Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci (2000), American Psychologist 55(1):68–78 — DOI-10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68

Key takeaways

  • Kinds of motivation. “Motivation” is not one quantity. A person can act from interest, from a value they hold, from guilt or pride, or under a reward or threat, and these have different consequences “even when the people have the same level of perceived competence or self-efficacy” (p. 69).
  • The continuum (Figure 1, pp. 72–73). Amotivation, then four kinds of extrinsic motivation ordered by relative autonomy (external, introjected, identified, integrated), then intrinsic motivation. Introjection is a regulation “taken in” but “not fully accepted as one’s own”, run by guilt, anxiety and contingent self-esteem. Identification is “a conscious valuing” of the behaviour. Integration is identification “brought into congruence with one’s other values and needs”.
  • Internalization depends on the social context. Relatedness and competence support internalization. Autonomy support is required for a regulation to be integrated rather than introjected: “To integrate a regulation, people must grasp its meaning and synthesize that meaning with respect to their other goals and values” (p. 74).
  • Needs, defined functionally. A basic need is “an energizing state that, if satisfied, conduces toward health and well-being but, if not satisfied, contributes to pathology and ill-being” (p. 74). The three are claimed to be universal; how they are satisfied varies by culture.

Standing in the record

Filed on 2026-10-03 at the owner’s request, as the first of the record’s self-determination theory (SDT) holdings and the paper the others build on. The topic motivation was added for this filing (ADR-023). This paper is its primary statement. Deci and Ryan’s Psychological Inquiry target article (LIT-558) is the long statement of the needs. Ryan and Deci (2006), LIT-560, is where they defend the autonomy concept against philosophers’ and psychologists’ objections. Vansteenkiste, Ryan and Soenens (2020), LIT-561, is the two-decade update.

Where it meets the record’s philosophy of agency: its continuum is an empirical, graded version of the question the Frankfurt holdings ask about whose a motive is. That bearing is drawn in NOTE-442 and NOTE-441, and is left to THEORY documents to state. The paper itself names no philosopher.

No instruction for machine-learning practice; nothing here belongs in the anthology.