Topics — What a work is about. Nucleation holds whatever reading the owner files here, whether or not an Anthology of the SOTA topic could also hold it; instruction for ML practice belongs to the anthology (ADR-048). The words are seeded from the clusters the reading-time triage of 2026-09-25 found, and grow by decision.
Motivation — why organisms act and persist — intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, needs, goals and values, the internalization of regulation, and the difference between autonomous and controlled motives; the empirical counterpart of the philosophy of autonomy under agency (ADR-023).
93 of 2004 LIT documents. Back to the full index.
| # | Title | Summary | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| LIT-540 | Impulsive action: emotional impulses and their control | Frijda, Ridderinkhof & Rietveld (2014), Frontiers in Psychology 5:518. Impulsive action is non-deliberate but purposive. Automatic appraisal of an event’s pertinence to the agent’s concerns elicits a state of action readiness, a motive to establish, modify or end a relation to the object, with “control precedence” (urgency, persistence, attentional capture). Modes of action readiness are what distinguish one emotion from another. Events usually draw several appraisals and so several states of readiness, and their interaction regulates action: much emotion regulation is itself emotional, not reason overriding passion. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-433); filed in place of Frijda’s The Emotions (LIT-546), which could not be read, as the shortest lawfully readable statement of his action-readiness theory in his own words. Appraisal of an event’s pertinence to one’s concerns elicits a state of action readiness, a motive to change one’s relation to the object, which has “control precedence”. Modes of action readiness correspond to emotions (hostility to anger, avoidance to fear). Much emotion regulation is itself one state of action readiness checking another, so “there is no clear distinction between processes of emotion and processes of emotion regulation”. It is a theoretical paper with no data, written for impulsive action, so it states the theory’s core and not its full range. |
| LIT-545 v3 | Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change | Bandura (1977), Psychological Review 84(2):191–215. The founding paper of self-efficacy theory: psychological treatments, whatever their form, are proposed to work by changing a person’s expectation that they can perform the needed behaviour. Unread: registered from bibliographic metadata, with no lawful abstract reachable. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref and PubMed, not read. The article is closed access at APA. Unpaywall and OpenAlex call it “green” open access, but their one location is a DOAJ record of an unrelated 2020 Jurnal Psikologi article on thalassemia screening that carries Bandura’s DOI by mistake. The copy Stanford hosted with Bandura’s papers (web.stanford.edu/dept/psychology/bandura/pajares/Bandura1977PR.pdf) now returns 403 Forbidden. Its archived snapshots are on the Wayback Machine, which this environment’s egress policy blocks, and the University of Kentucky mirror of the same collection now redirects away. A PDF of the published article is posted by the Sustainable Sanitation Alliance’s library (susana.org), a third party, so it was not read (only its first page was opened, to identify what it was). A human reader with APA access, or one who can open the archived Stanford copy, could promote this. |
| LIT-556 v3 | Reinforcement, Reward, and Intrinsic Motivation: A Meta-Analysis | Cameron & Pierce (1994), Review of Educational Research 64(3):363–423. A hierarchical meta-analysis of about 96 experiments concluding that rewards do not, overall, decrease intrinsic motivation; that verbal rewards increase it; and that the only reliable negative effect is on free-choice time when expected tangible rewards are given for merely doing a task. It called for “abandoning cognitive evaluation theory”. Unread: registered from the account of it in LIT-557 and its authors’ restatement in LIT-562. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from Crossref and from the two papers that analyse it, not read. The article is closed access at SAGE (Review of Educational Research), and Unpaywall finds no open copy. A web search found it only on Scribd, a third-party upload, which was not opened. Its authors’ reply to Deci, Koestner and Ryan, Cameron, Banko and Pierce (2001, LIT-562), has since been read and restates this paper’s results, but not as a substitute for reading it. A reader with SAGE access could promote this. |
| LIT-557 v2 | A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation | Deci, Koestner & Ryan (1999), Psychological Bulletin 125(6):627–668. A hierarchical meta-analysis of 128 experiments (101 with free-choice, 84 with self-report measures) on interesting tasks. Tangible rewards undermined free-choice intrinsic motivation (d = −0.34) and self-reported interest (−0.07); expected rewards did, by every task-related contingency; unexpected and task-noncontingent rewards did not; positive feedback enhanced both measures, but not children’s free choice. Read as strong support for cognitive evaluation theory and against Eisenberger and Cameron’s behavioural account. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-438), from an OCR of the scanned published article the authors post on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the largest meta-analysis of the reward-undermining effect and the evidential base SDT cites for it. Across 128 experiments on interesting tasks, expected tangible rewards undermined free-choice intrinsic motivation (d = −0.36), engagement-, completion- and performance-contingent rewards all did (−0.40, −0.36, −0.28), unexpected and task-noncontingent rewards did not, and positive feedback enhanced it (0.33), though not for children’s free choice. It reanalyses Cameron and Pierce (LIT-556) study by study. Its categories are CET’s, and the rival authors reply, by the abstract of Cameron, Banko and Pierce (LIT-562, unread), that the negative effects are circumscribed, not pervasive. |
| LIT-558 | The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior | Deci & Ryan (2000), Psychological Inquiry 11(4):227–268, target article. SDT’s case for innate psychological needs, for competence, relatedness and autonomy, defined as nutriments for growth, integrity and well-being and identified functionally, against Hull’s drives and Murray’s acquired needs. The “why” of a goal (autonomous or controlled regulation) and its “what” (intrinsic or extrinsic aspiration) each predict well-being, because each affects need satisfaction. Thwarted needs yield substitutes, controlled styles and rigid patterns. SDT grounds autonomy in the organism’s tendency to self-organize, argued to be an evolved advantage. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-439), from the authors’ own deposit of the published target article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the full statement of what SDT means by a “need” and why it posits three. Needs are “innate psychological nutriments that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being” (p. 228), identified by what follows when they are satisfied or thwarted, not by how strongly people want them. Goals differ in their “why” (autonomous or controlled regulation) and their “what” (intrinsic or extrinsic content), and both matter because of need satisfaction. Thwarting produces need substitutes, controlled regulatory styles and rigid behaviour patterns. It is a target article: the commentaries and the authors’ reply in the same issue were not read. |
