites, 0.22 apex, 0.27 H50) and with log polity population (r² = 0.11, 0.21, 0.08; values printed on Fig. 2, not in the text). The spread widens at three or more levels. A 0–3 expert-coded autocracy score does about as well (r² = 0.10, 0.18, 0.32; Fig. S4), and its sum with levels (“Hierarchical Clout”) reaches r² = 0.30 (apex), 0.42 (H50) and 0.50 (H100). All tests are bivariate OLS fits with no controls and no correction for many sites sharing polity-level values. | Active — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-049); worth reading as the widest quantitative record of premodern wealth disparity and a clear rebuttal of deterministic scale-drives-inequality narratives, a negative claim the scatterplots support well. Its positive claim that governance “matters” rests on bivariate r² from an expert-coded index whose “architecture” dimension overlaps with the house-size outcome, and should be read as suggestive. |
| LIT-089 v2 | Software engineering job openings hit five-year low? | Orosz (2025), https://blog.pragmaticengineer.com/software-engineer-jobs-five-year-lo…. Orosz reports that US software-development postings on Indeed stood at 65% of the pre-pandemic baseline, “3.5x” below the 2022 peak and 8% down year on year, while all postings were +10%. He attributes most of the fall to the end of zero interest rates, gives GenAI a secondary “wait and see” role, and doubts Indeed’s coverage. - Against Indeed’s current data the headline US figures reproduce: 65.2, peak ratio 3.59×, −8.3% y/y, all postings 109.5. - Several side figures and one comparative claim do not reproduce (see corrections). | Active — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-039); its headline figures reproduce from Indeed Hiring Lab’s postings series, which is the primary source and is not held here; several secondary claims (the sector comparison, the hospitality figure, the peak month) do not. |
| LIT-094 v2 | Airbnb and its potential impact on the London housing market | Shabrina et al. (2021), DOI-10.1177/0042098020970865. Using Inside Airbnb data, “possible misuse” is defined as entire-home listings available for more than 180 days a year whose host has 2 or more listings. On that definition, about 0.16% of London’s housing stock (≈5,300 homes) was possibly misused in 2018, rising to 3.5–7% in a few central LSOAs. Across LSOAs, misuse correlates weakly with purpose-built flats (r = +0.28), private renting (+0.33) and low dwelling-type entropy (−0.14). In a 33-borough OLS with 4 predictors, logged 2015 misuse has β = 0.084 (p = 0.001) on a min–max-normalised 2015–17 rent change. The paper translates this as “a 100% increase … up to 8%” in rent, which is £90 a year. | Active — read in full 2026-09-25 (NOTE-071); worth reading as a descriptive map of possibly non-compliant Airbnb supply in London and for its misuse definition. Its rent result is a 33-observation cross-sectional association whose “8% per doubling” translation does not follow from the reported model, and it should not be cited as an effect size. |
| LIT-101 v2 | Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality | Fitouchi et al. (2021), DOI-10.1017/S0140525X22002047. Puritanical norms (condemning lust, gluttony, intoxicants, immodesty, idleness; praising temperance and piety) are argued to be cooperative morality after all: people believe cooperation needs self-control and that indulgence erodes it (and discipline trains it), so a single harm/fairness-sensitive moral system condemns victimless pleasures as indirect, probabilistic threats to cooperation. Its decline in rich societies is put down to people seeing others as already self-controlled and trustworthy. The theory is explicitly agnostic about whether the norms actually work. Its most direct support is the authors’ own vignette studies (N > 1,100), in which perceived loss of self-control mediated 100% of the perceived effect of indulgence on cooperativeness. | Active — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-132); worth reading as a clearly stated, falsifiable, well-sourced BBS target theory of why “purity” norms exist. Much of its evidence is correlational or the authors’ own vignettes, and several predictions (intoxicants, piety) are explicitly untested. |
| LIT-118 v2 | A Pragmatist Theory of Evidence | Reiss (2015), DOI-10.1086/681643. Reiss proposes an “eliminativist hypothetico-contextualist” (EHC) theory of evidence for type-level causal claims in biomedical and social science. Support comes in two kinds: direct support (patterns we are “entitled to expect” if h is true) and indirect support (patterns incompatible with relevant alternatives). Warrant is graded by which alternatives have been eliminated, on four grades from “weak warrant” to “proof”. Where to stop probing is set by context, meaning background knowledge, a default entitlement to other scientists’ claims, and cost-benefit values. On this account there is no gold standard: RCTs are good only because they eliminate many alternatives at once. The 1950s smoking–lung cancer case illustrates the theory; it does not test it. | Active — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-197); worth reading as the clearest short statement of an eliminativist, anti-hierarchy account of evidence that works for observational science, and of how values and trust set stopping rules. Its grades of warrant and pragmatic guidelines are proposals illustrated on one historical case, not validated criteria. |
| LIT-129 v3 | Epistemic injustice in the clinical care of practitioners of Afro-Brazilian religions | Porcher & Santaella (2026), DOI-10.1080/09515089.2026.2623889. When clinicians override a patient’s religious interpretation of her experience in domains where medicine has no interpretive authority (“interpretive exclusivism”), they commit an epistemic injustice — racialised in the Brazilian case — that the authors say only epistemic humility remedies. | Unavailable — seeded from the abstract on 2026-09-26; a close reading was attempted the same day and found no reachable copy: Taylor & Francis refused the request, and no preprint or repository copy was found (the UFRGS repository did not respond). It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-155 v2 | Studying Philosophy Does Make People Better Thinkers | Prinzing & Vazquez (2025), DOI-10.1017/apa.2025.10007. In HERI/CIRP freshman–senior survey data (N = 649,511 students at 804 US institutions, 4,843 philosophy majors), one SD more SAT Verbal raises the odds of majoring in philosophy by 57% (OR 1.57), and freshman Habits of Mind by 34%. After adjusting for SAT or freshman scores, philosophy majors still score higher than non-majors on GRE Verbal (+33 points, SMD 0.48), LSAT (+2, SMD 0.35), Habits of Mind (SMD .24) and Pluralistic Orientation (SMD .21), with no difference on GRE Quantitative. On point estimates they rank first of 57 or 62 majors on GRE Verbal, LSAT and Habits of Mind. | Active — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-167); worth reading as the largest baseline-adjusted observational study of what studying philosophy does, and it is candid about its design; but its causal claim rests on covariate adjustment with self-reported scores, and a reader should take “philosophy causes better thinking” as well supported for verbal-test gains and weakly supported beyond that. |
| LIT-158 v2 | Status Distrust of Scientific Experts | Desmond (2022), DOI-10.1080/02691728.2022.2104758. Desmond gives a “how-possibly” argument, not a demonstration, that stubborn distrust of scientific experts can be valid reasoning. A low-status truster who is vulnerable in collective decision-making (Premise 1) and has reason to think the prevailing “service-for-prestige” ethos leaves out their core interests (Premise 2) has reason to distrust a high-prestige expert because of that prestige (§6, p. 16–17). The paper explicitly declines to say when those premises are true. | Active — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-113); worth reading as a compact, clearly structured rationalising account of distrust in experts that connects the trust literature (Baier, Hawley) with the sociology of professions and prestige; its §6 argument scheme is the citable part, but it shows only validity, not soundness. |
| LIT-159 v4 | If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious | Schwitzgebel (2014), DOI-10.1007/s11098-014-0387-8. A conditional, informal argument. Any materialist criterion liberal enough to credit rabbits (and rabbit-level distributed aliens, the “squidbits”) and behaviourally human-like but oddly built aliens (Sirian supersquids, Antarean antheads) with consciousness also credits the United States. On this argument the US meets the usual materialist marks of consciousness: sophisticated information processing (roughly 10^14 person-to-person visual “connections”, comparable to the brain’s about 10^14 synapses), goal-directed environmental responsiveness, self-representation and historical embedding. The only exits are eliminativism, extreme sparseness or neurochauvinism, each costlier than the conclusion. The paper argues for no universal criterion. It ends undecided between three readings: US consciousness, a challenge to materialists, or grounds to distrust universal metaphysics of mind. | Active — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-131); read in full (manuscript) 2026-09-26; the canonical over-generation argument against liberal materialist criteria of consciousness, and the standard critique of anti-nesting and exclusion principles, worth reading for anyone who attributes consciousness from functional or indicator properties. |
| LIT-161 v2 | Why Replication Is Overrated | Feest (2019), DOI-10.1086/705451. Every experiment and every replication rests on individuation judgments about what is being manipulated and measured (“conceptual scope”). So direct replication can at most help rule out random error, and “perhaps” establish that some effect exists but not which effect, while conceptual replication begs the question by presupposing that two operationalisations individuate the same effect. What productive research actually does, as in the Mozart-effect debate, is probe systematic errors, which is better called exploration than replication. | Active — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-196); worth reading as a short, clearly argued statement of why replication cannot settle “what effect?” questions, built on one worked case (the Mozart effect). It is suggestive for construct-validity arguments about benchmarks, but its strongest lines are asserted rather than argued. |
| LIT-188 v5 | Scaffolding individuality: coordination, cooperation, collaboration and community | Griesemer & Shavit (2023), DOI-10.1098/rstb.2021.0398. The paper sets out an idealized three-stage sequence of interaction types, which it calls a “first and rough sketch” (§1). Stage 1 is coordination in collections (pairwise, “aggregative” interactions of co-located individuals). Stage 2 is cooperation in conexuses (a connected web of binary interactions whose benefits can still be counted per member). Stage 3 is collaboration in communities: heterogeneous multi-way interactions around a shared goal, in which generatively entrenched “core” interactions give organizational closure. Table 1 puts the transition to a new level of individuality between stages 2 and 3 only. The paper asserts, rather than argues, that this describes evolutionary transitions non-circularly and that individuality is a special case of collectivity. Its one argued conclusion is hedged: community-level inheritance “seem[s] likely to evolve in tandem” with community-level individuality (§3). | Proposed — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-173); a short programmatic sketch, and the authors call it one. It is worth knowing as the compact statement of Griesemer’s scaffolding, reproducer and generative-entrenchment view applied to human social transitions. Its headline claims (non-circularity; individuality as a special case of collectivity) appear only in the abstract. Two things would settle it: the model of community “reliability” and endogenization the authors promise in §2 (“We hope to explore such models in future work”), or an application of the 3Cs to a worked case, such as the companion Neolithic paper (LIT-1935, registered unread), that separates collection, conexus and community by measurable criteria. Re-read 2026-11-01 (NOTE-173, version 3). |
| LIT-213 v2 | Rigour versus the need for evidential diversity | Cartwright (2021), DOI-10.1007/s11229-021-03368-1. Cartwright offers a characterisation of “rigour”: a method is rigorous when a valid argument shows its results are evidence for the conclusion and its premises are well established or secured by design. On that definition even well-run RCTs often fail to rigorously establish a study-population ATE, because orthogonality holds only at assignment and the potential-outcomes premise carries heavy metaphysics, and they seldom answer singular questions. Her alternative is a causal-process-tracing theory of change (pToC) with five elements (steps, causal principles, support factors, derailers, safeguards). It catalogues the diverse and mostly non-rigorous evidence that singular causal predictions need. | Active — read in full 2026-09-26 (NOTE-161); worth reading as a compact, citable statement of the “rigour is overvalued, evidence the causal process” position. The pToC template is concrete, but the paper openly offers no method for weighing the evidence it catalogues. |
| LIT-264 v2 | Is there contextuality in behavioral and social systems? | Dzhafarov, Zhang & Kujala (2016; arXiv 2015), ARXIV-1504.07422. Under Contextuality-by-Default a binary cyclic system is noncontextual iff ΔC ≤ 0, a criterion that separates context-dependent marginals from contextuality and reduces to Leggett–Garg, CHSH and KCBS when marginals agree. Every behavioural and social data set re-analysed meets it: 73 question-order pairs, Schröder staircases, conjoint choices, 23 primed word combinations and millions of dichotomisations of psychophysical matching. The QQ equality of the quantum question-order model implies it. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-235); worth reading as the paper that separates context-dependent response distributions (“inconsistent connectedness”) from contextuality proper in behavioural data, and finds no contextuality in any data set it re-analyses: 73 question-order pairs, Schröder staircases, conjoint animal–sound choices, 23 primed word combinations and psychophysical matching. Its sharpest result is that the quantum question model’s QQ equality implies noncontextuality, so the best-supported quantum-cognition model of order effects predicts its absence. Read with the caveats that the criterion it applies is proved elsewhere, that the absence of contextuality is offered as a working hypothesis, and that its worked Rose–Jackson example contains a labelling slip (the conclusion survives). |
| LIT-282 v2 | The Possibility of Social Choice | Sen (1998), DOI-10.1257/aer.89.3.349. Sen argues that Arrow’s impossibility is a result about voting-type rules, which are forced on social choice by excluding interpersonal comparisons, and that broadening the informational basis escapes it: cardinal utilities without interpersonal comparison do not help (Theorem 8*2 of Sen 1970a, cited), but even ordinal interpersonal comparisons break the exact impossibility, and partial comparability is often enough (pp. 188–189). The comparisons need not be of mental states; he offers capabilities — “to live the way he or she has reason to value” (p. 192) — as one informational basis among several, and shows it at work in poverty, famine and gender deprivation. The liberal paradox, by contrast, is not resolved by interpersonal comparisons and needs a different enrichment: people’s own priorities between liberty and desire-fulfilment (pp. 199–200). | Active — read in full 2026-09-28 (NOTE-263); worth reading as Sen’s own map of how his social-choice work, his capability view and his poverty and famine work connect through one idea — informational broadening — though every formal claim in it is cited to earlier papers rather than shown, so it is a guide to the results, not a source for them. |
| LIT-283 v2 | The Capability Approach | Robeyns & Byskov (2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach/. The entry treats the capability approach as an open normative framework, not a theory. Its core is the commitment to assess well-being and well-being freedom in the space of functionings (achieved doings and beings) and capabilities (real opportunities to achieve them). Everything else is optional specification: purpose, which capabilities count, functionings or capabilities, how to aggregate, and a distributive rule. On this view the approach is not a theory of justice (§4). Sen is reported as refusing any canonical list and appealing to public reasoning without ever specifying the procedure (§3.3). Sen’s paywalled texts appear only as citations: the Dewey Lectures for the well-being/agency freedom split (§2.5), and “Human Rights and Capabilities” 2005 p. 158 for the no-canonical-list quotation (§3.3). | Active — read in full 2026-09-28 (NOTE-260); worth reading as the definitional spine of the approach, with its concepts, its specification choices and the list of what a capability theory of justice still lacks. Use it for Sen’s paywalled texts only as a pointer to them, not as a substitute. Its retelling of Sen’s 1979 disability argument conflates two of his arguments and inverts who the “pleasure wizard” is. |
| LIT-284 v2 | Sen’s Capability Approach | Wells (2012), https://iep.utm.edu/sen-cap/. A Sen-centred overview. It presents the approach as Sen’s answer to four concerns: conversion variation, adaptive preferences, the value of options not taken, and informational exclusion. It sets out his critiques of the three pillars of utilitarianism (act-consequentialism, welfarism, sum-ranking) and of Rawlsian resourcism, and his two-stage structure, valuation then evaluation. In that structure selection is a social-choice exercise of public reasoning, able to reach partial agreement through “intersection” and “ranges of weights” (§3b). It reports four criticisms (illiberalism, under-theorisation, individualism, information gaps) with Sen’s replies, and closes on Nussbaum and on how she differs from Sen. It never mentions the well-being/agency distinction, and it cites none of Sen’s human-rights papers. | Active — read in full 2026-09-28 (NOTE-257); worth reading as the most Sen-specific short account in the batch, especially §3b’s partial-agreement mechanism and §5’s criticisms with Sen’s replies. It dates from 2012 and was never revised, and it omits agency freedom entirely, so for concepts it needs the SEP entry beside it. |
| LIT-287 v2 | Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined | Robeyns (2017), DOI-10.11647/OBP.0130. Robeyns defines the capability approach as an open, underspecified framework whose only compulsory content is an eight-part “A-module” (pp. 38–59, table 2.5 p. 74). The eight parts are: functionings and capabilities as core concepts; their value-neutrality; conversion factors; the means–ends distinction; functionings and/or capabilities as the evaluative space; other things may also have ultimate value; value pluralism; and each person as an end, i.e. ethical individualism. Every particular “capability theory” must also fill seven compulsory-but-open “B-modules” (purpose, selection of dimensions, human diversity, agency, structural constraints, functionings vs capabilities, meta-theory) and may add four contingent “C-modules”. On that basis she argues that most standing critiques (no list, individualism, power, political economy, liberalism) are valid at most against particular capability theories, not against the approach. She places Nussbaum’s work as one capability theory, not a rival version of the approach. | Active — read in full 2026-09-28 (NOTE-259); worth reading as the most systematic single account of what the capability approach is, and of what a capability theory must add. It is the best route to seeing which disputes are about the core and which are about optional choices. Read it as an advocate’s reconstruction, not a neutral survey: Robeyns says she takes sides in ch. 4 (p. 19), and her verdicts mostly hold that a critique misfires against the approach. |
| LIT-288 v2 | Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice | Nussbaum (2003), DOI-10.1080/1354570022000077926. Nussbaum argues that Sen’s capability approach yields no theory of social justice until it commits to a definite, if revisable, list of central capabilities, each owed to every citizen up to a threshold. She sets out her list of ten (Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination and Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; Control over one’s Environment). She rejects Sen’s talk of freedom as a general good because some freedoms are trivial or unjust. And she argues that political-liberal respect for pluralism favours a short list of capabilities over the promotion of freedom across the board. | Active — read in full 2026-09-28 (NOTE-256); worth reading as the canonical short statement of the list-versus-no-list dispute inside the capability approach, and of Nussbaum’s ten capabilities. It is argued by examples, not derived. Its threshold idea is announced but not worked out here. |
| LIT-289 v2 | Equality of What? | Sen (1979), https://ophi.org.uk/sites/default/files/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf. Sen argues that utilitarian equality (equal marginal utility), total-utility equality (completed as leximin) and Rawlsian equality (maximin/leximin on an index of primary goods) are each insufficient, and so is any combination of them, even for the needs-based part of equality: the test case is a disabled person who has no marginal-utility claim, no total-utility deprivation (he is contented) and no primary-goods deprivation, yet has an evident claim. He proposes “basic capability equality” — equality in “a person being able to do certain basic things” (p. 218) — as a non-fetishist, culture-dependent extension of Rawls, explicitly only “a partial guide” to the equality part of morality, and says his main (negative) thesis does not depend on this constructive proposal (p. 220). | Active — read in full 2026-09-28 (NOTE-258); worth reading as the founding statement of the capability idea and the cleanest short case against welfarist and primary-goods metrics; read it knowing that the positive proposal is a two-page sketch with no account of which capabilities count or how to index them, and that “functionings”, “capability sets” and “freedom” do not yet appear. |
| LIT-379 v2 | Anger makes fake news viral online | Chuai & Zhao (2020), arXiv:2004.10399. On Weibo 2011–2016, lexicon-scored fake news carries more anger and less joy than true news, and in observational regressions with content, author and topic controls a post’s anger share goes with more retweets and its joy share with fewer (moving 0.1 from joy to anger: about 5.8 retweets across all news, 5.4 within fake news). A survey ties two anger-dominated posts to stronger anxiety-management and information-sharing motives. The paper’s causal reading is not established by its design. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-852) in full; worth reading as a large Weibo study, with English checks, finding that fake news carries more anger and less joy than true news and that a post’s share of anger words goes with more retweets under controls. Read it knowing that its causal language rests on observational regressions with R² of 0.08–0.13, that its fake set is selected for having spread, that its headline 5.8 retweets comes from the all-news model, and that its survey result rests on two anger-dominated posts. The account filed from it is THEORY-329. |
| LIT-391 v4 | Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents | List & Pettit (2011), DOI-10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001. Per its publisher, the book argues that “there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them”, and that social science, law, morality and politics must take account of this. The account is said to be “entirely unmysterious” and grounded in social choice theory, economics and philosophy. Three parts: the logical possibility of group agents (conditions of agency, aggregation of attitudes, structure), their organisational design (epistemic, incentive-compatibility and control desiderata), and their normative status (responsibility, personhood, identification). Unread: filed from the description and contents only. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and table of contents; no lawful full text was reachable (Oxford Academic is paywalled, and neither author has posted the book or draft chapters), so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. It is the book-length case that organised groups are agents over and above their members, which is the composition side’s premise in the Minsky–Schwitzgebel bridge; whether it says anything about group consciousness is unknown from what was seen. Rechecked 2026-10-04 with no lawful copy found; two shorter papers by the authors stating Part I’s supervenience thesis were read and filed instead (LIT-705, LIT-700), and the book stays Unavailable because a paper is not a reading of it. |
| LIT-401 | What is it like to be a group agent? | List (2016), DOI-10.1111/nous.12162. Group agents (firms, courts, states) are real agents in a thin functionalist sense, and they can have consciousness as awareness. Whether they have phenomenal consciousness depends on which psycho-physical bridge principle is true. Under IIT, List argues informally that a group agent’s Φ is low: groups decompose into self-contained units, their steering bodies keep working when partly randomised, and most of their processing happens inside individuals. The exclusion postulate would deny group consciousness even if group Φ were high. So group agents are (close to) not conscious, which List uses to ground a normative asymmetry: groups have only derivative rights. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-340); the standard reply to LIT-159 from the group-agency side: it grants that organised groups are agents with functional awareness and argues, conditionally on IIT, that they have little or no phenomenal consciousness. Worth reading for its separation of agency from experience and for its three reasons why a group agent’s Φ should be low. The low-Φ verdict is argued informally, with no Φ computed for any group, and the paper never answers the reply Schwitzgebel had already made to the objection its third reason restates. |
| LIT-424 v2 | From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds | Dennett (2017), W. W. Norton. Per its publisher, the book shows “step by step, how a comprehending mind could in fact have arisen from a mindless process of natural selection”, with the decisive shift the sharing of memes, which produced “thinking tools” powerful enough that minds “create and comprehend”. Its contents run from the origin of reasons and “two strange inversions of reasoning”, through information, “brains made of brains”, words, memes and the origins of language, to consciousness as “an evolved user-illusion” and “the age of post-intelligent design”. Unread: registered from the description and the catalogue’s contents note. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and the catalogue record’s contents note, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. The Internet Archive scan is lending-only, Norton posts no excerpt beyond its description, and Dennett posted no draft chapters that I could find. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. The claim the record wants from it, competence without comprehension, is not stated in the description or the contents, so nothing here places it. |
| LIT-426 v2 | Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality | Huebner (2014), DOI-10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926275.001.0001. Per its publisher, the book argues that genuine cognition requires flexible goal-directed behaviour, which requires specialised representational systems integrated so as to cope fluidly with the environment, and so that collective mentality “should be posited where and only where specialized subroutines are integrated to yield goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to the concerns that are relevant to a group as such”. On this view there are many kinds of collective minds, some more like honeybees or cats than people, and groups are unlikely to be full “believers”. Unread: filed from the description and contents only. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and table of contents; no lawful full text was reachable (Oxford Academic is paywalled, the Internet Archive copy is lending-only, and no author-posted draft was found), so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Of the four works filed for the Minsky–Schwitzgebel bridge it is the one whose criterion for a collective mind is itself a decomposition criterion: mentality wherever specialised subroutines are integrated into goal-directed behaviour sensitive to the group’s concerns. A close reading is the most likely of the four to change the bridge. |
| LIT-472 v2 | Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together | Guala (2016), DOI-10.1515/9781400880911. Per its publisher, a unified theory of institutions combining three views (equilibria of strategic games, regulative rules, constitutive rules), applied to money, private property and marriage. It then addresses reflexivity, realism, Verstehen and fallibilism in the social sciences, criticises Hacking’s looping effects and interactive kinds, and asks whether causal and ontological dependence can demarcate social from natural science. Only the sample chapter 1 was read: it restates Hindriks & Guala’s case against a rules-only account. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description, table of contents, sample chapter and index, not read: the book is not lawfully readable in full online (De Gruyter and Princeton are paywalled, and the Internet Archive has no copy). Only chapter 1, Rules, the publisher’s free sample, was read; it is a lightly expanded version of the first section of Hindriks & Guala (LIT-481). It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-473 v2 | Convention: A Philosophical Study | Lewis (1969), DOI-10.1002/9780470693711 (the 2002 Blackwell reissue). The founding analysis of convention as a self-perpetuating solution to a recurring coordination problem with more than one equilibrium, sustained by a system of mutual expectations rather than by agreement, with conventions of language and communication as the main application. Unread: filed from catalogue records and chapter titles; the content summary is as Hindriks & Guala and the SEP entry state it. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from catalogue records and the chapter list, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The Harvard 1969 edition is lending-only at the Internet Archive (access-restricted, printdisabled), and the Wiley-Blackwell reissue of 2002 is paywalled. What the book argues is known here only through readings that state it (Hindriks & Guala, LIT-481; the SEP entry, LIT-487), and is labelled as theirs. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-474 v2 | The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge | Berger & Luckmann (1966), Doubleday. A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. By its contents: the reality of everyday life and its language; society as objective reality (institutionalization, sedimentation and tradition, roles, legitimation, symbolic universes); society as subjective reality (primary and secondary socialization, identity). Unread: filed from catalogue records and the table of contents only. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from library catalogue records and the 1966 edition’s table of contents; no lawful full text was reachable (the book is in copyright, the Internet Archive scans of the 1966 Doubleday edition and a 1967 printing are lending-only, and there is no author-posted text), so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. It is the sociology-of-knowledge treatise whose title phrase ADR-017’s topic blurb uses; what it claims, beyond its contents page, is not recorded here. |
| LIT-476 v2 | We-Intentions | Tuomela & Miller (1988), DOI-10.1007/BF00353512, Philosophical Studies 53(3): 367–389. The paper introduces the we-intention: roughly, a group member’s intention to do her part of a joint action, together with beliefs that the conditions for the joint action obtain and that this is mutually believed. The concept is applied to simple social practical reasoning and offered as basic to social theory. Unread: filed from metadata, with the content as search summaries report it. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s metadata and reference list; no lawful full text was reachable (Springer is paywalled, the University of Helsinki portal holds only the citation, and the 2020 De Gruyter reprint is closed), so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. It is the founding paper of Tuomela’s we-intention account, the main analysis Searle’s 1990 paper (LIT-490) is reported to argue against. |
| LIT-478 v2 | The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences | Epstein (2015), DOI-10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381104.001.0001. Social science works with an “anthropocentric” picture on which the social world is built out of people, as an ant colony is built out of ants. Part One separates the facts that ground a social fact from the facts that anchor the frame principle saying how such facts are grounded, and argues ontological individualism false. Part Two argues that even facts about groups, including group action and intention, are grounded in more than the members. Unread: filed from the introduction, the author’s précis and the publisher’s description. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and the author’s own posted introduction and table of contents, not read: the book is not lawfully readable in full online (Oxford Academic is paywalled; the author posts only the introduction). The introduction and the author’s open-access précis were read. Its framework, grounding versus anchoring, is stated in the record from the précis and from the author’s SEP entry (LIT-487, read). Part Two argues that facts about groups, including their actions and intentions, are grounded in more than their members, which bears directly on THEORY-043. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-481 | Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory | Hindriks & Guala (2015, online 2014), DOI-10.1017/S1744137414000496. Institutions are rules in equilibrium: correlated equilibria of coordination games with several equilibria, which the players represent to themselves as rules. Searle’s constitutive rules (“X counts as Y in C”) are obtained from a regulative rule by splitting it with a new term, a base rule (X is Y) and a status rule (if Y then Z). The new term is conservative and eliminable, so the constitutive-rules account reduces to the rules-in-equilibrium account, and Lewis’s theory of theoretical terms says the term refers if the rules are true. Shown on one toy institution (first-occupancy property); general reduction asserted. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-395), with the authors’ reply to their six commentators in the same issue; worth reading as the shortest statement of the rules-in-equilibrium theory of institutions and of the claim that Searle’s constitutive rules are regulative rules with a name added. The equilibrium half is a clear synthesis of Lewis, Aumann, Aoki and Greif. The reduction of constitutive rules is shown on one toy institution and asserted in general, and it leans on a reading of “collective acceptance” loose enough to make it hard to fail. |
| LIT-482 | Social ontology: Some basic principles | Searle (2006), DOI-10.1177/1463499606061731. Institutional reality is built from three primitives: collective intentionality, the assignment of function, and constitutive rules of the form “X counts as Y in C”. The Y status is held only by collective acceptance, and it carries deontic powers, which are desire-independent reasons for action. Institutional facts need language because they exist only as represented. Two revisions of the 1995 book: status indicators (after De Soto), and “free-standing Y terms” (after Barry Smith), such as corporations and money without currency. In those cases there is no X, and “We accept (S has power (S does A))”, a formula from later in the book, is ranked as the more general form. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-388), in its parallel English printing in Papers: Revista de Sociologia 80 (2006), pp. 51–71, not in the Anthropological Theory typesetting the DOI names; worth reading as Searle’s own short restatement of The Construction of Social Reality (LIT-485), and as the place where he concedes that “X counts as Y in C” is not the general form. Status functions imposed by collective acceptance carry deontic powers, and deontic powers are desire-independent reasons for action. Read it for the structure, not for an argument about collective intentionality: that is taken as a primitive and referred to his 1990 paper (LIT-490), not defended here. |
| LIT-484 | Qu’est-ce qu’un fait social ? | Durkheim (1894; book 1895), ch. I of Les Règles de la méthode sociologique. A social fact is “toute manière de faire, fixée ou non, susceptible d’exercer sur l’individu une contrainte extérieure”, or equivalently one general in a society while existing independently of its individual manifestations. Such facts are neither organic nor individual-psychic, so their substrate is society. They are general because collective, not collective because general: “il est dans chaque partie parce qu’il est dans le tout”. Ways of being (morphology) are consolidated ways of doing. A definition argued from examples, not proved. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-391); worth reading as the founding definition of a social fact, and as a short text later social ontology still cites (Ritchie 2018 does, for the group as more than a sum). Fifteen pages define the object of sociology by two marks, exteriority to individual consciousness and external constraint, with diffusion plus independent existence as an equivalent second test. It is a definition, not an argument: Durkheim calls it “un simple résumé des données immédiates de lobservation” (n. 3), and its two load-bearing steps (that what is neither organic nor individual-psychic must have society as its substrate, and that constraint is present even where nobody feels it) are asserted from examples. Read for the vocabulary and the part-whole thesis (“il est dans chaque partie parce qu’il est dans le tout”), not for a proof. |
| LIT-485 v2 | The Construction of Social Reality | Searle (1995), Free Press, New York (xiii + 241 pp.). The founding book of Searle’s social ontology. Per its catalogue description, it argues that some facts are independent of human observers and some require human agreement. Its chapters move from the building blocks of social reality and the creation of institutional facts through language and a general theory of institutional facts, to a defence of external realism and the correspondence theory of truth. Unread: filed from the catalogue record and contents; the record reads the theory in Searle’s 2006 restatement. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from catalogue records and a library scan of the table of contents; no lawful full text was reachable (the book is in print with Free Press / Simon & Schuster, the Internet Archive copies are either lending-only or unauthorised uploads, and Searle posted no draft), so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The record reads the theory through Searle’s own 2006 restatement (LIT-482, read in full), which is the entry to start from. |
| LIT-487 | Social Ontology | Epstein (2018; rev. 2024), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/. A survey that splits social ontology into two inquiries: what determines (grounds) a social fact, and what constructs or “anchors” the category it falls under, likened to semantics and metasemantics. §3 surveys determination bases (psychologism, atomism, bodies and practices, physicalism, holism, flat ontologies) and reports that ontological individualism is widely assumed and recently contested. §4 surveys anchoring theories (agreement, Lewis’s convention, Hart and Searle’s collective acceptance, patterns, practices, language). §5 covers groups, group minds and agency, institutions, race and gender, artifacts, money, law and language. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-393); worth reading as a survey: the best single map of social ontology in the record, organised around its author’s distinction between what grounds a social fact (§3) and what anchors, or sets up, the category it falls under (§4). It is also the record’s readable source for what The Ant Trap’s grounding–anchoring framework is (LIT-478 is not lawfully readable). Read it as a survey written by a partisan: Epstein’s own positions organise the entry, and the critics of anchoring are named but given a sentence each. |
| LIT-489 | Institutions | North (1991), DOI-10.1257/jep.5.1.97. Institutions are “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction”: informal constraints (taboos, customs, codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). With technology they set transaction and production costs, and so the incentive structure of an economy. Tribal exchange, the Suq and the caravan trade did not evolve from within; early modern European trade did, through merchant law, bills of exchange, insurance and a state bound not to confiscate. Institutional change is path dependent because the institutional matrix has increasing returns. A narrative essay; the definition is stipulated. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-392); worth reading as the economist’s canonical one-paragraph definition of institutions (“the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction”) and as a compact statement of the transaction-cost and path-dependence programme. It is an essay, not an argument: the game-theoretic motivation is one paragraph, the history is narrative, and the definition is stipulated, not defended. For what an institution is, read it beside Hindriks & Guala (LIT-481), who take it as the exemplar of the rules account and say what it leaves out. |
| LIT-492 v2 | On Social Facts | Gilbert (1989), Routledge (reissued by Princeton University Press, 1992; DOI-10.1515/9780691214627). The book asks whether social groups are real over and above individuals’ thoughts. It analyses everyday concepts of social action, social groups, collective belief and social convention, in dialogue with Weber, Simmel, Durkheim and David Lewis, and proposes that core social phenomena are “plural subject” phenomena. Unread: filed from the publishers’ descriptions and the chapter list. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publishers’ records and the chapter list; no lawful full text was reachable (the Princeton reissue is sold as an e-book on De Gruyter, and the Internet Archive’s copy of the Routledge edition is lending-only), so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. It is Gilbert’s book-length treatment of plural subjects, collective belief and social convention; “Walking Together” (LIT-477) is the short version. |
