Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Well-being — how well a life goes for the one living it, as psychology measures it — subjective and eudaimonic well-being, flourishing, vitality and meaning in life, and what predicts them (ADR-025).
26 of 2004 LIT documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| LIT-553 | Psychological Flexibility as a Fundamental Aspect of Health | Kashdan & Rottenberg (2010), Clinical Psychology Review 30(7):865–878. Psychological health is not a ratio of positive to negative experience or a set of fixed strengths but flexibility: adapting regulation to the situation, balancing time perspectives and life domains, and acting on values while open to experience. Inflexibility marks depression (rumination, emotion context insensitivity) and anxiety (experiential avoidance), and cardiac vagal control is proposed as an integrating marker. Executive functioning, default states and personality underlie it, and dynamic measurement is needed. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-436), in the NIH author manuscript on PubMed Central; worth reading as the review that took “psychological flexibility” out of the ACT literature and made it a general construct of health. Flexibility is adapting to situational demands, reconfiguring mental resources, shifting perspective and balancing competing desires and life domains. Its absence (rumination, emotion context insensitivity, experiential avoidance, low cardiac vagal control) runs through depression and anxiety. Executive functioning, default mental states and personality are its “building blocks”. It is a narrative synthesis: no meta-analysis of its own, the causal direction between inflexibility and disorder is left open by its own account, and it asks for dynamic measures in place of the global self-reports the ACT line relies on. |
| LIT-558 | The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior | Deci & Ryan (2000), Psychological Inquiry 11(4):227–268, target article. SDT’s case for innate psychological needs, for competence, relatedness and autonomy, defined as nutriments for growth, integrity and well-being and identified functionally, against Hull’s drives and Murray’s acquired needs. The “why” of a goal (autonomous or controlled regulation) and its “what” (intrinsic or extrinsic aspiration) each predict well-being, because each affects need satisfaction. Thwarted needs yield substitutes, controlled styles and rigid patterns. SDT grounds autonomy in the organism’s tendency to self-organize, argued to be an evolved advantage. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-439), from the authors’ own deposit of the published target article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the full statement of what SDT means by a “need” and why it posits three. Needs are “innate psychological nutriments that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being” (p. 228), identified by what follows when they are satisfied or thwarted, not by how strongly people want them. Goals differ in their “why” (autonomous or controlled regulation) and their “what” (intrinsic or extrinsic content), and both matter because of need satisfaction. Thwarting produces need substitutes, controlled regulatory styles and rigid behaviour patterns. It is a target article: the commentaries and the authors’ reply in the same issue were not read. |
| LIT-559 | Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being | Ryan & Deci (2000), American Psychologist 55(1):68–78. Self-determination theory in eleven pages. Three innate psychological needs, for competence, autonomy and relatedness, must be satisfied for growth, integration and well-being; their thwarting is “a principal source of human distress” (p. 74). Motivation differs in kind, not only amount: extrinsic motivation runs from external through introjected and identified to integrated regulation, and becomes more autonomous as a regulation is internalized and integrated with the self. Autonomy is volition, not independence. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-442), from the authors’ own deposit of the published article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the shortest statement of self-determination theory by its authors, and the one most cited. It gives the three basic psychological needs (competence, autonomy, relatedness), the continuum of regulation from amotivation through external, introjected, identified and integrated regulation to intrinsic motivation, and the claim that autonomy is volition, “not … being independent, detached, or selfish” (p. 74). It is a review: every empirical claim is cited to other papers, nothing is tested here, and it states the reward-undermining result as settled by Deci, Koestner & Ryan (LIT-557), which Cameron, Banko & Pierce dispute (LIT-562, unread; by its abstract). |