| LIT-559 | Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being | Ryan & Deci (2000), American Psychologist 55(1):68–78. Self-determination theory in eleven pages. Three innate psychological needs, for competence, autonomy and relatedness, must be satisfied for growth, integration and well-being; their thwarting is “a principal source of human distress” (p. 74). Motivation differs in kind, not only amount: extrinsic motivation runs from external through introjected and identified to integrated regulation, and becomes more autonomous as a regulation is internalized and integrated with the self. Autonomy is volition, not independence. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-442), from the authors’ own deposit of the published article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the shortest statement of self-determination theory by its authors, and the one most cited. It gives the three basic psychological needs (competence, autonomy, relatedness), the continuum of regulation from amotivation through external, introjected, identified and integrated regulation to intrinsic motivation, and the claim that autonomy is volition, “not … being independent, detached, or selfish” (p. 74). It is a review: every empirical claim is cited to other papers, nothing is tested here, and it states the reward-undermining result as settled by Deci, Koestner & Ryan (LIT-557), which Cameron, Banko & Pierce dispute (LIT-562, unread; by its abstract). |
| LIT-560 | Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will? | Ryan & Deci (2006), Journal of Personality 74(6):1557–1586. SDT’s defence of autonomy as a psychological construct. Philosophers (phenomenologists from Pfänder and Ricoeur; hierarchical accounts from Frankfurt and Dworkin) agree that autonomy is self-endorsement, not independence. On that definition, the critiques fail: behaviourists and Bandura define autonomy as independence from the environment; reductive neuroscience mistakes levels of explanation; nonconscious priming shows autonomy can be compromised, not that it is illusory; too many options is not self-determination; and autonomy matters across cultures. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-441), from the authors’ own deposit of the published article on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the place where SDT states its concept of autonomy against both philosophy and psychology. Autonomy is “regulation by the self”, its opposite “heteronomy”, regulation “without self-endorsement” (abstract). It is “a matter of degree” (p. 1562), compatible with dependence and with having one option, and lies “not in being independent causes but in exercising their capacity to reflectively endorse or reject prompted actions” (p. 1573). It answers Skinner, Bandura, Pinker, Bargh, Wegner, Schwartz and Iyengar. Its engagement with Frankfurt is thin: two citations of the 1971 paper inside one paragraph on hierarchical accounts, with the analytic detail taken from Dworkin. |
| LIT-561 | Basic psychological need theory: Advancements, critical themes, and future directions | Vansteenkiste, Ryan & Soenens (2020), Motivation and Emotion 44(1):1–31. Two decades of basic psychological need theory. A basic need must be psychological, essential, inherent, distinct and universal, and its effects pervasive, content-specific, directional and explanatory. Need frustration is not merely low satisfaction: it predicts ill-being, compensatory behaviour and need substitutes, and may be transdiagnostic. Novelty, morality and beneficence are reviewed as candidate fourth needs; none is yet admitted. Universality holds for the effects of need satisfaction, not for how needs are supported. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-440), from the publisher’s typeset PDF that the authors post on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the current statement of basic psychological need theory and of what would make something a basic need. It gives nine criteria (psychological, essential, inherent, distinct, universal; pervasive, content-specific, directional, explanatory), treats need frustration as distinct from low satisfaction and as a candidate transdiagnostic process in psychopathology, and restates universality as “universality without uniformity”: the effects of need satisfaction are claimed invariant, the ways needs are supported are not. It is an editorial introduction to two special issues, by SDT’s authors, and reviews selectively. |
| LIT-562 v2 | Pervasive negative effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation: The myth continues | Cameron, Banko & Pierce (2001), The Behavior Analyst 24(1):1–44. The authors of the 1994 rival meta-analysis re-analyse 145 studies, adopt Deci, Koestner and Ryan’s split by initial interest, and code reward contingencies by procedure rather than by cognitive evaluation theory. Rewards for merely doing an interesting task undermine free choice (−0.35, K = 57), as in Deci et al. Rewards for surpassing a score do not, and rewards for beating others enhance. Every effect either way is small. | Active — read in full 2026-10-05 (NOTE-587), on the owner’s instruction, from the article as hosted by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies; the same article is free in PubMed Central (PMC2731358). Worth reading as the strongest case against pervasive reward undermining, by the authors of the rival meta-analysis, and as the paper that shows the coding scheme decides the result. Re-coding 145 studies by procedure, it finds no overall effect on free choice and enhancement on low-interest tasks. On interesting tasks it finds undermining only for expected tangible rewards loosely tied to performance or earned at less than the maximum, and neutral or positive effects for rewards tied to a score or to beating others. The core effect agrees with Deci et al.; the per-contingency sizes are in figures with no text layer. |
| LIT-574 v2 | A Multicomponent Conceptualization of Authenticity: Theory and Research | Kernis & Goldman (2006), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38:283–357. Unread. As two read papers report it: authenticity is “the unimpeded operation of one’s true self in one’s daily enterprise”, it is measured by the 45-item Authenticity Inventory (AI-3), and dispositional authenticity correlates with self-esteem (r = .47), self-concept clarity and self-actualization and negatively with distress. It is commonly summarized as four components: awareness, unbiased processing, behaviour and relational orientation. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the Crossref record and from two read papers that report it, not read. No lawful full text was found: the chapter is paywalled at Elsevier (ScienceDirect), Unpaywall and Semantic Scholar list it as closed, and the copies a web search turns up are uploads to ResearchGate and academia.edu, neither an author or institutional deposit that could be reached (ResearchGate refuses automated requests). Michael Kernis died in 2009, so no author page holds it. It is a 75-page chapter; a human reader with library access to Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38 can read it, and that would move this to Active. |
| LIT-577 | Sophisticated Inference | Friston, Da Costa, Hafner, Hesp & Parr (2021; arXiv 2020), Neural Computation 33(3):713–763. Ordinary active inference scores a fixed set of policies by expected free energy (risk plus ambiguity). Sophisticated inference instead evaluates the expected free energy of the next action recursively, averaging over the beliefs the agent would hold after each plausible outcome and action, which amounts to a tree search over belief states pruned below a probability of 1/16. In simulations it plans past short-term costs: a rat visits a mildly aversive cue, and a horizon of four escapes a local minimum in a maze. It recovers Bayes-adaptive RL in the zero-temperature limit. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-454), from the arXiv preprint, whose displayed equations did not survive text extraction. Worth reading as the active-inference planning scheme the record’s free-energy holdings otherwise lack: expected free energy evaluated recursively over future belief states, a deep tree search pruned by probability, with the Bellman equation as its formal analogue. The evidence is small simulations (a T-maze rat and an 8 × 8 grid). Flagged anthology-candidate: it is a planning algorithm, compared with reinforcement learning, and the anthology’s agents-and-environments topic may hold it. |