| LIT-493 v2 | The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms | Bicchieri (2006; print December 2005), DOI-10.1017/CBO9780511616037. Per its publisher, an integrated account, drawing on social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, of how social norms such as fairness, cooperation and reciprocity emerge, why and when people follow them, when they attend to the relevant norm, why inefficient norms survive, and how psychological dispositions can lead to fairness norms like ours. Unread: filed from the description and contents only. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and table of contents, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. Cambridge Core is paywalled. The author’s own copy of chapter 1 on her University of Pennsylvania pages and the publisher’s excerpt at assets.cambridge.org both failed (HTTP 403; connection reset), and the Internet Archive has no copy. It is the standard equilibrium-and-expectations account of social norms; what its definition of a norm says was not seen. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-495 v2 | The Biology of Moral Systems | Alexander (1987), DOI-10.4324/9780203700976 (the 2017 Routledge reissue). By the publisher’s account, moral questions arise from conflicts of interest, and moral systems use confluences of interest at lower levels of organization to manage conflicts at higher ones; they are “systems of indirect reciprocity”, run on reputation, and morality arose within groups for unity in intergroup competition. Unread: filed from the publisher’s description and chapter titles. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and the chapter list, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The 1987 Aldine de Gruyter edition is lending-only at the Internet Archive (access-restricted, printdisabled), and the 2017 Routledge reissue is paywalled. A complete scan posted on a course blog was found and not used, since posting a whole in-copyright book is not a lawful copy. What the book argues is known here only from the publisher’s description and from Nowak 2006 (LIT-501), which cites it for the claim that indirect reciprocity leads to morality; both are labelled as theirs. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-496 | Mapping morality with a compass: Testing the theory of ‘morality-as-cooperation’ with a new questionnaire | Curry, Jones Chesters & Van Lissa (2019), DOI-10.1016/j.jrp.2018.10.008. The Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire, 21 Relevance and 21 Judgement items for seven domains, tested in UK (n = 1,392) and US (n = 469) online samples against the MFQ (UK n = 1,042). Seven factors fit the Relevance items (CFI .98) but not the Judgement items (CFI .87), and the combined seven-domain model is rejected (CFI .73). The MFQ’s five factors fit worse. MFQ purity items are rated about as morally relevant as its loyalty and authority items, which the authors concede contradicts the theory. | Proposed — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-412), from the PsyArXiv manuscript; worth reading as the programme’s psychometric test and as the place its authors concede that purity items are rated morally relevant, which “appear[s] to contradict” the theory. Its seven-factor result is weaker than the abstract says. The items were written by the authors, three per domain, from the theory itself, and selected by fit within each domain. Seven factors then fit the Relevance items but not the Judgement items, and the combined seven-domain model is rejected (CFI .73), so the best model has fourteen correlated factors. No non-cooperative item is in the MAC-Q, so it cannot test whether morality is only about cooperation. It would be settled by an item pool written independently of the theory, with harm, purity and other non-cooperative content in it, factored blind, on data that can be shared. |
| LIT-499 | Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism | Graham et al. (2013), DOI-10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4. Moral Foundations Theory in full: a nativist, cultural-developmental, intuitionist and pluralist account with five foundations (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity), each tied to an adaptive challenge and an existing evolutionary model. A decade of MFQ work finds liberals rely on Care and Fairness, conservatives on all five, across 12 world regions. Five criteria for “foundationhood” are proposed, and Liberty, Efficiency, Ownership and Honesty are named candidates. Harm monism (Gray) and fairness monism (Baumard) are rejected as Procrustean. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-396); worth reading as the full statement of Moral Foundations Theory and as the text to check morality-as-cooperation’s comparison against. It states the theory’s four claims (nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism, pluralism), reviews a decade of MFQ findings, mostly on political ideology, and offers five criteria for what counts as a foundation. By its own table the Care foundation rests on kin selection and Fairness on Trivers’ reciprocal altruism, and Ownership/theft is already a named candidate, so the claim that MFT omits kin altruism, reciprocal altruism and property does not survive this text. Sanctity, the foundation morality-as-cooperation excludes, is by the same table the one with the least evidence of innate preparedness. |
| LIT-500 | Morality beyond the WEIRD: How the nomological network of morality varies across cultures | Atari et al. (2023), DOI-10.1037/pspp0000470. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2: 36 items, six per foundation, for Care, Equality, Proportionality, Loyalty, Authority and Purity, built and tested on 25 populations (N ≈ 8,700) in local languages. Equality and Proportionality correlate weakly (mean r = .21). Purity is the foundation most related to cultural distance from the U.S. (r = .43) and to religiosity. The individualizing–binding split appears in only three of 19 national networks. The MFQ-2 explains more variance in 30 criterion scores than the MFQ-1 (mean adjusted R² .37 against .30). | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-398), from the APA accepted manuscript; worth reading as the current Moral Foundations measure (the MFQ-2) and the theory’s current list of six foundations, with Fairness split into Equality and Proportionality, and as the place MFT answers morality-as-cooperation directly: Curry et al. 2019 “left out Purity as an important and less-WEIRD moral foundation”. Its strongest evidence for that, Purity’s association with cultural distance from the U.S., rests on the one subscale that fails its own measurement-invariance threshold. Its samples are online panels in 25 populations, not small-scale societies. |
| LIT-502 | Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues | Haidt & Joseph (2004), DOI-10.1162/0011526042365555. Proposes that people are innately prepared to feel flashes of approval or disapproval at four patterns: suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity and purity, with ingroup the best candidate for a fifth (fn. 15). Each is a module with a proper domain it evolved for (one’s own child in distress; cheating in joint ventures; disease and waste) and a culturally widened actual domain. Cultures build virtues on these intuitions and differ in which they use. The four were chosen by counting which concerns appeared in five surveyed works; the essay reports no data. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-400); worth reading as the founding statement of Moral Foundations Theory, and as the text morality-as-cooperation quotes when it calls purity non-cooperative. It proposes four innately prepared intuition “modules” (suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity), with ingroup as a likely fifth in a footnote, and argues that cultures build virtues on them. The list comes from tallying five books, not from data, and no study is reported. It already grounds the suffering module in care for one’s own children and the reciprocity module in Trivers, so the later charge that the foundations omit kin and reciprocal altruism does not fit this text. |
| LIT-503 | Morality as Cooperation: A Problem-Centred Approach | Curry (2016), DOI-10.1007/978-3-319-19671-8_2. Morality is “a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation and conflict recurrent in human social life”. Nonzero-sum game theory yields seven problems (kin, coordination, exchange, hawkish and dovish contest displays, division, possession) and hence seven moral domains, illustrated but not tested. The chapter predicts that non-cooperative behaviour is morally neutral everywhere, and that MFT’s purity domain has no connection to cooperation. | Proposed — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-408); the founding statement of morality-as-cooperation and the place its predictions are stated most sharply, including the one its own tests have not run: that behaviour unrelated to cooperation will be morally neutral, and that no culture’s morality will be about “aesthetics or nutrition” (p. 40). It reports no data. The seven domains are derived from game theory and then illustrated with quotations from philosophers and ethnographers, so the chapter shows the taxonomy is coherent, not that it is the right one. It would be settled by the test LIT-047 lacks: blind coding of all moralized content in one sample, asking whether non-cooperative domains are moralized. |
| LIT-504 v2 | A Natural History of Human Morality | Tomasello (2016), DOI-10.4159/9780674915855. By the publisher’s account, a reconstruction from experiments comparing great apes and children of how early humans became “an ultra-cooperative and, eventually, a moral species”. The chapter titles give the steps: an interdependence hypothesis, a second-personal morality of collaborating partners, an “objective” morality of the cultural group, and human morality as “cooperation-plus”. Unread: filed from the description and chapter list. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and the chapter list, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The book is lending-only at the Internet Archive (access-restricted, printdisabled) and paywalled at Harvard University Press and De Gruyter. Its relation to Tomasello’s later “The moral psychology of obligation” (LIT-125, read in NOTE-185) is inferred from the chapter titles and that reading, and is labelled as inference. An author’s précis exists (Philosophical Psychology, 2018, DOI 10.1080/09515089.2018.1486605) and was not read; it would be the natural first step. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-507 | Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality | Rai & Fiske (2011), DOI-10.1037/a0021867. Relationship regulation theory: moral judgments are not about features of acts (harm, unfairness, impurity) but about whether acts fit the relationship model in force. Fiske’s four relational models each carry a moral motive: Unity (communal sharing), Hierarchy (authority ranking), Equality (equality matching) and Proportionality (market pricing). The motives are universal; cultures differ in where they apply them. So violence, inequality and “impure” acts can be morally required, and purity and ingroup loyalty are one motive. A review, with no new data. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-405); worth reading as the relational alternative to both Moral Foundations Theory and morality-as-cooperation, and as the source of the Equality/Proportionality split the MFQ-2 later adopted. It is a theoretical review with no new data. It agrees with morality-as-cooperation that morality exists to sustain cooperative relationships, and differs from it on purity (a Unity motive, the same motive as ingroup loyalty), on harm (violence can be morally required) and on the units (four relational models, not seven game-theoretic problems). |
| LIT-508 | A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice | Baumard, André & Sperber (2013), DOI-10.1017/S0140525X11002202. When individuals can choose partners and have equal outside options, a split that gives one side less than it could get elsewhere is not stable, so partner choice selects for sharing the gains of cooperation in proportion to contribution. Competition to be chosen then favours a genuine, non-instrumental sense of fairness. Economic-game results (entitlement effects, merit-based division, need-based mutual aid, proportionate punishment) are reinterpreted as fairness, not altruism. Morality is defined as fairness; kin care and group loyalty are not intrinsically moral. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-407), with all 28 open peer commentaries and the authors’ Response; worth reading as the strongest single-mechanism cooperative theory of morality and as the parent of moral disciplining (LIT-101). It is a cooperation theory that cuts the other way from morality-as-cooperation: partner choice selects one moral sense, fairness, and kin care and group loyalty are not intrinsically moral. Its evidence is a reinterpretation of others’ economic-game results, and its central formal claim is cited from the authors’ separate model. The commentaries (Graham, Ramlakhan & Brook, Machery & Stich, Sachdeva et al., Atran) press the purity, harm and scope objections, and the Response answers them two ways because the authors disagree among themselves. |
| LIT-509 | Moral Molecules: Morality as a Combinatorial System | Curry, Alfano, Brandt & Pelican (2021), DOI-10.1007/s13164-021-00540-x. The seven morality-as-cooperation domains are treated as elements that combine into “molecules”. For each of the 21 pairs a moral concept is proposed and an example found in the literature: fraternity, blood revenge, filial piety, honour, queuing and so on. Counting combinations gives 127 positive molecules and 2,186 of mixed valence. The test is confirmatory: no search protocol, blind judges or failed searches are reported. | Proposed — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-399); a clear statement of the programme’s ambition, that seven cooperative elements generate “all moral ideas, possible and actual”, but its test is the weakest in the programme. For each of the 21 pairs the authors proposed a concept and then searched the literature until they found it (“We succeeded in every case”). No search protocol, judges or failed attempts are reported, and the theory “doesn’t predict which of these many possibilities will be actualities”. Two molecules (mendicance, common ownership) combine an element with the negation of another, which the paper’s own notation counts as mixed valence. It would be settled by blind judges classifying an independent list of moral concepts into the scheme, with a count of those that fit nothing. |
| LIT-510 | The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism | Trivers (1971), DOI-10.1086/406755. Altruism between non-relatives can be selected if acts cost the giver less than they benefit the recipient, the same partners meet repeatedly and symmetrically, and altruists stop helping those who fail to reciprocate. Cleaner-fish hosts fit; bird alarm calls are explained instead by self-interest. In humans, friendship, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, guilt, suspicion and their sham versions are proposed as adaptations that regulate exchange, and rules of conduct as a multiparty extension. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-402); worth reading as the source of reciprocal altruism and, for this record above all, of the first adaptive account of moral emotions: moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, guilt and the detection of sham versions of each, with “norms of reciprocal conduct” as a later step. The formal part is slight (a verbal model and Hamilton’s communicated Prisoner’s Dilemma sketch); the human psychology is hypothesis supported by the social-psychology literature of the 1960s. It grounds the exchange domain of morality-as-cooperation and gives that domain its emotions. |
| LIT-511 | The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment | Haidt (2001), DOI-10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814. Moral judgment is usually caused by fast affective intuitions; moral reasoning mostly comes after, to justify the judgment to others, and changes minds chiefly by triggering new intuitions in listeners. Four reasons are offered: two processing systems, motivated reasoning, post-hoc confabulation, and the weak link between moral reasoning and moral action. Intuitions are partly innate and are tuned by culture through custom complexes and peers in late childhood. Harmless taboo violations are condemned anyway, and people are “dumbfounded” when their reasons run out. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-403), from the author’s final manuscript; worth reading as the standard statement of the social intuitionist model, the proximate account of moral judgment that morality-as-cooperation lacks, and as the source of the “harmless wrongs” (consensual incest, sex with a dead chicken) on which the purity and sex objections to cooperative theories rest. Most of its evidence comes from outside the moral domain, which the author says himself: the model is offered as “a plausible alternative”, not an established fact. |
| LIT-512 | Moral universals: A machine-reading analysis of 256 societies | Alfano, Cheong & Curry (2024), DOI-10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e25940. A word-count dictionary for the seven morality-as-cooperation domains (MAC-D, built by expert brainstorming and WordNet expansion) is run over 9,653 eHRAF Ethics paragraphs from 256 societies. Most morals are detected in most societies, with small but significant differences by region and subsistence. Against the earlier hand codes the dictionary agrees only slightly to fairly (κ .08–.25) and overstates prevalence. It cannot tell praise from condemnation, so it says nothing about valence. | Proposed — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-406); worth reading for the Morality-as-Cooperation Dictionary and for what it shows about the sixty-society result, not as a replication of it. The dictionary counts words and, by the authors’ own statement, “cannot be used to estimate the moral valence of cooperation”, so it does not test the 961-of-962 finding at all. Its agreement with the earlier hand codes is slight to fair (κ .08–.25), and it inflates fairness from 15% to 58% of societies. It detects significant, though small, regional differences, against the earlier claim of equal frequency. A spot-check of its paragraphs found admired theft in four more societies. It would be settled by valence-aware coding validated against blind hand codes, run with dictionaries for non-cooperative domains on the same corpus. |
| LIT-513 | Validation of Morality as Cooperation Questionnaire in Turkey, and Its Relation to Prosociality, Ideology, and Resource Scarcity | Yilmaz, Harma & Doğruyol (2021), DOI-10.1027/1015-5759/a000627. In Turkish undergraduates (n = 445), the MAC-Q’s seven-factor model fits the Relevance items (CFI .949, RMSEA .053) but not the Judgement items or the full form, as in the original. Deference and family track resistance to change, and fairness tracks lower opposition to equality. Resource-scarcity primes in Turkey (n = 576) and a preregistered US study (n = 921) change nothing. Relevance scores correlate modestly with prosocial intentions. | Active — read in full 2026-10-02 (NOTE-397), from the accepted manuscript; worth reading as the first independent test of the MAC-Q, by a team with no morality-as-cooperation author. It reproduces the questionnaire’s main result in Turkish undergraduates (n = 445): seven factors fit the Relevance items (CFI .949) and fail on the Judgement items (CFI .828) and the full form (CFI .752). Its two resource-scarcity experiments are null. Its scope is narrow: there is no non-cooperative item, so it tests MAC’s structure, not its claim that morality is only cooperation; and the latent correlations (fairness–property .87, family–group .80) and a second-order single factor fitting at CFI .906 limit how distinct the seven are. |
| LIT-514 v3 | Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame | Boehm (2012), Basic Books. By the publisher’s account, the moral sense is “a sophisticated defense mechanism”: group punishment of bullies, thieves, free riders and psychopaths over six million years made social selection favour altruists and bred conscience, virtue and shame. The chapter list adds a “selection-by-reputation hypothesis” and its test. Unread: filed from the description and chapter list. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-02 from the publisher’s description and the chapter list, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The book is lending-only at the Internet Archive (item moraloriginsevol0000boeh) and sold by Basic Books. What it argues is known here only from the publisher’s description, labelled as such. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-538 | How effective psychological treatments work: mechanisms of change in cognitive behavioural therapy and beyond | Salkovskis, Sighvatsson & Sigurdsson, Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 51(6):595–615, in the special issue “Disseminating CBT: 50 years and beyond” (issue dated November 2023, first published online 5 January 2024). A history of behaviour therapy and CBT as empirically grounded treatment development, an argument that common factors are not mechanisms of change, and a proposal: the mechanism of all effective therapies is a shift from a stuck, threat-laden meaning (“Theory A”) to a collaboratively built and tested alternative (“Theory B”), which the authors call a type of psychological flexibility. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-428), from the open-access (CC BY 4.0) publisher PDF; worth reading as a senior Beckian’s statement of a single mechanism of change for all effective psychological therapy, and for its clear separation of “common factors” from “mechanisms of change”. Its thesis is a proposal argued from the history of CBT and clinical examples, not a tested result: people are “stuck” in an exaggerated negative or threatening meaning (Theory A) kept alive by what it makes them do, and any effective therapy works by helping them build and test a less threatening alternative (Theory B). The paper calls this a particular type of psychological flexibility, without citing the ACT literature that uses that name. |
| LIT-541 | Relational Frame Theory: Some Implications for Understanding and Treating Human Psychopathology | Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McHugh & Hayes (2004), International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 4(2):355–375. RFT stated briefly: humans relate events bidirectionally and arbitrarily, as a generalized operant under contextual control, so words take on the functions of what they are related to. Frames combine into networks, networks are related to networks (metaphor), rules are networks that regulate behaviour, and the self is content, process and context of verbal relations. Psychopathology is read as verbal behaviour, and ACT’s acceptance, defusion and values are given RFT interpretations. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-430), in place of the RFT book, LIT-549; worth reading as a short statement of Relational Frame Theory by two of the book’s editors, and as the paper that shows how RFT is meant to become a theory of psychopathology. Humans, unlike the animals of conditioning research, relate events bidirectionally, so a word acquires the functions of what it names. Relating is a generalized operant learned across exemplars, and its frames share mutual entailment, combinatorial entailment and the transformation of function. Rules are relational networks, and the self is three verbal relations to one’s own behaviour. ACT’s acceptance, defusion and values are then reinterpreted in those terms. Its clinical examples are illustrations, not data, and it says its Part 3 is “no more than a heuristic”. |
| LIT-543 v2 | Examining Domains of Psychological Flexibility and Inflexibility as Treatment Mechanisms in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: A Comprehensive Systematic and Meta-Analytic Review | Macri & Rogge (2024), Clinical Psychology Review 110:102432. A systematic review and meta-analysis of 77 records (67 studies, N = 9,123). ACT reduced global inflexibility, lack of present-moment awareness, fusion, experiential avoidance, self-as-content and inaction, and increased committed action/values, flexibility/acceptance and defusion, against waitlist and active comparators. Those changes were linked to drops in distress. Unread: registered from the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the PubMed abstract and Crossref, not read. The article is closed access at Elsevier, it is not in PubMed Central, and Unpaywall and OpenAlex list no open copy. A web search for a PsyArXiv or OSF preprint found none, and the University of Rochester’s repository (UR Research) holds two dissertations from Rogge’s lab on the same question (Dubler 2018, Rolffs 2019) but not this review. ScienceDirect itself was not tried. A human reader with Elsevier access could promote this; it is the record’s only quantitative test of the ACT process model. |
| LIT-544 | The Future of Intervention Science: Process-Based Therapy | Hofmann & Hayes (2019; online 2018), Clinical Psychological Science 7(1):37–50. The era of “protocols for syndromes” is over: thirty years of DSM-defined randomised trials never found the diseases the syndromes were meant to reveal. Evidence-based therapy should be redefined as process-based therapy, “evidence-based processes linked to evidence-based procedures”, with mediation and moderation as the evidence, functional analysis and idiographic networks as diagnosis, and named therapies and broad schools in decline. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-437), from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central; worth reading as the programme statement of process-based therapy by the leading figures of the two camps of CBT it reconciles. It replaces “protocols for syndromes” with one question: “What core biopsychosocial processes should be targeted with this client given this goal in this situation, and how can they most efficiently and effectively be changed?” It is a position paper with predictions, not a result. Its sharpest commitment is a falsification rule: an intervention whose specified process of change “cannot be shown to be consistently applicable” has an incorrect model, however well it works. |
| LIT-545 v3 | Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change | Bandura (1977), Psychological Review 84(2):191–215. The founding paper of self-efficacy theory: psychological treatments, whatever their form, are proposed to work by changing a person’s expectation that they can perform the needed behaviour. Unread: registered from bibliographic metadata, with no lawful abstract reachable. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref and PubMed, not read. The article is closed access at APA. Unpaywall and OpenAlex call it “green” open access, but their one location is a DOAJ record of an unrelated 2020 Jurnal Psikologi article on thalassemia screening that carries Bandura’s DOI by mistake. The copy Stanford hosted with Bandura’s papers (web.stanford.edu/dept/psychology/bandura/pajares/Bandura1977PR.pdf) now returns 403 Forbidden. Its archived snapshots are on the Wayback Machine, which this environment’s egress policy blocks, and the University of Kentucky mirror of the same collection now redirects away. A PDF of the published article is posted by the Sustainable Sanitation Alliance’s library (susana.org), a third party, so it was not read (only its first page was opened, to identify what it was). A human reader with APA access, or one who can open the archived Stanford copy, could promote this. |
| LIT-546 v2 | The Emotions | Frijda (1986), The Emotions, Cambridge University Press, Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction (ISBN 0-521-30155-6 hardback, 0-521-31600-6 paperback), 544 pp. The canonical statement of Frijda’s appraisal and action-readiness theory: emotions are changes in action readiness elicited by appraisal of events as relevant to the individual’s concerns, with control precedence over other activity. Unread here; what is said of it comes from the works that cite it. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from bibliographic records, not read. No lawful open copy of the book (544 pages) was found: it has no Crossref DOI, and Open Library lists no open or lendable scan. Under the owner’s book rule its reading is replaced by Frijda, Ridderinkhof and Rietveld (2014), LIT-540, read in full, which states the book’s central constructs, action readiness, concern and control precedence, in Frijda’s words. The closer substitute, Frijda (1988) “The laws of emotion” (American Psychologist 43(5):349–358, DOI 10.1037/0003-066X.43.5.349), was not lawfully reachable from here. A human with library access could read it, or the book, and either would let this entry say more. On 2026-10-14 a lawful full text of the book was sought again and none was reached. OpenAlex: no DOI to look up, and its title search refused the request (the shared daily budget was exhausted). Unpaywall: no DOI to query. Crossref: still no record for the book. Cambridge University Press’s product page returned HTTP 403; the book is not on Cambridge Core as an open title. UvA-DARE, Frijda’s university repository, holds a metadata record for it with no file attached. PhilPapers returned HTTP 403. Europe PMC: no hit. Internet Archive: no copy of The Emotions; the only Frijda book there, The Laws of Emotion (2007), is a borrow-only lending scan. A web search found only catalogue and bookseller listings. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-549 v2 | Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Account of Human Language and Cognition | Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche (eds.), Kluwer Academic/Plenum, 2001. The founding book of Relational Frame Theory: human language and cognition are learned, generalized operant behaviour, the arbitrarily applicable relating of events (mutually, in combination, and with transformation of their functions) under contextual control. Eight chapters state the theory, from derived relations to rules and the self; five apply it to development, education, social processes, psychopathology and religion. Unread: registered from Crossref’s chapter records, with LIT-541 read in its place. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref’s book and chapter records, not read; LIT-541, a 21-page statement of the same theory by two of its editors, was read in its place. No lawful full text of the book was found. Springer’s book page returned a “Client Challenge” bot page, Unpaywall and OpenAlex list no open copy, and Maynooth University’s repository (where Barnes-Holmes and Roche deposited many RFT papers) holds no chapter of it. A copy on an Ethiopian national-library server was not used, because it is not an author, institutional or publisher deposit. The editors’ own fourteen-page chapter 8, “Relational Frame Theory: A Précis” (pp. 141–154, DOI 10.1007/0-306-47638-x_8), is the part a human reader should take first; a reading of the whole book would move this to Active. |
| LIT-550 v2 | Emotion and Adaptation | Lazarus (1991), Emotion and Adaptation, Oxford University Press, New York (ISBN 0-19-506994-3). The book-length statement of Lazarus’s cognitive-motivational-relational appraisal theory; its chapter titles frame emotion through the person–environment relationship, motivation, coping and goal congruence. Eleven chapters run from definition and measurement through motivation and coping, cognition, causality, negative, positive and problematic emotions, development, social influence and health, to research, assessment, treatment and prevention. Unread. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref’s chapter records, not read, and no substitute was read either. The book (Oxford University Press, about 560 pages) is closed at the publisher. The shorter work by the same author that states the same theory, Lazarus (1991), “Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion” (American Psychologist 46(8):819–834, DOI 10.1037/0003-066X.46.8.819), has no lawful open copy. APA does not make it free, and Unpaywall and Semantic Scholar list none. The only full text the web search found is in a bulk upload of Lazarus’s journal articles to the Internet Archive by a private user, which is not a lawful source, so I did not open it. Other Lazarus emotion papers (American Psychologist 1991 46(4); Smith & Lazarus 1993; Psychological Inquiry 1995; Journal of Personality 2006) are also closed. His 1993 Annual Review of Psychology chapter is listed as free at the publisher, but annualreviews.org answered with a bot challenge. A human with library access could read the 1991 American Psychologist paper and file it as the read substitute. |
| LIT-551 v2 | Experiential Avoidance and Behavioral Disorders: A Functional Dimensional Approach to Diagnosis and Treatment | Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl (1996), Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 64(6):1152–1168. Syndromal diagnosis has not found functional pathological processes, and functional analysis has not produced a replicable classification. The paper proposes functional diagnostic dimensions instead, and offers experiential avoidance as one: many disorders are unhealthy efforts to escape and avoid emotions, thoughts, memories and other private experiences. Unread: registered from the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the PubMed abstract and Crossref, not read. The article is closed access at APA, and Unpaywall and OpenAlex list no open copy. Copies found online were all third-party postings: a clinician’s practice site (actmindfully.com.au), an Argentine ACT group’s site (grupoact.com.ar), and a CiteSeerX cache whose source could not be traced because CiteSeerX now redirects to the Wayback Machine, which this environment’s egress policy blocks. None is an author, institutional or publisher deposit, so none was used. The ACBS publication page (contextualscience.org) gives the citation and abstract but no file. A human reader with APA PsycArticles access, or the chapter of the same title in The Act in Context (Routledge, 2015, DOI 10.4324/9781315745138-20; Crossref lists it without authors, so that it is a reprint is an inference), could promote this. |
| LIT-553 | Psychological Flexibility as a Fundamental Aspect of Health | Kashdan & Rottenberg (2010), Clinical Psychology Review 30(7):865–878. Psychological health is not a ratio of positive to negative experience or a set of fixed strengths but flexibility: adapting regulation to the situation, balancing time perspectives and life domains, and acting on values while open to experience. Inflexibility marks depression (rumination, emotion context insensitivity) and anxiety (experiential avoidance), and cardiac vagal control is proposed as an integrating marker. Executive functioning, default states and personality underlie it, and dynamic measurement is needed. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-436), in the NIH author manuscript on PubMed Central; worth reading as the review that took “psychological flexibility” out of the ACT literature and made it a general construct of health. Flexibility is adapting to situational demands, reconfiguring mental resources, shifting perspective and balancing competing desires and life domains. Its absence (rumination, emotion context insensitivity, experiential avoidance, low cardiac vagal control) runs through depression and anxiety. Executive functioning, default mental states and personality are its “building blocks”. It is a narrative synthesis: no meta-analysis of its own, the causal direction between inflexibility and disorder is left open by its own account, and it asks for dynamic measures in place of the global self-reports the ACT line relies on. |
| LIT-554 | The Emerging Field of Emotion Regulation: An Integrative Review | Gross (1998), Review of General Psychology 2(3):271–299. Emotions are response tendencies (behavioural, experiential, physiological) called forth by evaluated situations and open to modulation. Emotion regulation is how people influence which emotions they have, when, and how they are experienced and expressed, and it is distinct from coping, mood regulation and defense. A process model places regulation at five points in emotion generation: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change (reappraisal), and response modulation (suppression). The first four are antecedent-focused, the last response-focused. Dysregulation is said to figure in over half of the DSM-IV Axis I disorders and all of Axis II. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-429); worth reading as the founding statement of the process model of emotion regulation, the five-family scheme (situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, response modulation) that later regulation research and many therapies are organised around. It defines emotion regulation as “the processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” (p. 275) and separates it from coping, mood regulation and defense. It is a conceptual review: no data of its own, and it says the scheme is “a set of working distinctions” (p. 282). |
| LIT-555 | Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: Model, Processes and Outcomes | Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis (2006), Behaviour Research and Therapy 44(1):1–25. The ACT model: psychopathology is psychological inflexibility, produced when language (cognitive fusion) and experiential avoidance dominate direct contingencies, and ACT restores flexibility through six processes. A review of correlational, component, mediational and outcome studies finds the model “broadly supportive” but the literature immature, and the evidence suggests ACT works through different processes from traditional CBT. Read in an early author manuscript whose numbers differ from the published paper’s. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-431), but in an early manuscript, not the published text; worth reading as the canonical statement of the ACT model of psychopathology, “psychological inflexibility”, and of the six processes ACT targets. Cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance (from LIT-551) narrow behaviour, and acceptance, defusion, present-moment contact, self as context, values and committed action restore flexibility. The copy read is an author manuscript in Georgia State University’s repository that still carries “xx” placeholders, and its numbers differ from the published paper’s as Kashdan and Rottenberg report them (21 studies against 32; an AAQ correlation printed “.030” against “.42”). Use its model and argument, not its numbers. Its own verdict on the evidence is “broadly supportive” but “not mature”. |
| LIT-556 v3 | Reinforcement, Reward, and Intrinsic Motivation: A Meta-Analysis | Cameron & Pierce (1994), Review of Educational Research 64(3):363–423. A hierarchical meta-analysis of about 96 experiments concluding that rewards do not, overall, decrease intrinsic motivation; that verbal rewards increase it; and that the only reliable negative effect is on free-choice time when expected tangible rewards are given for merely doing a task. It called for “abandoning cognitive evaluation theory”. Unread: registered from the account of it in LIT-557 and its authors’ restatement in LIT-562. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref and from the two papers that analyse it, not read. The article is closed access at SAGE (Review of Educational Research), and Unpaywall finds no open copy. A web search found it only on Scribd, a third-party upload, which was not opened. Its authors’ reply to Deci, Koestner and Ryan, Cameron, Banko and Pierce (2001, LIT-562), has since been read and restates this paper’s results, but not as a substitute for reading it. A reader with SAGE access could promote this. |
| LIT-557 v2 | A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation | Deci, Koestner & Ryan (1999), Psychological Bulletin 125(6):627–668. A hierarchical meta-analysis of 128 experiments (101 with free-choice, 84 with self-report measures) on interesting tasks. Tangible rewards undermined free-choice intrinsic motivation (d = −0.34) and self-reported interest (−0.07); expected rewards did, by every task-related contingency; unexpected and task-noncontingent rewards did not; positive feedback enhanced both measures, but not children’s free choice. Read as strong support for cognitive evaluation theory and against Eisenberger and Cameron’s behavioural account. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-438), from an OCR of the scanned published article the authors post on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the largest meta-analysis of the reward-undermining effect and the evidential base SDT cites for it. Across 128 experiments on interesting tasks, expected tangible rewards undermined free-choice intrinsic motivation (d = −0.36), engagement-, completion- and performance-contingent rewards all did (−0.40, −0.36, −0.28), unexpected and task-noncontingent rewards did not, and positive feedback enhanced it (0.33), though not for children’s free choice. It reanalyses Cameron and Pierce (LIT-556) study by study. Its categories are CET’s, and the rival authors reply, by the abstract of Cameron, Banko and Pierce (LIT-562, unread), that the negative effects are circumscribed, not pervasive. |
| LIT-558 | The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior | Deci & Ryan (2000), Psychological Inquiry 11(4):227–268, target article. SDT’s case for innate psychological needs, for competence, relatedness and autonomy, defined as nutriments for growth, integrity and well-being and identified functionally, against Hull’s drives and Murray’s acquired needs. The “why” of a goal (autonomous or controlled regulation) and its “what” (intrinsic or extrinsic aspiration) each predict well-being, because each affects need satisfaction. Thwarted needs yield substitutes, controlled styles and rigid patterns. SDT grounds autonomy in the organism’s tendency to self-organize, argued to be an evolved advantage. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-439), from the authors’ own deposit of the published target article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the full statement of what SDT means by a “need” and why it posits three. Needs are “innate psychological nutriments that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being” (p. 228), identified by what follows when they are satisfied or thwarted, not by how strongly people want them. Goals differ in their “why” (autonomous or controlled regulation) and their “what” (intrinsic or extrinsic content), and both matter because of need satisfaction. Thwarting produces need substitutes, controlled regulatory styles and rigid behaviour patterns. It is a target article: the commentaries and the authors’ reply in the same issue were not read. |