| LIT-561 | Basic psychological need theory: Advancements, critical themes, and future directions | Vansteenkiste, Ryan & Soenens (2020), Motivation and Emotion 44(1):1–31. Two decades of basic psychological need theory. A basic need must be psychological, essential, inherent, distinct and universal, and its effects pervasive, content-specific, directional and explanatory. Need frustration is not merely low satisfaction: it predicts ill-being, compensatory behaviour and need substitutes, and may be transdiagnostic. Novelty, morality and beneficence are reviewed as candidate fourth needs; none is yet admitted. Universality holds for the effects of need satisfaction, not for how needs are supported. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-440), from the publisher’s typeset PDF that the authors post on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the current statement of basic psychological need theory and of what would make something a basic need. It gives nine criteria (psychological, essential, inherent, distinct, universal; pervasive, content-specific, directional, explanatory), treats need frustration as distinct from low satisfaction and as a candidate transdiagnostic process in psychopathology, and restates universality as “universality without uniformity”: the effects of need satisfaction are claimed invariant, the ways needs are supported are not. It is an editorial introduction to two special issues, by SDT’s authors, and reviews selectively. |
| LIT-572 v2 | Narrative Identity | McAdams & McLean (2013), Current Directions in Psychological Science 22(3):233–238. Per its abstract, narrative identity is “a person’s internalized and evolving life story, integrating the reconstructed past and imagined future to provide life with some degree of unity and purpose”. Narrators who find redemptive meanings in adversity and whose stories feature agency and exploration “tend to enjoy higher levels of mental health, well-being, and maturity”. Unread: registered from the abstract; the construct is read in LIT-595. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the Crossref record and its abstract, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. SAGE does not make it open, Unpaywall and OpenAlex report it closed with no repository copy, Kate McLean’s publications page lists it without a file, the APS journal page offers no PDF, and ResearchGate refused this session (403). Its definition and its role are read first-hand in McAdams’s 2019 essay (LIT-595, read in full), which quotes the definition and builds on it. Filed because it is the canonical citation for narrative identity in psychology. A human reader with SAGE access could read its six pages and move it to Active. |
| LIT-574 v2 | A Multicomponent Conceptualization of Authenticity: Theory and Research | Kernis & Goldman (2006), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38:283–357. Unread. As two read papers report it: authenticity is “the unimpeded operation of one’s true self in one’s daily enterprise”, it is measured by the 45-item Authenticity Inventory (AI-3), and dispositional authenticity correlates with self-esteem (r = .47), self-concept clarity and self-actualization and negatively with distress. It is commonly summarized as four components: awareness, unbiased processing, behaviour and relational orientation. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the Crossref record and from two read papers that report it, not read. No lawful full text was found: the chapter is paywalled at Elsevier (ScienceDirect), Unpaywall and Semantic Scholar list it as closed, and the copies a web search turns up are uploads to ResearchGate and academia.edu, neither an author or institutional deposit that could be reached (ResearchGate refuses automated requests). Michael Kernis died in 2009, so no author page holds it. It is a 75-page chapter; a human reader with library access to Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38 can read it, and that would move this to Active. |
| LIT-589 | Goal Striving, Need Satisfaction, and Longitudinal Well-Being: The Self-Concordance Model | Sheldon & Elliot (1999), JPSP 76(3):482–497. A goal is self-concordant when pursued for identified or intrinsic rather than external or introjected reasons. In three semester-long studies of students, self-concordance predicted sustained effort, which fully mediated its link to attainment; attainment raised well-being more when goals were self-concordant; and accumulated daily experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness partly mediated attainment’s effect on well-being. Paths survived controls for self-efficacy, implementation intentions, avoidance framing and life skills. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-448); worth reading as the canonical statement of the self-concordance model and its evidence. Goals pursued for identified or intrinsic reasons get more sustained effort, so are better attained (effort fully mediates, in Studies 1 and 3), and attaining them raises well-being more, partly through accumulated daily experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness. The evidence is three semester-long correlational studies of students (N = 169, 152, 73), with structural models refitted after modification indices, and self-concordance is a self-report of reasons that cannot separate integration from identification. |
| LIT-592 v2 | The Authentic Personality: A Theoretical and Empirical Conceptualization and the Development of the Authenticity Scale | Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis & Joseph (2008), Journal of Counseling Psychology 55(3):385–399. Unread. Per its abstract it builds the 12-item Authenticity Scale on a tripartite, person-centred conception (self-alienation, authentic living, accepting external influence), supported by exploratory and multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, with discriminant validity from the Big Five, nonsignificant correlations with social desirability, test–retest r = .78 to .91, and strong relations of every subscale to self-esteem and well-being. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the abstract on the University of Manchester research portal and the repository records, not read. Every lawful copy found is out of reach: Manchester’s portal lists a pre-peer-review manuscript (PRE-PEER-REVIEW.PDF, 143 KB) whose download is behind a JavaScript and cookie challenge, which I did not try to get past; Stirling’s STORRE holds the published version under a permanent embargo (“The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available”); Warwick’s WRAP and Lincoln’s repository records carry no file; ResearchGate refused the request. A human reader can open the Manchester manuscript in a browser, or ask an author for a copy through STORRE; either would move this to Active. |