| LIT-583 v2 | Breakdown of Will | Ainslie (2001), Cambridge University Press. The book-length statement of picoeconomics: hyperbolic discounting makes a person a population of bargaining interests, and will is the recursive bundling of choices into precedents. Unread: registered from the publisher’s description and the précis, LIT-586, which stands in for it. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from the publisher’s description and from the outline of the book given in its précis, not read. Not open access: Unpaywall reports no open copy, and no author deposit of the book was found (the author’s site, picoeconomics.org, carries the précis and articles, not the book). The owner suggested the précis instead, and it is read and filed as LIT-586 (NOTE-443), which follows the book’s three sections and twelve chapters. The book is kept as the citation others reach for. A human with library access could read chapters 5-8 (the bargaining model and its evidence) against the précis. |
| LIT-584 | Model-based and model-free Pavlovian reward learning: Revaluation, revision, and revelation | Dayan & Berridge (2014), Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 14(2):473-492. Pavlovian prediction is not only model-free. A cue that had predicted disgusting salt became instantly “wanted” when a never-experienced salt appetite was induced, before the salt was retasted, which needs a prediction of the outcome’s identity revalued against the current bodily state. Over-training may “defocus” outcome representations rather than hand control to a model-free system. Dopamine may carry model-based evaluations. No algorithm for the revaluation is given. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-463), from the PubMed Central author manuscript. Worth reading as the argument that Pavlovian prediction, usually modelled as purely model-free, is also model-based. In the “Dead Sea salt” experiment a lever that had predicted a disgusting salt solution became, on first presentation after a novel sodium appetite was induced and before any salt was retasted, nearly as attractive as a sucrose lever, with mesolimbic activation. A cached value cannot do that. The CS must predict the outcome’s identity, and its value must be recomputed against the current bodily state. The paper adds “defocusing” of outcome representations as a model-based route to apparent habit, and argues that dopamine can carry model-based evaluations. |
| LIT-585 | The Expected Value of Control: An Integrative Theory of Anterior Cingulate Cortex Function | Shenhav, Botvinick & Cohen (2013), Neuron 79(2):217-240. Control is allocated by a cost-benefit decision. The expected value of control (EVC) of a candidate control signal is its probability-weighted payoff, with future value discounted, minus an intrinsic cost rising with its intensity. dACC monitors state and outcome information and specifies the identity and intensity of the EVC-maximizing signal. Lateral PFC and subcortical structures implement it. The account integrates conflict monitoring, effort costs and the override of defaults (exploration, foraging, patience). | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-446), from the PubMed Central author manuscript. Worth reading as the standard statement that cognitive control is allocated by a cost-benefit decision. The “expected value of control” (EVC) of a control signal, which has an identity (which task) and an intensity (how much), is its expected payoff minus an intrinsic cost that rises with intensity. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is proposed to monitor and to specify the EVC-maximizing signal, which lateral PFC and subcortical structures then implement. It is a review and synthesis: the model is stated, not fitted, and the authors say the ingredients are not new. |
| LIT-586 | Précis of Breakdown of Will | Ainslie (2005), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(5), the précis of Breakdown of Will (2001). People and other animals discount delayed rewards hyperbolically, so preferences reverse as a smaller, sooner reward comes near, and a person becomes a population of reward-seeking “interests” that must forestall one another. Willpower is the bundling of future choices by treating the present one as a precedent: an intertemporal repeated prisoner’s dilemma, not an organ or a top-down ego. The same recursion predicts the will’s costs: legalism, circumscribed “lapse districts”, motivated blindness to lapses, and rules that favour countable goals over subtle ones. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-443), as the substitute for the 2001 book (LIT-583), which the owner suggested and which the précis follows chapter by chapter. Worth reading as the shortest complete statement of picoeconomics in Ainslie’s own words. Hyperbolic discounting makes preference reverse as a smaller, sooner reward draws near, so a person behaves like a population of “interests” that bargain across time. Will is not a faculty above them but a recursive self-prediction: treating each choice as a precedent “bundles” future rewards, an intertemporal repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which “credibility is power”. The same mechanism predicts the will’s side effects: legalism, “lapse districts”, motivated misperception and compulsive over-control. |
| LIT-589 | Goal Striving, Need Satisfaction, and Longitudinal Well-Being: The Self-Concordance Model | Sheldon & Elliot (1999), JPSP 76(3):482–497. A goal is self-concordant when pursued for identified or intrinsic rather than external or introjected reasons. In three semester-long studies of students, self-concordance predicted sustained effort, which fully mediated its link to attainment; attainment raised well-being more when goals were self-concordant; and accumulated daily experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness partly mediated attainment’s effect on well-being. Paths survived controls for self-efficacy, implementation intentions, avoidance framing and life skills. | Active — read in full 2026-10-03 (NOTE-448); worth reading as the canonical statement of the self-concordance model and its evidence. Goals pursued for identified or intrinsic reasons get more sustained effort, so are better attained (effort fully mediates, in Studies 1 and 3), and attaining them raises well-being more, partly through accumulated daily experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness. The evidence is three semester-long correlational studies of students (N = 169, 152, 73), with structural models refitted after modification indices, and self-concordance is a self-report of reasons that cannot separate integration from identification. |
| LIT-604 v2 | Control theory: A useful conceptual framework for personality–social, clinical, and health psychology | Carver & Scheier (1982), Psychological Bulletin 92(1):111-135. A review arguing, by its title, that control theory is a useful framework for personality-social, clinical and health psychology. Unread: no lawful open copy and no published abstract could be reached. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-03 from bibliographic records, not read. No lawful free copy was found. Unpaywall reports no open copy. Semantic Scholar marks it closed and says the publisher has withheld the abstract. The APA landing page refused the request (HTTP 403). The authors’ University of Miami pages offer their self-report scales, not their papers. No shorter work by Carver and Scheier stating the control-theory model was found in a lawful open copy. The only open copies seen were on ResearchGate and similar sharing sites, which this record does not use. A human with APA PsycNet access could read it and move it to Active. |