| LIT-559 | Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being | Ryan & Deci (2000), American Psychologist 55(1):68–78. Self-determination theory in eleven pages. Three innate psychological needs, for competence, autonomy and relatedness, must be satisfied for growth, integration and well-being; their thwarting is “a principal source of human distress” (p. 74). Motivation differs in kind, not only amount: extrinsic motivation runs from external through introjected and identified to integrated regulation, and becomes more autonomous as a regulation is internalized and integrated with the self. Autonomy is volition, not independence. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-442), from the authors’ own deposit of the published article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the shortest statement of self-determination theory by its authors, and the one most cited. It gives the three basic psychological needs (competence, autonomy, relatedness), the continuum of regulation from amotivation through external, introjected, identified and integrated regulation to intrinsic motivation, and the claim that autonomy is volition, “not … being independent, detached, or selfish” (p. 74). It is a review: every empirical claim is cited to other papers, nothing is tested here, and it states the reward-undermining result as settled by Deci, Koestner & Ryan (LIT-557), which Cameron, Banko & Pierce dispute (LIT-562, unread; by its abstract). |
| LIT-560 | Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will? | Ryan & Deci (2006), Journal of Personality 74(6):1557–1586. SDT’s defence of autonomy as a psychological construct. Philosophers (phenomenologists from Pfänder and Ricoeur; hierarchical accounts from Frankfurt and Dworkin) agree that autonomy is self-endorsement, not independence. On that definition, the critiques fail: behaviourists and Bandura define autonomy as independence from the environment; reductive neuroscience mistakes levels of explanation; nonconscious priming shows autonomy can be compromised, not that it is illusory; too many options is not self-determination; and autonomy matters across cultures. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-441), from the authors’ own deposit of the published article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the place where SDT states its concept of autonomy against both philosophy and psychology. Autonomy is “regulation by the self”, its opposite “heteronomy”, regulation “without self-endorsement” (abstract). It is “a matter of degree” (p. 1562), compatible with dependence and with having one option, and lies “not in being independent causes but in exercising their capacity to reflectively endorse or reject prompted actions” (p. 1573). It answers Skinner, Bandura, Pinker, Bargh, Wegner, Schwartz and Iyengar. Its engagement with Frankfurt is thin: two citations of the 1971 paper inside one paragraph on hierarchical accounts, with the analytic detail taken from Dworkin. |
| LIT-561 | Basic psychological need theory: Advancements, critical themes, and future directions | Vansteenkiste, Ryan & Soenens (2020), Motivation and Emotion 44(1):1–31. Two decades of basic psychological need theory. A basic need must be psychological, essential, inherent, distinct and universal, and its effects pervasive, content-specific, directional and explanatory. Need frustration is not merely low satisfaction: it predicts ill-being, compensatory behaviour and need substitutes, and may be transdiagnostic. Novelty, morality and beneficence are reviewed as candidate fourth needs; none is yet admitted. Universality holds for the effects of need satisfaction, not for how needs are supported. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-440), from the publisher’s typeset PDF that the authors post on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the current statement of basic psychological need theory and of what would make something a basic need. It gives nine criteria (psychological, essential, inherent, distinct, universal; pervasive, content-specific, directional, explanatory), treats need frustration as distinct from low satisfaction and as a candidate transdiagnostic process in psychopathology, and restates universality as “universality without uniformity”: the effects of need satisfaction are claimed invariant, the ways needs are supported are not. It is an editorial introduction to two special issues, by SDT’s authors, and reviews selectively. |
| LIT-562 v2 | Pervasive negative effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation: The myth continues | Cameron, Banko & Pierce (2001), The Behavior Analyst 24(1):1–44. The authors of the 1994 rival meta-analysis re-analyse 145 studies, adopt Deci, Koestner and Ryan’s split by initial interest, and code reward contingencies by procedure rather than by cognitive evaluation theory. Rewards for merely doing an interesting task undermine free choice (−0.35, K = 57), as in Deci et al. Rewards for surpassing a score do not, and rewards for beating others enhance. Every effect either way is small. | Active — read in full 2026-10-05 (NOTE-587), on the owner’s instruction, from the article as hosted by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies; the same article is free in PubMed Central (PMC2731358). Worth reading as the strongest case against pervasive reward undermining, by the authors of the rival meta-analysis, and as the paper that shows the coding scheme decides the result. Re-coding 145 studies by procedure, it finds no overall effect on free choice and enhancement on low-interest tasks. On interesting tasks it finds undermining only for expected tangible rewards loosely tied to performance or earned at less than the maximum, and neutral or positive effects for rewards tied to a score or to beating others. The core effect agrees with Deci et al.; the per-contingency sizes are in figures with no text layer. |
| LIT-572 v2 | Narrative Identity | McAdams & McLean (2013), Current Directions in Psychological Science 22(3):233–238. Per its abstract, narrative identity is “a person’s internalized and evolving life story, integrating the reconstructed past and imagined future to provide life with some degree of unity and purpose”. Narrators who find redemptive meanings in adversity and whose stories feature agency and exploration “tend to enjoy higher levels of mental health, well-being, and maturity”. Unread: registered from the abstract; the construct is read in LIT-595. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the Crossref record and its abstract, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. SAGE does not make it open, Unpaywall and OpenAlex report it closed with no repository copy, Kate McLean’s publications page lists it without a file, the APS journal page offers no PDF, and ResearchGate refused this session (403). Its definition and its role are read first-hand in McAdams’s 2019 essay (LIT-595, read in full), which quotes the definition and builds on it. Filed because it is the canonical citation for narrative identity in psychology. A human reader with SAGE access could read its six pages and move it to Active. |
| LIT-573 v2 | Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice | Schelling (1984), American Economic Review 74(2):1-11, the Richard T. Ely Lecture, on self-command and what it means for the theory of rational choice. Unread: no lawful free copy. Schelling’s 1980 essay “The Intimate Contest for Self-Command”, LIT-602, is read in its place. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from bibliographic records, not read. No lawful free copy was found. The article is on JSTOR (AER 74(2), the May 1984 Papers and Proceedings issue), which returned a bot challenge and was not pursued. RePEc lists no downloadable version. It is reprinted in Schelling’s Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 63-81), which is not open access. The only copies found online were on a personal website that is not the author’s and on course pages, which this record does not use. Schelling’s earlier, freely published essay on the same subject was read instead and filed as LIT-602 (NOTE-452). A human with JSTOR access could read this lecture and move it to Active. |
| LIT-574 v2 | A Multicomponent Conceptualization of Authenticity: Theory and Research | Kernis & Goldman (2006), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38:283–357. Unread. As two read papers report it: authenticity is “the unimpeded operation of one’s true self in one’s daily enterprise”, it is measured by the 45-item Authenticity Inventory (AI-3), and dispositional authenticity correlates with self-esteem (r = .47), self-concept clarity and self-actualization and negatively with distress. It is commonly summarized as four components: awareness, unbiased processing, behaviour and relational orientation. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the Crossref record and from two read papers that report it, not read. No lawful full text was found: the chapter is paywalled at Elsevier (ScienceDirect), Unpaywall and Semantic Scholar list it as closed, and the copies a web search turns up are uploads to ResearchGate and academia.edu, neither an author or institutional deposit that could be reached (ResearchGate refuses automated requests). Michael Kernis died in 2009, so no author page holds it. It is a 75-page chapter; a human reader with library access to Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38 can read it, and that would move this to Active. |
| LIT-583 v2 | Breakdown of Will | Ainslie (2001), Cambridge University Press. The book-length statement of picoeconomics: hyperbolic discounting makes a person a population of bargaining interests, and will is the recursive bundling of choices into precedents. Unread: registered from the publisher’s description and the précis, LIT-586, which stands in for it. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the publisher’s description and from the outline of the book given in its précis, not read. Not open access: Unpaywall reports no open copy, and no author deposit of the book was found (the author’s site, picoeconomics.org, carries the précis and articles, not the book). The owner suggested the précis instead, and it is read and filed as LIT-586 (NOTE-443), which follows the book’s three sections and twelve chapters. The book is kept as the citation others reach for. A human with library access could read chapters 5-8 (the bargaining model and its evidence) against the précis. |
| LIT-586 | Précis of Breakdown of Will | Ainslie (2005), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(5), the précis of Breakdown of Will (2001). People and other animals discount delayed rewards hyperbolically, so preferences reverse as a smaller, sooner reward comes near, and a person becomes a population of reward-seeking “interests” that must forestall one another. Willpower is the bundling of future choices by treating the present one as a precedent: an intertemporal repeated prisoner’s dilemma, not an organ or a top-down ego. The same recursion predicts the will’s costs: legalism, circumscribed “lapse districts”, motivated blindness to lapses, and rules that favour countable goals over subtle ones. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-443), as the substitute for the 2001 book (LIT-583), which the owner suggested and which the précis follows chapter by chapter. Worth reading as the shortest complete statement of picoeconomics in Ainslie’s own words. Hyperbolic discounting makes preference reverse as a smaller, sooner reward draws near, so a person behaves like a population of “interests” that bargain across time. Will is not a faculty above them but a recursive self-prediction: treating each choice as a precedent “bundles” future rewards, an intertemporal repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which “credibility is power”. The same mechanism predicts the will’s side effects: legalism, “lapse districts”, motivated misperception and compulsive over-control. |
| LIT-589 | Goal Striving, Need Satisfaction, and Longitudinal Well-Being: The Self-Concordance Model | Sheldon & Elliot (1999), JPSP 76(3):482–497. A goal is self-concordant when pursued for identified or intrinsic rather than external or introjected reasons. In three semester-long studies of students, self-concordance predicted sustained effort, which fully mediated its link to attainment; attainment raised well-being more when goals were self-concordant; and accumulated daily experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness partly mediated attainment’s effect on well-being. Paths survived controls for self-efficacy, implementation intentions, avoidance framing and life skills. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-448); worth reading as the canonical statement of the self-concordance model and its evidence. Goals pursued for identified or intrinsic reasons get more sustained effort, so are better attained (effort fully mediates, in Studies 1 and 3), and attaining them raises well-being more, partly through accumulated daily experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness. The evidence is three semester-long correlational studies of students (N = 169, 152, 73), with structural models refitted after modification indices, and self-concordance is a self-report of reasons that cannot separate integration from identification. |
| LIT-592 v2 | The Authentic Personality: A Theoretical and Empirical Conceptualization and the Development of the Authenticity Scale | Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis & Joseph (2008), Journal of Counseling Psychology 55(3):385–399. Unread. Per its abstract it builds the 12-item Authenticity Scale on a tripartite, person-centred conception (self-alienation, authentic living, accepting external influence), supported by exploratory and multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, with discriminant validity from the Big Five, nonsignificant correlations with social desirability, test–retest r = .78 to .91, and strong relations of every subscale to self-esteem and well-being. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the abstract on the University of Manchester research portal and the repository records, not read. Every lawful copy found is out of reach: Manchester’s portal lists a pre-peer-review manuscript (PRE-PEER-REVIEW.PDF, 143 KB) whose download is behind a JavaScript and cookie challenge, which I did not try to get past; Stirling’s STORRE holds the published version under a permanent embargo (“The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available”); Warwick’s WRAP and Lincoln’s repository records carry no file; ResearchGate refused the request. A human reader can open the Manchester manuscript in a browser, or ask an author for a copy through STORRE; either would move this to Active. |
| LIT-595 | “First we invented stories, then they changed us”: The Evolution of Narrative Identity | McAdams (2019), Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 3(1):1–18. Narrative identity is “the internalized and evolving story a person invents to explain how he or she has become the person he or she is becoming”, giving a life “unity, moral purpose, and temporal coherence”. Storytelling evolved with human hypersociality. The self develops from social actor (by age 2) to motivated agent (school years) to autobiographical author (adolescence). Agentic and redemptive stories go with well-being and generativity, and cultures supply master narratives. “Biology guides and culture fills in the details.” | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-470), as the read substitute for McAdams & McLean, “Narrative Identity” (2013; LIT-572), which has no lawful copy and whose definition this essay takes over word for word. Worth reading as McAdams’s own short statement of narrative identity: “the internalized and evolving story a person invents to explain how he or she has become the person he or she is becoming”, which gives a life “unity, moral purpose, and temporal coherence”. It places the life story as the third layer of a self that develops from actor to agent to author, and reports that story features (agency, redemption, coherence) predict well-being and generativity. A review essay: the empirical claims are cited, not shown, and the evolutionary story is offered as plausible, not tested. |
| LIT-602 | The Intimate Contest for Self-Command | Schelling (1980), The Public Interest, Summer 1980, pp. 94-118. People behave sometimes “as if they had two selves” in “continual contest for control”, and the tactics of self-management (removing the option, bright lines, monitoring, delays, raising the stakes) are the tactics of managing someone else. A single-dimension model of impatience fits poorly. Which self is authentic is left open. Failures of consumer self-management may be worth “on the order of a trillion dollars”. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-452), in place of the 1984 Ely Lecture (LIT-573), which has no lawful free copy. Worth reading as Schelling’s own first statement of “egonomics”: a person sometimes behaves “as if they had two selves” that alternate in command, and the tactics people use on themselves (mittens, alarm clocks across the room, bright lines, Christmas savings, deadlines, delays) are the tactics they use to manage another person. It refuses to say which self is authentic in general, and it gives an order-of-magnitude estimate that failures of consumer self-management cost as much as all other consumer-ignorance problems together. |
| LIT-604 v2 | Control theory: A useful conceptual framework for personality–social, clinical, and health psychology | Carver & Scheier (1982), Psychological Bulletin 92(1):111-135. A review arguing, by its title, that control theory is a useful framework for personality-social, clinical and health psychology. Unread: no lawful open copy and no published abstract could be reached. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from bibliographic records, not read. No lawful free copy was found. Unpaywall reports no open copy. Semantic Scholar marks it closed and says the publisher has withheld the abstract. The APA landing page refused the request (HTTP 403). The authors’ University of Miami pages offer their self-report scales, not their papers. No shorter work by Carver and Scheier stating the control-theory model was found in a lawful open copy. The only open copies seen were on ResearchGate and similar sharing sites, which this record does not use. A human with APA PsycNet access could read it and move it to Active. |
| LIT-606 | Thine Own Self: True Self-Concept Accessibility and Meaning in Life | Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt & King (2009), JPSP 96(2):473–490. Five studies: faster “me” judgments for one’s own true-self traits (residualized on speed for control traits) predict presence of meaning in life, while actual-self accessibility does not, controlling affect, need satisfaction and (Study 4) AI-3 authenticity, which was itself uncorrelated with true-self accessibility. Subliminal priming of true-self traits raised reported meaning (Studies 3 and 5), for disliked traits as much as liked ones. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-469); worth reading as the experimental case that the true self-concept, as distinct from self-reported authenticity, matters to felt meaning. In five student studies (N = 56 to 149), how quickly people classify their own “true self” traits predicts presence of meaning in life over and above actual-self accessibility, need satisfaction and AI-3 authenticity, and subliminally priming true-self traits raises reported meaning, even when the traits are disliked. Effects are small, meaning is self-report only, and the Study 5 interaction is printed with an F that cannot carry its stated p. |
| LIT-696 v2 | Towards a Theory of Collective Emotions | von Scheve & Ismer (2013), Emotion Review 5(4):406–413. Collective emotion is synchronous convergence in affective responding towards an event or object. Three literatures (face-to-face contagion and effervescence, culture and shared knowledge, social identification) are recast as bottom-up mechanisms on three levels: social cognition (shared appraisals; collectively intentional appraisals), expressive behaviour (contagion, “facial dialects”) and symbolic practice (collective memory, group-based sentiments, norms, cultural sharing). Mutual awareness and group membership amplify convergence and can turn I-mode into We-mode collective emotion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-552); worth reading as a compact map of how collective emotion has been theorised across sociology, social psychology and philosophy, and as the source of a working definition: collective emotion is synchronous convergence in affective responding across individuals towards one event or object. Shared appraisal structures give the minimal case. Mutual awareness (contagion, sharing) and group membership (identity, collective intention, norms, collective memory, sentiments) amplify it and can turn “I-mode” into “We-mode” collective emotion. A conceptual synthesis with no data, built bottom-up by methodological choice. |
| LIT-699 v3 | Emotional Aperture and Strategic Change: The Accurate Recognition of Collective Emotions | Sanchez-Burks & Huy (2009), Organization Science 20(1):22–34. Introduces emotional aperture, the ability to recognise the composition of diverse emotions in a collective such as a group or business unit, and argues that a leader’s ability to respond to the patterns of shared emotion that arise in strategic change depends on it. Describes cultural, psychological and contextual enablers and impediments, and extends emotional competencies beyond the individual level. Unread: from the abstract. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-04 from bibliographic records and the publisher’s abstract, not read. No lawful full text was reachable. Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy. The 2006 working-paper version (Ross School of Business Paper No. 1047, “Emotional Aperture and Strategic Renewal”, SSRN 931492) is on SSRN, which returned 403 to this session, and a Deep Blue item the search found, “Emotional Aperture and Emotional Sequencing” (handle 2027.42/48737), sits behind a bot challenge, which I did not try to pass. ProQuest’s open preview carries the citation only. A human with library access, or anyone opening the SSRN working paper in a browser, could read it, and that reading would move this to Active. Free copy: ssrn.com/abstract=931492 (the 2006 working paper). |
| LIT-700 | Three kinds of collective attitudes | List (2014), Erkenntnis 79(S9):1601–1622. Collective attitudes come in three kinds. Aggregate attitudes summarise members’ attitudes by a rule or a market, supervene proposition-wise and need not be rational. Common attitudes are held by all members with common awareness, matter for coordination, and inherit consistency from their unanimity. Corporate attitudes belong to a group agent, guide its action, supervene holistically on members’ contributions and must be rational. The kinds are almost logically independent, and fears and hopes divide the same way as beliefs and desires. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-554); worth reading as the disambiguation the collective-attitudes literature needs: aggregate attitudes (summaries, supervening proposition by proposition), common attitudes (unanimous and commonly known, supervening on a slightly enriched base) and corporate attitudes (a group agent’s, supervening holistically and not straightforwardly reducible). The three are almost logically independent. A review by its own description, with no new theorem; its value for this record is that it names fears and hopes among the attitudes the split applies to, which gives the collective-emotion debate a vocabulary. |
| LIT-703 v2 | Emotion in the Workplace: A Reappraisal | Ashforth & Humphrey (1995), Human Relations 48(2):97–125. Organisations treat emotion as the antithesis of rationality, and so regulate it through four institutionalised mechanisms: neutralizing, buffering, prescribing and normalizing emotion. Against this, emotionality and rationality are “interpenetrated”, emotion is an inseparable part of organisational life and often functional for the organisation, as shown for motivation, leadership and group dynamics. Unread: from the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-04 from bibliographic records and the publisher’s abstract, not read. No lawful full text was reachable. Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy. A web search found only ResearchGate (not used) and a 2014 Arizona State syllabus that lists the paper but does not carry it. SAGE does not make the article open. A human with library access could read it (29 pages) and move this to Active. |
| LIT-705 | Group Agency and Supervenience | List & Pettit (2006), Southern Journal of Philosophy 44(S1):85–105. A group agent’s rationality must supervene on its members’ contributions, but not proposition by proposition. Three impossibility results show that robust group rationality (complete, consistent, deductively closed group judgments for every profile of rational member judgments) is inconsistent with majoritarian, uniform proposition-wise and proposition-wise supervenience. Premise-based and distributed premise-based procedures show it is consistent with set-wise supervenience, with group judgments that can be discontinuous with the members’ judgments on the same proposition. Emergent agency without any member’s conception of the group is set aside as unintelligible. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-550); worth reading as the short, formal core of List and Pettit’s group agency: a group can be a robustly rational judge only if its judgment on a proposition is not, in general, a function of its members’ judgments on that proposition. Group judgments supervene on members’ judgments set-wise, not proposition-wise, so a group agent is individualistically unmysterious and still “not directly continuous” with its members. Read here as the lawful substitute for the unread book LIT-391, whose chapter 3 takes up the same supervenience question; the impossibility results are cited from other papers, not proved here. |
| LIT-706 | The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and its Influence on Group Behavior | Barsade (2002), Administrative Science Quarterly 47(4):644–675. Two studies of mood contagion in a leaderless group negotiation. In Study 1 (94 undergraduates, 29 groups) a trained confederate showed pleasant or unpleasant, high- or low-energy mood. Members’ mood moved with the confederate’s valence, by self-report and by blind video-coders, and pleasant contagion predicted more cooperation, less conflict and higher self-rated performance. Study 2 (113 MBA students, 26 groups, no confederate) found mood convergence (ICC .00 to .24) with the same process correlates. Members recognised that others influenced how pleasant they felt, but not that their mood shaped their judged effectiveness. | Active — read in full 2026-10-04 (NOTE-551), from the August 2001 revise-and-resubmit manuscript Wharton deposited in Penn’s repository, not the published version; worth reading as the first causal test of emotional contagion in groups. A trained confederate’s pleasant or unpleasant mood spread to the members of 29 work groups (self-report and blind video-coders agree), and the more pleasant mood spread, the more cooperative and the less conflicted the group (coder-rated) and the better members rated their own performance. A second study without a confederate found members’ moods converging (ICC .00 before, .24 after). Members related their pleasantness to others’ conduct but showed no awareness of their mood’s bearing on how effective they judged themselves (manuscript p. 37). Valence and energy hypotheses failed or came out mixed. |
| LIT-715 v2 | The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA | Vaughan (1996), University of Chicago Press. The sociological account of the 1986 Challenger launch decision from which the normalization of deviance comes. Unread: the concept is read as the Columbia Accident Investigation Board applies it to Challenger and Columbia, in LIT-734. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-05 from Crossref and Open Library, not read: it is an in-copyright book with no lawful open copy known. Its account of the normalization of deviance is read secondhand in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s chapter “History As Cause: Columbia and Challenger” (LIT-734), which cites it for its central claim. Filed because it is the source usually cited for normalization of deviance. On 2026-10-14 a lawful full text was sought and none was reached. OpenAlex locations for the DOI: one, the doi.org landing page, closed (oa_status closed, no repository full text). Unpaywall: closed, no OA locations. The University of Chicago Press page loads and offers the enlarged edition for sale only; the Chicago Scholarship Online record is subscription-only. The ACLS Humanities E-Book copy on Fulcrum is restricted to institutional login (HTTP 403 here). Europe PMC: no hit. Internet Archive: two scans, both borrow-only lending (printdisabled), which are not a fetchable full text. A web search for an open copy or an author-posted text found only reviews. Its status is not a judgement on merit. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-719 | Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems | Ostrom (2009), Nobel lecture; AER 2010. Polycentric arrangements of many formally independent decision centres can perform better than a single hierarchy. Long-surviving common-pool resource institutions share eight design principles, among them monitoring by users or those accountable to them, graduated sanctions, local conflict resolution and nested layers. Communication and self-chosen sanctions raise cooperation in experiments. Fit to local conditions matters more than the type of regime. | Active — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-563): the Nobel Prize lecture in full, from the Nobel Foundation’s PDF. Worth reading as Ostrom’s own summary of fifty years of work: polycentricity defined, the eight design principles of long-surviving common-pool resource institutions in their updated form, the experiments on communication and self-chosen sanctions, the field evidence on local monitoring, and the warning against single policy prescriptions. A retrospective lecture, not a report of new results. |
| LIT-729 | Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning | March (1991), Organization Science 2(1):71–87. Exploration’s returns are less certain, more remote and more distant than exploitation’s, so adaptive processes refine exploitation faster and become self-destructive in the long run. In a model of mutual learning, the organizational code improves only from members who deviate from it: slow socialization, mixed learning rates and moderate turnover raise organizational knowledge, at a cost to some individuals. | Active — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-581): in full, from a JSTOR copy in an NTNU doctoral-course readings folder. Worth reading as the source of the exploration–exploitation trade-off in organizations: exploitation’s returns are surer and nearer, so adaptation drives exploration out and becomes self-destructive. A simple simulation of mutual learning between members and an organizational code shows that slow socialization, a mix of learning rates and moderate turnover raise what the organization knows. Limits: the results are from simple models, and March gives no optimal balance. |
| LIT-734 | History As Cause: Columbia and Challenger | Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003), Report Vol. I ch. 8, pp. 195–204. Foam debris and O-ring erosion followed the same trajectory: each anomaly was reinterpreted as acceptable and “in-family”, and each flight without disaster justified the next. Budget and schedule pressure, a hierarchy that silenced dissent, and a dependent safety organization sustained the pattern. “History is cause”: Challenger’s institutional causes had not been fixed. | Active — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-578): in full, from the official CAIB report as archived by the UNT Libraries CyberCemetery. Worth reading as the Board’s finding that Columbia repeated Challenger’s organizational cause: technical anomalies normalized one decision at a time, under budget and schedule pressure, in a hierarchy that kept dissent from rising, with a safety organization dependent on the program it oversaw. Limits: a two-case comparison within one agency, written as an official finding; the chapter is unsigned, and its concept of normalization rests on Vaughan’s unread book (LIT-715). |
| LIT-737 v2 | Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action | Ostrom (1990), Cambridge University Press: from case studies of long-enduring and failed common-pool resource institutions, argues that resource users can and do govern commons themselves, without either privatisation or state control, and proposes design principles shared by the institutions that lasted. Unread: the principles are read in Ostrom’s Nobel lecture LIT-719. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-05 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached (Cambridge Core is closed). Its design principles are read first-hand in Ostrom’s Nobel lecture (LIT-719), §4E, in the updated wording of Cox, Arnold & Villamayor-Tomás that she adopts there. Filed because an essay the owner is writing cites “Ostrom’s work on differentiated and polycentric governance”. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-739 v2 | Double Loop Learning in Organizations | Argyris (1977), Harvard Business Review 55(5). Single-loop learning corrects errors within an organization’s governing norms. Double-loop learning questions and changes those norms, and organizations characteristically avoid it. Unread: registered from its publisher record. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-05 from its publisher record, not read: no copy was used. The one open copy found is restricted to students enrolled in a course. Argyris’s 2002 statement of the same theory (LIT-745) was read instead, from a copy his co-authors’ practice posts, used on the owner’s instruction. Filed because it is the article usually cited for double-loop learning. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-743 | Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem | Rasmussen (1997), Safety Science 27:183–213. Risk management is a control problem spanning government, regulators, companies, management, staff and work. Behaviour within a work space moves under an effort gradient and a cost gradient toward the boundary of acceptable performance. In defence-in-depth systems, defences degrade unobserved under cost pressure. Accidents arise from many locally reasonable decisions. Improvement means making boundaries visible, not fighting errors. | Active — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-584): the argument in full, the review of research paradigms skimmed, from the author’s manuscript in DTU’s repository. Worth reading for the model of drift. Under a cost gradient from management and an effort gradient from workers, activity migrates toward the boundary of acceptable performance. In defence-in-depth systems one actor’s breach of a defence has no visible effect, so defences erode unobserved. Major accidents come from the interaction of many decision makers adapting to local pressures, not from coincident errors. Built from accident analyses; not a quantitative model. |
| LIT-745 | Double-Loop Learning, Teaching, and Research | Argyris (2002), Academy of Management Learning & Education 1:206–218. Single-loop learning corrects errors without changing governing values; double-loop learning changes them. Most people espouse double-loop learning but act on Model I: unilateral control, winning, suppressing negative feelings, appearing rational. That produces self-sealing defensive routines in individuals and organizations. A workshop case shows CEOs reproducing the pattern they diagnose. | Active — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-561): in full, from a Word file of the published issue posted by Action Design, a practice founded by Argyris’s co-authors. The owner chose to use it, since whether they may post it could not be confirmed. Worth reading as Argyris’s compact late statement of the theory of action. Single-loop learning corrects errors within governing values; double-loop learning changes the values. The prevalent theory-in-use, Model I, keeps reasoning tacit and produces organizational defensive routines that are self-sealing. The empirical base is his own workshop transcripts, and the quasi-experimental design is proposed, not run. |
| LIT-746 v2 | Brain of the Firm | Beer (1972), Brain of the Firm, Allen Lane; 2nd edn Wiley 1981. The streamlined statement of the Viable System Model in neurophysiological terms, the second edition adding the Chilean application of 1971–73. Unread: the model is read in Beer’s 1984 retrospective LIT-752. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-05 from Open Library and Beer’s own references, not read: no copy was sought, the book being in copyright and commercially published. Its model is read first-hand in Beer’s article-length retrospective “The Viable System Model: Its Provenance, Development, Methodology and Pathology” (LIT-752), which restates the five subsystems, the recursion theorem and the pathologies and refers to this book and The Heart of Enterprise for the detail. Filed because it is the book usually cited for the Viable System Model. On 2026-10-14 a lawful full text was sought and none was reached. OpenAlex: the book has no DOI to look up, and its title search refused the request (the shared daily budget was exhausted). Unpaywall: no DOI to query. Crossref: no record for the book, only for reviews of it. Wiley’s product page for the 1995 paperback reissue loads and offers it for sale only (listed out of stock), with no e-book or open-access edition. Europe PMC: no open-access hit for the title. Google Books: its API refused the request (daily quota exceeded). Internet Archive: no text item for this book; Beer’s other books there are borrow-only lending scans, and a community upload titled “Brain of the Firm, Reclaimed” is a transcription not posted by the rights holder, so it was not used (its metadata did not load either). A web search for an authorised copy found none. Its status is not a judgement on merit. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-748 v2 | Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States | Hirschman (1970), Harvard University Press. When firms, organizations and states decline, members and customers can exit or voice their discontent, and loyalty affects which they choose; voice can complement and sometimes supersede exit as a means of recovery. Unread: the argument is read in his 1974 “Further Reflections”, LIT-750. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-05 from Open Library, not read: it is an in-copyright book with no lawful open copy known, and the Harvard University Press page did not load. Its argument is read first-hand in Hirschman’s own “Further Reflections” (LIT-750), which restates the thesis, corrects it, and refers back to the book’s chapters in his words. The essay does not give the book’s formal treatment of loyalty. Filed because it is the source of the exit–voice framework. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-750 | ”Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions | Hirschman (1974; reprinted 1980, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 58(3):430–453). His advocacy of voice was “too timid”: voice can be felt as a benefit, carries richer information than exit, and suits shared uncertainty; exit can be costly or uninformative. Organizations need floor levels of exit and voice for feedback and fail beyond ceiling levels; managers may favour whichever response least threatens their power. | Active — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-566): in full, from the Milbank Memorial Fund’s own archive of its Quarterly. Worth reading as Hirschman’s own restatement and extension of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: voice as a recuperation mechanism that can be a benefit rather than a cost and carries richer information than exit; exit that is costly, or that signals nothing; the floor and ceiling levels of each an organization needs; and managers’ interest in steering members toward the least threatening response. Limits: informal and partly a survey, and it presupposes the book (LIT-748, unread), including its treatment of loyalty. |
| LIT-752 | The Viable System Model: Its Provenance, Development, Methodology and Pathology | Beer (1984), Journal of the Operational Research Society 35:7–25. A retrospective on the Viable System Model. Any system able to keep its identity independently in a shared environment has five necessary and sufficient subsystems, and every viable system contains and is contained in one. The model is offered as a scientific model reached by homomorphic mapping, not an analogy. Breakdowns trace to a failing subsystem, as when Three and Five collapse without Four. | Active — read 2026-10-05 (NOTE-577): in full except one page, from the 1989 book reprint posted by the Cwarel Isaf Institute, which Beer co-founded. Worth reading as Beer’s own retrospective on the Viable System Model. Five subsystems are claimed necessary and sufficient for any system to keep its identity independently, and the structure recurs, since every viable system contains and is contained in one. Breakdowns are diagnosed as failures of a subsystem: without System Four, Systems Three and Five collapse into each other and the system can only react. Limits: the paper declines to expound or validate the model, the copy lacks the page with the synopsis of the subsystems and its figures, and the applications are recalled, not documented. |
| LIT-754 v2 | Effects of reward on intrinsic motivation—Negative, neutral, and positive: Comment on Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) | Eisenberger, Pierce & Cameron (1999), Psychological Bulletin 125(6):677–691, a comment on Deci, Koestner and Ryan’s meta-analysis. By Cameron, Banko and Pierce’s account it re-analyses the performance-contingent studies by reward procedure and by the kind of control group, and reports that reward contingencies raise perceived self-determination. Unread: closed at APA, no abstract reachable. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-05 from Crossref and PubMed records and from the account of it in Cameron, Banko and Pierce (2001, LIT-562), not read. The article is closed at APA (Psychological Bulletin); Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy, and neither PubMed nor Crossref carries its abstract. The only web copy found is on ResearchGate (not used). The author’s University of Houston lab page, which may post it, answered with 503s and connection resets and was not reached. A reading would test the comparison THEORY-049’s refutation clause needs: performance-tied reward against a control given the same feedback. |