| LIT-595 | “First we invented stories, then they changed us”: The Evolution of Narrative Identity | McAdams (2019), Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 3(1):1–18. Narrative identity is “the internalized and evolving story a person invents to explain how he or she has become the person he or she is becoming”, giving a life “unity, moral purpose, and temporal coherence”. Storytelling evolved with human hypersociality. The self develops from social actor (by age 2) to motivated agent (school years) to autobiographical author (adolescence). Agentic and redemptive stories go with well-being and generativity, and cultures supply master narratives. “Biology guides and culture fills in the details.” | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-470), as the read substitute for McAdams & McLean, “Narrative Identity” (2013; LIT-572), which has no lawful copy and whose definition this essay takes over word for word. Worth reading as McAdams’s own short statement of narrative identity: “the internalized and evolving story a person invents to explain how he or she has become the person he or she is becoming”, which gives a life “unity, moral purpose, and temporal coherence”. It places the life story as the third layer of a self that develops from actor to agent to author, and reports that story features (agency, redemption, coherence) predict well-being and generativity. A review essay: the empirical claims are cited, not shown, and the evolutionary story is offered as plausible, not tested. |
| LIT-606 | Thine Own Self: True Self-Concept Accessibility and Meaning in Life | Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt & King (2009), JPSP 96(2):473–490. Five studies: faster “me” judgments for one’s own true-self traits (residualized on speed for control traits) predict presence of meaning in life, while actual-self accessibility does not, controlling affect, need satisfaction and (Study 4) AI-3 authenticity, which was itself uncorrelated with true-self accessibility. Subliminal priming of true-self traits raised reported meaning (Studies 3 and 5), for disliked traits as much as liked ones. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-469); worth reading as the experimental case that the true self-concept, as distinct from self-reported authenticity, matters to felt meaning. In five student studies (N = 56 to 149), how quickly people classify their own “true self” traits predicts presence of meaning in life over and above actual-self accessibility, need satisfaction and AI-3 authenticity, and subliminally priming true-self traits raises reported meaning, even when the traits are disliked. Effects are small, meaning is self-report only, and the Study 5 interaction is printed with an F that cannot carry its stated p. |
| LIT-914 v3 | The Concept of Flow | Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi (2002), chapter 7 of Snyder & Lopez (eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology, pp. 89–105: the standard short statement of flow, the state of complete absorption in an activity that is done for its own sake. Unread; registered so the record’s claims about flow have a work to name. | Unavailable — unread, registered from Crossref metadata 2026-10-11. No lawful open copy was found: Oxford Academic’s chapter page is paywalled, and the only full copy a search turned up is an unofficial Scribd upload of the later 2009 chapter, which was not opened. Filed as the record’s anchor for flow, which it held nothing on. A reading of the chapter, or of Csikszentmihalyi (1990), would place it. |
| LIT-1183 v2 | A survey on self-assessed well-being in a cohort of chronic locked-in syndrome patients: happy majority, miserable minority | Bruno et al. (2011). Of 168 members of the French LIS association invited, 91 replied and 65 gave usable answers, with a proxy’s help: 47 (72%) rated their present life at or above the midpoint between their best period before LIS and their worst ever (median +3), 18 below (median −4). All had chronic LIS after a brainstem vascular accident, a median of 8 years before; 55% had recovered some speech and 70% some limb movement. Happiness was associated with years in LIS (OR 1.5 per year), recovered speech (OR 20.5) and absence of anxiety (OR 0.19). 58% did not wish to be resuscitated; 7% wished for euthanasia. | Active — read 2026-10-16 (NOTE-961) in full, from the open-access version in PubMed Central. Worth reading as the largest survey of chronic locked-in patients’ own ratings of their lives: 47 of 65 rated their present life at or above the midpoint between their best period before LIS and their worst ever, and happiness rose with years in LIS, recovered speech and absence of anxiety. Read it knowing that it is a self-selected association sample (54% response, 26 more excluded) answering with a proxy’s help, that most respondents had recovered some speech or limb movement, and that the authors expect its biases to overstate well-being. |