| LIT-704 v2 | The laws of emotion | Frijda (1988), American Psychologist 43(5):349–358. Frijda’s short statement, in ten pages, that emotions obey laws, and the article the record names as the efficient way into his theory. Unread: no lawful copy was reachable. What the record says of it comes from the read works that cite it, which use it for mood as information and for the flexible modulation of emotion. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-04 from bibliographic records, not read; a second attempt at the copy LIT-540 could not reach. APA does not make the article open, and Unpaywall, OpenAlex and PubMed list no open copy and carry no abstract. The one copy a web search finds, a course upload on a University of Crete student server, now fails TLS verification with an expired certificate; WebFetch got a 503 from it. I did not disable verification. Every other hit was Scribd, academia.edu, ResearchGate or a commercial book site, none of them usable under the record’s rules. A human with library access could read its ten pages, and that reading would move this to Active and LIT-546 with it. |
| LIT-754 v2 | Effects of reward on intrinsic motivation—Negative, neutral, and positive: Comment on Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) | Eisenberger, Pierce & Cameron (1999), Psychological Bulletin 125(6):677–691, a comment on Deci, Koestner and Ryan’s meta-analysis. By Cameron, Banko and Pierce’s account it re-analyses the performance-contingent studies by reward procedure and by the kind of control group, and reports that reward contingencies raise perceived self-determination. Unread: closed at APA, no abstract reachable. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-05 from Crossref and PubMed records and from the account of it in Cameron, Banko and Pierce (2001, LIT-562), not read. The article is closed at APA (Psychological Bulletin); Unpaywall, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar list no open copy, and neither PubMed nor Crossref carries its abstract. The only web copy found is on ResearchGate (not used). The author’s University of Houston lab page, which may post it, answered with 503s and connection resets and was not reached. A reading would test the comparison THEORY-049’s refutation clause needs: performance-tied reward against a control given the same feedback. |
| LIT-903 | From gut microbiota to host appetite: gut microbiota-derived metabolites as key regulators | Han et al. (2021), Microbiome 9:162. A narrative review of how microbe-derived metabolites and proteins may regulate host appetite: SCFAs through FFAR2 to GLP-1 and PYY; bile acids through TGR5; indoles; ClpB as an α-MSH mimetic; and immunoglobulins against appetite peptides. Mostly rodent and in vitro evidence, by the authors’ own account. The human findings are associations, or prebiotic trials that conflict. | Active — read in full 2026-10-11 (NOTE-706) from the open-access text in Europe PMC (PMC8293578, CC BY). Worth reading as a map of the mechanisms by which gut microbes are proposed to reach host appetite (SCFAs, bile acids, tryptophan and indoles, bacterial protein mimics of host peptides such as ClpB for α-MSH), and for its own admission that the field “is mainly based on in vitro studies and rodent models”. The human evidence it cites is correlational, or comes from prebiotic and metabolite interventions that do not isolate microbes as the cause. |
| LIT-906 v3 | The effect of brief mindfulness training on momentary impulsivity | Dixon, Paliliunas, Belisle, Speelman, Gunnarsson & Shaffer (2019), Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 11: 15–20. Twenty-three participants were randomised to a 5-minute mindful-breathing video or a music video. Monetary delay discounting decreased after the mindfulness video and did not change after the control. Small and brief. Unread beyond the abstract’s summary. | Unavailable — unread, registered 2026-10-11 from Crossref metadata and the abstract as summarised on the Missouri State BearWorks record page. The article is closed. Filed as direct evidence on whether mindfulness changes discounting, which is the fork the record’s mindfulness claim turns on. |
| LIT-914 v3 | The Concept of Flow | Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi (2002), chapter 7 of Snyder & Lopez (eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology, pp. 89–105: the standard short statement of flow, the state of complete absorption in an activity that is done for its own sake. Unread; registered so the record’s claims about flow have a work to name. | Unavailable — unread, registered from Crossref metadata 2026-10-11. No lawful open copy was found: Oxford Academic’s chapter page is paywalled, and the only full copy a search turned up is an unofficial Scribd upload of the later 2009 chapter, which was not opened. Filed as the record’s anchor for flow, which it held nothing on. A reading of the chapter, or of Csikszentmihalyi (1990), would place it. |
| LIT-916 v3 | Brief Online Training in Mindfulness Meditation Momentarily Reduces Some Impulsive Behaviors: A Randomized Controlled Trial | Ge, Xie, Sun, Fan, Zhang & Liu (2024), Mindfulness 16: 448–464. An RCT with mindfulness, monitor and control groups, measuring impulsivity by Stroop, Go/No-Go and delay discounting. As summarised: some impulsive behaviours reduced momentarily, discounting not significantly improved relative to the comparison groups, and no effect sustained at follow-up. Unread. | Unavailable — unread, registered 2026-10-11 from Crossref metadata and a search-result summary of the abstract. Springer’s page redirected to a login and the abstract was not read directly. Filed beside Dixon et al. (2019) because, as summarised, it dissociates the two: some impulsive behaviour reduced, delay discounting not improved. |
| LIT-1005 v2 | Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective | Bandura (2001). Social cognitive theory’s account of people as agents of their own functioning, not only products of their circumstances. The core features of agency are intentionality, forethought, self- reactiveness and self-reflectiveness, and beliefs of self-efficacy are the foundation of it. Distinguishes three modes: direct personal agency, proxy agency through others who act on one’s behalf, and collective agency through shared beliefs in a group’s efficacy. Held here for what it is standardly cited for; not read. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-12 from its Crossref record, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-14 and not reached. OpenAlex lists only the publisher location and reports the work closed; Unpaywall reports no open copy; Europe PMC holds the PubMed record (PMID 11148297) with no full text. The Annual Reviews article and PDF pages returned a bot check (403). The Bandura family site albertbandura.com returned 406, and searches found no copy posted by the author or by Stanford. The copies found are on course and document-sharing pages (a UNED course directory, e-teaching.org), which are not authorised and were not opened. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. |
| LIT-1187 v2 | The construction of preference. | Slovic (1995), a review from an award address. Normatively equivalent elicitation procedures give systematically different preference orderings: in the Las Vegas study the two bets were chosen about equally often but the high-payoff bet was priced higher about 88% of the time, and Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman found 40–50% reversal rates of which 90% violated procedure invariance and 10% were intransitive. Scale compatibility and prominence explain the reversals. Slovic concludes that for important, complex and unfamiliar options preferences are “constructed on the spot” in elicitation. The evidence compares procedures; none follows a constructed preference into a later judgement. | Active — read 2026-10-16 (NOTE-949) in full, from a scan of the published article on a University of Florida course page, compared with the author’s manuscript in the University of Oregon’s ScholarsBank; worth reading as the compact review of preference reversals: normatively equivalent procedures give different orderings, about 90% of reversals violate procedure invariance rather than transitivity, and scale compatibility and prominence explain them. Read it knowing that its evidence compares procedures and never follows a constructed preference into a later judgement, so it shows the elicitation entering the response, not changing the judge; that construction is claimed for important, complex and unfamiliar options; and that the only remedy it reports is market repetition with feedback and penalties. |