| LIT-768 v3 | Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology | Bartlett (1932), Cambridge University Press. Remembering is reconstruction from schemata, not retrieval of traces, and it is in important ways social: retellings of an unfamiliar folk tale drift toward the teller’s own culture. Filed, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-09 from Crossref and Open Library, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. Every Internet Archive copy is lending-only (access-restricted), the Wellcome Library scan of the 1932 edition included; HathiTrust holds three copies of the 1932 edition, all Limited (search-only); Cambridge Core sells the 1995 reissue chapter by chapter. A user upload to Internet Archive’s opensource collection was not used, since nothing shows it is lawful. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-771 | Cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory: An experimental approach to the origins of structure in human language | Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008), PNAS 105(31):10681–10686. Artificial languages passed down chains of human learners become easier to learn and more structured, without any learner intending it: cultural transmission produces design without a designer. Without a pressure against ambiguity the languages collapse into a few words for classes of meanings; with homonyms filtered from training they become compositional. Skimmed in NOTE-596. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-09 (NOTE-596): every section of the main text was covered, but through a fetch tool’s section-by-section account of the PubMed Central page, not a verbatim copy, and the SI was not reached; worth reading as the laboratory demonstration of iterated learning: four chains of ten adults, each learning a 27-item artificial language from 14 items and passing on its test output, made the languages steadily easier to learn and more structured while believing they were copying. Unfiltered, the languages collapsed to 2–5 words that systematically underspecified meaning (colour lost in every chain); with homonyms filtered out of training, they became compositional. Consistent with THEORY-155, not a test of it: no prior was measured, and the filter is a selection the theory excludes. |
| LIT-775 v3 | Structural Anthropology | Lévi-Strauss (1958; English 1963, Basic Books). Essays that carry the method of structural linguistics into anthropology: kinship, myth and social organisation analysed as systems of relations and oppositions, including “The Structural Study of Myth”. Not read: no lawful full text was found. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-09 from catalogue records, not read: no lawful full text was found. The English edition is lending-only at the Internet Archive and search-only at HathiTrust. One Internet Archive scan of the 1958 Plon edition is openly downloadable under a not-in-copyright flag that HathiTrust’s review of the same scan contradicts, so it was not used. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-779 | The stance triangle | Du Bois (2007), in Englebretson (ed.), Stancetaking in Discourse, pp. 139–182. Stance as one act with three sides: a speaker evaluates an object, thereby positions themselves, and thereby aligns with other speakers, as three aspects of one dialogic act. Read in full. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-590), in full, from the author’s posted scan of the published chapter; worth reading as the unifying model of stance in conversation: evaluation, positioning and alignment are not kinds of stance but three aspects of one act (“I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with you”), structured as two subjects and a shared object joined by directed vectors. Stance belongs to utterances in dialogic context, takes an object even when none is spoken, and a resonant stance follow must mark itself with too or either. Argued from Santa Barbara Corpus excerpts, with no counts. |
| LIT-780 v3 | Forms of Talk | Goffman (1981), University of Pennsylvania Press. Five essays on talk, including “Footing”: a speaker’s role decomposes into animator, author and principal, and hearers into ratified and unratified participants, so who is speaking is not one thing. Not read: no lawful full text was reachable. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-09 from catalogue records, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The Internet Archive holds the 1981 edition only as a controlled-lending item, and the essay “Footing” in its first publication (Semiotica 25, 1979, DOI 10.1515/semi.1979.25.1-2.1) is closed access with no repository copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-795 | Context effects produced by question orders reveal quantum nature of human judgments | Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin & Busemeyer (2014), PNAS 111(26):9431–9436. Tests the QQ equality of LIT-834, that the probability of giving the same answer to two questions does not depend on their order, on 70 national surveys and two laboratory experiments. Across all 66 Pew surveys from 2001–2011 that varied the order of two questions, order effects are significant (p = 0.0004) and the q values are not (p = 0.4625); paired context effects across 72 studies correlate at r = −0.82 along the predicted line of slope −1. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-604); worth reading as the large-scale test of the QQ equality: across 66 Pew surveys chosen without regard to their results, question order changes the answers significantly (p = 0.0004 for the distribution of order-effect χ² values), while the probability of answering the two questions alike stays the same (p = 0.4625 for the q values). Read with the caveats that the supporting information, which holds the proof, the per-study table and the χ² tests, was not reachable and was not read, and that the paper’s title claims more than its evidence: the equality is a symmetry constraint that the authors concede a classical model could be built to satisfy, and LIT-264 shows that data satisfying it are noncontextual. |
| LIT-802 v2 | Le structuralisme | Piaget (1968), Presses Universitaires de France, Que sais-je? no. 1311; English as Structuralism (1970), Basic Books. By its catalogue description, an attempt at a synthesis of the senses structuralism has taken in the contemporary sciences, finding a common ideal of intelligibility beneath variable critical intentions. Not read: no lawful full text was reachable. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-09 from catalogue records, not read: no lawful full text was reachable. The Internet Archive holds the 1968 PUF edition and the 1970–1973 English editions only as access-restricted lending items, and HathiTrust holds the 1970 Basic Books translation as Limited (search-only); the book is in copyright and the publishers offer no open access. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-804 | Computational challenges to test and revitalize Claude Lévi-Strauss transformational methodology | Doja, Capocchi & Santucci (2021), Big Data & Society 8(2). Proposes DEVS modelling and simulation (in DEVSimPy) to generate Lévi-Strauss’s myth transformations and to map a myth’s mythemes onto a landscape, and a “neo-structural” extension of the canonical formula to identity politics. Implemented: myths as mytheme lists, variants generated by user-specified operations, and a Google Earth display of one Corsican folktale. A software demonstration; no structural hypothesis is tested. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-609), in full, from the publisher’s PDF deposited in HAL; worth reading as a statement of a programme rather than a result: the authors propose discrete-event system specification (DEVS) modelling, in their Python environment DEVSimPy, to generate and visualise Lévi-Strauss’s transformations of myth, and to extend the canonical formula to identity politics. What the paper implements is modest: a myth is entered as a list of mythemes (term and function), a new variant is produced from a reference myth (Lévi-Strauss’s M1 Bororo) by transformation operations stored as an attribute of a model, i.e. specified by the user, and the variants are drawn as a graph; the “validation” plots the 20 mythemes of one Corsican folktale, U Lurcu, on Google Earth in narrative order. No hypothesis about how myths transform is tested. The transformation engine is summarised from the authors’ 2020 Symmetry paper, not presented here. |
| LIT-807 | A Discrete-Event Simulation of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Structural Analysis of Myths Based on Symmetry and Double Twist Transformations | Santucci, Doja & Capocchi (2020), Symmetry 12(10):1706. Specifies the authors’ DEVS models (in DEVSimPy) for generating variants of a myth from a reference myth by Lévi-Strauss’s transformations, and a NetworkX graph of the variants produced. Every basic transformation is a user-specified substitution of one term for another across the mythemes; the canonical formula is described but its computation is not; validation is reproduction of 70 Mythologiques myths and 28 Corsican tales by transformations chosen to produce them. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-632), in full, from the publisher’s version deposited in HAL; worth reading as the place where the authors’ “transformation model” of Lévi-Strauss is actually specified, and for what that specification turns out to be. A myth is a list of mythemes, each a pair (term a, function x); homology, inversion, opposition and symmetry are all one operation, replacing a term by another term in every mytheme, the inverse, opposite or “symmetric” term being supplied by the user; adding and removing a mytheme complete the set. The canonical formula is explained by Lévi-Strauss’s Jealous Potter example and listed as selectable, but no rule for computing it on a mytheme list is given. The “validation” generates 70 myths of the Mythologiques and 28 Corsican folktales by choosing, each time, the transformations that produce them, and reports them correct against Lévi-Strauss’s books and Corsican specialists, with no measure. It encodes an analyst’s transformations; it does not find or test them. |
| LIT-822 | Transformation transformed | Descola (2016), HAU 6(3):33–44. A keynote on structuralism as method: meaning lies in contrasts within a set of variants, and a structure is the set of invariant relations that orders transformations between them. Lévi-Strauss used transformation in two regimes, Goethean development of an initial form (kinship) and Thompsonian deformation between given forms (myth, where the analyst chooses the cuts). Descola’s fourfold ontology is a Goethean group; structural comparison is anthropology’s fairest symmetrization. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-641), in full, from the PDF on the journal’s own site (haujournal.org); worth reading as a short statement, by Lévi-Strauss’s student, of what structural analysis is when separated from Lévi-Strauss’s philosophy: no phenomenon has meaning in itself, only in contrast with others of its kind, and a structure, unlike a system, is the set of invariant relations that lets one move from one variant to another by transformation. Descola distinguishes two regimes of transformation in Lévi-Strauss: a Goethean one, the development of an initial form into its possible variants (kinship in Les structures élémentaires, and Descola’s own four ontologies), and a Thompsonian one, continuous deformation between given forms (myth). In myth, he notes, the group of transformations is a virtual continuum on which the analyst makes the cuts, so the path between variants is the analyst’s choice. A keynote lecture; argued, not demonstrated. |
| LIT-825 | Larger communities create more systematic languages | Raviv, Meyer & Lev-Ari (2019), Proc. R. Soc. B 286:20191262. In a laboratory group-communication game, groups of eight built more systematic (compositional) languages than groups of four, faster and more consistently, with the same total interaction; small groups varied more, as drift would predict. Input variability, greater in larger groups, predicted gains in structure. Group size was isolated from network structure and second-language learners, the confounds of cross-linguistic correlations. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-628), the main text in full from the publisher’s version in the Radboud University repository; the electronic supplementary material was not read. Worth reading as the experiment that isolates community size: 12 groups of four and 12 groups of eight Dutch adults, fully connected, invented a typed language to describe moving shapes over 16 rounds with the same total amount of interaction. Larger groups’ languages became more systematic (string distance tracking meaning distance), faster, and ended more systematic; larger groups also varied far less from one another, while some small groups never built structure. Larger groups faced more input variability, and input variability predicted the next round’s gain in structure better than shared history did. Communicative success and convergence ended equal. It is a group-interaction paradigm, not a transmission chain: no generation turnover. Source of THEORY-164. |
| LIT-828 | Морфология сказки | Propp (1928), Leningrad, Academia (Morphology of the Folktale, English 1958, 2nd ed. 1968). In a hundred Russian wondertales the constants are the characters’ functions, defined by their place in the action, not the characters or motifs: 31 functions, always in one order, distributed over seven spheres of action, so all wondertales are of one type and differ in what they omit, how functions are realised and who performs them. Classification by plot is impossible; the wondertale may be morphologically a myth. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-615), in Russian, the preface and all nine chapters of the 1928 first edition from a library scan in full view at the Internet Archive; the appendices skimmed. Worth reading as the founding structural analysis of narrative: in the wondertales of Afanasyev’s collection (nos. 50–151), what stays constant is not the characters or motifs but the functions of the characters, actions defined by their consequence for the plot; there are only 31, they follow one order, and so all wondertales are of one type, differing in which functions they omit, how each is realised and who performs it. Functions fall to seven spheres of action (villain, donor, helper, princess and her father, dispatcher, hero, false hero). Propp holds that a tale can be generated from the scheme, that plot and variant cannot be told apart, and that wondertales in their morphological basis are myth. Source of THEORY-167. |
| LIT-830 v2 | Morphology of the Folktale | Propp (1958), Morphology of the Folktale, trans. Laurence Scott, ed. Svatava Pirkova-Jakobson, Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics, Publication 10 (IJAL 24(4), pt. 3); 2nd ed., revised and edited by Louis A. Wagner, introduction by Alan Dundes, University of Texas Press, 1968. The English translation of Морфология сказки (1928), held as LIT-828 and read there in Russian. Skimmed in the 1968 edition (chs. II–III and Dundes’s introduction): the four theses and 31 functions match the Russian reading; the genre and character terms shift (“folktale”, “fairy tale”, “dramatis personae”); and Wagner’s notes correct Propp’s tale references and renumber the tales. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-09 (NOTE-642) in the 1968 edition: Dundes’s introduction and chs. II–III (pp. 19–65), from copies on University at Buffalo and MIT web pages; the 1958 edition was not seen. Worth reading as the text through which most readers outside Russia met Propp. Chs. II–III carry the four theses and all 31 functions with their definitions and signs, matching the record’s reading of the Russian (NOTE-615), but with Latin and Greek signs that differ from the Cyrillic. It names the class “fairy tales” under a title its own introducer calls misleading, and alternates “dramatis personae” with “characters”. Wagner’s 41 notes in those two chapters correct Propp’s tale citations and renumber the tales to the later Afanas’ev numbering. The seven roles (ch. VI) were not read. |
| LIT-834 | A Quantum Question Order Model Supported by Empirical Tests of an A Priori and Precise Prediction | Wang & Busemeyer (2013), Topics in Cognitive Science 5(4):689–710. Models answering an attitude question as projecting a belief state onto the answer’s subspace and replacing the state by the normalised projection. Non-commuting projectors are then necessary for order effects, and a parameter-free constraint follows for any state and any projectors: the probability of answering the two questions differently is the same in both orders (the QQ equality). Five of six data sets meet it; the sixth, where background information was read out between the questions, fails it, as predicted. | Active — read 2026-10-09 (NOTE-636); worth reading as the source of the quantum question (QQ) model and its QQ equality: if each answer is a Lüders projection of one belief state, the probability of giving different answers to two questions is the same in both orders, whatever the state, the projectors or the dimension. Six data sets bear it out, and the Rose–Jackson poll fails it, as the authors predicted, because new information was inserted between the questions. Read with the caveat that the case against classical rivals is thin: the Bayesian argument is informal and the Markov proof is “available upon request”, so the paper shows that unconstrained classical models need not satisfy the equality, not that none can. |
| LIT-837 v2 | Structuralism | Piaget (1970), Structuralism, trans. and ed. Chaninah Maschler, Basic Books (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971; reissued 2015). The English edition of Le structuralisme (1968), held as LIT-802. Skimmed thinly from a publisher’s preview (17 pages of chs. I–IV): a structure is a whole under laws of composition, a system of transformations and self-regulating. Logico-mathematical structures are fully reversible (groups); linguistic and social ones are regulated in time but not fully reversible; and a structure is real only if governed from within. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-09 (NOTE-618), thinly: the publisher’s Google Books preview of the 2015 reissue served only 17 pages of text, pp. 3–63 at one page in four and p. 69, all in chs. I–IV, and none of the chapters on linguistics, the social sciences or philosophy, nor the conclusion. Worth reading as Piaget’s definition of structure by wholeness, transformation and self-regulation, and for his distinction between logico-mathematical structures, whose operations all have inverses (groups), and linguistic, social and psychological structures, whose transformations unfold in time under regulations that are “not entirely reversible”. He argues that a structure must be “governed from within” to be real, and defines the subject as “the center of functional activity”. Read it with the caveat that the skim saw the argument in fragments. |
| LIT-848 | Large AI models are cultural and social technologies | Farrell, Gopnik, Shalizi & Evans (2025), Science 387(6739):1153–1156, Policy Forum. Large models are best understood not as intelligent agents but as a new cultural and social technology: like writing, print and search they give access to what other people have produced, and like markets, bureaucracies and elections they make lossy, uninvertible summaries of it that can be operated on at scale. The questions that follow are the old ones about such technologies: homogenization or diversity, who gains and who loses, and which countervailing institutions emerge. Argued by historical analogy, without data. | Active — read in full 2026-10-09 (NOTE-649) from the authors’ accepted version (Science galley of 25 February 2025, posted on Farrell’s site); worth reading as the compact statement of the view that large models are not agents but a new cultural and social technology, of a kind with writing, print, markets, bureaucracies and elections: lossy summaries of what other humans have produced that let people reorganize it at scale. It is a four-page Policy Forum argued by analogy, with no data. Its one mechanism with consequences is that models fit their training distribution on average, so are least accurate where the data are rare, which may homogenize culture; it sets this against the possibility of “society-like” ecologies of models that keep diversity. |
| LIT-905 | The Architecture of Complexity | Simon (1962), Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106(6): 467–482. Complexity usually takes the form of hierarchy, defined by intensity of interaction, not by subordination. Hierarchies evolve fast because stable intermediate forms survive interruption (Hora and Tempus). Hierarchies are nearly decomposable: subsystems run fast and nearly independently, and interact slowly and only in aggregate. In social systems the higher levels have the slower dynamics and the longer intervals between interactions. | Active — read in full 2026-10-11 (NOTE-704) from the JSTOR PDF posted on a University of Washington course page (homes.cs.washington.edu/~ztatlock/599z-17sp/papers/complexity-simon-62.pdf; an identical copy is on pdodds.w3.uvm.edu). The record has read from a JSTOR PDF on a course page before (McAdams 2019). Worth reading for near-decomposability (fast dynamics inside subsystems, slow and aggregate between them) and for hierarchy defined by intensity of interaction rather than by space or by authority. The evolutionary-speed argument is an illustrative model whose numbers Simon says not to take seriously. |
| LIT-933 v2 | Functional Synchronization: The Emergence of Coordinated Activity in Human Systems | Nowak et al. (2017), a Hypothesis and Theory article. It proposes one scenario for psychology from neural processes to group dynamics: functions are carried out by functional units, which form when lower-level elements synchronize and dissolve when the task ends. Synchronization means any binding of dynamics, including complementary and compensatory roles, not convergence on one state. A higher-level element may be a pattern of synchronization (an order parameter) rather than a set of members. Group synchrony from mutual influence and from a common external signal are treated alike. No data, model or derivation; the authors offer it as a heuristic. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-768) in full; worth reading as a statement of the functional-unit view: at every level from neurons to groups, a function is a transient configuration of synchronized elements. Read it knowing that it is a programmatic hypothesis paper with no data or model, which its authors call “a heuristic”, that its synchronization includes complementary roles and is not convergence, and that it counts synchrony from mutual influence and from a common external signal as the same functional unit. Registered for QUESTION-053, where it is a third option rather than either side; no THEORY is filed from it. |
| LIT-939 v2 | Modeling opinion misperception and the emergence of silence in online social system | Vilone and Polizzi (2024). In two agent-based models on scale-free networks with fixed private beliefs, a small hard-core minority makes expressed and perceived opinion lean far toward the minority. The first model has no voluntary silence. In the second, the majority falls silent: 55–60% of agents end silent, whatever the minority’s size or degree. The network’s direct (friendship-paradox) distortion of perception is small and of no fixed sign. Simulation only. No belief changes, and the majority is overturned in expression only above a minority of about 30%. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-810) in full; worth reading for its separation of two sources of opinion misperception in a network: the friendship-paradox distortion of what members see, which it finds small and of no fixed sign, and a spiral of silence, which it finds large. With private beliefs held fixed, a hard-core minority drives 55–60% of agents into silence and makes expressed opinion lean far toward the minority. Read it knowing that it is simulation only, that no belief ever changes, and that the majority is overturned in expression only above a minority of about 30%. Filed for QUESTION-047; THEORY-242 holds what it shows. |
| LIT-958 v2 | How manipulable are prediction markets? | Rasooly and Rozzi (2025). A pre-registered field experiment randomly moved prices by ±5 points in 817 Manifold prediction markets. About 25% of the yes–no gap reverted in the first week and 6% more over the next three. At 60 days, the last measurement, about 59% remained in unresolved markets. A model with finite, risk-averse traders predicts partial, slowing reversion even without learning. Markets with more traders, more activity or a Metaculus twin reverted more, but these splits are not randomised and are mostly significant only at 10%. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-778) in full; worth reading as a randomised, pre-registered field experiment that answers the counterfactual question that historical manipulation studies could not. On 817 Manifold markets about 59% of a random ±5-point shock was still present after 60 days in unresolved markets, and a price-impact model with finite, risk-averse traders explains partial persistence even when no trader learns. Read it knowing that it cannot say whether traders came to believe the shocked price, that the platform runs mostly on play money, and that its evidence on which markets resist manipulation is correlational. Filed for QUESTION-047; THEORY-267 holds what it shows. |
| LIT-966 v2 | Cooperative Dilemmas in Rational Debate | Handfield et al. (2025). Two debaters in a Betz-style logical space choose fixed argument strategies, with payoff w·v − d (true beliefs against changes of mind). At low and moderate truth weights the game is a cooperative dilemma: a prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt or, most often, a snowdrift in which one debater argues boldly and the other free-rides. At low weight both exit. At high weight in short debates mutual boldness is the unique, truth-optimal equilibrium. In a narrow band of mixed equilibria, raising the truth weight slightly lowers collective accuracy. All exact results are for n = 3 propositions. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-795) in full; worth reading as a clean game-theoretic statement of epistemic free-riding in debate. Two deductive reasoners who value true beliefs but pay for each change of mind face a cooperative dilemma at low and moderate truth weights: typically one argues boldly and the other free-rides, and at low weights both exit. Read it knowing that it models two people and three propositions, that its outcome is collective accuracy and not a shared belief, and that the drop in accuracy as truth motivation rises is small and confined to a narrow band of mixed equilibria. Filed for QUESTION-047; THEORY-290 holds what it shows. |
| LIT-988 v2 | Scientific discovery in a model-centric framework: Reproducibility, innovation, and epistemic diversity | Devezer et al. (2019). Scientists drawn at random test a proposed linear model against the consensus by AIC or SC, and the winner becomes the consensus. Markov-chain analysis and an agent-based model show that replication cannot change the transition matrix, so reproducibility cannot cause convergence. A population of boundary testers reproduces almost perfectly while rarely holding the true model. Strategies that keep the model space connected speed discovery. An equal mix of strategies is never the worst on any property and varies least, but it is not the best on time at the truth, and under high noise it fails too. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-792) in full; worth reading for a formal model in which every inquiry step is a sound model comparison and the community’s consensus still sits on a false model, with results that reproduce almost perfectly, because of which alternatives its research strategies put up. It proves that replication cannot change where the consensus goes. Read it knowing that the consensus is memoryless and held by no one, that its scientists neither believe nor learn, and that its “epistemic diversity optimizes” means only that an equal strategy mix is never the worst and varies least. Filed for QUESTION-047; THEORY-295 holds what it shows. |
| LIT-999 v2 | Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds | Golub and Jackson (2010). Agents with independent noisy signals of a true value repeatedly average their neighbours’ beliefs with fixed weights, ignoring repeated information. The consensus is the signals weighted by the network’s left unit eigenvector, and in a growing society it converges to the truth if and only if the largest such influence weight vanishes; with reciprocal equal weights, if and only if no degree is a non-vanishing share of all links. A finite group everyone attends to prevents it; balance and dispersion conditions ensure it. Speed of consensus is unrelated to its correctness. | Active — read 2026-10-14 (NOTE-840) in full; worth reading for QUESTION-047 as a proved case in which members share one updating rule and the network alone decides whether the group belief is right: a growing society of DeGroot averagers converges to the truth if and only if the largest influence weight vanishes. Read it knowing that its agents are naïve, not sound (they ignore repeated information), that weights are fixed and signals independent, and that the result is asymptotic and about a model, not data. |
| LIT-1001 v2 | Taken Out of Context: American Teen Sociality in Networked Publics | danah boyd (2008), PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. An ethnography of American teenagers on MySpace and Facebook. Networked publics have four properties (persistence, replicability, scalability, searchability) and three dynamics: invisible audiences, collapsed contexts, and the blurring of public and private. Collapsed contexts make it hard to keep distinct social contexts distinct. The analysis of self-presentation builds on Goffman (1959) and Meyrowitz (1985). | Active — read in part 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1432, Skimmed) from the author’s copy at danah.org (www.danah.org/papers/TakenOutOfContext.pdf), licensed CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 (Appendix 3): Chapter 1 on networked publics, Chapter 4 on self-presentation and context, and Chapter 7 in full, with the passages on collapse elsewhere; Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6 were not read in full. This extends the reading of 2026-10-12 (NOTE-710). Worth reading for its account of collapsed contexts: distinct social contexts are kept apart by spatial, social and temporal boundaries, and networked media remove them, so audiences a person keeps apart are brought together, often without the person seeing it. Its examples, after Meyrowitz (1985), show contradictory self-presentations doing no harm while the audiences stay segmented, and trouble when they meet. Read it knowing that the evidence is ethnographic, with no comparison of conflict between segmented and collapsed audiences, and that the teens’ documented collisions are mostly one presentation misread by an unintended audience. |
| LIT-1005 v2 | Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective | Bandura (2001). Social cognitive theory’s account of people as agents of their own functioning, not only products of their circumstances. The core features of agency are intentionality, forethought, self- reactiveness and self-reflectiveness, and beliefs of self-efficacy are the foundation of it. Distinguishes three modes: direct personal agency, proxy agency through others who act on one’s behalf, and collective agency through shared beliefs in a group’s efficacy. Held here for what it is standardly cited for; not read. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-12 from its Crossref record, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-14 and not reached. OpenAlex lists only the publisher location and reports the work closed; Unpaywall reports no open copy; Europe PMC holds the PubMed record (PMID 11148297) with no full text. The Annual Reviews article and PDF pages returned a bot check (403). The Bandura family site albertbandura.com returned 406, and searches found no copy posted by the author or by Stanford. The copies found are on course and document-sharing pages (a UNED course directory, e-teaching.org), which are not authorised and were not opened. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1025 | Interpretable early warnings using machine learning in an online game-experiment | Falmagne, Stephenson and Levin (2026), PNAS 123(1). On about 10,900 crowd-built r/place compositions of 2022, gradient-boosted trees over 19 composition-level series predict the time until an image is abruptly overrun: half the overthrows within 20 minutes at 3.6% false positives, far better than generic indicators, and still good on 2023. The precursors are plural (attack outrunning defence, turbulent history, little accepted change, uncoordinated activity, simple images), and about a quarter of overthrows give no warning. | Active — read in full 2026-10-13 (NOTE-731) from the version of record, the CC BY-NC-ND JATS text that Europe PMC serves for PMC12773730 (https://www.ebi.ac.uk/europepmc/webservices/rest/PMC12773730/fullTextXML), with the SI Appendix read from the arXiv preprint (https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.09880), sections 1, 2 and 6 in full and 3–5 skimmed. Worth reading as the one large-sample study of how crowd-maintained images on r/place are overthrown: the defended image is an equilibrium of attack and repair, and its failure has many precursors, several of them about the defending community. It supports CLAIM-280 (THEORY-214), with the qualification that some compositions last through neglect, and makes CLAIM-279’s frame-relativity operational; it does not answer QUESTION-091. |
| LIT-1032 | How Millions Coordinate at Scale: Engagement, Collaboration, and Conflict in Three Editions of Reddit r/place | Wu and Silva (2024; v3 2026), arXiv:2408.13236. Cross-edition statistics for 2017, 2022 and 2023 and a method that recovers coalitions, failed ones included, from the 2017 placement log. Participation stays heavy-tailed under the uniform cooldown. Larger coalitions repaint more redundantly and have less active members. Participants consolidate into large coalitions over the event. Survival is barely predictable from coalition size, area, start time and colour entropy until late. | Active — read in full 2026-10-13 (NOTE-724) from the arXiv PDF, v3 of 13 July 2026 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.13236). Worth reading for the only reconstruction of failed as well as lasting r/place coalitions, and for cross-edition statistics. It supports CLAIM-280 weakly (THEORY-216): lasting artworks are those whose coalitions keep working under overwriting. Its heavy-tailed use of the uniform cooldown qualifies CLAIM-272, because unequal influence begins before any plan directs anyone. It concedes the interaction-level data that QUESTION-084 asks about were not observed. |
| LIT-1034 | Two Ways of Understanding Social Dynamics: Analyzing the Predictability of Emergence of Objects in Reddit r/place Dependent on Locality in Space and Time | Adams, Fernandez and Witkowski (2022), arXiv:2206.03563. Using the 2017 canvas alone, it tallies local cellular-automaton-style rules between 10-minute snapshots and trains a CNN to predict each pixel from its 3×3 neighbourhood. Prediction worsens with horizon and dips mid-event. Objects that spread by recolouring neighbours are predicted, and designs coordinated off the canvas are missed. No baselines or participant data. | Active — read in full 2026-10-13 (NOTE-725) from the arXiv PDF, v2 of 15 June 2022 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.03563). A short, preliminary paper, worth reading only for its one suggestive contrast: on the 2017 canvas, a 3×3 local predictor recovers objects that spread by recolouring neighbours and misses designs coordinated off the canvas (THEORY-224). It has no baselines, and it models no participants, so it does not do what the exchange filed it for, estimating participants’ reach. It is a pointer for QUESTION-084 and QUESTION-093, not evidence on them. |
| LIT-1037 | Instruction vs. emergence on r/place: Understanding the growth and control of evolving artifacts in mass collaboration | Litherland and Mørch (2021), Computers in Human Behavior 122. A mixed-methods case study of the 2017 Mona Lisa and its forum. The design was set and revised in the forum through linked blueprints and negotiation with neighbouring communities, gated by a few central members, and placed by about 77,000 accounts. Image and forum evolve as interdependent artifacts. “Instruction” (Reddit’s rules, top-down) and emergence (bottom-up) are framed as complementary controls on complexity. | Active — read in full 2026-10-13 (NOTE-733) from the publisher’s CC BY PDF deposited as the published version by the University of Oslo in the Norwegian research archive (DUO handle http://hdl.handle.net/10852/86918, resolving to https://nva.sikt.no/registration/0198cc58d5aa-ec8dd620-880a-4a49-8839-aaa8bf137792); the article is also open access at ScienceDirect. Worth reading as the only r/place study that reads the forum beside the canvas. For one artwork it shows the design decided off the canvas by negotiation, gated by a few central members, and carried out by tens of thousands of placers (THEORY-218). That supports CLAIM-272 and CLAIM-279 and answers QUESTION-084 in part. Its “instruction” is Reddit’s rules, not planners’ instructions. |
| LIT-1064 | Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective accessibility | Strack and Mussweiler (1997), JPSP 73(3). Proposes that comparing a target with an anchor makes anchor-consistent knowledge about the target more accessible, and that this knowledge then drives the absolute judgement. | Active — read in full 2026-10-15 from a scan of the APA typeset article (pp. 437–446) posted in the readings directory of a University of Florida graduate course (Lyle Brenner, MAR 7588; bear.warrington.ufl.edu/brenner/mar7588/Papers/strack-mussweiler-jpsp97.pdf). That is a course’s copy of the publisher’s version, not an author’s copy. Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list the article as closed. No copy was found on the authors’ pages: London Business School’s publication pages returned 404 or failed TLS, and the Internet Archive refused connections from this environment. Worth reading as the source of the selective accessibility model of anchoring. Three small studies (N = 32, 32 and 67) show that, with the anchor number held fixed, the anchor’s effect depends on whether the knowledge used to compare applies to the later estimate. Applicability came from the dimension: the estimate was on the dimension compared, or on another one (Study 1). Representativeness came from the object: the estimate was about the same object, or about a very different one, where the effect turned to contrast (Study 2). With plausible anchors the comparison was slower and the later estimate faster (Study 3). For CLAIM-298 (whose psychological form is now CLAIM-315) it argues against numeric priming of a response, and supports the claim’s psychological form for plausible anchors. It infers accessibility rather than measuring it; the direct lexical-decision test is Mussweiler and Strack 2000a, which the record does not hold and LIT-1067 failed to replicate. It does not rule out adjustment, and assigns adjustment to implausible anchors, which anchored at least as strongly. Its model holds that accessibility does not fix the direction of the judgment, so evaluation matters as well as retrieval. For QUESTION-109 it states, without testing, that hypothesis-consistent retrieval “improves the validity of comparative judgments but distorts subsequent judgments for which no specific hypothesis has been provided”. |
| LIT-1067 | Failures to replicate a key result of the selective accessibility theory of anchoring | Harris, Blower, Rodgers, Lagator, Page, Burton, Urlichich and Speekenbrink (2019), JEP: General 148(9), e30–e50. Five preregistered experiments (N = 128 each) repeated Mussweiler and Strack’s (2000a) test of selective accessibility, which asks whether a high or low anchor speeds recognition of anchor-consistent words. Four used lexical decision and one used continuous identification. Anchoring was large in all five, the accessibility effect was absent in all five, and an exploratory meta-analytic Bayes factor favoured the null about 21 to 1. Because the same tasks also failed to detect direct picture priming, the authors conclude that the method is unfit as a test, not that the theory is false, and that the earlier evidence from it “is not a strong part of the evidence base”. | Active — read in full 2026-10-15 from the authors’ manuscript on UCL Discovery (discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10074759/1/HarrisEtAl_2019_anchoring.pdf, eprint 10074759; 76 pp. with appendices and supplementary experiments). It is a Word-generated manuscript dated 23 May 2019, which Unpaywall and OpenAlex label submittedVersion. Its abstract is worded differently from the published one, so it is not the APA version of record (JEP: General 148(9), e30–e50), which returned 403 from this environment. Worth reading as the preregistered, high-powered test of the lexical-decision evidence for selective accessibility (Mussweiler & Strack 2000a, Studies 1 and 2). In five experiments of N = 128, anchoring was large every time (d ≈ 0.85–1.39) and anchor-consistent word recognition never moved (η²G ≤ .004). An exploratory meta-analytic Bayes factor favours the null by 21 to 1. Validation studies show the same tasks also miss direct picture priming. For CLAIM-298 it shows that the most direct published measure of “anchors change what is reachable” does not replicate and cannot detect priming. The claim’s psychological form therefore rests on inferred, not measured, accessibility, and the theory is neither refuted nor confirmed. The authors’ leading explanation of durable anchoring is a provisional answer formed at the comparison, which is neutral between retrieval and evaluation. For QUESTION-109 it bears only indirectly. It also corrects the record’s attribution: by this paper’s account the lexical-decision studies are Mussweiler & Strack 2000a, not 1999 (LIT-1078). |