| LIT-1448 | Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility | Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin (1997), Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2):375–405. “Utility” has two meanings: decision utility, an outcome’s weight in choice, and experienced utility, its hedonic quality. Experienced utility is instant (the pleasure or distress of the moment, reported in real time) or remembered (a retrospective evaluation). Remembered utility follows the Peak-End average and neglects duration. Choices follow remembered utility, so subjects repeat a longer cold-water trial that dominates the shorter one in pain. Axioms on ordinal instant utility with a neutral zero make total utility the time integral of a value transform. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1105): in full, from the published article as deposited in Erasmus University Rotterdam’s repository (RePub, hdl 1765/23011). Distinguishes decision utility (an outcome’s weight in choice) from experienced utility (hedonic quality). Experienced utility divides into instant utility, reported in real time, and remembered utility, a retrospective evaluation. Remembered utility follows a Peak-End rule and neglects duration. Choices follow remembered utility, so people choose dominated, longer painful episodes. Axioms on ordinal instant utility with a neutral zero yield total utility as a time integral. Filed for the record’s three-layer operationalization of felt valence (CLAIM-440). |
| LIT-1960 v2 | The path taken: Consequences of attaining intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations in post-college life | Niemiec, Ryan and Deci (2009), J. Res. Pers. 43. 147 graduates surveyed one and two years after college. Valuing intrinsic or extrinsic aspirations predicted attaining them (β = .51, .67). With both attainments in the model, intrinsic attainment predicted well-being (β = .77) and ill-being (β = −.66), extrinsic attainment well-being β = .00 and ill-being β = .38; over the year, change in need satisfaction mediated intrinsic attainment’s link to change in well-being. All self-report and correlational; alone, extrinsic attainment correlates positively with well-being (mean r = .19). | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1520), from the PubMed Central author manuscript PMC2736104; worth reading as the direct longitudinal test of goal contents theory’s claim about attainment, and for what it shows that its citations drop: extrinsic attainment’s null is a unique-variance result, and alone it correlates positively with well-being. |
| LIT-1962 v2 | A meta-analysis of self-determination theory-informed intervention studies in the health domain: effects on motivation, health behavior, physical, and psychological health | Ntoumanis et al. (2020; Health Psychol. Rev. 15, 2021). A meta-analysis of 73 SDT-informed health interventions (58 RCTs, 30,088 participants). At the end of the intervention they raised perceived need support (g = 0.64), autonomy and competence satisfaction (0.37, 0.31), autonomous motivation (0.30), health behaviour (0.45) and psychological health (0.29); not relatedness, controlled motivation or amotivation. At follow-up behaviour (0.28) and physical health (0.28) held, psychological health did not (0.14, ns). Mediation was not tested and need frustration was not an outcome. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1526), from the open-access PDF in White Rose eprints; worth reading as the experimental evidence that manipulating need support moves need satisfaction, autonomous motivation and health behaviour. It does not give what THEORY-052’s promote_when asks: no need-frustration outcome, no mediation test, and a psychological-health effect that is gone at follow-up. |
| LIT-1966 v2 | What is satisfying about satisfying events? Testing 10 candidate psychological needs. | Sheldon, Elliot, Kim and Kasser (2001), JPSP 80. Three studies (USA; USA and South Korea; USA) rated ten candidate needs within participants’ most satisfying event of the last month, week or semester. Autonomy, competence, relatedness and self-esteem were the most salient and the strongest correlates of event affect; among all ten, self-esteem was the largest unique predictor in Studies 1 and 3 (β = .28, .38). The authors concluded there may be four needs. Security mattered in unsatisfying events; money–luxury came last. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1502), from the scan on selfdeterminationtheory.org, read as page images; worth reading because its own SDT authors concluded there may be four needs, self-esteem the fourth, and named the need-or-outcome ambiguity that QUESTION-369 asks about. |
| LIT-1967 v2 | We know this much is (meta-analytically) true: A meta-review of meta-analytic findings evaluating self-determination theory. | Ryan, Duineveld, Di Domenico, Ryan, Steward and Bradshaw (2022), Psychological Bulletin 148. A narrative synthesis of 60 meta-analyses of self-determination theory found to July 2021, not preregistered. Support is strongest for cognitive evaluation, organismic integration and basic needs theory, thin for causality orientations and goal contents, and absent for relationships motivation theory; no meta-analysis of need frustration exists, and integrated regulation is not separated from identified regulation (Howard et al. 2017; Van den Broeck et al. 2021). Most pooled effects are cross-sectional correlations with high, largely unexplained heterogeneity. No meta-analysis is re-pooled or graded. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1500), from the authors’ accepted manuscript on OSF; the online supplement was not read. Worth reading as the one map of SDT’s meta-analytic evidence: where it is strong (CET, OIT, BPNT), thin (COT, GCT) or absent (RMT, need frustration, integrated regulation). It is a narrative synthesis by the theory’s co-founder, not an independent audit. |