| LIT-1209 v2 | Thinking, Fast and Slow | Kahneman (2011). A trade synthesis of the heuristics-and-biases programme around two modes of thought, a fast, automatic System 1 and a slow, effortful System 2, with prospect theory, overconfidence, and the split between the experiencing and the remembering self. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-18, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. The book is in copyright and sold by Farrar, Straus and Giroux; no open-access edition, author posting or public-domain copy exists. The Internet Archive holds several items under the title, all uploads of unknown provenance, and they were not used. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied; a library or purchased copy would do. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1389 v4 | Willpower and Personal Rules | Bénabou and Tirole (2004). Models personal rules as self-reputation: an agent with imperfect recall of its own past motives reads its own lapses and successes as evidence about its willpower, so a single lapse can become a damaging precedent and rules can be self-enforcing or brittle. | Unfetched — no lawful copy reached, 2026-10-22; failed on access. Lawful copies exist and could not be fetched: Roland Bénabou’s Princeton page hosts the paper (rbenabou.scholar.princeton.edu/document/34) behind a Cloudflare check that refused every request, and the CEPR working-paper version (DP3143) is on SSRN and the CEPR site, both of which returned 403. Unpaywall and OpenAlex list only the SSRN copy; the RePEc listings of the Princeton and CEPR working papers carry no file; the Toulouse repository pages returned 404 or 500; the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine was blocked by this client’s network policy. The owner can fetch the Princeton copy in a browser. Registered from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-22, “Graph Learning Applications”. No NOTE is filed. Tried again once on 2026-10-30: the Princeton address answered HTTP 403 with a Cloudflare challenge (cf-mitigated: challenge), which was not retried. Free copy: rbenabou.scholar.princeton.edu/document/34. |
| LIT-1433 | Demystifying Emotions: A Typology of Theories in Psychology and Philosophy | Moors (2022), Cambridge University Press. A typology of emotion theories in psychology (evolutionary, network, appraisal, goal-directed, psychological constructionist, social) and philosophy (feeling, judgmental, quasi-judgmental, perceptual, embodied, motivational), compared with tools from the philosophy of science. It also proposes Moors’s own skeptical “goal-directed theory”, “based on the central idea that all kinds of behaviors and feelings are grounded in goal-striving”. Unread beyond the front matter: the theory is read in her 2017 article LIT-1434. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref and the publisher’s free front matter, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex lists the book as closed, with no repository copy; Cambridge Core offers no open chapter; no Lirias or author-posted copy was found. The front matter and table of contents, which Cambridge hosts openly, were read. Filed as the book-length statement of Moors’s goal-directed theory of emotion, the theory whose 2017 article (LIT-1434) is the nearest prior statement of the record’s reading of appraisal as negotiation. Its Chapter 7, on response evaluation theories and her goal-directed theory, is the part to read first. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1434 | The power of goal-directed processes in the causation of emotional and other actions | Moors, Boddez & De Houwer (2017), Emotion Review 9(4):310–318. Standard dual-process models make stimulus-driven processes the default and give goal-directed ones a late, regulatory role, in action research and in emotion research alike. The authors reverse the default. Goal-directed processes, which select the action option with the highest expected utility, can be fast and automatic too, so most of the competition that decides behaviour is between goal-directed processes, settled by the values and expectancies of outcomes. Emotional action tendencies can be caused this way. Appraisal-to-action-tendency links are sophisticated stimulus-driven processes. Evidence for stimulus-driven control rests on null results open to hidden goals. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1117): in full, from the submitted manuscript deposited in Ghent University’s repository. Worth reading as the shortest statement of Moors’s goal-directed account of emotional action, and as the nearest prior statement of the record’s reading of appraisal as negotiation. Goal-directed processes, which weigh the utility of action options by the values and expectancies of their outcomes, are the default cause of action, emotional action included. Most of the competition that decides behaviour is between goal-directed processes, and its winner is fixed by values and expectancies. Control precedence is what high goal relevance produces, so an emotional episode is a decision process with higher stakes. The competition is run on a common currency, expected utility, which is the point where the record parts from it. |
| LIT-1441 | Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: A control-process view | Carver & Scheier (1990), Psychological Review 97(1):19–35. The paper usually cited for the control-process account of affect: a second feedback loop monitors the rate at which the action loop reduces its discrepancy, and affect is that loop’s error signal, positive when progress beats a reference rate and negative when it falls short. Unread: the account is read in Carver’s 2018 restatement (LIT-1449). | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. Looked for on 2026-10-23. Unpaywall reports no open copy. The journal (APA, Psychological Review) is closed. A web search found the APA record, DeepDyve (paid), ERIC (EJ494079, record only), a Widener University file that is a reference list citing it, and Carnegie Mellon’s KiltHub record of a later Carver and Scheier chapter (2012, no file attached). The only full text seen was an author upload on ResearchGate, which this record does not use. Europe PMC has no open copy of it or of any other Carver statement of the model before 2018. The model is read first-hand, briefly, in Carver’s 2018 author manuscript in PubMed Central (LIT-1449), which restates that affect tracks the velocity of goal attainment against a reference value. Filed for the record’s account of valence as an ordering serving as the negotiation’s potential (CLAIM-440), whose sign clause this paper anticipates. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1445 v3 | Pleasure as a sign you can attend to something else: Placing positive feelings within a general model of affect | Carver (2003), Cognition and Emotion 17(2):241–261. By its title, it places positive feelings in a control-process model of affect as a sign that one can attend to something else. Unread: registered so that the claim that positive affect releases a goal’s priority, which bears against reading valence intensity as the potential’s strength, is checked against the paper. | Unfetched — registered 2026-10-23, not read. A lawful full text was sought on 2026-10-29 and not reached. OpenAlex reports it closed with no repository copy; Europe PMC has the PubMed record (PMID 29715724) with no full text; Taylor & Francis is paywalled. Carver’s University of Miami page lists no publication PDFs, and its older local.psy.miami.edu host failed TLS and returned 503. The academia.edu upload (https://www.academia.edu/3044771/Pleasure_as_a_sign_you_can_attend_to_something_else_Placing_positive_feelings_within_a_general_model_of_affect), which counts as a lawful copy under ADR-064, returned a Cloudflare challenge (HTTP 403) to curl and to WebFetch on 2026-10-29, so it could not be checked or read; the epdf.pub page still does not count. It is Unfetched (ADR-053) until a copy is supplied; the claim that positive affect lowers a goal’s priority, which bears on CLAIM-440, is still unchecked against the paper. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1449 | Control Theory, Goal Attainment, and Psychopathology | Carver (2018), Psychological Inquiry 29(3):139–144, a commentary on DeYoung and Krueger. Problems arise wherever a feedback loop’s input, reference value, comparison or output is extreme or biased. The five factors are read as sensitivities to classes of goals, not as loop parameters. Valence tracks the velocity of goal attainment against a reference value, so approach and avoidance can each yield either sign. Doubt and disengagement sit outside the loop itself. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1102): in full, from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC6707771, NIHMS1512534). A short commentary on DeYoung and Krueger’s cybernetic theory of psychopathology, and the nearest lawful first-hand statement found of Carver and Scheier’s control-process account of affect. Valence is read off the velocity of goal attainment against a reference value. An approach system and an avoidance system can each produce either sign. Many goals are in play at once, and their priorities are juggled. It stands in for the unread 1990 paper (LIT-1441). |
| LIT-1450 | Pain experience in hermit crabs? | Elwood & Appel (2009), Animal Behaviour 77(5):1243–1246. Hermit crabs given small shocks inside their shells. Only shocked crabs evacuated, and fewer did so from a preferred shell species, which the authors read as a motivational trade-off. Crabs that stayed were later quicker to take a new shell. “The results are consistent with the idea of pain in these animals.” Unread beyond the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read beyond the abstract: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex lists it as closed; Queen’s University Belfast’s research portal has the record and abstract but no file; the Elsevier article is paywalled; a web search found no author or course posting. Filed because it is one of the two hermit-crab trade-off studies usually cited for the criterion THEORY-101’s promotion names, an animal accepting a noxious cost for a resource, and the bumblebee study (LIT-1466) cites it as such. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1457 | The Emotion Process: Event Appraisal and Component Differentiation | Scherer & Moors (2019), Annual Review of Psychology 70:719–745. A review of experimental evidence on the emotion process, organised by five appraisal criteria (novelty, intrinsic and extrinsic valence, agency, control or power, fairness) and three paths from appraisal: to action tendencies, to physiological responses and to facial, vocal and gestural expression. Appraisal criteria have more stable response correlates than emotion categories do. Proposes that coherence among components above a threshold marks an episode, and above a second threshold awareness. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1106): in full, from the PDF Annual Reviews serves to guest readers. Worth reading as the latest review of the component process model’s evidence, organised by appraisal criterion rather than by emotion category. Its paths run from appraisal to action tendencies, to physiological responses and to expression. It separates intrinsic valence from goal congruence and reports the few studies that pull them apart: they have partly different physiological signatures and combine multiplicatively. It ends with a two-threshold proposal: coherence among components above one threshold starts an episode, and above a second it becomes aware. It does not describe appraisal as a negotiation among perspectives. |
| LIT-1458 | Levels of valence | Shuman, Sander & Scherer (2013), Frontiers in Psychology 4:261. Valence exists at two levels. Micro-valences are the valenced outcomes of separate appraisal checks (pleasantness, goal conduciveness, power, self-congruence, moral goodness), and they can conflict, which explains mixed feelings. Macro-valence is one-dimensional, always present, and the common currency for choice. It is integrated from micro-valences and other inputs by rules ranging from weighted sums to lexicographic and elimination-by-aspects strategies. Intrinsic pleasantness and goal conduciveness are dissociable, citing Berridge. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1108): in full, from the publisher’s open-access PDF (Frontiers, CC licence). Worth reading as the component process model’s own statement that valence is several things. Five appraisal checks are each valenced (pleasantness, goal conduciveness, power, self-congruence, moral goodness), and these “micro-valences” are integrated, by weighted sums or by lexicographic and elimination rules, into a one-dimensional “macro-valence” that serves as the common currency for choice. It separates intrinsic pleasantness from goal conduciveness and grounds the split in Berridge. It bears directly on the objection that the record’s potential account tracks ‘wanting’, not ‘liking’ (CLAIM-438). |
| LIT-1459 | Pleasure systems in the brain | Berridge & Kringelbach (2015), Neuron 86(3):646–664. Reward is three separable components: ‘liking’ (hedonic impact), ‘wanting’ (incentive salience) and learning. ‘Liking’ can be measured without report, by orofacial taste reactivity, which is homologous from rats to human infants. It is generated by cubic-millimetre opioid and endocannabinoid hotspots in nucleus accumbens, ventral pallidum and perhaps cortex and pons. Mesolimbic dopamine and most “pleasure electrodes” raise ‘wanting’ without raising ‘liking’. Incentive sensitization makes an addict want a drug that has become less pleasant. Objective ‘liking’ can occur without any felt pleasure. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1110): in full, from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC4425246, NIHMS664561). A review of the affective neuroscience of pleasure. Reward splits into ‘liking’ (hedonic impact), ‘wanting’ (incentive salience) and learning, with separable mechanisms. ‘Liking’ is measured without report by taste reactivity, which is homologous across rats, apes and newborn humans. It is generated by small opioid and endocannabinoid hotspots. Mesolimbic dopamine and most “pleasure electrodes” raise ‘wanting’ without raising ‘liking’. Objective ‘liking’ can occur without felt pleasure. Filed for the record’s account of valence as potential (CLAIM-440), which wanting-without-liking puts under pressure. |
| LIT-1461 | Liking, wanting, and the incentive-sensitization theory of addiction | Berridge & Robinson (2016), American Psychologist 71(8):670–679. ‘Wanting’ (incentive salience, mesolimbic and dopamine-related) and ‘liking’ (hedonic impact, small opioid and endocannabinoid hotspots) are dissociable. Repeated, especially intermittent high-dose, drug use can sensitize the ‘wanting’ system, making it hyper-reactive to drug cues and contexts, lastingly and perhaps permanently, while ‘liking’ need not rise and may fall. Sensitized ‘wanting’ can oppose cognitive desire, run without report, and grow during abstinence. Its scope is said to extend, on emerging evidence, to behavioural addictions and to the compulsions of dopamine dysregulation syndrome. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1109): in full, from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC5171207, NIHMS816820). Worth reading as the authors’ own short statement, a quarter-century on, of the incentive-sensitization theory of addiction. Drugs, and perhaps unpredictable non-drug rewards, can make mesolimbic ‘wanting’ systems lastingly hyper-reactive to cues and contexts, and ‘liking’ need not rise with it. Sensitized ‘wanting’ can oppose a person’s cognitive desire, operate without report, persist for years and grow during abstinence. It is a review of the authors’ programme. Filed for the record’s question whether potential of a proxy for maintenance is valence, and the form addiction and metric fixation share (QUESTION-267), to which it gives a mechanism on the personal side. |