| LIT-1078 | Hypothesis-Consistent Testing and Semantic Priming in the Anchoring Paradigm: A Selective Accessibility Model | Mussweiler and Strack (1999), JESP 35(2). States the selective accessibility model of anchoring: considering an anchor triggers hypothesis-consistent testing, which makes anchor-consistent knowledge accessible for the later judgement, with experiments on the mechanism. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-15, not read. Registered from the exchange of 2026-10-14 on prompting, epistemic memory and retrieval (the workbench entry of 2026-10-15). No NOTE is filed, and it stays Unavailable until it is read, not on merit. Looked for a lawful full text on 2026-10-15 and found none that could be fetched: Unpaywall reports it closed (no open-access location, no repository copy) and OpenAlex likewise (closed, no repository full text); the Semantic Scholar API gives no openAccessPdf (status CLOSED, abstract elided by the publisher); Crossref lists only Elsevier text-mining links (api.elsevier.com, PII S0022103198913646) under Elsevier’s TDM user licence, which refused an unkeyed request, and ScienceDirect refused direct requests from this environment (403), so whether the article sits in Elsevier’s open archive could not be checked there, though Unpaywall and OpenAlex, which track that archive, record no free copy; London Business School Research Online, Mussweiler’s institutional repository, holds other anchoring papers of his (eprint 620, “Anchoring: accessibility as a cause of judgmental assimilation”) but not this one, and the London Business School publication page for it returns 404, with its Internet Archive capture (2023-09-26) unreachable from this environment; web searches found no copy on Mussweiler’s or Strack’s institutional pages (London, Cologne, Würzburg), no course-hosted copy and no preprint. A ResearchGate entry (publication 253136010) advertises a full text, but ResearchGate refused the request (403) and who uploaded it could not be confirmed, so it was not used. The 1997 companion paper (LIT-1064) and the later “Comparing is believing” review (European Review of Social Psychology 10, 1999) are different works. |
| LIT-1121 v2 | Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide | Jenkins (2006). Media convergence as a cultural shift in which content flows across platforms and audiences take part in making and circulating it, not only a technological one. | Unavailable — Searched 2026-10-20 for a lawful full text, none reached, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Crossref gives no licence or full-text link for the NYU Press Scholarship Online DOI; its host, De Gruyter Brill, answered with an empty bot-check page (HTTP 202); the Internet Archive holds the 2006 and 2008 printings (isbn_9780814742815, convergencecultu0000unse) only as controlled lending (printdisabled); an upload of the Spanish translation carrying a CC BY-ND label is not the publisher’s and was not used. OpenAlex refused the query (the shared daily budget was spent) and the DOAB API refused this client, so neither was checked. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1124 v2 | Reconceptualizing Organizational Routines as a Source of Flexibility and Change | Feldman & Pentland (2003), ASQ 48(1):94–118. A routine has an ostensive aspect, the pattern as participants understand, invoke and account for it, and a performative aspect, its particular enactments; the ostensive guides, accounts for and names performances, and performances create, maintain and modify the ostensive, so variation and selective retention inside a routine make it a source of endogenous change as well as of stability. Theory, illustrated with academic hiring. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1386) in full, from UC Irvine’s eScholarship deposit of the published pages, by OCR; worth reading as the paper that splits a routine into an ostensive aspect, the pattern as participants understand and refer to it, and a performative aspect, its enactments, each making the other, so that a routine can change endogenously by variation and selective retention within it. Read it knowing that it is theory with one illustrative example and no data, that its analysis stays inside one routine in one organization, and that it does not separate a particular organization’s continuity from reproduction of a kind, which was A6’s question for it; it only doubts that routines carry unchanging genealogical information between organizations. |
| LIT-1125 v2 | Memories of ‘The Rivalry’: Differences in How Fans of the Winning and Losing Teams Remember the Same Game | Talarico (2012). Fans of the winning side of the 2008 Lafayette–Lehigh game rehearsed it more and recalled it more accurately and vividly over time than the losers’ fans, while confidence was equal. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-16, not read; a search for a lawful full text on 2026-10-29 reached none. Unpaywall lists it as closed, with no open location; the Wiley version is paywalled. A web search found no author or repository copy, only a 2012 Lafayette College event page for a talk by Talarico on the same study. Botzung et al. (2010, PMC3319676), an open study of Duke and UNC fans’ memories of one game, is the nearest open work; it is not filed. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1131 v2 | ’Who can represent the city?’ Football fandom, derby rivalry and civic identity in Shanghai | Qi (2026). From 30 interviews and online observation, rival Shanghai fan groups claim local authenticity and cosmopolitan identity against each other, and together produce the city’s derby culture. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-16, not read; set Unfetched 2026-10-29. A lawful free copy exists: the article is published open access under CC BY-NC at doi.org/10.1177/10126902261441016 (journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10126902261441016), per Unpaywall. On 2026-10-29 SAGE answered with HTTP 403 (a bot check); a web search found only an index record (metatoc.com). A human reader can likely open the SAGE copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until it is read, not on merit. |
| LIT-1133 v2 | Belonging to a community of European fans? European common in-group identity formation through football fandom | Biel (2026). Surveys in Germany, Spain, Poland and Norway find a distinct European fan identity among a substantial share of fans, associated with youth, education, attachment to Europe and international football consumption. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1299) from the CC BY published article; worth reading as the survey evidence that football fans identify with a European community of fans as well as with club and nation, and that this identification goes with trust in foreign fans and cross-border viewing but not with views of football governance. Single items, cross-sectional; its percentages use a denominator other than the analysed n. Source of THEORY-1116. |
| LIT-1134 v3 | Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions | DeMarzo, Vayanos & Zwiebel (2003). Agents who average the reports of those they listen to with fixed weights, treating every round’s report as new (persuasion bias), reach a consensus weighted by the stationary distribution of the listening matrix, so influence depends on network position as well as precision; the consensus is correct only if the network is balanced, and rational agents who know the network reach the correct beliefs in at most N² rounds. Long-run differences of opinion line up along a single axis across all issues, set by the second eigenvectors. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1392) in full, from the LSE Research Online copy of the authors’ version of April 2003; worth reading as the paper that reads DeGroot averaging as a bias, failing to discount repeated information, and derives from it that consensus weights are the listening matrix’s stationary distribution, correct only in balanced networks, and that long-run disagreement lines up on one axis across all issues. Read it knowing that its listening weights are fixed and reports truthful, so it gives capture without fidelity but no hysteresis or feedback from outcome to authority, that its political and marketing applications are conjecture, and that only the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 were followed. |
| LIT-1135 v2 | Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability | Gioia, Schultz & Corley (2000), Academy of Management Review 25(1):63–81. Organizational identity is better seen as continuous than enduring: its labels persist while their meanings shift, because members compare who they think they are with how they think outsiders see them and change identity or image to close the gap; the authors call the resulting instability adaptive, since it helps organizations change. Conceptual, illustrated with Shell’s Brent Spar, IBM, Oticon and British Airways. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1389) in full, from Imperial College London’s Spiral repository, which deposits the published version; worth reading as the argument that organizational identity has continuity rather than endurance: its labels persist while their meanings shift, driven by members’ comparison of who they think they are with how they think outsiders see them, and that this instability helps organizations adapt. Read it knowing that it is conceptual, illustrated only by chosen successes of deliberate change (Shell, IBM, Oticon, British Airways) with no data, that “adaptive” is not measured, and that it poses, without answering, when a changed identity is still the same one. |
| LIT-1138 v2 | The Social Identity Buffer: How Cognitive, Affective, and Evaluative Ties Sustain Fan Commitment and Loyalty Amidst Club Controversies | Čater (2026). Two cross-sectional studies of reactions to a hypothetical European Super League entry: cognitive identity buffers commitment best, and strong opposition to the decision weakens every buffer. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-16, not read; set Unfetched 2026-10-29. A lawful free copy exists: the article is published open access under CC BY at doi.org/10.1177/10616934261433626 (journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10616934261433626), per Unpaywall, with a further listing in COBISS (plus.cobiss.net/cobiss/si/en/bib/273845507). On 2026-10-29 SAGE answered both curl and a second fetcher with HTTP 403 (a bot check), and a web search found no other copy. A human reader can likely open the SAGE copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until it is read, not on merit. |
| LIT-1140 v2 | Fan response to the identity threat of potential team relocation | Wegner (2020). Facing a possible relocation, fans both change and resist change in what their team identity means; place identity works both for and against them, and identifying with the team does not always put team and fans in one in-group. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-16, not read; a search for a lawful full text on 2026-10-29 reached none. Unpaywall lists it as closed, with no open location. The Elsevier version (Sport Management Review 23(2), pii S1441352318303085) is paywalled. A web search found only index records (RePEc/IDEAS, EconPapers) and no author or repository copy. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1141 v2 | Identity Trajectories: Explaining Long-Term Patterns of Continuity and Change in Organizational Identities | Cloutier (2020). In four nonprofits followed over the long term, identity claims about ends shape continuity and change more than claims about means. | Unavailable — searched 2026-10-29 for a lawful full text and none was reached, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. OpenAlex reports it closed with no repository copy; Semantic Scholar lists no open PDF; the publisher’s page at journals.aom.org returned 403 to curl; standard and extended web searches for the title with the authors’ names found no preprint, accepted manuscript or author copy, only the publisher’s page and citing works. UCL Discovery (Ravasi’s institution) refused its search to this client (403), so a deposit there is not ruled out; HEC Montréal’s repository (Cloutier’s) was not searched. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1142 v2 | The Oral History of ‘I’m the Juggernaut, Bitch!’ | Siegel (2024). Journalism: interviews with the makers of the 2006 “Juggernaut, Bitch!!” redub and others, and Simon Kinberg’s quoted remark, via Polygon, that the film’s line “was a reshoot Ratner line”. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1272) from theringer.com; worth reading as the only source for CASE-100’s timeline, with the creators’ own account. It dates the line’s addition to the film (a reshoot, per Kinberg via Polygon) but gives no production testimony on why the line was added: that the director had seen the video is the writer’s inference. |
| LIT-1143 v2 | Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture | Jenkins (2013). Rejects the “viral” metaphor for spreadability: content circulates because audiences actively choose to share and reshape it. | Unavailable — Searched 2026-10-20 for a lawful full text, none reached, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Crossref gives no licence or full-text link for the NYU Press Scholarship Online DOI; its host, De Gruyter Brill, answered with an empty bot-check page (HTTP 202); the Internet Archive holds the 2013 edition (spreadablemediac0000jenk) only as controlled lending (printdisabled). OpenAlex refused the query (the shared daily budget was spent) and the DOAB API refused this client, so neither was checked. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1144 v2 | Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel Theory | Marquis & Tilcsik (2013), Academy of Management Annals 7(1):195–245. Imprinting is a process in which, during a brief sensitive period, an entity develops characteristics reflecting prominent features of its environment that persist despite later environmental change; the review separates it from path dependence and cohort effects, orders the literature by four levels (collectives, organizations, building blocks, individuals) and three sources, and proposes layered imprints from several sensitive periods and secondhand imprinting by emulation. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1373) in full, from the University of Toronto’s TSpace copy of the typeset article; worth reading as the review that defines imprinting by a brief sensitive period, the stamp of the environment during it and persistence despite later change, separates it from path dependence and cohort effects, and orders the literature across four levels of analysis. Read it knowing that its extensions, layered imprints from several sensitive periods and secondhand imprinting by emulation, are proposals with little evidence, that the studies it surveys are mostly correlational, and that it asks which features persist in an entity whose identity is fixed, never when a bearer of another’s imprint is that entity continuing. |
| LIT-1146 v2 | Opinion Dynamics and the Evolution of Social Power in Influence Networks | Jia, MirTabatabaei, Friedkin & Bullo (2015). In the DeGroot–Friedkin model, DeGroot averaging on each issue with self-weights set by reflected appraisal across issues, self-weights converge from every non-autocratic start to one equilibrium ordered by the eigenvector centralities of the fixed relative interpersonal weights: power accumulates at the top, is autocratic exactly for a star network (whose centre has centrality 1/2) and democratic exactly for a doubly stochastic one, and members no path of influence reaches end with none. | Active — read 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1135) from the version of record posted on the last author’s site, proofs skimmed; worth reading as the exact analysis of reflected appraisal under DeGroot dynamics. With fixed relative interpersonal weights, self-weights converge from every non-autocratic start to one equilibrium ordered by eigenvector centrality; power accumulates above a threshold, is autocratic exactly for a star and democratic exactly for a doubly stochastic network, and members no path of influence reaches end with none. Theorems about a model; the authors say its validity and robustness are not yet established. |
| LIT-1147 v2 | Enemies with benefits: the dual role of rivalry in shaping sports fans’ identity | Berendt (2016). A survey of 571 supporters at eight Bundesliga clubs: rivalry lowers public collective self-esteem relative to the rival’s fans but raises it relative to others, and raises perceived ingroup distinctiveness and cohesion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1303) from the authors’ accepted manuscript in the Hochschule Hannover repository (CC BY-NC-ND); worth reading as the structural model showing rivalry’s two faces for fans, less regard from the rival’s fans and more in-group distinctiveness, cohesion and regard from others, with the gains carried by perceived reciprocity of the rivalry rather than disidentification. One cross-sectional sample, N = 571, with fans who named no rival excluded. Source of THEORY-1113. |
| LIT-1150 v2 | Supporters, Followers, Fans, and Flaneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football | Giulianotti (2002). Four ideal types of football spectator, supporters, followers, fans and flâneurs, set on hot–cool and traditional–consumer axes. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1244) from the Author’s Original Text deposited in Loughborough’s repository (Figshare 9625841, CC BY-NC-ND), the pre-review version; worth reading as the standard four-type taxonomy of football spectators (supporters, followers, fans, flâneurs) on two axes, hot–cool and traditional–consumer, with a claimed historical drift towards the flâneur. Conceptual, with no data. Source of THEORY-1111. |
| LIT-1216 v2 | Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, Seventh Edition | Software Engineering Institute (2022). Twenty-two best practices for mitigating insider threat, drawn from the CERT Division’s analysis of more than 3,000 insider-threat cases, each with quick wins, mitigations and mappings to security and privacy standards. | Deferred — filed 2026-10-18; reading stopped at a skim on 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1355), from the SEI’s own PDF (175 pages): the front matter, the introduction with its data page, and three of the twenty-two best practices in full, 15 (separation of duties and least privilege), 21 (positive incentives) and 22 (learning from past incidents). The other nineteen practices and the appendices are unread. |
| LIT-1218 v3 | Propagation, not aggregation: linking individual psychological flexibility to organizational functioning | Guida, Minutola & Presti (2026). A conceptual paper with no data. Organizational flexibility is not the aggregate of flexible individuals but a pattern of coordinated, values-consistent action that is retained and spread or absorbed and extinguished; whether a rise in a member’s flexibility reaches the organization depends jointly on that member’s leverage over the consequences colleagues meet and on whether the culture reinforces or penalizes such action. Bond’s (2018) leader-based route is the high-leverage special case. Five propositions and a factorial design are set out; the two measures a test needs do not yet exist. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1353) in full, from the publisher’s open-access PDF (Frontiers, CC BY); worth reading as the prior transfer of ACT’s psychological flexibility to the organization, which puts the problem as propagation, not aggregation, and makes it depend jointly on a member’s leverage over the consequences colleagues meet and on whether the culture reinforces values-consistent action, with Bond’s (2018) leader route as the high-leverage case. Read it knowing that it is a conceptual paper with no data, that the two measures its tests need do not exist, that its motivating evidence (Fleming 2024) is cross-sectional and bears on individual benefit more than on organizational transfer, and that two empirical sentences in §2.1 carry no citation. |
| LIT-1220 v3 | Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams | Edmondson (1999). In a cross-sectional field study of 51 work teams in one office-furniture manufacturer, team psychological safety, a shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-taking, was associated with members’ and observers’ ratings of learning behavior, while team efficacy added little once safety was controlled. Learning behavior mediated between psychological safety and observer-rated team performance, and safety between context support and leader coaching and learning. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1404) in full, from a JSTOR-printed copy posted among MIT course readings (https://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341_Readings/Group_Performance/Edmondson%20Psychological%20safety.pdf); worth reading as the paper that defines team psychological safety, a shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking, and finds it associated with team learning behavior in 51 teams of one company, with learning behavior carrying its association with observer-rated performance. Read it knowing that the study is cross-sectional and in one company, that the antecedents and safety come from the same survey, that efficacy’s role is mixed rather than absent, and that its teams are cooperative: it says nothing about compromised or adversarial members. |
| LIT-1222 v2 | A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare | Arrow (1950). No rule that turns every profile of individual orderings into a social ordering can satisfy unrestricted domain, the Pareto condition, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship together: the impossibility theorem. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-18, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports it closed with no repository copy; the Journal of Political Economy’s page (University of Chicago Press) and JSTOR are paywalled; EconPapers lists only the journal; a web search found lecture slides and summaries, no copy of the article. The fuller statement, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), was not sought. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1265 | Windows to the soul: Children and adults see the eyes as the location of the self | Starmans & Bloom (2012), Cognition 123(2):313–318. Three experiments with 4- and 5-year-olds (41–50 per study) and US adults on Mechanical Turk (51–53 per study) asked which of two pictured flies or snowflakes was “closer to” a cartoon character. Both groups chose positions near the eyes: over the lower body on a girl; at the chest on an alien whose eyes were there; and in front of the eyes over behind the head, or in front of the feet, on a profile. The authors conclude that people intuitively think of the self as located at or near the eyes, and, since preschoolers share it, that this is not learned from ideas about the brain. The judgement is about another, drawn person, and the step from “closer to her” to “the location of the self” is assumed, not tested. | Active — read in full 2026-10-20 (NOTE-995), from the published article on the authors’ lab site at Yale; worth reading as the best-known folk-judgement study of where a person is in their body, and for what such a study can and cannot show. Preschoolers and adults on Mechanical Turk chose which of two pictures had a fly, or a snowflake, closer to a cartoon character. They chose positions near the eyes: on a girl, near the eyes over the body; on an alien with its eyes on its chest, near the chest-eyes; on a profile, in front of the eyes over behind the head and over places the character could see. The authors conclude that children and adults intuitively place the self at or near the eyes. Read it as a judgement about where another, drawn, person is, with small samples, some slips in the statistics and an inference from “closer to Mary” to “the location of the self” that the design assumes. It bears on none of the rubber hand THEORYs. |
| LIT-1290 | Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling | McLeod and DiCola (2011). Not read. From more than 100 interviews, a history of sampling and of the US lawsuits and licensing practice that now govern it. The clearance system is argued to be inefficient and to limit creativity: at estimated present-day fees, two golden-age albums (Paul’s Boutique, Fear of a Black Planet) could not be released commercially. Reforms are surveyed, including a reverse liability rule. | Unavailable — Searched 2026-10-20 for a lawful full text, none reached, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Crossref gives no licence for the DOI and no full-text link; the Duke University Press book page (dukeupress.edu/creative-license) offers it for sale only, with no open-access edition; De Gruyter Brill, which hosts the Duke e-book, answered with an empty bot-check response (HTTP 202); Project MUSE’s search returned a server error (HTTP 500). Web searches found no open-access, author-repository or CC-licensed copy; library records mark the e-book restricted. McLeod’s earlier, CC-licensed book is a different work. Lending-only scans and shadow-library copies were not opened. OpenAlex was not used (out of budget today). It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1297 | The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy | Perzanowski and Schultz (2016). Digital media and software-laden devices are sold under licences that deny a sale and DRM that enforces the licence, while the law of exhaustion, built around owning a tangible copy, cannot follow purchases that are copied at every use or never copied at all. Buyers lose resale, lending, repair and privacy, and a survey shows “Buy Now” misleads them. The book proposes treating one-time purchases as sales, judging licences as permissions rather than contracts, exempting owners from anti-circumvention law, and a multifactor test for digital exhaustion. | Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1026) in full except the last page of the Conclusion, which the copy lacks; worth reading as the standard account of how licences, DRM and the copy-centred law of exhaustion turn digital purchases into conditional access, with the case law from Bobbs-Merrill to Lexmark v. Impression Products, a survey showing that “Buy Now” misleads buyers, and a proposed multifactor test for digital exhaustion. Its diagnosis is the consumer side of Lessig’s copy trigger: exhaustion is tied to owning a copy, and digital use and transfer make new copies. Read it knowing that it is US law as of early 2016, that it is advocacy by two authors who were parties or counsel in several of its episodes, that the survey is their own and of a mock store, and that several of its pending cases have since been decided. |
| LIT-1298 | Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy | Lessig (2008). Digital technology revives a read/write culture in which amateurs remake what they consume. Remix is quotation whose meaning comes from the reference, so it needs the original. Because every digital use makes a copy and copyright regulates copies, the law now reaches every ordinary use and makes RW culture presumptively illegal. The commercial and sharing economies, kept distinct, combine in hybrids. Proposed reforms: free amateur remix, registration after a term, no regulation of the copy as such, and a levy or licence for file sharing. | Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1023) in full; worth reading as the standard statement of the read/write (RW) against read-only (RO) distinction, of remix as quotation whose meaning depends on using the original, of the copy-trigger argument (digital use always makes a copy, so copyright now reaches every ordinary use), and of the commercial, sharing and hybrid economies. Read it knowing that the economic core (remix does not compete with what it remixes, money crowds out sharing) is asserted rather than shown, that the hybrids are founders’ own accounts of successes, and that the legal reforms are sketches without rates or a line between amateur and professional. |
| LIT-1301 | The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind | Boyle (2008). Intellectual property is a limited monopoly granted to solve a public-goods problem, and its limits matter as much as its rights. A “second enclosure movement” is extending rights over facts, genes, business methods, digital fences and the fragments of music, without evidence that more rights bring more innovation. Cheaper copying makes the limits more important, not less. The book argues for an environmentalism of the public domain. | Active — read 2026-10-20 (NOTE-1021) in full; worth reading as the standard statement of the “second enclosure movement” argument: that intellectual property is a state-made monopoly to be kept as short and narrow as its purpose allows (the “Jefferson Warning”), that the public domain and the limits on rights do as much work as the rights, that cheaper copying makes those limits more important rather than less (the “Sony Axiom”), and that policy runs on faith rather than evidence. Its music chapter traces one melody from a 1951 gospel record through Ray Charles and Kanye West to a 2005 political mashup. Read it knowing that most of it is argument from cases chosen to make the point; the one sustained empirical test is the database right (ch. 9). It treats the commons of the mind as nonrival and open to all, so it does not engage Ostrom’s work on bounded common-pool resources beyond two notes. |
| LIT-1312 v2 | Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought | Collins (1986). Black women intellectuals occupy an “outsider within” position in sociology, inside its institutions but marginal to them, and from it can see anomalies its insiders do not; three themes of Black feminist thought (self-definition and self-valuation, interlocking oppression, the importance of Black women’s culture) show what that standpoint contributes. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1042) in full, in the authorized Portuguese translation in Sociedade e Estado 31(1), 2016 (doi:10.1590/S0102-69922016000100006, open on Redalyc), published with Collins’s and Oxford University Press’s permission; the English original was not reached. Worth reading for the outsider-within argument, that a member trained into a discipline but rooted in experience its paradigms omit or distort sees anomalies insiders are not placed to see and outsiders lack the authority to press (THEORY-834), and for its early statement of a self-confirming status: a group assigned an inferior status, and that status used as proof of its inferiority. Read it knowing that it is an argued essay with no comparison of who detects what, and that every quotation in the record but the English abstract is the translator’s. |
| LIT-1314 v2 | Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events | Arthur (1989). In a model of adopters choosing between competing technologies, increasing returns to adoption make the outcome depend on the order of small, unforeseeable early events; the market can lock in to one technology, and not necessarily the better one, and its course is neither predictable from prior knowledge nor flexible later. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1052) through its precursor only, the 1983 IIASA working paper WP-83-90 (“On Competing Technologies and Historical Small Events: The Dynamics of Choice under Increasing Returns”), read in full from IIASA’s repository; the 1989 article itself was not reached (Unpaywall and OpenAlex closed, no open PDF on Semantic Scholar, JSTOR paywalled). Worth reading for the model that makes lock-in analysable: increasing returns turn the adoption difference into a random walk with absorbing barriers, so one technology takes the market, which one is decided by the order of small events, and the outcome is neither predictable, flexible nor necessarily efficient (THEORY-863, re-derived). Read it knowing that the model is very special (two types, linear returns, no expectations, pricing or sponsors), that its historical examples are illustrations, and that the published version may differ from the precursor read here. |
| LIT-1315 v2 | Media Capture Through Favor Exchange | Szeidl & Szucs (2021). Using Hungarian data, 1994–2016, documents large advertising favours from the government to connected media, shown by state-owned firms’ but not private firms’ advertising shifting at changes of connection status, and corruption-coverage favours back; a structural model separates owner ideology from favour exchange and finds both matter, and counterfactuals show targeted advertising can also shift owner ideology by making ownership profitable to connected investors. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1039) in full, from the open-access published article on the Econometric Society’s site, with the supplement’s regression tables and proofs; worth reading for the cleanest evidence the record holds of two-way favors between a government and connected media, with private advertisers as the control (THEORY-850), for a model whose slant gap splits into owner ideology plus favor exchange (THEORY-860, re-derived), and for the point that targeted advertising can change who owns the media. Read it knowing that the split between ideology and exchange (THEORY-852, Proposed) rests on identifying assumptions the authors call strong for print, and that only advertising and corruption coverage are measured. |
| LIT-1317 v2 | Commensuration as a Social Process | Espeland & Stevens (1998). Defines commensuration as the comparison of different entities by a common metric, treats it as a general social process and a mode of power rather than a technical step, and discusses what is at stake, cognitively and politically, in calling something incommensurable. | Unavailable — sought 2026-10-21 and no lawful full text reached, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Unpaywall and OpenAlex report it closed, with no repository location; Semantic Scholar’s openAccessPdf is empty; CORE holds a metadata record with no full text. The Annual Reviews article page and PDF (annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.313) returned 403 to curl and to the WebFetch tool, so whether the publisher offers it free is unknown. A web search found no author-posted copy. Its account of commensuration is summarized secondhand in Espeland and Sauder (2007), read as NOTE-1050, which cites it for that concept; that is not a reading of it. Failed on access as much as on availability: a reader with library access can clear it. |
| LIT-1318 v3 | When Is Society Susceptible to Manipulation? | Mostagir, Ozdaglar & Siderius (2022). In a social-learning model a principal manipulates agents’ beliefs by using the same forces that produce the wisdom of the crowd; characterizes the social norms and network structures susceptible to such manipulation, the conditions under which a network is impervious to it, and a new centrality measure. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-21; on 2026-10-21 a lawful full text was sought and none was reached, so no NOTE is filed. Open copies exist, so this failed on access, not availability. The authors’ working paper is in the University of Michigan’s Deep Blue repository (handle 2027.42/154046, files reputation-v11Submit.pdf and manipulation-final.pdf, by web search), but every Deep Blue URL tried (handle page, item page, bitstream and REST API) returned a Cloudflare browser check to this client, and WebFetch got HTTP 403. A copy on James Siderius’s MIT LIDS site (siderius.lids.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/36/2021/09/manipulation.pdf, by web search) failed DNS resolution from this client, and Mohamed Mostagir’s Michigan page (public.websites.umich.edu/~mosta) returned 403; mostagir.engin.umich.edu was refused by the proxy. CORE holds Deep Blue’s copy (core.ac.uk/download/287611458.pdf), which returned 403 to curl and to WebFetch, and CORE’s API withholds the full text from public users. SSRN (doi:10.2139/ssrn.3474643, which Unpaywall lists as the only open location) returned 403. Unpaywall and OpenAlex list the Management Science article as closed, Semantic Scholar had no record of its DOI, and arXiv has no copy. A copy the owner supplies would let it be read. |
| LIT-1319 v2 | Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals | Di Tella & Franceschelli (2011; NBER 2009, revised 2010). Across the four main Argentine newspapers, April 1998–December 2007, monthly government advertising correlates negatively with front-page coverage of the government’s corruption scandals, within newspaper and month and within newspaper-president pairs: one standard deviation of advertising goes with 0.31 fewer front pages a month, 25 percent of a standard deviation, in the 2010 working paper (0.23 and 18 percent in the published abstract). The association holds for advertising placed by the presidency’s agency and not for autonomous agencies, and not for scandals of non-political actors. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1040) in full, in the NBER working-paper version (revised July 2010); worth reading as a careful within-newspaper, within-presidency measure of how government advertising goes with front-page coverage of the government’s corruption, with placebos on advertising channel and scandal type (THEORY-851). Read it knowing that it shows an association, that the version read reports 0.31 of a front page per standard deviation where the published abstract reports 0.23, that the early advertising series is reconstructed, and that one presidency carries much of the variation. |
| LIT-1321 v2 | Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed | Scott (1998). States make societies legible by simplifying them into standardized, administrable forms (surnames, cadastral maps, planned cities and forests); joined to high-modernist ideology, authoritarian power and a weak civil society, these simplifications override the practical local knowledge (mētis) that working arrangements depend on, and large schemes fail. | Unavailable — sought 2026-10-21 and no lawful full text reached, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The book is in copyright (Yale University Press, 1998). OpenAlex lists it closed, with only the three doi.org locations (10.12987/9780300128789, 10.12987/9780300252989, 10.2307/j.ctvxkn7ds) and no repository copy; Unpaywall reports it closed; Semantic Scholar has no record of the DOI. The Internet Archive holds two scans (seeinglikestateh00scot_0, seeinglikestate00jame) in its controlled-lending and print-disabled collections, access-restricted and not openly downloadable, so not a fetch open to this client. Two other Internet Archive items under the title are user uploads, an audiobook and a text marked public domain, which the book is not, and were not used. A supplied copy, a library loan or the Yale e-book returns it to reading. |
| LIT-1324 v2 | The Theory of Economic Regulation | Stigler (1971). Regulation is, as a rule, acquired by an industry and designed and operated primarily for its benefit; the state’s coercive power is a resource that small, concentrated interests can buy through the political process more cheaply than large, diffuse ones can resist. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-21; on 2026-10-21 a search for a lawful full text reached none, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. Unpaywall and OpenAlex report it closed with no repository copy; Semantic Scholar lists no open PDF; the publisher’s copy is JSTOR’s, paywalled, and RePEc points only to it. Web searches for the title with “pdf” and restricted to .edu, and for a RAND-hosted copy, found commentary and no copy of the article: the Stigler Center’s “George Stigler 50 Years Later” (ProMarket, 2022), Carrigan and Coglianese’s handbook chapter, and Peltzman’s essays. No working-paper version was found. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, through library access or JSTOR. |
| LIT-1326 v2 | Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare | Kleinberg & Raghavan (2021). In a model of two firms hiring from one pool by noisy rankings, if both use the same algorithm, even one more accurate than their private rankings, the quality of decisions can fall without any shocks: under two conditions on the ranking model, for every private accuracy there is a more accurate shared algorithm that is strictly dominant for both firms and lowers both firms’ utility and social welfare, a Braess paradox. The Mallows model always meets the conditions; Plackett–Luce never does. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1033), from arXiv:2101.05853v2: the main text and Appendices A, B and E in full, Appendices C, D and F in statement; worth reading for the exact conditions under which a shared, more accurate screening algorithm is dominant for every firm and still lowers welfare without any shock (THEORY-835), and for the identity that makes independence valuable to a second mover. Read it knowing that the model has two firms hiring one candidate each, that the conditions hold for Mallows rankings always, for Gaussian and Laplacian random utility models with three candidates, and never for Plackett–Luce, and that the losses measured are small (about 4% in one instance). |
| LIT-1330 v2 | Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds | Espeland & Sauder (2007). Using US law-school rankings, shows that public measures are reactive: the people measured change what they do in response to being measured, through self-fulfilling prophecy and through commensuration, so the measure helps produce the world it describes. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1050) in full, from the copy in the Australian National University’s Open Research repository (hdl 1885/30995), which carries the AJS pagination; worth reading for reactivity as an object of study rather than a nuisance, for a definition of self-fulfilling prophecy that includes reactions which raise a measure’s validity by making the measured conform to it (THEORY-854), for commensuration as simplification and decontextualization, and for its typology of effects, reallocation, redefinition of work and gaming (THEORY-862). Read it knowing that it is an interview study of one ranking in one field, with no effect sizes and no counterfactual, that its quantitative links (rank to yield, past rank to reputation) are cited from other studies rather than shown, and that it offers its framework as an orienting heuristic, not a theory. |
| LIT-1332 v2 | Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm | Entman (1993). To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a text, so as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation; proposes this as the shared definition a scattered literature lacked. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-21, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-21 and not reached. Unpaywall and OpenAlex report the article closed; OpenAlex’s only other location is a CiteSeerX record, and CiteSeerX now redirects to the Wayback Machine, which this environment cannot reach. Semantic Scholar lists no open copy. The publisher’s page (academic.oup.com, Journal of Communication) returned 403. Web searches found no author or institutional deposit; the copies found were a Charles University course resource and an academia.edu upload, both marked as restricted to enrolled students, and were not used. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1333 v2 | Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability | Besley & Prat (2006). A model of democratic politics in which media capture is endogenous: even without censorship a government can pay outlets to suppress verifiable bad news, and because one report informs every voter, each outlet must be paid what it would earn as the sole breaker of the story, so the press is captured exactly when buying every outlet at that price, raised by the transaction cost of transfers, costs less than the rent of office. Plurality, costly transfers and audience revenue protect accountability; capture ends turnover. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1031) in full, from the authors’ 2005 working paper in LSE Research Online; worth reading for the model of media capture as a bargain (each outlet must be paid what it would earn as the only one to break the story, so the press is captured exactly when n·τa < r, THEORY-837), for its precise sense of media independence as the transaction cost of transfers, and for the observation that capture needs no deception. Read it knowing that it is static, that news in it is hard and the same at every outlet, that its cross-country table is raw means, and that the published AER text was not compared. |