| LIT-1968 v2 | Daily Well-Being: The Role of Autonomy, Competence, and Relatedness | Reis et al. (2000), doi:10.1177/0146167200266002. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). Within-person evidence for the three needs, the design THEORY-052’s promote_when prefers to between-person correlation. | Unfetched — sought 2026-11-03; a lawful free copy is located and was not fetched. The co-author Shelly Gable’s lab page posts the article at https://labs.psych.ucsb.edu/gable/shelly/sites/labs.psych.ucsb.edu.gable.shelly/files/pubs/reis_et_al._2000.pdf (listed, per a web search, on https://labs.psych.ucsb.edu/gable/shelly/node/390). From this client the host failed TLS certificate verification through the session proxy and returned HTTP 503 to a second fetcher; a Wayback capture of 2024-07-03 exists, and web.archive.org is blocked by this session’s egress policy. Supplying that PDF returns it to reading. |
| LIT-1969 v2 | Interpersonal supports for basic psychological needs and their relations with motivation, well-being, and performance: A meta-analysis. | Slemp et al. (2024), JPSP 127. A psychometric meta-analysis of 881 samples (N = 443,556), over 70% cross-sectional and mostly recipient-reported. Perceived autonomy, competence and relatedness support each correlate with satisfaction of all three needs at ρ = .44–.62, with their frustration at −.20 to −.55, with autonomous motivation at about .4 and with performance at .14–.25. The supports intercorrelate .67–.71; in joint models competence and relatedness support add to autonomy support, and relatedness support carries relatedness satisfaction. Individualism moderated 2 of 18 relations. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1507), from the CC BY Online First PDF as posted on selfdeterminationtheory.org; supplementary tables not read. Worth reading as the largest synthesis of SDT’s contextual claim, 881 samples; its “effects” are correlations, mostly cross-sectional, and its three supports intercorrelate about .7. |
| LIT-1971 v2 | The role of need fulfillment in relationship functioning and well-being: A self-determination theory perspective. | Patrick, Knee, Canevello and Lonsbary (2007), JPSP 92. Three correlational studies of romantic relationships, mostly women students: eight pooled samples (N = 1,918), 66 couples, and a 10-day diary of 908 disagreements by 120 people. Perceived need fulfilment by the partner correlates with satisfaction (r = .72 corrected), commitment, secure attachment and less defensiveness; relatedness is the strongest unique predictor of relationship outcomes; the partner’s fulfilment predicts one’s own satisfaction beyond one’s own; and the relative autonomy of one’s reasons for being in the relationship carries fulfilment’s association with post-disagreement satisfaction. Autonomy and competence subscales correlate .96 after correction. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1515), from the article on the SDT site. Worth reading as the relationship-level test of all three needs: fulfilment by a partner goes with relationship quality, relatedness most, and the partner’s fulfilment adds to one’s own; but its measure does not separate autonomy from competence (r = .96 corrected), and all three studies are correlational self-report. |
| LIT-1977 v2 | Further Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals | Kasser and Ryan (1996), PSPB 22. Two cross-sectional self-report studies, 100 community adults and 192 students. Seven aspirations form two factors, extrinsic (financial success, social recognition, appealing appearance) and intrinsic (self-acceptance, affiliation, community feeling, physical fitness). With overall importance controlled, extrinsic importance goes with less self-actualization (β = −.52, −.67) and vitality (−.60, −.34) and more physical symptoms (.46, .43), and intrinsic importance with the reverse; likelihood ratings parallel this, and the pattern survived social desirability with two effects becoming marginal. Reasons for pursuing the goals are not measured. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1525), from the scan on the SDT site. Worth reading as a primary source of goal contents theory: with overall striving held fixed, extrinsic aspirations go with lower and intrinsic with higher self-reported well-being, in an adult and a student sample. It does not test the “beyond the reasons” half of NOTE-439’s C4, which it names as an open question. |