| LIT-1465 | A taxonomy of technology design features that promote potentially addictive online behaviours | Flayelle, Brevers, King, Maurage, Perales & Billieux (2023), Nature Reviews Psychology 2(3):136–150. Reviews evidence linking design features to loss of control in online gaming, gambling, cybersexual activity, shopping, social networking and streaming. Proposes a taxonomy based on model-free and model-based learning and control. Model-free: reinforcement schedules (random-ratio rewards such as loot boxes and likes) and personalized triggers (push notifications, recommendations). Model-based: overvaluation of outcomes, features that interfere with deliberation (autoplay, countdowns), partial goal fulfilment (infinite scroll, levels, progress bars) and features that strengthen cognitive biases (near-misses, losses disguised as wins). Providers keep whatever raises use or revenue, and informational asymmetry lets them personalize it. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1096): in full, from the typeset article as deposited in the University of Lausanne’s repository (SERVAL/IRIS). Worth reading as a compact, theory-driven catalogue of the design features of games, gambling, pornography, shopping, social-networking and streaming services that may weaken users’ control. Features are sorted by whether they work on model-free learning (reinforcement schedules, personalized cues) or on model-based choice (overvaluation, features that interfere with deliberation, partial goal fulfilment, cognitive biases). It also names the selection process on the provider’s side: features that raise use, time-on-device or spending are kept, with no psychology needed. The evidence reviewed is mostly cross-sectional, qualitative or indirect, and the authors warn against pathologizing common behaviour. Filed for the record’s question whether potential of a proxy is valence (QUESTION-267), because it describes how a firm optimizing its own metric can install proxy-keyed potential in its users. |
| LIT-1466 | Motivational trade-offs and modulation of nociception in bumblebees | Gibbons, Versace, Crump, Baran & Chittka (2022), PNAS 119(31). Bumblebees chose between two 40% sucrose feeders, heated to 55 °C in the test phase, and two unheated alternatives of 10–40%. They avoided the heated feeders when the alternatives were also rich and fed from them more as the alternatives got poorer, guided by learned colour cues. The authors read this as a centrally mediated motivational trade-off, consistent with a capacity for pain. Corrected in 2025 for a misreported model. | Active — read 2026-10-23 (NOTE-1114): in full, from the published version (CC BY 4.0) in LSE Research Online, with the 2025 correction and the authors’ deposited data. Worth reading as the cleanest published motivational trade-off in an insect. Bees chose between heated (55 °C) and unheated feeders. They took the heated, high-sucrose feeders less as the unheated alternative got sweeter, and more steeply than when nothing was heated. The trade-off relied on learned colour cues, so it is central. At this one cost the data are graded, not thresholded, and the design varies only the resource, so it cannot show a threshold in cost. |
| LIT-1467 | Pleasure: the common currency | Cabanac (1992), Journal of Theoretical Biology 155(2):173–200. On the PubMed abstract: physiologists have no common currency for comparing the strength of the drives behind different regulatory needs, yet an organism must rank its priorities when they conflict. Pleasure is proposed as that currency, measured by choice in animals and by rated pleasantness in humans, and trade-offs are made by maximizing it. Unread. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref and PubMed, not read: no lawful full text could be reached. Looked for on 2026-10-23. OpenAlex records it as closed, with no repository copy. The publisher (Elsevier, Journal of Theoretical Biology) returned a 403 to this client, and no open-archive copy is offered. PubMed (PMID 12240693) carries the abstract only, and there is no PubMed Central record. A web search found no author-posted or institutional copy, only the later Ramírez and Cabanac abstract (2003). Unpaywall was not queried, because it requires an email address. The thesis is known here from the PubMed abstract and from citations in Berridge and Kringelbach 2015 (LIT-1459) and Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997 (LIT-1448), which cite other Cabanac papers on alliesthesia. Filed because it is the standard source for pleasure as the common currency of motivational trade-offs, which CLAIM-440 recasts as an ordering. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1470 | Motivational trade-offs and potential pain experience in hermit crabs | Appel & Elwood (2009), Applied Animal Behaviour Science 119:120–124. Hermit crabs in preferred or less preferred shell species were given shocks “of gradually increasing intensity”. The first observable response did not depend on the shell, but crabs in preferred shells evacuated at a higher shock level. The authors read this as a trade-off between keeping a good shell and avoiding the noxious stimulus, consistent with pain rather than a nociceptive reflex. Unread beyond the abstract. | Unavailable — registered 2026-10-23 from Crossref, not read beyond the abstract: no lawful full text could be reached. OpenAlex lists it as closed; Queen’s University Belfast’s research portal has the record and abstract but no file; the Elsevier article is paywalled. Filed with its companion (LIT-1450) because it is the hermit-crab study that varies the cost: shock rising until the crab leaves its shell, in preferred and less preferred shells. That is the nearest published design to the test CLAIM-435 proposes. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied, not on merit. |
| LIT-1474 v3 | An Action-Based Model of Cognitive-Dissonance Processes | Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Levy (2015). The action-based model extends dissonance theory by saying why inconsistency causes dissonance and its reduction. Many perceptions and cognitions impel action; the negative state of dissonance arises not from all cognitive conflict but when cognitions with action implications conflict, making it hard to act. Dissonance signals that the inconsistency must be resolved so that behaviour can proceed. Behavioural and neuroscience tests of the model are reviewed. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-24 from the owner’s exchange of 2026-10-23/24, shared at https://chatgpt.com/share/6adc1ece-bb28-83e9-a8f6-cadf0f8b7113, where it is cited at turn U13; a reading was attempted on 2026-10-24 and failed on availability. The article is closed at SAGE (Unpaywall: not open access; OpenAlex: closed, no repository full text; Semantic Scholar: closed), and the publisher’s PDF links returned 403. Europe PMC has no record. The University of New South Wales repository (UNSWorks) holds Levy’s PhD thesis and other papers of the group but not this one, and the Western Sydney University research portal has a record with only a DOI link. Web searches found no author manuscript; the one full-text copy found is a third-party repost on an unrelated journal’s site, not a lawful source. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied. No NOTE is filed. |