| LIT-1335 v2 | The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media | McCombs & Shaw (1972). Among 100 Chapel Hill voters not yet committed to a candidate in the 1968 US presidential campaign, the aggregate ranking of issues they named as most important correlated +.967 and +.979 with the emphasis the nine media serving them gave those issues, and leaning voters matched all the news better than news about their own side in 18 of 24 comparisons. Offered as evidence that the media may not tell people what to think but do shape what they think about; the authors say the correlations do not prove it. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1046) in full, from a copy of the published article posted on a UNC Chapel Hill course page; worth reading as the founding test of agenda-setting, for its distinction between influence on what an audience thinks about and on what it thinks, and for its comparison of agenda-setting against selective perception. Read it knowing that its evidence is an aggregate cross-sectional correlation over a handful of issues in one sample of 100 undecided voters in one town, with no test reported, that the direction from media to voters is argued and not identified, and that the authors say the correlations do not prove agenda-setting. The correlations are held as THEORY-842, the hypothesis as THEORY-838 (Proposed). |
| LIT-1337 v2 | The Use of Knowledge in Society | Hayek (1945). The economic problem is not allocating given resources by a known plan but using knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place that exists only dispersed among many people; a price system communicates the part of that knowledge which matters for each decision without anyone holding it all. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1036) in full, from the Econlib reprint of the American Economic Review article, published there with the AEA’s permission; worth reading for the distinction between scientific knowledge and knowledge “of the particular circumstances of time and place”, for the argument that the second cannot be put into statistics for a central authority (THEORY-841), and for the price system as a mechanism that conveys relative scarcities without their causes. Read it knowing that it is an argument from examples with no model or evidence, that it is about the economic order and not organizations, and that it argues for competition, not that removing any given public rule decentralizes decisions. |
| LIT-1340 v2 | Regulatory independence may limit electoral holdup but entrench capture | Schram & Ule (2024). Where elected policymakers set infrastructure prices, investors fearing electoral pressure delay investment (holdup); regulatory independence, modelled as a price fixed by the first policymaker for all periods, can relieve that, but if policymakers’ interests are aligned with the infrastructure owner’s (“regulatory capture”, assigned as a treatment), independence entrenches the capture. Laboratory experiments (59 groups) find capture entrenchment, and uninformed voters too weak to remove it. | Active — read 2026-10-21 (NOTE-1053) in full (main text; the online appendices not read), from the publisher’s open-access PDF (CC BY 4.0); worth reading for a laboratory measurement (THEORY-856) that the commitment which relieves electoral holdup also locks in the interests of whoever designs it, raising prices further when policymakers are aligned with the operator (“capture entrenchment”), and for the authors’ general conclusion that independence helps consumers only when its designers serve them (THEORY-858, Proposed). Read it knowing that capture is assigned as a treatment, not produced, that “independence” is a price fixed by the first policymaker, that groups have three voters and the capture cells 18 groups, and that some effects weaken when the 45.8% of groups with dominated period-1 investment are excluded. |
| LIT-1366 v2 | Linked Ecologies: States and Universities as Environments for Professions | Abbott (2005). Treats professions, states and universities as linked ecologies, each defined by actors, locations and the relation between them and each an environment for the others. Two concepts link them: hinges, issues or strategies that work in both ecologies at once, around which alliances form; and avatars, attempts to institutionalize in one ecology a copy of an actor from another. Hinges are worked through medical licensing in 19th-century New York and England, avatars through four cases linking professions and universities. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1077) through its precursor only: Abbott’s French chapter “Écologies liées” (2003), which his page says antedates this article, and the section on Bourdieu cut from it, both posted on his University of Chicago pages and read in full. The 2005 article was not reached (Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar closed; Wiley 403). Worth reading for the thesis that a profession’s audiences, the state first, are themselves ecologies, so every jurisdictional event must serve actors in two ecologies at once, and for a case in which the different tempos of medicine and politics decided the doctors’ allies. The precursor lacks the article’s university ecology, avatars, English case and developed account of hinges. |
| LIT-1367 v2 | Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies | Swidler (1986). Recasts culture as a “tool kit” of symbols, stories, rituals and skills from which people construct strategies of action, and not as values that set the ends of action; culture’s effects differ between settled periods, where it constrains through the cost of retooling, and unsettled ones, where explicit ideologies govern action directly but structural opportunities decide which survive. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1075) from a JSTOR copy of the published article posted on an MIT course page; worth reading as the source of the toolkit account: culture supplies a repertoire from which strategies of action are built, strategies outlast the ends they serve, and settled and unsettled periods need different causal models, with structural opportunities selecting among competing ideologies. A theoretical essay with illustrations and no data; held as THEORY-890, Proposed. Its repertoire is public meaning, not disposition, so it is not interchangeable with habitus. |
| LIT-1370 v3 | Pluralistic ignorance and alcohol use on campus: Some consequences of misperceiving the social norm | Prentice and Miller (1993). Princeton students believed their peers were more comfortable with campus drinking practices than they were themselves; over time men’s private attitudes shifted toward the misperceived norm, while women’s alienation from it grew. | Unavailable — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-22; failed on availability. The article is closed: Unpaywall and OpenAlex report no open copy and no repository full text; the APA PsycNET copy is paywalled; the authors’ institutional pages (Princeton’s research portal, two records; Stanford GSB’s publication page for Dale Miller) list it without a file; PubPeer has a record only. A web search found no author’s copy. The summary is the abstract’s and the paper’s standard reading, unchecked. Registered from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-22, “Graph Learning Applications”. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1373 v2 | Reconstruction of Tradition: Modernity, Tourism and Shaolin Martial Arts in the Shaolin Scenic Area, China | Su (2016). Shaolin martial arts served imperial authorities before 1949 and were restricted and forbidden in the Mao era (1949–1978); since 1978, UNESCO’s heritage conventions, China’s heritage policies and tourism have reconstructed them as “Shaolin Kungfu”. The reconstruction serves contemporary political and economic needs and positions “experts” and local residents unequally. | Unavailable — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-22; failed on access. The article and its 2019 reprint are closed: Unpaywall and OpenAlex list no open location for either DOI, Semantic Scholar marks it closed, and CORE has metadata only. Taylor & Francis (tandfonline.com) and the Routledge chapter page (taylorfrancis.com) returned 403 to this client. The Internet Archive has no copy of the article or of the book Martial Arts in Asia (Hong & Ok, eds.), and Internet Archive Scholar answered with an anti-scrape check; ResearchGate returned 403; a web search found no author-posted copy (the author is Xiaoyan Su, Luoyang Normal University, per OpenAlex), only a blog review. The summary is the abstract’s, unchecked. Registered from the owner’s branched exchange of 2026-10-22, “Branch · Graph Learning Applications”. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1377 v2 | A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus | Wacquant (2016). Traces the concept of habitus from Aristotle to Bourdieu and sets out its anatomy: socially acquired, durable but not fixed dispositions that can be layered and internally discordant, and that must be studied together with the social worlds that form and solicit them. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1074) from the journal’s typeset article deposited in UC Berkeley’s eScholarship collection; worth reading as a seven-page authoritative statement that habitus is layered, revisable, possibly split against itself, able to misfire against its world, shared as a kind and unique as a token, and inert without the positions that trigger it. It is exegesis of Bourdieu with cited, not presented, evidence, and it dismisses Sewell’s critique in a note without argument. |
| LIT-1379 v2 | Human Nature and the Social Order | Cooley (1902). Argues that society and the individual are two aspects of one life and that the immediate social reality is the idea people have of one another. The self of common speech is a feeling of appropriation attached to ideas formed in communication, and in “a very large and interesting class of cases” it is the “looking-glass self”: an imagined appearance in another mind, an imagined judgement of it, and a self-feeling such as pride or mortification. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1080): five of twelve chapters (I, III, V, VI, VIII) read in full from the Project Gutenberg text of the 1902 edition (public domain); worth reading for the source of the looking-glass self and for how much of the imagined-audience argument it already holds: the other in whose mind one sees oneself is imagined and may be absent, dead or ideal, a group is realized as imagined persons, conformity is driven by a judgement one attributes to others, and opposition to what others enjoin is itself steered by it. The looking-glass self is one large class of the social self, not its definition. An essay from introspection, two children and literature, with no method that could fail. |
| LIT-1380 v2 | Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965 | Schickler (2016). Argues that the parties’ realignment on civil rights began from below well before the 1960s: from the late 1930s, Northern state Democratic parties, labor unions and new urban constituencies tied economic liberalism to civil rights, and Northern Democrats in Congress moved before national leaders did. | Unavailable — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-22; failed on access. The book is in copyright and not open access: Unpaywall and OpenAlex report the book DOIs and the De Gruyter chapter DOIs (Introduction, chapters 2–4) closed; Project MUSE lists it “Open Access: No” with every chapter restricted; De Gruyter Brill’s page refused this client. Princeton University Press offers no sample chapter. The Internet Archive’s lending library holds a copy (racialrealignmen0000schi, access-restricted), which this client cannot borrow. Web searches found no chapter, précis or symposium posted by the author. A pdfroom.com listing of the whole book shows no sign of permission and was not opened. The summary is unchecked against the text; the publisher’s description agrees with it in outline but dates the crystallization of the new alignment in public opinion, state parties and Congress to “the mid-1940s”. Registered from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-22, “Graph Learning Applications”. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1381 v2 | Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance | Taylor (1989). Shows that the American women’s movement did not vanish between 1945 and the mid-1960s but persisted in abeyance, in small, committed organizations that kept networks, goals and identity alive and supplied the later movement. | Unavailable — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-22; failed on access. The article is closed (Unpaywall, OpenAlex, Semantic Scholar) and on JSTOR behind subscription. No author-posted, repository or course-page copy was found by web search; the ResearchGate items it turned up are other works. Its reprint in McAdam and Snow’s reader Social Movements (Internet Archive socialmovementsr0000mcad) and Rupp and Taylor’s Survival in the Doldrums (survivalindoldru0000rupp) are lending-library copies this client cannot borrow. The summary is checked against the abstract only (OpenAlex): the movement persisted through abeyance structures with five characteristics, temporality, purposive commitment, exclusiveness, centralization and culture. Registered from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-22, “Graph Learning Applications”. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1383 v2 | A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation | Sewell (1992). Revises Giddens’s duality of structure: structures are mutually sustaining cultural schemas (virtual) and sets of resources (actual), and because structures are multiple and intersect, schemas are transposable, and resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably, the same structures that enable action also make their own transformation possible. Agency is the capacity to transpose schemas and remobilize resources. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1078) from a JSTOR copy of the published article posted on a University of Athens course page; worth reading as the standard repair of Giddens’s duality of structure: structures are virtual schemas and actual resources that sustain each other, and change arises from within because structures are multiple and intersect, schemas transpose, and resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably. Agency is the capacity to transpose and remobilize. Conceptual, with a conjecture (durability follows depth more than power) illustrated, not tested; its critique of habitus is aimed at Bourdieu’s 1977 Outline. |
| LIT-1386 v2 | The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training in Commercial Aviation | Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm (1999). Traces CRM through five generations, from training aimed at captains’ management style and juniors’ assertiveness after accidents such as United 173 to error management: avoiding, trapping and mitigating error. Reports that accident rates cannot validate CRM, that acceptance of its concepts decays over time even with recurrent training, and that it exported poorly to high power-distance cultures. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1087) from the authors’ manuscript (UT Austin Human Factors Research Project 235), hosted by the FAA, which funded the work. Worth holding for two reported findings rather than for what the record cited it for: acceptance of CRM concepts slips in the years after training even with recurrent training, and CRM designed in the U.S. fits poorly in high power-distance cultures; and for its statement that accident rates cannot validate CRM. It does not argue that CRM keeps command while opening challenge; that phrasing is the exchange’s. A review with no new data. Registered from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-22, “Graph Learning Applications”. |
| LIT-1388 v2 | The Political Legacy of American Slavery | Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2016). White Southerners in counties where slavery was more prevalent in 1860 are today somewhat more Republican, more opposed to affirmative action and more racially resentful, and present-day black population share does not explain it. The difference appeared after Reconstruction rather than before the war, and the authors argue it was amplified by planters’ post-emancipation incentives to repress black labor and votes and then passed down locally, through families and institutions they do not separate. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1089) from the journal’s typeset PDF posted by the second author (mattblackwell.org), without the online appendix; worth reading as a careful persistence study: white Southerners in counties with more slavery in 1860 are today somewhat less Democratic, less supportive of affirmative action and more racially resentful (about a tenth of a standard deviation), not accounted for by present black share, and the difference in voting appears after Reconstruction, not before the war (THEORY-889). The association is strong; the causal reading rests on an instrument with an untestable exclusion restriction; the intergenerational transmission is argued with thin evidence. What persists is attitude, not party. |
| LIT-1390 v2 | The Majority Illusion in Social Networks | Lerman, Yan and Wu (2015). Shows that in networks where well-connected nodes share an attribute, many or most nodes can see the attribute among a majority of their neighbours though it is rare overall, a local majority that is a global illusion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1085) from the publisher’s PDF in PLOS ONE (CC BY 4.0); worth reading as the clean statement of a structural route to an apparent majority: when an attribute sits on well-connected nodes, most nodes can see it in a majority of their neighbours though few hold it, more so in disassortative and heavy-tailed networks, and a binomial model predicts how many. It shows what topology permits, not what happens: the attributes are assigned by the authors on every network, real ones included, and no person’s perception, belief or conduct is measured. Its mechanism is degree, not a loud minority, and it is not pluralistic ignorance, though it offers itself as an explanation of it. Filed as THEORY-887. |
| LIT-1391 v2 | The Unspoken Whiteness of Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu: The Gracies versus Luta Livre | Penglase (2025). Argues that Brazilian jiu-jitsu has been positioned as “white” within Brazil’s racial hierarchy, usually implicitly, and that scholars and non-Brazilian practitioners have overlooked this. It focuses on the challenge matches the Gracie family fought against practitioners of luta livre, a Brazilian catch-wrestling style, and shows how those matches located jiu-jitsu in that hierarchy. | Active — read in full 2026-10-22 (NOTE-1092) from the publisher’s open-access PDF at Cardiff University Press (CC BY-NC-ND); worth reading as a documented history of the Gracie–luta livre rivalry from 1931 to 1997, including the negotiation of the 1931 rules in the Gracies’ favour, and as an argument that the matches placed jiu-jitsu in Brazil’s racial hierarchy as white through class, neighbourhood and employment rather than in words. The racial reading is interpretive and rests on secondary and family sources; the paper also says, in its body, that jiu-jitsu became far more profitable than luta livre and lists class and racial position among the causes, without weighing them. |
| LIT-1394 v2 | The Way I Am | Eminem (2000), from The Marshall Mathers LP. The couplet the record cites, “I am whatever you say I am” and “If I wasn’t then why would I say I am”, is delivered amid complaints about fame, fans and expectations, and reads as defiance, not assent. Its second line is taken from Eric B. & Rakim’s “As the Rhyme Goes On”. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-22, not studied as a text, and on 2026-10-29 not heard. The work is a recording, so a reading of it is a listening. A lawful free copy is at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mQvteoFiMlg, the official video on the EminemVEVO channel, titled “Eminem - The Way I Am (Clean Version)”, which Wikipedia’s article links and YouTube’s oEmbed confirmed on 2026-10-29. This client cannot listen to audio or watch video, so it is Unfetched (ADR-053). The record holds no licensed lyric text, and lyric pages on unlicensed sites were not used. Listening, to the clean edit or to the album track on a licensed service, would check the couplet CLAIM-415 quotes and the context the summary gives; the clean edit may mute words elsewhere. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1395 v3 | An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets | MacKenzie (2006). Argues that modern financial economics did not only describe markets but changed them: an authoritative theory of option pricing gave derivatives legitimacy and was used to trade, so that prices came to fit the model. Standardly cited for its kinds of performativity, from generic (a model is used) through Barnesian (its use makes it truer) to counterperformativity (its use makes it less true), and for the 1987 crash as a case of the last. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not found. OpenAlex reports the book closed, with the MIT Press eBook at its DOI as its only location and no repository copy. A web search for an open-access edition, a chapter on the author’s pages or a deposit found catalogue entries and paywalled reviews only. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied; a library copy of the 2006 hardback or the 2008 paperback would do. The summary is still the publisher’s abstract and the standard reading. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1396 v3 | Hyperstition: An Introduction | Carstens and Land (2009). Land defines the CCRU’s term: “Hyperstition is a positive feedback circuit including culture as a component. It can be defined as the experimental (techno-)science of self-fulfilling prophecies. Superstitions are merely false beliefs, but hyperstitions – by their very existence as ideas – function causally to bring about their own reality.” His example is cyberspace, whose fictional idea drew the investment that made it real; market confidence works the same way, “and inversely”. Under “favorable” circumstances, which he leaves for further investigation, hyperstition can “transmute lies into truths”. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1378) in full, from the Orphan Drift Archive’s page; worth reading as the short, quotable definition of the CCRU’s term by its leading user: a positive feedback circuit through culture, “the experimental (techno-)science of self-fulfilling prophecies”, with cyberspace, market confidence and Jerusalem as examples. Read it knowing that it is an interview of about 850 words, mostly occult and apocalyptic; that Land leaves the conditions under which the loop works “for further investigation”; and that he says a hyperstition can “transmute lies into truths”, so it need not begin as a fiction that is merely not yet true. |
| LIT-1397 v2 | Fallibility, reflexivity, and the human uncertainty principle | Soros (2013). States his theory of reflexivity: participants’ views of a social situation are fallible, and acting on them changes the situation they are views of, through a cognitive function (understanding the situation) and a manipulative one (changing it) that interfere with each other, so that neither has an independent variable. Fallibility and reflexivity together he calls the human uncertainty principle, and he says fallibility is the key source of the Knightian uncertainty of human affairs. Feedback can be negative (self-correcting) or positive (boom–bust). A postscript withdraws the sharp demarcation of social from natural science that the essay argues for. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1362) in full, from the copy on the author’s own site; worth reading as Soros’s fullest short statement of reflexivity: a participant’s view both tracks and changes its situation, so facts stop being an independent test of it, and the loop can run toward the view or away from it. Read it knowing that it is argued from experience and not tested; that it calls fallibility, not reflexivity, the key source of the uncertainty; that its postscript withdraws the sharp line between natural and social science that its middle section is built on; and that the figures are not in the web copy. |
| LIT-1398 v3 | The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy | Merton (1948). Names the self-fulfilling prophecy: a false definition of a situation evokes behaviour that makes the originally false conception come true, and the prophet then cites the course of events as proof that he was right from the beginning. Builds on the Thomas theorem, that situations defined as real are real in their consequences. Applies it to American ethnic and racial prejudice, sets beside it “moral alchemy”, in which the in-group renames the same conduct as virtue in itself and vice in an out-group, and argues that institutional change, not education, breaks the circle. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1409) in full, from a JSTOR download of the article posted on a course wiki (https://entrepreneurscommunicate.pbworks.com/f/Merton.%2BSelf%2BFulfilling%2BProfecy.pdf); worth reading as the essay that names the self-fulfilling prophecy and defines it, and that sets beside it a second route, “moral alchemy”, by which an out-group is condemned whatever it does. Read it knowing that it is a magazine essay on American race relations in 1948, with no references and no sources for its figures, that it sets the self-defeating (“suicidal”) prophecy aside in a footnote, and that two of its three opening examples are forecasts, not false definitions of a present situation. |
| LIT-1399 v2 | Twenty-Five Years of Hidden Profiles in Group Decision Making: A Meta-Analysis | Lu, Yuan & McLeod (2012). A meta-analysis of 65 hidden-profile studies (101 effects, 3,189 groups). Groups mention common information about two standard deviations more than unique information, and hidden-profile groups are eight times less likely to find the correct solution than groups with full information. Pooling of unique information predicts decision quality (coverage more than discussion focus); communication medium affects neither pooling nor quality; group size, information load, the share of unique information, task demonstrability and profile strength moderate. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not found. OpenAlex reports it closed, with only the SAGE page and the PubMed record (PMID 21896790) as locations and no repository copy. Europe PMC holds the record with no full text. The SAGE page is listed as restricted access. A web search for an author’s copy or a deposit found none. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. The figures in the summary are the abstract’s. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1400 v2 | Peace through Trade or Free Trade? | McDonald (2004). Argues that free trade, not trade as such, promotes peace: removing protective barriers removes a foundation of domestic privilege that strengthens groups likely to support war, weakens free-trading interests that restrain aggression, and builds political support for the state’s war machine. Statistical tests show that higher levels of free trade, rather than trade alone, reduce military conflict between states, and the argument recasts World War I as consistent with commercial liberalism. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports it closed, with only the SAGE page and a RePEc record, which links back to SAGE; the Journal of Conflict Resolution offers paid access. A web search for an author’s or repository copy found none. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1402 v2 | The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin | Franklin (written 1771–1790; first published 1791). The memoir of his life to 1757. Part Three holds the anecdote the Benjamin Franklin effect is named for: to win over a hostile new member of the Pennsylvania Assembly, Franklin asked to borrow a scarce book from his library, returned it with thanks, and the man thereafter spoke to him with civility and “manifested a readiness to serve me on all occasions”. Franklin gives it as “another instance of the truth of an old maxim”, “He that has once done you a kindness will be more ready to do you another, than he whom you yourself have obliged”, and as a lesson in prudence. Around it the memoir is a record of how he got others to act with him: undogmatic speech, projects presented as his friends’, and opinion prepared in print and through the Junto’s satellite clubs. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1360) in full, from Project Gutenberg eBook #148 (Harvard Classics, 1909); worth reading as the source of the Benjamin Franklin effect and, around it, a first-hand manual of influence: modest speech, projects put forward as “a scheme of a number of friends”, opinion prepared in print and spread through the Junto’s clubs “as arising in each of them”. Read it knowing that it is a memoir written decades after the events, for posterity and in part from memory without papers; that the borrowed-book story is one instance of an “old maxim”, given as prudence, with the member unnamed and the effect reported by the man who sought it; and that the edition’s chronology list has errors the memoir itself contradicts. |
| LIT-1403 | Knowing others’ preferences degrades the quality of group decisions | Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt (2010), JPSP 98(5): 794–808. By its abstract: in four experiments, learning the other members’ preferences at the start of a discussion made hidden profiles less likely to be solved, through less attention to the information exchanged, not through bolstering or information load; it held even when another member favoured the correct option, and Experiment 4 replicated it in face-to-face three-person groups. Unread: no lawful copy reached. | Unavailable — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-23; failed on availability as far as this client could tell. The article is closed (APA; Unpaywall and OpenAlex: closed, no repository full text). Göttingen Research Online, the one repository OpenAlex lists, sits behind a bot check, so whether it holds a file is unknown; the Hildesheim repository holds the record with no file; the authors’ Göttingen publications page has no file; a web search found no author-posted copy. Only the abstract was read (PubMed 20438225). Registered for QUESTION-089 and CASE-108 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23, “Framework Overview Request”. No NOTE, CASE or THEORY is filed. It returns to reading when a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1404 v2 | A Formal Theory of Reflected Appraisals in the Evolution of Power | Friedkin (2011/2012). A formal theory of how power evolves in a group’s influence network over a sequence of issues. Each issue is settled by the Friedkin–Johnsen process, with members anchored on their initial positions; by “reflected appraisal”, each member’s self-weight on the next issue is set to their share of total control over the last, with relative interpersonal weights fixed. In 50 four-person laboratory groups over five issues, prior control predicts the next self-weight. In simulations of 100,000 random networks, over 98% evolve to a single leader whose preferences control outcomes through intermediaries; the rest end with two. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1374) in full, from the eScholarship deposit of the OnlineFirst version of record; worth reading as the paper that formalizes reflected appraisal as an update of self-weights across issues in the Friedkin–Johnsen model, with a laboratory test of one step and a simulation in which over 98% of random groups evolve to a single leader who controls outcomes through intermediaries. Read it knowing that the end state is shown only in simulation; that the concentration depends on the Friedkin–Johnsen single-issue step, since the same rule under DeGroot consensus (LIT-1146) does not concentrate power on the same networks (re-run 2026-10-29); and that appraisals are assumed accurate. |
| LIT-1405 v3 | How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-Analytic Tests of Three Mediators | Pettigrew & Tropp (2008). Tests meta-analytically the three most studied mediators of contact’s effect on prejudice, over 54 studies through June 2005: knowledge about the outgroup (17 samples), reduced anxiety about intergroup contact (60) and increased empathy and perspective taking (14). All three mediate (Sobel Z = 3.87, 26.6 and 12.4), but knowledge is much less strong than anxiety reduction and empathy, which in nine samples measuring both together account for about half of the contact–prejudice covariance. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1405) in full, from the published article’s PDF in a University of Washington course’s readings folder (https://courses.washington.edu/pbafhall/563/Readings/pettigrew.pdf); worth reading as the meta-analytic test of how contact reduces prejudice: knowledge of the outgroup, intergroup anxiety and empathy all mediate, knowledge much the most weakly, and anxiety and empathy together carry about half the association. Read it knowing that the mediation is statistical, on pooled correlational data, over a different set of samples for each mediator (17, 60, 14), that empathy and perspective taking could not be separated, and that Table 3 misprints the empathy Sobel statistic (4.38 for 12.43). |
| LIT-1407 v2 | Reducing Exclusionary Attitudes through Interpersonal Conversation: Evidence from Three Field Experiments | Kalla & Broockman (2020). Three pre-registered, placebo-controlled field experiments (230 canvassers, 6,869 voters reached, 7 US locations) on attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants and transgender people. In Experiment 1 (2018), a door-to-door conversation with arguments alone had no detectable effect (pooled d = 0.02, p = 0.27), while the otherwise identical, twice as long conversation that added a non-judgmental exchange of narratives reduced exclusionary attitudes (pooled d = 0.08 over surveys from 4 days to about 4.5 months; difference 0.06, p < 0.01). Experiments 2 and 3 replicate on transphobia: d = 0.08 whether or not the canvasser and voter shared their own stories alongside a video narrative, and d = 0.04 by phone. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1396) in full, from the authors’ accepted manuscript on SocArXiv; worth reading as the field experiment that removes the exchange of narratives from an otherwise identical canvass and finds the effect goes with it, and as two replications on transphobia, one with a stranger’s video narrative and one by phone. Read it knowing that the effects are small (pooled d = 0.08 and 0.04) and self-reported, that the argument-only arm is in Experiment 1 alone and was half as long as the full conversation, that “durable” is a pooled effect over waves ending at about 4.5 months whose last wave alone is not significant for prejudice, and that the mechanism is not tested. |
| LIT-1408 v4 | Intergroup Contact Theory | Pettigrew (1998). Reviews Allport’s contact hypothesis (equal status, common goals, cooperation, authority support) and names four problems: selection bias in cross-sectional studies, an expanding list of conditions that are facilitating rather than essential, no account of process, and no account of how effects generalize. Proposes four processes (learning about the outgroup, changed behaviour as the precursor of attitude change, affective ties, and ingroup reappraisal, whose outcome it calls “deprovincialization”), three sequential strategies for generalization (decategorization, salient categorization, recategorization), and a longitudinal contact theory in which Allport’s four conditions and a fifth, friendship potential, are essential and other factors facilitating. In the author’s European surveys the path from outgroup friendship to less prejudice is stronger than the reverse. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1408) in full, from an Annual Reviews PDF of the chapter on Serendip Studio, Bryn Mawr College’s science-education site (https://serendipstudio.org/oneworld/system/files/annurev.psych_.49.1.65-2.pdf); worth reading as the review that turned Allport’s contact hypothesis into a theory with four processes (learning, changed behavior, affective ties, ingroup reappraisal), a staged account of generalization and a fifth condition, friendship potential. Read it knowing that its processes are proposed rather than tested, that its causal evidence is mostly the author’s cross-sectional European surveys, that “deprovincialization” occurs once and rests on one unpublished analysis of national pride, and that its model still treats Allport’s four conditions as essential, which the 2006 meta-analysis (LIT-1413) does not bear out. |
| LIT-1409 v2 | Group decision making in hidden profile situations: Dissent as a facilitator for decision quality | Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter & Frey (2006), JPSP 91(6). By its abstract: in 135 three-person groups solving a personnel-selection hidden profile, groups whose members agreed on a wrong option before discussion “hardly ever solved” it, while groups with prediscussion dissent did so significantly more often, even when no member favoured the correct option. The size of the dissent did not matter; the benefit ran mainly through greater discussion intensity. Unread: no lawful copy reached. | Unfetched — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-23; failed on access. A lawful copy exists: the authors’ working paper (LMU Munich, Wirtschaftspsychologie working paper WOP 2006/3) was posted on the department’s site and is captured by the Internet Archive, but the live file now returns 404 and this client cannot reach web.archive.org. The journal version is closed (APA). mediaTUM, which Unpaywall and OpenAlex list as green open access, holds metadata and the abstract only; Göttingen Research Online sits behind a bot check; the Hildesheim repository and the Aston portal hold no file; ResearchGate returned 403. Only the abstract was read (PubMed 17144766, the same text on mediaTUM). Registered for QUESTION-089 and CASE-108 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23, “Framework Overview Request”. No NOTE, CASE or THEORY is filed. It returns to reading when a copy is supplied, not on merit. Free copy: the Wayback Machine’s capture of 2023-11-18 of psy.lmu.de/wirtschaftspsychologie/forschung/working_paper/wop_2006_3.pdf. |
| LIT-1413 v3 | A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory | Pettigrew & Tropp (2006). A meta-analysis of 515 studies (713 independent samples, 250,089 participants, 38 countries, through 2000) finds that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice (random-effects r ≈ −.21; 94% of samples negative). Samples without choice of contact show larger effects, and the more rigorous studies larger ones (experiments −.34), though for racial and ethnic targets experiments show no advantage. Five of six publication-bias checks find none; Vevea and Hedges’s model, adjusted, leaves no significant overall effect but a significant one for well-controlled designs. Effects generalize to the whole outgroup and, in few tests, beyond. Allport’s optimal conditions enhance the effect (structured programs −.29 against −.20) but work as a bundle and are not essential to it. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1407) in full, from the published article’s PDF on a University of Pennsylvania Wharton site (https://ideas.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Pettigrew-Tropp.pdf); worth reading as the meta-analysis of 515 studies (713 samples) that established a reliable negative association between face-to-face intergroup contact and prejudice (r ≈ −.21, −.34 in experiments) and showed Allport’s conditions to enhance it without being needed. Read it knowing that most of its samples are cross-sectional surveys of reported contact, that one of its six publication-bias checks (Vevea and Hedges) leaves no significant overall effect, and that the larger effects of rigorous designs come from non-racial targets: for racial and ethnic samples experiments give −.22, the overall mean. |
| LIT-1415 v2 | The “Peace Dividend” of International Trade: A New Empirical Approach | Feng, Huang, Li & Meissner (2026). Estimates the causal effect of international trade on interstate military conflict with global bilateral data, 1962–2014, using variation in trade from technological advances in air relative to maritime transport. More trade significantly reduces both the probability and the intensity of conflict, robustly across specifications and confounders; the authors relate this to decoupling, de-risking and protectionism. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. NBER’s PDF (https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w35078/w35078.pdf and its revision rev0) returned NBER’s “Access denied” page, and IDEAS notes that the full text is limited to series subscribers, so the copy is restricted rather than blocked. OpenAlex lists an SSRN record (doi:10.2139/ssrn.6610721) whose page returned 403 to curl and WebFetch, so whether it carries a free download is unknown. No author copy was found. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied or NBER opens it. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1416 v2 | International Friends and Enemies | Kleinman, Liu & Redding (2024; NBER 2020). Asks whether countries that become more economically dependent on a trade partner realign politically toward it. Dependence is the elasticity of a country’s real income to the partner’s productivity, from a constant-elasticity trade model with sectors and input-output links; about 30 percent of pairs are “enemies”, with negative elasticity. Instrumented by a counterfactual Chinese productivity shock (119 countries, 1980–2010) and by the falling cost of air relative to sea transport (country pairs, 1970–2012), greater exposure raises UN voting similarity (0.094 SD per SD in the pair panel), lowers strategic rivalry except ideological rivalry, and raises formal alliances; bilateral trade does not proxy for it. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1403) in full, from NBER’s copy of the working paper as revised in March 2023; worth reading as a measure of economic dependence that is not bilateral trade, the general-equilibrium elasticity of one country’s real income to another’s productivity, and as a causal estimate, from two instruments, that it moves UN voting, strategic rivalry and alliances. Read it knowing that the effect in the pair panel is 0.094 SD per SD of exposure, that the China evidence is one cross-section of 119 countries, that the air-travel exclusion restriction is argued and not tested, that ideological rivalry does not respond, and that the paper’s own model of alignment is strategic. The journal version of 2024 was not seen. |