| LIT-1979 v3 | Within-person variation in security of attachment: A self-determination theory perspective on attachment, need fulfillment, and well-being. | La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman and Deci (2000), JPSP 79: 367–384. In three studies of undergraduates (N = 136, 152, 160), between 19% and 44% of the variance in attachment security was between persons, the rest within persons across partners (mother, father, romantic partner, best friend, and in Study 2 roommate and another adult). Relationship-specific satisfaction of the three needs predicted relationship-specific security, also without the relatedness items; relatedness was the strongest unique predictor, then autonomy, then competence. Mean security predicted well-being and variability across partners mostly did not. Need satisfaction and security each partly mediated the other’s relation to well-being. All cross-sectional. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1523), from the typeset.io copy of the published article, at the owner’s direction. Worth reading as the source of the claim that need satisfaction varies by relationship and predicts attachment security relationship by relationship: most of the variance in attachment is within persons, across partners. Cross-sectional, and the authors say so: the direction is undetermined and probably runs both ways. |
| LIT-1980 v2 | Beyond the three basic needs: beneficence satisfaction and frustration as predictors of well- and ill-being in a Central European sample | Lubics et al. (2026), doi:10.1007/s11031-026-10216-7. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). A 2026 test of beneficence as a fourth need, against Martela and Ryan’s classification. | Unfetched — searched 2026-11-03 for a lawful full text; one exists but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. OpenAlex lists it as open access under CC BY at the publisher, link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11031-026-10216-7.pdf, which returned a client challenge (bot check) to curl and was not retried. No repository copy is listed and none was found. A browser fetch of the Springer address is the cheapest way to read it. |
| LIT-1983 v2 | Distinguishing between basic psychological needs and basic wellness enhancers: the case of beneficence as a candidate psychological need | Martela and Ryan (2019), doi:10.1007/s11031-019-09800-x. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). Held second-hand in NOTE-440: beneficence’s frustration adds no variance, so it is classed a wellness enhancer rather than a need. For QUESTION-369. | Unfetched — searched 2026-11-03 for a lawful full text; one exists but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The article is open access under CC BY: the publisher’s PDF at link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11031-019-09800-x.pdf returned a client challenge (bot check) to curl, and the authors’ submitted version in Aalto University’s repository, research.aalto.fi/files/38294637/Martela_Ryan2019_Article_DistinguishingBetweenBasicPsyc.pdf, returned a Cloudflare “Just a moment” page. Neither host was retried. A web search found no other copy (selfdeterminationtheory.org holds the 2016 beneficence paper, not this one). A browser fetch of either address is the cheapest way to read it. Until then what the record holds of it is second-hand, in NOTE-440. |
| LIT-1988 v2 | Assessing basic/fundamental psychological need fulfillment: systematic mapping and review of existing scales to foster cumulative science | Kermavnar, Avsec, Huang and Desmet (2024), Frontiers in Psychology 15. A PRISMA review, searched 21 August 2023, of original self-report scales of need fulfillment in healthy general populations: 31 scales from 32 primary studies, 23 based on self-determination theory, with 89 adaptations. 21 measure satisfaction only; four satisfaction and frustration, three support, one frustration only (2020), one thwarting (Bartholomew et al. 2011), one support and thwarting. Autonomy appears in 27 scales, relatedness 24, competence 23, over 30 other needs in a few each. The review documents the four states’ terms used interchangeably, double-barrelled frustration-thwarting items, satisfaction items that ask about thwarting, and the BPNSFS’s frustration scales “repurposed” from negatively coded satisfaction items (after Murphy et al. 2023). It finds no consensus on what makes a need basic, takes no side on the two-dimensional model, and names the IBQ and GNSF as good practice. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1509), from the version of record (CC BY) via Europe PMC; worth reading as a finding aid to the 31 original need-fulfillment scales and as a plain list of the field’s measurement faults: satisfaction, frustration, support and thwarting confused, frustration scales built from negatively worded satisfaction items, double-barrelled items. It offers no criterion for need-hood (THEORY-1318). |
| LIT-2000 v2 | Basic psychological need satisfaction, need frustration, and need strength across four cultures | Chen et al. (2015), Motiv. Emot. 39, online 12 November 2014. Two cross-sectional studies, Belgium and China (N = 683) and Belgium, China, the USA and Peru (N = 1,051). They build the 24-item Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction and Frustration Scale: six factors fit better than three and are metric-invariant across the four countries. Satisfaction relates mainly to life satisfaction and vitality, frustration mainly to depressive symptoms, with no detectable country differences and no moderation by need valuation or need desire. All frustration items are negatively worded and all satisfaction items positively. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1527), from the publisher’s typeset copy in the ULB repository DI-fusion; worth reading as the source of the BPNSFS, the standard need-frustration scale, and for its test that need satisfaction helps regardless of how much a person values or desires the need. Its satisfaction/frustration split coincides with item direction by construction. |