| LIT-1419 v2 | Liking a Person as a Function of Doing Him a Favour | Jecker & Landy (1969). The first experimental test of the Benjamin Franklin effect. Participants won money in a concept-formation task; afterwards one group was asked by the experimenter to return it as a personal favour (he was paying out of his own pocket), one was asked by a departmental secretary on behalf of the psychology department, and one was not asked. Those who did the experimenter a personal favour rated him most likable. Standardly read as a dissonance effect: one justifies a favour by liking its recipient. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports it closed with no repository copy; the SAGE page is paywalled; a web search found only secondary accounts and abstract listings (Scilit). It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, and its summary remains secondary. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1420 v3 | The Contact Hypothesis Re-evaluated | Paluck, Green & Green (2019; preprint 2017). Assembles the 27 intergroup contact studies with random assignment and outcomes measured at least a day later and meta-analyses them. 24 of 27 estimates are positive and the random-effects average is Δ = 0.39 SD, but effects are heterogeneous (I² = 0.85), shrink as precision grows (a study of infinite size is predicted at −0.01), are largest for disability, fall to 0.25 for ethnic, racial, religious and immigrant targets, and average 0.016 in the three pre-registered studies. No study tests interracial or interethnic contact on adults over 25, and none varies Allport’s conditions; the authors conclude these gaps must be filled before the hypothesis can guide policy. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1393) in full, from the publisher’s open-access PDF on Cambridge Core; worth reading as the meta-analysis of the 27 randomized contact studies with delayed outcomes and as the check on Pettigrew and Tropp: a pooled Δ = 0.39 that is heterogeneous, shrinks toward zero with precision, is 0.25 for ethnic, racial, religious and immigrant targets and 0.016 in the three pre-registered trials. Read it knowing that every subgroup rests on a handful of studies, that its precision test is borderline (p = 0.049), and that its supplement, with the p-hacking tests and the excluded studies, was not read here. |
| LIT-1421 v2 | Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992 | Oneal, Russett & Berbaum (2003). Tests the reciprocal relation between economic interdependence and interstate conflict, 1885–1992, with distributed-lag analyses. Economically important trade substantially reduces dyadic militarized disputes, especially fatal ones, even controlling for past conflict, and disputes in turn reduce trade. Democracy and shared membership in intergovernmental organizations also reduce conflict; there is little support for costly signals as the mechanism, no evidence that democratization raises disputes, and allies are not less conflict-prone. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports it closed, with the publisher’s page only; International Studies Quarterly offers paid access. A web search found no author or repository copy, only lists of Oneal’s publications. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1422 v2 | Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict? | Barbieri (1996). Tests the liberal hypothesis that trade promotes peace on dyads 1870–1938 (14,341 dyad-years, 270 militarized disputes, 14 wars). Economic linkages strongly affect militarized disputes but not wars, and extensive interdependence increases the likelihood of disputes rather than reducing it. The relation is curvilinear: low to moderate interdependence reduces disputes, extensive interdependence, symmetric or asymmetric, raises them; peace through trade is likeliest between mutually dependent partners. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful free copy exists but this client could not fetch it, so no NOTE is filed. PRIO, which owns the Journal of Peace Research, posts the version of record “in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy”, “free to view and download for private research and study”, at https://www.prio.org/publications/1347; on 2026-10-29 its file link on cdn.cloud.prio.org redirected curl to a Microsoft sign-in page. OpenAlex reports the article closed, and the University of South Carolina’s Scholar Commons record (poli_facpub/33) holds no file. A browser fetch of the PRIO copy is the cheapest way to read it. |
| LIT-1423 | The perpetuation of an arbitrary tradition through several generations of a laboratory microculture | Jacobs and Campbell (1961). In Sherif’s autokinetic task, confederates gave exaggerated estimates of a stationary light’s movement, and group members were then replaced one at a time by naive participants. As standardly reported, the exaggerated norm outlasted the confederates for several generations and decayed gradually toward the level of control groups. Unread: the summary is the study’s standard description and has not been checked against the paper. | Unavailable — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-23; failed on access. The article is in copyright and closed (Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar: closed, no open location). APA PsycNET returned 403. Europe PMC and PubMed index it (PMID 14450695) without full text. Internet Archive full-text search found it only in two lending-library copies of Hare, Borgatta and Bales’s reader Small Groups (1965, 1966; access-restricted, needing a borrowing account). ResearchGate and Northwestern University’s archive record of the manuscript returned 403. Web searches found secondary accounts only. Registered from the owner’s exchange “Framework Overview Request” of 2026-10-23. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1424 | The geometry of interpersonal synchrony in human dance | Bigand, Bianco, Abalde and Novembre (2024). Dyads of laypeople danced face to face in a “silent disco” while shared music (same or 8.5% tempo-shifted songs through earphones) and visual contact (a curtain or none) were varied in a 2 × 2 design. Of 15 principal movements from motion capture, four synchronized more with visual contact (lateral and hand movements), five more with shared music (anteroposterior movements such as head bobs) and one, vertical bounce, with both; no movement showed an interaction. The spatial direction of a movement classified which factor drove its synchrony; its periodicity did not. | Active — read in full 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1093) from PubMed Central (PMC11266842), the publisher’s CC BY text, with Figure 2 and the supplementary Document S1; worth reading as the cleanest human instance the record holds of shared drive and coupling manipulated separately in one collective: in 35 dyads dancing face to face, shared music and visual contact each raised synchrony, in different movement components and with no interaction, and the timing of the synchrony could not tell the two kinds apart while its spatial direction could (THEORY-891). Direction of coupling between the partners was not measured. |
| LIT-1435 | Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium | Debreu (1959), Theory of Value, Cowles Foundation Monograph 17, Wiley. The axiomatic theory of general equilibrium: commodities and prices, producers, consumers, equilibrium, optimum and uncertainty. Read only for §4.6 and its notes. There a continuous complete preorder on a connected separable space is proved to have a continuous utility function. The lexicographic ordering of R² is shown to have none. | Active — read in part 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1112): §4.6, “Continuity assumption on preferences” (pp. 55–59), and the notes to chapter 4 (pp. 72–73), from the PDF the Cowles Foundation posts as Monograph 17. Worth reading for Debreu’s own statement of the utility representation theorem and its limits. A complete preorder on a connected subset of Rˡ (more generally, a connected separable space) with closed upper and lower contour sets has a continuous utility function. The lexicographic ordering of R² has no real-valued representation at all. A utility function is “arbitrary to a large extent”. The rest of the book (commodities, producers, equilibrium, optimum, uncertainty) was not read. |
| LIT-1453 v2 | Relationship between attitudes and evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the separability of positive and negative substrates | Cacioppo & Berntson (1994), Psychological Bulletin 115(3):401–423. The review that introduced the evaluative space model. Attitudes have been measured on one bipolar scale. The positive and negative evaluative processes behind them are separable, and can be activated reciprocally, independently or together. Unread: the model is read in Norris et al. 2010 (LIT-1438). | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists, but this client could not fetch it, so it failed on access, not availability. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Cacioppo posted the paper on his University of Chicago reprint page (psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/cacioppo/jtcreprints/cb94.pdf). That URL now returns 404, and the Internet Archive’s capture of 2012-05-16 (timestamp 20120516001838) could not be fetched: web.archive.org reset the connection, and the fetch tool refuses the domain. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (APA, Psychological Bulletin) is closed. A ResearchGate copy was seen and not used. The model is read first-hand in its authors’ 2010 review in PubMed Central (LIT-1438), whose Figures 2 and 3 are adapted from this paper. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1454 v2 | Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function | Debreu (1954), in Thrall, Coombs & Davis (eds), Decision Processes, Wiley, pp. 159–165. Gives conditions under which a complete preference preorder is represented by a real-valued function. On a space satisfying the second axiom of countability, a continuous complete preorder has a continuous representation, with no connectedness needed. Unread: the result as Debreu restates it is read in Theory of Value (LIT-1435). | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. Looked for on 2026-10-23. The Cowles Foundation’s page for it (cowles.yale.edu/node/148338) lists it as a Discussion Paper, document control number 2083, with no file. The old Cowles Foundation Paper URL cited elsewhere (cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p00b/p0097.pdf) redirects to the Foundation’s home page. Its archive of Cowles Commission discussion papers lists the economics series only up to Econ 245, and guessed paths for the paper on its file server were not found. The only Crossref record is the 1983 reprint in Debreu’s Mathematical Economics (Cambridge University Press, ch. 6, pp. 105–110), which is paid, and Unpaywall reports no open copy of it. OpenAlex was not consulted (it refused requests without a key that day). Its theorem is read first-hand in Debreu’s Theory of Value, which the Cowles Foundation does post (LIT-1435, §4.6 and ch. 4 note 2). There Debreu proves the connected-separable case, credits that form to Eilenberg, and cites this paper for removing connectedness on second-countable spaces. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1456 v2 | Beyond Bipolar Conceptualizations and Measures: The Case of Attitudes and Evaluative Space | Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson (1997), PSPR 1(1):3–25. The full statement of the evaluative space model for attitudes. Bipolar measures fold together states that a bivariate measure keeps apart, among them ambivalence (high positivity and negativity) and indifference (low both). Unread: the model is read in Norris et al. 2010 (LIT-1438). | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: a lawful copy exists, but this client could not fetch it, so it failed on access, not availability. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Cacioppo posted the paper on his University of Chicago reprint page (psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/cacioppo/jtcreprints/cgb97.pdf). That URL now returns 404, and the Internet Archive’s capture of 2012-05-16 (timestamp 20120516012547) could not be fetched: web.archive.org reset the connection, and the fetch tool refuses the domain. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (Personality and Social Psychology Review, SAGE) is closed. A web search found only bibliographic records and secondary accounts. The model is read first-hand in its authors’ 2010 review in PubMed Central (LIT-1438), which names this paper and its 1999 sequel as the statement of the evaluative space model. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1474 v3 | An Action-Based Model of Cognitive-Dissonance Processes | Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Levy (2015). The action-based model extends dissonance theory by saying why inconsistency causes dissonance and its reduction. Many perceptions and cognitions impel action; the negative state of dissonance arises not from all cognitive conflict but when cognitions with action implications conflict, making it hard to act. Dissonance signals that the inconsistency must be resolved so that behaviour can proceed. Behavioural and neuroscience tests of the model are reviewed. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-24 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23/24, shared at https://chatgpt.com/share/6adc1ece-bb28-83e9-a8f6-cadf0f8b7113, where it is cited at turn U13; a reading was attempted on 2026-10-24 and failed on availability. The article is closed at SAGE (Unpaywall: not open access; OpenAlex: closed, no repository full text; Semantic Scholar: closed), and the publisher’s PDF links returned 403. Europe PMC has no record. The University of New South Wales repository (UNSWorks) holds Levy’s PhD thesis and other papers of the group but not this one, and the Western Sydney University research portal has a record with only a DOI link. Web searches found no author manuscript; the one full-text copy found is a third-party repost on an unrelated journal’s site, not a lawful source. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1481 v4 | War Making and State Making as Organized Crime | Tilly (1985). European states were built by war makers who behaved like racketeers: they sold protection against threats they themselves produced or exaggerated, eliminated rivals at home and abroad, and extracted the resources to do so, and the administrative apparatus of the state grew out of that extraction. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-24 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23/24, shared at https://chatgpt.com/share/6adc1ece-bb28-83e9-a8f6-cadf0f8b7113, where it is cited at turn U16; a reading was attempted on 2026-10-24 and failed on access, not availability. A lawful copy exists: Unpaywall and OpenAlex list a deposit in the University of Michigan’s Deep Blue repository (hdl:2027.42/51028, file 256.pdf) as the submitted version. Deep Blue answered every request, to the file, the handle and its API, with a Cloudflare bot check (403 or a script-only page), from curl and a second fetcher; the Wayback Machine holds a 2012 snapshot of the file but reset every connection; CORE’s mirror was blocked the same way. The two Routledge reprints OpenAlex marks free returned 403, and the Internet Archive holds the 1985 volume only for print-disabled lending. Course-site and Anarchist Library postings were found and not used. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied or Deep Blue can be reached. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1482 v2 | A Theory of the Evolution of Social Power: Natural Trajectories of Interpersonal Influence Systems along Issue Sequences | Friedkin, Jia & Bullo (2016). Extends the single-issue opinion dynamics of small deliberative groups to dynamics along a sequence of issues: elementary reflected-appraisal mechanisms modify the influence network and the flows of influence, and the theory predicts how influence centralities evolve from issue to issue. New experimental findings from groups discussing issue sequences show issue-sequence effects on influence-network structure consistent with the predictions. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1126) from the CC BY version of record and its online supplement; worth reading as the first experiment long enough (30 groups of four, 15 issues each) to look for social power evolving along an issue sequence. A member’s self-reported closure on the next issue rose with their prior influence, and influence networks thinned and discussions shortened, while the rate of consensus did not change. Its single-issue model is Friedkin–Johnsen, not DeGroot; closure and influence come from one self-report, and prior closure is not controlled. |
| LIT-1488 v3 | The when and how of planning: Meta-analysis of the scope and components of implementation intentions in 642 tests | Sheeran, Listrom & Gollwitzer (2024). Across 642 independent tests, forming implementation intentions was effective for cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes (.27 ≤ d ≤ .66). Effects were larger when plans had a contingent if-then format, participants were highly motivated to reach the goal, and plans were rehearsed. A new taxonomy of the cues and responses that plans specify is developed and its categories tested. Publication bias was substantial: the pooled d = .36 falls to d = .15 under robust Bayesian meta-analysis, a small and highly heterogeneous effect. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1131) from the version of record deposited in the University of Konstanz repository (KOPS, in copyright, terms of use); worth reading as the largest synthesis of if-then planning (642 experimental tests to September 2019) and the one that corrects its size. The effect is reliable (BF10 = 319) but small once publication bias is modelled (d = .15, against an uncorrected .36 and 2006’s .65), and highly heterogeneous. Between tests, the conditional link beats a schedule of the same behaviour, rehearsal helps, keeping a copy to revisit hurts, and plans work only when the goal is wanted. Its taxonomy finds nearly every cue and response effective, ignoring and waiting before responding among them. No mechanism is tested. |
| LIT-1489 v2 | Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade | Juhász (2018). A natural experiment on temporary trade protection: regions of the French Empire that were, for exogenous reasons, better shielded from British trade during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) expanded mechanized cotton spinning more than exposed regions. In the long run they kept higher activity in mechanized spinning and higher industrial value added per capita until the second half of the nineteenth century, but not later. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1122) from the author’s working draft of 17 December 2015, not the version of record; worth reading as the first well-identified evidence that temporary protection can leave a lasting industry behind it. Departments more shielded from British trade by the Napoleonic blockade built more mechanized cotton spinning, kept a larger industry through 1887 and had more productive firms in 1840; industrial value added was higher in 1860 and not detectably from 1896. The long-run instrument is weak (first-stage F mostly below 10). The protection was a war blockade followed by post-war tariffs, not a temporary tariff lifted, and what persisted was the industry, not the protection. |
| LIT-1497 v3 | Implementation Intentions and Goal Achievement: A Meta‐analysis of Effects and Processes | Gollwitzer & Sheeran (2006). A meta-analysis of 94 independent tests: forming an implementation intention, an if-then plan saying when, where and how a goal will be pursued, had a medium-to-large effect on goal attainment (d = .65). The plans helped people start goal striving, shield it from unwanted influences, disengage from failing courses of action and conserve capacity, and the postulated processes were supported: the specified opportunity became more accessible and the response more automatic. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1124) from the University of Konstanz repository’s scan of the published chapter (KOPS, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0), through OCR; worth reading as the first large meta-analysis of if-then planning and the fullest statement of its mechanism: a plan hands initiation of a response decided in advance to the cue it names, so nothing is deliberated in the situation, and the plan fires only while the goal behind it is active. 94 tests, d = .65 against a goal intention alone, with large effects on cue accessibility and on the immediacy, efficiency and non-conscious running of planned responses from small sets of tests. The size is not corrected for publication bias; the 2024 review of 642 tests (LIT-1488) finds the bias substantial and a corrected effect near d = .15. What happens when a plan’s response proves wrong is named and left untested. |
| LIT-1502 v2 | A Bayesian Truth Serum for Subjective Data | Prelec (2004). A scoring method for subjective reports where objective truth is unknowable: each respondent gives an answer and a prediction of how others will answer, and answers score high not for being common but for being more common than the same population collectively predicted. By the abstract, this removes the bias toward consensus, so that a truthful answer maximizes expected score even for a respondent who believes hers is a minority view. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-24 for the owner’s question of how the record stands on multi-agent learning, as the second founding scoring rule for subjective reports without ground truth; a reading was attempted the same day and failed on availability. The article is closed: Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy, Europe PMC holds the abstract only (not open access, no PMC copy), science.org returned 403 for the PDF, and no author or repository copy was found at MIT (DSpace search for the title and author returns later BTS papers and a thesis, not this one; Prelec’s MIT Sloan page links none). A copy on a third party’s personal site was found by web search and not used, as it is not a lawful public copy. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1513 | Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas | Leibo, Zambaldi, Lanctot, Marecki & Graepel (2017). Defines a sequential social dilemma as a Markov game whose cooperative and defecting policies, played against each other, give payoffs satisfying the social dilemma inequalities. Independent deep Q-learners in a fruit-Gathering game learn aggression when apples are scarce or a tagged rival is out long; in Wolfpack they hunt together when the joint-capture bonus and radius are high. Both games embed Prisoner’s Dilemmas, but network size raises defection in Gathering and lowers it in Wolfpack, which no matrix game captures. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1151) from arXiv v1, the AAMAS 2017 paper; worth reading as the paper that moved social dilemmas from matrix games to learned policies in Markov games. Two two-player games, Gathering (apples, and a beam that removes the rival for a while) and Wolfpack (lone or joint capture of prey), both yield Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrices when the learned policies are played off, yet respond in opposite directions to agent capacity: a larger network makes Gathering agents more aggressive and Wolfpack agents more cooperative, because aggression is the harder policy to implement in one and cooperation in the other. Agents learn aggression where apples are scarce. It is a descriptive simulation with independent learners, no figures of spread, and no protective institution or depletable commons. |
| LIT-1518 | Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method | Miller, Resnick & Zeckhauser (2005). A center with no independent information scores each rater by applying a strictly proper scoring rule to the distribution of a reference rater’s report that her own report implies, given a common prior and signal model. Truthful reporting is a strict Nash equilibrium; scaling the scores induces costly effort and can outweigh bribes; three or more raters allow budget balance. Uninformative equilibria also exist, and collusion, risk aversion, unmodelled private signals and trust in the center are named limits. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1139) from the authors’ final pre-publication draft of 26 January 2005, on Paul Resnick’s University of Michigan page; worth reading as the founding scoring rule for evaluators when there is no ground truth. Each rater reports a signal, the center turns it into a posterior over a reference rater’s report, and the rater is paid a strictly proper scoring rule on that posterior against what the reference rater actually reported. Truth-telling is then a strict Nash equilibrium (Proposition 1), and scaling the payments buys effort. It is not the only equilibrium: everyone always reporting h, or always l, is an equilibrium too, and collusion is named as a limit the paper does not settle. The mechanism needs a common prior and a signal model the center knows. |
| LIT-1527 v3 | Reaching a Consensus | DeGroot (1974). Members of a group that must act together each hold a subjective probability distribution for an unknown parameter. A model describes how they might reach agreement on a common distribution by repeatedly pooling one another’s opinions; the process and the consensus it reaches are given explicitly. The model also applies when each opinion is a point estimate rather than a distribution (abstract). | Active — read 2026-10-25 (NOTE-1157) in full, from the copy the owner supplied on 2026-10-25, a JSTOR scan of the published article (the searches of the same day had found no lawful copy). Worth reading as the source of the DeGroot model: repeated averaging with fixed weights is a Markov chain on opinions, a consensus from every start is reached exactly when the chain has one closed class and it is aperiodic, and its weights are the stationary vector, zero for members outside that class (THEORY-960). Read it knowing that the theorems are cited from Markov-chain texts without proof, that the “if and only if” of §4 needs the quantifier “for every starting opinion”, that its Theorems 1 and 2 are the same condition, and that the weights are fixed and nothing tracks the truth. |
| LIT-1598 v2 | Chagos Islanders in Mauritius and the UK: Forced Displacement and Onward Migration | Jeffery (2011). An ethnography of Chagos islanders displaced to Mauritius and onward to the UK: their marginalization, their political organization, and their disagreements over sovereignty, the Diego Garcia base, and negotiation against litigation. | Unavailable — searched 2026-10-29 for a lawful full text and none was reached, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. OpenAlex reports the book closed with no open location. Manchester University Press sells it in print and as an ebook; De Gruyter Brill, Torrossa, Perlego and library catalogues (JSTOR, Project MUSE) offer only paid or institutional access. Web searches for an open-access edition or an author’s deposit found none. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. Human Rights Watch’s report (LIT-1593, NOTE-1365), read the same day, does not cite it but confirms from its own interviews that Chagossians disagree about sovereignty while agreeing on return. |
| LIT-1607 v2 | Compliance with Judicial Decisions | Hillebrecht (2024). A review of research on compliance with court rulings, organized by three determinants (the capacity of the institutions that must comply, their political commitment, and the nature of the ruling), proposing compliance as a process rather than a yes-or-no outcome, with systematic noncompliance and time as open directions. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-27, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports the chapter closed with no repository copy; the DOI resolves to Oxford Academic (academic.oup.com/edited-volume/55208/chapter/440434056), which offers it only by subscription and returned 403 to this client; web searches for an author’s copy, a preprint or an SSRN deposit, and Lee Epstein’s page for the handbook, found none. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1609 v2 | Administrative Burden: Policymaking by Other Means | Herd & Moynihan (2018). Learning, compliance and psychological costs in people’s encounters with the state are policy choices that shape who gets benefits and rights, and they fall unequally; burdens can restrict access without any formal change to eligibility. | Deferred — filed 2026-10-27; reading stopped at a skim on 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1382): only the Introduction (pp. 1–14), from the Russell Sage Foundation’s free excerpt, was read. No lawful free copy of the whole book was found: OpenAlex reports it closed, Project MUSE lists it as not open access, and the publisher’s page offers only the contents, the authors’ note and the introduction. The introduction supports the summary. Read it knowing that one figure there is inconsistent ($1.2 billion stated as 1.2 percent of GDP). |
| LIT-1615 v2 | The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? Third Edition | Rosenberg (2023, 3rd ed.). The “constrained court” view: courts produce significant social reform only when other institutions, political actors and conditions already support it, so a judicial victory is not by itself a change in practice. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-27, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports the third edition closed; the DOI resolves to a BiblioVault landing page; the University of Chicago Press page for the book has its excerpt link disabled and offers no free chapter; web searches found only retailers, paid ebooks and library records. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1620 v2 | How a plantation became paradise: changing representations of the homeland among displaced Chagos islanders | Jeffery (2007). Compares songs composed in Chagos with songs composed in exile, and reads how a plantation society came to be represented as a lost paradise in a standardized collective narrative that helped political mobilization; as the exchange reported it, the standardization also complicated legal claims. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-27, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports the article (JRAI 13(4): 951–968) closed with no repository copy; Wiley’s page offers paid access only; the University of Edinburgh’s research portal, where a deposit would be, returned 403 to curl and to WebFetch, so whether it holds a file is unchecked; web searches found no author’s copy. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1630 v2 | Coarse-graining as a downward causation mechanism | Flack (2017), DOI-10.1098/rsta.2016.0338, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 375. Downward causation, made operational: components tune their behaviour to their own estimates of coarse-grained variables they collectively compute (“endogenous coarse-graining”). In the weak, apparent form one component tuning to a variable slower than the behaviour producing it suffices, and estimates may be wrong and disagree. In the strong, effective form the variable is predictive, robust, used nearly universally, agreed on, and gaining mutual information with the microscopic behaviour; that marks a new organizational level. The macaque power distribution, computed from subordination signals that coarse-grain fight outcomes, is the example, reviewed from earlier work. Time-scale separation lets an aggregate act as a “social” environment whether or not it is accurate. | Active — read in full 2026-10-27 (NOTE-1216); worth reading as the general, operational statement of Flack’s account: downward causation as components tuning to their own estimates of aggregate variables they collectively compute, in a weak (apparent) and a strong (effective) form, with a new organizational level only at the strong form. A conceptual paper; the macaque results are reviewed, not reported. Its criteria put convergence of estimates, not regeneration of the variable, beyond use. |
| LIT-1677 | A comparison of minimal group induction procedures | Two small experiments with US undergraduates (N = 42 and 73) compare four ways of making minimal groups. In the classic one, participants are falsely told their painting preferences put them in a group. In the others, they imagine being assigned, are assigned at random, or only memorize five names from one group, with no categorization at all. On explicit liking and identification, and on a bonus-money allocation between two other participants, all four produced comparable in-group favouritism. On IATs of attitude (pleasant/unpleasant) and identification (self/other), only memorization produced large effects; the classic procedure produced none. Implicit and explicit favouritism correlated weakly. Explicit identification correlated with allocation favouritism (r = .37). The allocation result was carried mostly by one of the two colour groups. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1319), in place of LIT-1697, which could not be reached; worth reading as a direct test of how little it takes to make a minimal group. Merely studying a group’s names ties it to “self” on an implicit measure, and imagined or random assignment yields the same explicit favouritism as the classic procedure. Read in place of Tajfel et al. 1971 (LIT-1697, Unavailable); small samples, one college. |
| LIT-1679 | Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity | Alexander et al. (2004). Cultural trauma is not the direct effect of an event but a social construction: carrier groups narrate an event as a fundamental injury to a collective’s identity, and the claim succeeds when a wider audience takes it up. Cases include the Holocaust, slavery in African-American identity (Eyerman), and Germany after Nazism. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher. University of California Press sells it as an ebook, and no chapter is open at Project MUSE, Luminos or eScholarship. An aggregator copy at CORE was not used, since its source repository could not be traced. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Eyerman 2001, chapter 1 (LIT-1789) and Hirst, Cyr and Merck 2020 (LIT-1787). |
| LIT-1696 | Intergenerational transmission of paternal trauma among US Civil War ex-POWs | Costa, Yetter & DeSomer (2018). Among 19,903 children of Union Army veterans born after the Civil War and surviving to 45, sons of men held in Confederate camps in the no-exchange period (July 1863 to July 1864), when conditions were worst, had an older-age mortality hazard 1.11 times that of sons of non-POWs (P = 0.009) and about 1.09 times that of sons of exchange-period POWs. Daughters were unaffected. Within families, sons born after the war to no-exchange POWs died at 2.23 times the rate of their brothers born before it (P = 0.056). The effect was 1.20 among sons born in the second quarter and absent among those born in the fourth, which the authors read as adequate maternal nutrition reversing it. Paternal and maternal socioeconomic controls and maternal lifespan did not change the result. By elimination, the authors judge an epigenetic route most consistent, while granting they cannot reject psychological or cultural transmission. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1255) from the published text (PMC6217388, CC BY-NC-ND), served by NCBI’s PMC OAI-PMH service; the supplementary information was not read; worth reading as the largest human study of a father’s trauma and his sons’ longevity, with an unusually clean natural experiment in the timing of captivity. Read it knowing that the effect is about 10% on the older-age hazard, that its mechanism is argued by elimination without biological data, and that its within-family and nutrition results rest on the SI and on modest P values. |
| LIT-1705 | Group Identity, Social Influence, and Collective Action Online: Extensions and Applications of the SIDE Model | An overview of the SIDE model by two of its authors. Deindividuation theory held that anonymity and immersion in a group cut self-awareness and so released antinormative behaviour. SIDE reverses this. Anonymity within a group makes whichever identity is salient more salient. When that identity is a group identity, people conform more to its local norms, and behaviour is more socially regulated, not less. A second, strategic dimension concerns anonymity to an audience: being unidentifiable to a powerful out-group frees members to act on in-group norms it would punish. The model is applied to text chat and email, webcams, online communities and online collective action. The chapter argues that online and offline action share the same predictors: shared identity, efficacy and anger at injustice. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1280), in place of LIT-1744 and LIT-1731, which could not be reached; worth reading as the SIDE model’s own authors’ statement of its cognitive and strategic dimensions and their evidence, and as the record’s second-hand access to Reicher, Spears & Postmes 1995 and Postmes & Spears 1998. |
| LIT-1711 | The Minimal Group Paradigm and its maximal impact in research on social categorization | A short review of the minimal group paradigm (MGP) after 45 years. Its defining features are a novel, arbitrary and anonymous categorization in which no personal self-interest is served by the allocations. Tajfel’s first studies found that fairness guided allocations strongly, but in-group favouritism appeared reliably, and maximizing the in-group’s lead over the out-group sometimes beat maximizing its gain. The effect replicated with revised matrices. Critics say it may come from reciprocity expectations or from projecting a positive self onto the new group. It is largely confined to positive resources. When participants can also pay themselves, they take the most for themselves and still favour the in-group with what is left. The paradigm is now used mostly to study other effects of mere categorization: implicit attitudes, face processing, trust, communication. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1301), in place of LIT-1697, which could not be reached; worth reading as the record’s only account, at second hand, of what Tajfel et al. 1971 (LIT-1697, Unavailable) designed and found, and as a map of the critiques. Two of them bear on the owner’s thesis: favouritism may come from projecting the personal self onto the group, and personal gain comes first when it is on offer. |
| LIT-1723 | Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory | Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell (1987), Blackwell. The founding statement of self-categorization theory: personal and social identity are levels of self-categorization, a category becomes salient by meta-contrast and fit, and group behaviour follows from depersonalization, self-perception as an interchangeable exemplar of the ingroup prototype, rather than from attraction or interdependence among members. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-28; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. The Internet Archive holds the 1987 Blackwell printing (rediscoveringsoc0000turn, 266 images) only as a controlled-lending item (access-restricted), which this client cannot borrow. The book has no DOI and no open edition was found. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied: a lawful copy exists, as a lending item (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Turner et al. 1994 (LIT-1794), Skorich’s critique (LIT-1765), which quotes chapter 3 with page numbers, León (LIT-1721), Hornsey 2008 (LIT-1742) and Reimer et al. (LIT-1790). |
| LIT-1730 | Managing the Terror of Publication Bias: A Systematic Review of the Mortality Salience Hypothesis | A systematic review of the mortality-salience (MS) hypothesis of terror management theory, that reminders of death increase worldview defense. An uncorrected random-effects meta-analysis of 635 effects reproduces Burke et al.’s (2010) moderate effect (g = 0.81, about r = .37, against their r = .35 over 277 studies), but a funnel plot shows strong asymmetry. Bias corrections disagree. Selection models and WAAP-WLS give a small effect, about r = .18; PET-PEESE finds none. A p-curve of 825 focal tests shows that some studies test real effects, at an average power of 25%; z-curve gives an expected replication rate of 19% and an expected discovery rate of 8%, near the 5% of a literature of null effects. Five of nine preregistered replications succeeded, and Many Labs 4 did not. The authors conclude the literature holds some non-zero effects, much smaller and far more heterogeneous than published, and that most studies are underpowered. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1271), in place of LIT-1687, which could not be reached; worth reading as the current quantitative verdict on the mortality-salience hypothesis, and as the only source the record holds for Burke et al.’s figures. |
| LIT-1733 | A Mathematical Theory of Saving | Ramsey (1928). Asks how much of its income a nation should save, for a community that lives for ever with fixed numbers, tastes and motives, summing utility over time without discounting it, a practice he calls “ethically indefensible” and the product of “the weakness of the imagination”. The answer, credited in its simple form to Keynes: the rate of saving times the marginal utility of consumption equals the shortfall of present net enjoyment from Bliss, the maximum obtainable rate. The rule is independent of the production function except through Bliss, and of the interest rate. It asks far more saving than usual: on an illustrative scale, £300 out of a family income of £500. With a constant discount rate ρ below the interest rate r, the same solution holds with a “modified utility” that discounts high incomes instead of the future; with ρ above r, consumption runs down to subsistence. A constant rate is argued to be the only one consistent with successive generations sharing one system of preferences. The last section turns to the rate of interest. Out of equilibrium it is set by capital’s demand price and can far exceed the reward needed to induce abstinence. With families discounting at different rates, equilibrium divides society into “the thrifty enjoying bliss and the improvident at the subsistence level”. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1287) from the published article, public domain in the US, from the Internet Archive’s scan of the issue (sim_economic-journal_1928-12_38_152); worth reading as the source of the zero-discount view and of the optimal-saving rule, knowing that the refusal to discount is a one-line assertion with a psychological diagnosis, and that the paper itself models discounting as how people actually save. |
| LIT-1742 | Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization Theory: A Historical Review | Hornsey (2008). A critical, historical review of the social identity approach, social identity theory and self-categorization theory, from the early 1970s: their core principles, how they were elaborated, reinterpreted and sometimes misread, their effect on the field, and their strengths and limitations. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1253) from a copy of the published article supplied by the owner; worth reading as a map that tells social identity theory (intergroup relations, positive distinctiveness, status and legitimacy) apart from self-categorization theory (levels of self-categorization, fit, depersonalization), and records the strands later dropped or softened: identification as a predictor of bias, the self-esteem hypotheses, and strict functional antagonism. An insider’s review that lists the critiques and declines to answer them. Co-source of THEORY-1114. |
| LIT-1752 | Economics and Identity | Akerlof & Kranton (2000). Adds identity, “a person’s sense of self”, to the utility function: U = U(own actions, others’ actions, I), where I depends on one’s assigned social categories, how well one’s own traits match the category’s ideal, and how far one’s own and others’ actions follow the category’s prescriptions. Violating one’s prescriptions costs utility (Is); others’ violations cost it too (Io), and the loser may pay to “respond”, harming the violator. A two-person game shows when such responses deter. Applied to occupational segregation by sex, to “oppositional” identities chosen by the socially excluded, and to wives who earn more yet still do most of the housework, it yields predictions standard models do not. Evidence is illustrative: ethnographies, a 70-household vignette survey, census shares and a Panel Study of Income Dynamics regression. Identity is modelled as self-image to be maintained, not as concern for a group’s welfare. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1311) from the journal’s typeset text deposited in Duke University’s repository DukeSpace (hdl.handle.net/10161/1993; Unpaywall labels it the submitted version, but it carries the journal’s pagination and copyright line), fetched through the repository’s own API; worth reading as the founding statement of identity economics: identity as self-image in the utility function, with prescriptions and identity externalities, applied to gender at work, exclusion and the household. Read it knowing that its evidence is illustrative, that two of its models are solved only in appendices “available from the authors upon request”, and that the self it puts in utility is a self-image to be kept, not a self that takes in the group’s welfare. |
| LIT-1765 | Reconceptualizing Individuals, Categories, and the Social Group: Self-Categorization Theory 2.0 | Skorich (2025, v2 2026), preprint. Five critiques of self-categorization theory as stated in Turner et al. 1987: categorization into equivalence classes is neither sufficient nor necessary for perceiving a group as an entity; “self-categorization” is underspecified and should mean categorization of intentional agents; the person level is underexamined; meta-contrast is computationally intractable as a basis for entity formation and rests on prototype semantics; and comparative relations are overemphasized. Proposes SCT2.0 (self-conceptualization theory): groups are perceived from cues to collective intentionality, and represented as atomic concepts with object files in a language of thought. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1295) from the PsyArXiv preprint, v2; worth reading as a sympathetic insider’s critique of self-categorization theory that quotes the 1987 book’s chapter 3 assumptions and hypotheses verbatim with page numbers, so it stands in for the unread book’s core statement. It argues that categorization yields interchangeability, not a group entity; that meta-contrast is computationally intractable as a basis for entity formation; and that groups are perceived from cues to collective intentionality. Unreviewed; its key experiments are under review. Source of THEORY-1112. |
| LIT-1771 | Social Influence and Group Identity | A review, by one of the SIDE model’s authors, of the self-categorization account of social influence. Group influence is not only compliance for approval (normative influence). Because a group can be a level of the self, influence from in-group members can be true private acceptance (“referent informational influence”). Classic findings are reread this way: Asch and Sherif conformity, Milgram obedience, minority influence, emergency crowds, bystander helping, emotional contagion and riots. Influence is moderated by identification, prototypicality, intergroup threat and context. Isolation and visual anonymity strengthen group influence rather than weakening it, as the SIDE model predicts. Crowd members do not lose the self; they switch to a group identity. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1268), in place of LIT-1726 and LIT-1731, which could not be reached; worth reading as the most recent overview, by an author of the SIDE model, of how self-categorization theory treats influence, norms and deindividuation, and as the record’s second-hand access to Postmes & Spears 1998. |
| LIT-1787 | Witnessing and cultural trauma: the role of flashbulb memories in the trauma process | Hirst, Cyr and Merck (2020). An essay joining Alexander’s trauma process to the psychology of flashbulb memory. People who learned of an event at a distance keep vivid, confident memories of where they were, and these let them claim to have been “there” and to testify, like eyewitnesses, to what it was like. Such memories are community-specific and can be community-defining, so where nearly everyone holds one, carrier group and audience coincide and the trauma process can start among equals. The memories are inaccurate in detail but held with high confidence, which is what makes them count. They pass to children: in a study of children young at the time of 9/11, 89% could report a parent’s flashbulb memory, and those who identified more strongly as American knew it better. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1305), in place of LIT-1679, which could not be reached; worth reading as the one work in the record that ties knowing a parent’s memory of a public trauma to the child’s identification with the group. |
| LIT-1789 | Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity | Eyerman (2001), chapter 1 read. Cultural trauma is not a wound to individuals but “a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric” of a group, which need not be felt or experienced by all its members. Slavery became the trauma of African Americans “in retrospect”: after the failure of Reconstruction, a generation that had not been enslaved made its memory the “primal scene” of a new collective identity, against a white memory of slavery as benign. Membership was set by a shared fate, not shared experience or descent. Carrier groups, chiefly intellectuals and social movements, articulate the trauma; each social generation reworks the memory; it moved from group memory to national memory only with the civil rights movement. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1246), in place of LIT-1679, which could not be reached; worth reading as the chapter that states the cultural trauma framework for slavery, and says plainly that the injured collective self is fixed by shared fate, not by descent or experience. |
| LIT-1790 | Self-categorization and social identification: Making sense of us and them | Reimer, Schmid, Hewstone and Al Ramiah (2020), preprint of a textbook chapter. Self-categorization is social categorization applied to oneself, hierarchical in level and situational in salience (accessibility × fit); social identification is multidimensional (Ashmore et al.’s seven components); social identity theory explains in-group bias by positive distinctiveness, moderated by status, permeability, stability and legitimacy; and multiple categorization (crossed, common in-group, dual identity, in-group projection, complexity) predicts when bias falls. It concludes that identity processes alone do not explain negative intergroup attitudes. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1251) from the authors’ PsyArXiv preprint of a textbook chapter; worth reading as a plain, current exposition of the social identity perspective: self-categorization (accessibility, comparative and normative fit, depersonalization), Ashmore et al.’s seven dimensions of social identification, social identity theory’s minimal-group and status findings, and the multiple categorization models (crossed categorization, common in-group, dual identity, in-group projection, social identity complexity). A secondary source; its account of self-categorization theory is two pages. |
| LIT-1794 | Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context | Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty (1994). Self-categorization theory’s account of self and collective: personal and social identity are different levels of self-categorization, the emergent properties of group processes come from a shift in self-perception from the one to the other, and self-categories are inherently variable and context dependent because they are social comparative and relative to a frame of reference. | Active — read in full 2026-10-28 (NOTE-1284) from a scan of the published article supplied by the owner; worth reading as the shortest statement, by its authors, of self-categorization theory’s view of the self: personal and social identity are equally authentic levels of self-categorization, salience is readiness times fit (metacontrast and normative fit), and the level, kind, content and prototype of self-categories vary with the comparative frame. It goes on to speculate that the self is generated in context rather than stored. A theoretical paper whose evidence is the group’s own studies, reported without data. Source of THEORY-1114. |
| LIT-1796 | Many Labs 4: Failure to Replicate Mortality Salience Effect With and Without Original Author Involvement | A preregistered multisite replication of Study 1 of Greenberg et al. (1994), the standard mortality-salience test: writing about one’s own death, against writing about watching television, was to raise preference for a pro-US over an anti-US essay author. Seventeen US university labs contributed 1,550 usable participants. Seven ran a protocol designed with the original authors; ten built their own. The pooled effect was Hedges’ g = 0.07 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.17), against the original d = 1.34, and no exclusion rule, protocol type or subset of TMT-knowledgeable labs produced a significant effect. Effects did not vary across labs more than chance allows, so the test of whether expert involvement helps replication was left without an effect to act on. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1322), in place of LIT-1687, which could not be reached; worth reading as the best-powered direct test of terror management theory’s worldview-defense prediction, and as the fullest record of how its original authors think the effect must be produced. |
| LIT-1823 | Learning from Mistakes is Easier Said Than Done: Group and Organizational Influences on the Detection and Correction of Human Error | Edmondson (1996), Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 32(1), 5–28. A study of drug-administration errors in patient-care groups in two hospitals, reported to show that groups differ systematically not only in how often errors occur but in how likely they are to be detected and learned from, with unit climate and leadership bearing on whether errors are reported. Not read; from the abstract as indexed. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-29, not read. A lawful free copy is located at an exact address: an author upload on Edmondson’s ResearchGate profile, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Amy_Edmondson/publication/250959492_Learning_from_Mistakes_Is_Easier_Said_Than_Done_Group_and_Organizational_Influences_on_the_Detection_and_Correction_of_Human_Error/links/00b49535113800fcce000000.pdf, of the kind the owner’s ruling of 2026-10-29 counts. On 2026-10-29 it returned 403 to curl and to WebFetch, so the failure is on access, not availability. The search listing labels that file with the DOI of the journal’s 2004 reprint of the article (10.1177/0021886304263849, JABS 40(1), 66–90), so it may be the reprint rather than the 1996 printing; the text is the same article. OpenAlex reports both printings closed with no repository copy, and SAGE’s pages are paid. A browser fetch of the ResearchGate file is the cheapest way to read it. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1825 | Social Networks and Financial Markets | DeMarzo, Vayanos & Zwiebel (2001), working paper, MIT and Stanford. Described in their 2003 QJE paper (LIT-1134) as a model in which agents choose whom to listen to by the profits of trading on what they hear, and stable structures have everyone listening to the same experts, who need not be the best informed, so that influence can perpetuate itself apart from accuracy. Not read; that description is all the record has. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-29, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. The paper is an unpublished working paper of 2001 (MIT and Stanford, as the QJE paper’s references give it); it has no DOI, and Crossref, OpenAlex and SSRN hold no record of it under this title. Vayanos’s research page at LSE (https://personal.lse.ac.uk/vayanos/research.html) lists “Financial Markets and Social Networks”, with DeMarzo and Zwiebel, among his working papers with no link and no file; the authors’ Stanford pages and RePEc list no copy. Web searches found only citations. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1829 | Extended Contact Effects: Is Exposure to Positive Outgroup Exemplars Sufficient or Is Interaction With Ingroup Members Necessary? | Cernat (2011), The Journal of Social Psychology 151(6), 737–753. An experiment with 108 Romanian students, who read the same story of a close friendship between a Roma and either a Romanian (ingroup member) or a Bulgarian (another outgroup), against a control. Per the abstract, the outgroup–outgroup story was enough to improve attitudes toward Roma and reduce intergroup anxiety; the ingroup–outgroup story had stronger and broader effects, mediated by group emotions rather than anxiety or norms. Every arm receives information; none takes part. Unread. | Unfetched — searched 2026-10-29 for a lawful full text; one appears to exist but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The ResearchGate publication page (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/51971721_Extended_Contact_Effects_Is_Exposure_to_Positive_Outgroup_Exemplars_Sufficient_or_Is_Interaction_With_Ingroup_Members_Necessary) is indexed by web search with text from the article’s method section (sample, sex and age, and the three conditions’ sizes), so it seems to carry the full text as an upload, which counts under the owner’s ruling of 2026-10-29; it returned 403 to curl and to WebFetch. The publisher’s page (tandfonline.com) returned 403 and is subscription-only; Europe PMC lists only the subscription DOI, Semantic Scholar marks it closed, the Princeton prejudice-reduction database’s pages returned 403, and no course, faculty or academia.edu copy was found. OpenAlex was over its shared daily budget and was not consulted. A browser fetch of the ResearchGate copy is the cheapest way to read it. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1830 | Organizational Flexibility: Creating a Mindful and Purpose-Driven Organization | Bond (2018), chapter 11 (pp. 185–199) of Wilson & Hayes (eds.), Evolution and Contextual Behavioral Science, Context Press. The statement of Bond’s organizational flexibility model, the ACT-derived account that Guida, Minutola and Presti (LIT-1218) recast, with the leader as the high-leverage route. Not read; the record knows it only through Guida et al. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-29, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. It is a chapter of an in-copyright book (Context Press, an imprint of New Harbinger, 2018) with no DOI; Crossref and OpenAlex hold no record of it. The publisher’s page sells the book and offers no chapter. Goldsmiths Research Online, Bond’s institutional repository, lists 42 of his items and not this chapter (checked 2026-10-29). Searches for an author’s upload (ResearchGate, academia.edu, the ACBS site) found only the related thesis of Gascoyne (2019) and the ACBS slides on the organisational flexibility measure, which are not this work. A whole-book copy would not count (ADR-064). The book’s table of contents, from the Czech national library service obalkyknih.cz, confirms the chapter and its pages. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1831 v2 | Can Social Contact Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria | Scacco & Warren (2018), APSR 112(3). 849 randomly sampled Christian and Muslim young men in Kaduna, Nigeria, were randomized to a sixteen-week computer course or a survey-only control, then to a mixed or single-religion class and to a same- or other-religion partner. Four to six weeks after it, no arm changed stated prejudice, but the course raised giving to everyone, and mixed classes discriminated less than single-religion classes in a dictator game (about 70% less) and a destruction game. Against the control, the single-religion classes discriminated more and the mixed classes about the same. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1418) in full, from the published version deposited by the WZB on EconStor (https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/194860/1/f-21548-full-text-Scacco-et_al-Contact-v3.pdf); worth reading as a randomized field test of intergroup contact in a conflict city that measured attitudes and behaviour separately and found that sixteen weeks of cooperative contact left stated prejudice unchanged while reducing discrimination in two incentivized games. Read it knowing that its behavioural measures are games played at home four to six weeks after the course, that the contact effect is mostly a rise in discrimination in the single-religion classes rather than a fall in the mixed ones, that the effect on unfamiliar out-group members holds only for Christians, and that its “pre-analysis plan” was registered in August 2015, after the endline survey, though before the authors had the outcome data. |
| LIT-1836 v2 | Can we really reduce ethnic prejudice outside the lab? A meta-analysis of direct and indirect contact interventions | Lemmer & Wagner (2015), EJSP 45(2). 129 comparisons from 73 evaluations of contact programmes run in schools, universities and other field settings. In controlled designs, attitudes improve by g = 0.28 immediately (k = 79) and 0.23 one to twelve months later (k = 8). Direct and indirect programmes do not differ (0.29 against 0.23); among subtypes, extended contact through stories of cross-group friendship gives 0.42 (k = 8) and virtual contact 0.08, not significant. Effects are larger for majorities and reach the whole outgroup. No study measured behaviour. | Active — read 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1419) in full, from the authors’ accepted manuscript (“In press: European Journal of Social Psychology”) posted on bildung-diversity.ch (https://bildung-diversity.ch/fileadmin/dokumente/Can_We_Really_Reduce_Ethnic_Prejudice_Outside_the_Lab.pdf); worth reading as the meta-analysis of contact interventions run outside the laboratory, which separates direct (face-to-face) from indirect (extended and virtual) programmes and finds them about equally effective on ethnic attitudes. Read it knowing that the comparison of types is between studies, not within them; that “indirect” pools extended contact, which is reading or watching stories of cross-group friendship, with virtual contact, which is online interaction and showed no effect in the stronger designs; that every outcome is a self-reported attitude, since the authors found no behavioural studies to include; and that the copy is the manuscript, not the typeset article, whose tables were not compared with it. |
| LIT-1855 | Relevance of social categories, depersonalization and group processes: two field tests of self-categorization theory | Voci (2006), European Journal of Social Psychology 36(1):73–90. By its abstract (the only source used here): two field studies, of football fans and of employees, with new meta-contrast-based measures of comparative fit and depersonalization, report that fit drove ingroup bias and other outcomes through depersonalization, and only when the category was highly accessible. Expected to supply field evidence for THEORY-1114’s metacontrast-to-depersonalization chain, and, through its football fans, a case for CLAIM-493. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-30, not read. The publisher’s own free copy exists (bronze): onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/ejsp.259. On 2026-10-30 Wiley answered HTTP 403 with a Cloudflare challenge (cf-mitigated: challenge). The challenge was not retried. A human reader can likely open it. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. Free copy: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/ejsp.259. |
| LIT-1857 | Exposing Pluralistic Ignorance to Reduce Alcohol Use Among College Students | Schroeder & Prentice (1998). Princeton first-year students took part in either a peer-oriented discussion that exposed pluralistic ignorance about drinking or an individual-oriented discussion of responsible decisions. Four to six months later the peer-oriented group reported fewer drinks a week (3.10 against 5.05; p = .05). Their estimates of the average student’s comfort with drinking did not differ by condition. What differed was that, in the control condition, students high in fear of negative evaluation drank above average whatever they thought of peers. The authors infer that exposure weakened the norm’s prescriptive force without changing what it prescribed. Men closed the gap between their own and the average student’s comfort, but by revising their estimate of others, not their own attitude, the reverse of Prentice and Miller’s 1993 finding. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1439) from the published article as downloaded from Wiley and posted on Stanford SPARQ’s site (https://sparq.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj19021/files/media/file/schroeder_prentice_1998_-_exposing_pluralistic_ignorance.pdf); worth reading as the field test of exposing pluralistic ignorance, and as the nearest read source for Prentice and Miller 1993 (LIT-1370), which it restates and in part fails to replicate. Read it knowing that drinking is self-reported, that the comparison is between two discussion formats with no untreated control, that 143 of 452 students were followed up, and that the main effect is p = .05. |
| LIT-1858 | Changing Norms to Change Behavior | Miller and Prentice (2016), Annual Review of Psychology 67:339–361. By its abstract (the only source used here): a review of norm-based interventions, which give people information about their peers’ behaviour and attitudes, with special attention to college drinking and environment-friendly behaviour, and of the conditions under which norm information is most likely to change the targeted behaviour. Expected to supply, for CLAIM-415, the review-level evidence on when a misperceived collective norm shapes behaviour and when correcting it does not. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-30, not read. The publisher’s own free copy exists (bronze): www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015013. On 2026-10-30 Annual Reviews answered HTTP 403 with a Cloudflare challenge (cf-mitigated: challenge). The challenge was not retried. A human reader can likely open it. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. Free copy: www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015013. |
| LIT-1862 | Contrast effects in stereotype formation and change: the role of comparative context | Wyer, Sadler and Judd (2002), Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38(5):443–458. Unread, and no abstract was available, so nothing is said here of its content beyond its title: contrast effects in forming and changing stereotypes, and the role of comparative context. Expected to supply, for THEORY-1114, evidence on whether a group’s stereotype shifts with the comparative frame, from authors outside the self-categorization group. | Unfetched — filed 2026-10-30, not read. A lawful green copy was located in the University of Plymouth’s repository, PEARL: https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/context/psy-research/article/1866/viewcontent/wyer_sadler_judd_2002.pdf (also reached through hdl.handle.net/10026.1/2959). On 2026-10-30 that address redirected (HTTP 302) to pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?…, which answered HTTP 403 with a Cloudflare challenge (cf-mitigated: challenge). The challenge was not retried. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unfetched until a copy is supplied, not on merit. Free copy: pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/context/psy-research/article/1866/viewcontent/wyer_sadler_judd_2002.pdf. |
| LIT-1901 | A pre-individual perspective to organizational action | Bencherki (2017), ephemera 17(4). After Simondon, action is pre-individual: logically prior to the people and organizations that appear to be its authors, it contributes to the individuation of both at once. Affect (“affectivo-emotivity”) is how a person discovers a pre-individual load that can only be resolved by continuing into a collective individuation; when that is refused, the result is felt as disindividuation. An action’s signification is its participation in an individuation, so one action can have several. Illustrated by a documentary on Canadian military spouses, read as co-individuation, channeling and usurpation of their action by the army. | Active — read in full 2026-10-31 (NOTE-1482), from the journal’s open-access PDF (ephemera, CC BY-NC-ND). Worth reading as the direct ancestor of Bencherki, Brummans & Vézy’s “agency without agents” (LIT-1902): pre-individual action, affect, disindividuation, the continuation of personal into collective individuation, and coexisting significations are all here, seven years earlier. It is a conceptual proposal illustrated by excerpts from one documentary, not a test. |
| LIT-1902 | Agency Without Agents: Affective Forces, Communicative Events, and Organizational Becomings | Bencherki, Brummans & Vézy (2024). A strong process theory of agency for organization studies. Agency is not an agent’s capacity to act but “the affective force, expressed as a communicative event, that governs the transition from one process of individuation to another”. It arises when one individuation process takes up another’s “excess action”, which may augment the ability to act of both and start a collective transindividuation. Failure is disindividuation. Communication is transduction, the continuity of action through processes, and meaning is retrospective. The illustration is a reanalysis of a meeting from Cooren’s ethnography of Médecins Sans Frontières. | Active — read in full 2026-10-31 (NOTE-1484), from the version of record the owner supplied. The publisher’s copy is open access (CC BY-NC 4.0) and a copy is deposited in R-libre (TÉLUQ). This client could not fetch either: SAGE and CORE served a bot check, and the repository reset every connection. Worth reading as the clearest statement in organization studies of agency without agents, built on Simondon’s individuation and Massumi’s affect. It is a conceptual proposal whose empirical illustration is a reanalysis, not a test. |
| LIT-1903 | The concept of transduction and its use in organization studies | Styhre (2010), Emergence: Complexity and Organization 12(3). Presents Simondon’s transduction “as a generalized model for the individuation of entities, that is, when heterogeneous resources are brought together and temporarily stabilized into functional units”, and uses it to examine Schatzki’s “site of the social” and Czarniawska’s “action nets”. Unread beyond the abstract. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-31, not read beyond the abstract. No lawful full text was reached. The journal’s own site (journal.emergentpublications.com) failed with a proxy 502 and its publisher, ISCE, closed in 2018; the Wayback Machine could not be reached from this client; Chalmers’ research portal (research.chalmers.se/en/publication/136251) holds metadata and the abstract only; the PhilArchive record STYTCO returned 403; CORE refused with 403; OpenAlex was out of its daily budget, and Crossref has no record of the article. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1906 | Process as the Becoming of Temporal Trajectory | Hernes (2016), a six-page handbook chapter. Process is the becoming of temporal trajectory: events connect with other events as they occur and so define a trajectory that orients what follows. Unread: registered from metadata. Its claims here are as the parent paper reports them. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex reports it closed. SAGE Knowledge serves it to subscribers. The CBS Research Portal record holds no file. The Internet Archive holds no copy, and a web search for an author’s or course copy found none. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1912 | Dislocation and stabilization: How to scale up from interactions to organization | Cooren & Fairhurst (2009), in Putnam & Nicotera (eds), Building Theories of Organization, pp. 117–152. The Montréal School’s answer to how organization is constituted from interactions, framed as “scaling up” through dislocation and stabilization. Unread: registered from metadata. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31 from Crossref and Taylor & Francis, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. The chapter has no DOI of its own in Crossref; the volume (DOI 10.4324/9780203891025) has no open licence and Semantic Scholar marks it closed. The Taylor & Francis chapter page served a bot check, which was not passed. Internet Archive’s copy of the volume (isbn_9780805847109) is lending-only (printdisabled). Papyrus (Université de Montréal) holds nothing by Cooren or Fairhurst; a web search found no author or course copy. Not a judgement on merit; it stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1913 | On Organizational Becoming: Rethinking Organizational Change | Tsoukas & Chia (2002). Change should be treated as the normal condition of organizations, not an exception to stability. After Bergson and James, change is ontologically prior to organization. It is “the reweaving of actors’ webs of beliefs and habits of action to accommodate new experiences obtained through interactions”, driven by the radial structure of categories and by human reflexivity. Organization is a secondary accomplishment in two senses: an attempt to order the flux of action, and a pattern that emerges from it. The paper is agent-centred: its becoming is carried by human actors. | Active — read in full 2026-10-31 (NOTE-1489), from the version of record (a scan with OCR) posted on the first author’s own site, htsoukas.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/tsoukas-chia-2002.pdf. Worth reading as the standard statement of “organizational becoming” in organization studies: change is ontologically prior to organization, and organization is a secondary accomplishment of it. A conceptual paper; its evidence is other people’s ethnographies, reread. |
| LIT-1914 | Acting for, with, and through: A relational perspective on agency in MSF’s organizing | Cooren (2018), in Brummans (ed.), The Agency of Organizing, pp. 142–169. A relational account of agency, in which any action is done for, with and through others, illustrated by interaction analysis of Médecins Sans Frontières meetings in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The source of the excerpt Bencherki, Brummans & Vézy reanalyse. Unread. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. The chapter is in a Routledge volume with no open licence in Crossref, and Semantic Scholar marks it closed. The Taylor & Francis chapter page served a bot check (403), which was not passed. Papyrus (Université de Montréal, umontreal.scholaris.ca) holds no item authored by Cooren; HAL holds other Cooren papers but not this one; a web search found no author or course copy. The excerpt the parent paper reanalyses therefore could not be compared with Cooren’s published transcript. Not a judgement on merit; it stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1915 | Simondon: investigating the pre-organizational | Letiche & Moriceau (2016; print 2017), the introduction to a Culture and Organization special issue on Simondon. Their abstract reads Simondon as “more a thinker of transindividuation than of individuation”, with transduction as an impersonal “life-force” of becoming of which “No one in particular is the subject”. It warns that transduction “would seem to escape the individual and/or collective will – becoming an all-important life-force outside political or ethical control”, and that Simondon’s ontology “needs to be debated”. Unread beyond the abstract. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-31, not read beyond the abstract. No lawful free full text was found: HAL’s record hal-01430560 is a notice with no file, and the IDEAS/RePEc entry says the item “is not available for download”; Moriceau’s page at jlmoriceau.wp.imt.fr/?p=56 links only to the publisher. The publisher’s page (tandfonline.com, doi 10.1080/14759551.2016.1240358) served a Cloudflare challenge, which was not passed, and Crossref records no open licence. OpenAlex was out of its daily budget for this client. The abstract, read in full from HAL’s API, holds the parent’s two p. 1 quotations. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1916 | A Process Theory of Organization | Hernes (2014), Oxford University Press. A process theory of organization for “a world on the move”, after Whitehead, pragmatism and phenomenology. Organizing is made of events connected through time and given meaning by articulation. Agency belongs to events, not to actors set in advance. Unread: registered from metadata and the table of contents. Its claims here are as the parent paper reports them. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31 from Crossref and OUP’s metadata, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex reports it closed. Oxford Academic serves it to subscribers. The CBS Research Portal record holds no file. The Internet Archive holds no copy. A PhilPapers record (HERAPT-4) served a Cloudflare check, which was not passed, and nothing shows that it holds more than metadata. A library’s table-of-contents scan (toc.uni.li/FLMF043296.pdf) was read for the chapter structure. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1917 | Having to be: The possessive constitution of organization | Bencherki & Cooren (2011), Human Relations 64:1579–1607. Organizations act by being attributed actions: through the imbrication of mandates and programs of action, in a logic of appropriation and attribution, the organization acts while always relying on others to act for it, which reconciles “the organization acts itself” with “agents act on its behalf”. Grounded in meetings of a community organization, with Greimas’s narratology. Unread: registered from the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. Crossref gives the SAGE version of record no open licence and Semantic Scholar marks it closed; SAGE’s PDF served a bot check (403), which was not passed. HAL holds a metadata-only notice (hal-00652927, under the variant title “To have or not to be”). Papyrus (Université de Montréal, now umontreal.scholaris.ca) holds Bencherki’s 2011 thesis, Avoir ou ne pas être, in French, which develops the same argument and cites the article as forthcoming, but not the article. R-libre (TÉLUQ) lists Bencherki’s later works, not this one. Not a judgement on merit; it stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1921 | From Modern to Postmodern Organizational Analysis | Chia (1995). What divides postmodern from modern organizational analysis is a style of thinking, not an epoch or a paradigm. Modernist thought rests on a “strong” ontology of being, of discrete states, static attributes and sequential events. Postmodern thought rests on a “weak” ontology of becoming, so it studies “local assemblages of ‘organizings’” rather than organizations, individuals and structures. Read from the abstract only. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-31 from Crossref, not read beyond its abstract: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex reports it closed. SAGE serves it to subscribers. The University of Glasgow’s Enlighten record (eprints.gla.ac.uk/162488) says “Full text not currently available” and gives the abstract, which was read. The Internet Archive holds no copy, and a web search for an author’s or course copy found none. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1922 | The Constitution of Organization as Informational Individuation | Bencherki & Iliadis (2019; print 2021), Communication Theory. Proposes Simondon’s informational individuation as the theory of communication that the communicative-constitution-of-organization (CCO) tradition lacks. Information is a differential in action potential between differently ordered domains; communication is its propagation “from kin to kin” (transduction), which organizes each domain it passes through; an action’s signification is the reordering it brings about; entities at different levels coexist rather than scale up. Four propositions, illustrated by one meeting excerpt. Agency is not theorized. | Active — read in full 2026-10-31 (NOTE-1483) from the authors’ manuscript in R-libre, TÉLUQ’s repository: 43 pp., Word-generated, headed “A more recent version of this paper is published in Communication Theory”. The version of record (Oxford, subscription) was not read, so its pagination (pp. 442–462) could not be checked against the text. Worth reading as the bridge between Iliadis’s exegesis of Simondon (LIT-1911) and the communicative constitution of organization; it is a theoretical proposal with one illustrative excerpt. |
| LIT-1923 | Ventriloquism’s methodological scope | Wilhoit (2016), Language Under Discussion 2:45–49. A response to Cooren (2014): Montréal School CCO is ontologically committed to interaction, so it takes conversation analysis as its method of choice, and a ventriloquism carrying those commitments cannot be the open metamodel Craig (1999) asked for. Dialogue is emerging instead from CCO work that uses other methods. It does not say Cooren’s analyses “entify agents”. | Active — read in full 2026-10-31 (NOTE-1487), from the journal’s open-access PDF (CC BY 4.0). A five-page response to Cooren’s “Pragmatism as ventriloquism” (Language Under Discussion 2014). Its point is about method: Montréal School CCO’s commitment to interaction makes conversation analysis its method of choice, so ventriloquism cannot be the open metamodel for Craig’s seven traditions that Cooren proposes. Worth knowing chiefly because Bencherki, Brummans & Vézy (LIT-1902) cite it for a claim it does not make, that Cooren’s analyses “entify agents”. |
| LIT-1935 | Can models of evolutionary transition clarify the debates over the Neolithic Revolution? | Shavit & Sharon (2023), DOI-10.1098/rstb.2021.0413. Asks whether an evolutionary-transition-in-individuality perspective can clarify the disputed cause, tempo and role of intention in the Neolithic shift in the southern Levant; it offers “a fresh lens”, not a solution, stressing within- and between-group differences. From the abstract; unread. | Deferred — filed 2026-11-01, not read. The companion paper to LIT-188 in the same theme issue, and the source of its one worked illustration. Open access (CC BY) at PubMed Central as PMC9869441; no reading was attempted. |
| LIT-1949 v2 | Rethinking the value of choice: A cultural perspective on intrinsic motivation. | Iyengar and Lepper (1999), doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.3.349. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A2). The cultural challenge to the value of choice; discussed second-hand in NOTE-439 and NOTE-441. | Unavailable — sought 2026-11-03, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists it closed with no repository copy; APA’s page is paywalled; web searches found only the separate 2000 paper “When choice is demotivating” on a course page; Iyengar’s Columbia pages (columbia.edu/~ss957) refuse this client with 403 throughout, so no address there could be confirmed; a CORE result (core.ac.uk/download/161434838.pdf) returned 403 and could not be identified. Its findings are held second-hand in Chirkov et al. 2003 (NOTE-1513, p. 97) as well as NOTE-439 and NOTE-441; a supplied copy returns it to reading. |
| LIT-1989 v2 | Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being. | Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003), JPSP 84. 559 students in South Korea, Russia, Turkey and the USA rated their reasons for practices of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. For every type of practice, the relative autonomy of their reasons predicted a well-being composite (β = .24–.29), positive in all sixteen country-by-practice tests and with no country or gender interaction. Vertical practices were much less internalized than horizontal ones. Autonomy as volition is argued to be orthogonal to independence. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1513), from the published PDF on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the primary study for SDT’s claim that autonomy is not individualism: autonomous enactment of collectivist and vertical practices predicts well-being in four countries. Cross-sectional, 94–195 students per country; “no moderation” is non-significant interactions. |
| LIT-2004 v2 | The Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation | Henrich & Muthukrishna (2021), doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106. Registered unread from the owner’s synthesis of 2026-11-04, whose §4 cites it for the claim that genetic evolution alone cannot explain the scale and cultural variability of human cooperation, so cultural evolution, norms, institutions and culture–gene coevolution matter too. That is unverified until read. The record holds the genetic mechanisms (THEORY-567, THEORY-655, THEORY-663) and the moral psychology (THEORY-468, THEORY-539), not the cultural-evolutionary account. | Unfetched — looked for 2026-11-04, not reached. A lawful free copy exists on the authors’ lab site: https://coevolution.fas.harvard.edu/sites/projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/culture_cognition_coevol_lab/files/annurev-psych-081920-042106.pdf. From this client it returns HTTP 403 with an “Access Denied” page, so it was not fetched and no attempt was made to get past it. LSE Research Online’s record (eprints.lse.ac.uk/107611) holds no file. OpenAlex and Europe PMC (no email address sent, ADR-008) list no open copy, and the publisher’s PDF is paywalled. A copy the owner supplies returns it to reading. |