| LIT-1488 v3 | The when and how of planning: Meta-analysis of the scope and components of implementation intentions in 642 tests | Sheeran, Listrom & Gollwitzer (2024). Across 642 independent tests, forming implementation intentions was effective for cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes (.27 ≤ d ≤ .66). Effects were larger when plans had a contingent if-then format, participants were highly motivated to reach the goal, and plans were rehearsed. A new taxonomy of the cues and responses that plans specify is developed and its categories tested. Publication bias was substantial: the pooled d = .36 falls to d = .15 under robust Bayesian meta-analysis, a small and highly heterogeneous effect. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1131) from the version of record deposited in the University of Konstanz repository (KOPS, in copyright, terms of use); worth reading as the largest synthesis of if-then planning (642 experimental tests to September 2019) and the one that corrects its size. The effect is reliable (BF10 = 319) but small once publication bias is modelled (d = .15, against an uncorrected .36 and 2006’s .65), and highly heterogeneous. Between tests, the conditional link beats a schedule of the same behaviour, rehearsal helps, keeping a copy to revisit hurts, and plans work only when the goal is wanted. Its taxonomy finds nearly every cue and response effective, ignoring and waiting before responding among them. No mechanism is tested. |
| LIT-1497 v3 | Implementation Intentions and Goal Achievement: A Meta‐analysis of Effects and Processes | Gollwitzer & Sheeran (2006). A meta-analysis of 94 independent tests: forming an implementation intention, an if-then plan saying when, where and how a goal will be pursued, had a medium-to-large effect on goal attainment (d = .65). The plans helped people start goal striving, shield it from unwanted influences, disengage from failing courses of action and conserve capacity, and the postulated processes were supported: the specified opportunity became more accessible and the response more automatic. | Active — read in full 2026-10-24 (NOTE-1124) from the University of Konstanz repository’s scan of the published chapter (KOPS, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0), through OCR; worth reading as the first large meta-analysis of if-then planning and the fullest statement of its mechanism: a plan hands initiation of a response decided in advance to the cue it names, so nothing is deliberated in the situation, and the plan fires only while the goal behind it is active. 94 tests, d = .65 against a goal intention alone, with large effects on cue accessibility and on the immediacy, efficiency and non-conscious running of planned responses from small sets of tests. The size is not corrected for publication bias; the 2024 review of 642 tests (LIT-1488) finds the bias substantial and a corrected effect near d = .15. What happens when a plan’s response proves wrong is named and left untested. |
| LIT-1687 | Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-Analysis of Mortality Salience Research | Burke, Martens & Faucher (2010). A meta-analysis of experiments testing terror management theory’s mortality salience hypothesis: reminding people of their own death increases defence of their cultural worldview and the pursuit of self-esteem, with a moderate effect across many paradigms and moderators such as delay. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Many Labs 4 (Klein et al. 2022) (LIT-1796) and Chen et al. 2025 (LIT-1730). |
| LIT-1689 | The Concept and Psychological Consequences of Symbolic Immortality | An ANU master’s thesis in psychology testing Otto Rank’s idea that people need to feel they will transcend death, in three modes (children, an afterlife, creative work), to which Lifton added two (nature and experiential transcendence, an expansion of the self). It reviews ethnographic, ancient and modern evidence that all five modes are expressed. Then it surveys 440 Australian adults aged 18 to 88, recruited through Christian, Yoga, Spiritualist and secular groups, using vignettes rated as imagined consolation in terminal illness. Having a mode in one’s life and religious affiliation predict accepting it; education predicts accepting the modes less. The modes predict personality only weakly; Rank’s links to neuroticism and to sex differences fail. | Active — skimmed 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1312), in place of LIT-1714, which could not be reached; worth reading as a review of how Rank’s and Lifton’s modes were measured by 1991, and as one survey showing that the secular modes go with accepting death as final. It is a modest test that found little; skim chapters 1, 4 and 10. |
| LIT-1691 | Generativity as a Route to Active Ageing | A gerontological essay with a report of the authors’ own studies. It reads Erikson’s generativity, as McAdams models it, as the psychological form of an ethical category of “joint responsibility”, and argues it is a lifelong concern, not a midlife task. It restates McAdams’ model: generativity springs from cultural demand and from an inner desire made of a “need to be needed” and a need for symbolic immortality, and passes through concern, commitment and belief in the species to action and a life-story script. It distinguishes generativity from altruism and says generative engagement can be selfish or altruistic in motive. Studies of 3,308 people aged 59 to 108 in Mexico, Spain and Germany found generativity predicted optimism and life satisfaction beyond health, money and family status. An intervention of intergenerational dialogue projects in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine raised Loyola Generativity Scale scores in old and young participants. No test statistics are reported. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1261), in place of LIT-1777, which could not be reached; worth reading as a compact restatement of McAdams’ model of generativity, with symbolic immortality as one of its motives, and for its claim that generativity serves the well-being of the old. |
| LIT-1693 | Psychometric validation of the Loyola Generativity Scale in Chilean teachers: evidence for a three factor structure | A validation of McAdams and de St. Aubin’s 20-item Loyola Generativity Scale (LGS) in Spanish, with 430 Chilean elementary teachers. Four items were dropped for low sampling adequacy, and a three-factor solution on 14 items was retained (RMSEA = 0.043, CFI = 0.989): Generative Inefficacy (three reverse-scored items), Generative Action (eight items on teaching, creativity and community work) and Generative Legacy (three items on symbolic continuity and contribution to future generations). Action and Legacy correlated .45; Inefficacy correlated −.34 and −.30 with them. Factor-score reliabilities were .80 to .86. The authors read the three factors as an extension of the original two (positive generativity and generative doubts) produced by the teaching context. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1260), in place of LIT-1777, which could not be reached; worth reading as evidence that legacy motivation can be measured apart from generative action within McAdams’ scale, with the caution that the analysis is exploratory and two items vanish unexplained. |
| LIT-1702 | Future self-continuity: how conceptions of the future self transform intertemporal choice | Hershfield (2011). A review, mostly of the author’s own studies, of “future self-continuity”: following Parfit, people who feel their future self is less connected to them treat it more like a stranger and save less for it. Three components are proposed. Similarity, measured by choosing overlapping circles (adapted from Aron et al.’s inclusion-of-other-in-self scale) for one’s self in ten years, predicted patient choices and accumulated assets, controlling for age; neural activity for the future self that looked more like activity for another person predicted steeper discounting (r = .47). Vividness: seeing an age-progressed image of oneself raised hypothetical retirement saving. Positivity: respect for the elderly tracked national saving rates and, when induced, raised patient choices. Asking directly how much people liked and cared for their future selves did not predict choice, though those answers were near ceiling. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1259) from the NIH author manuscript (PMC3764505), served by NCBI’s PMC OAI-PMH service after Europe PMC refused this client; worth reading as the short statement of the future self-continuity programme, and as the record’s clearest case of a measured extent of the self predicting concern-like behaviour where directly reported caring did not. Read it knowing that the review gives almost no statistics, that the caring null comes from a ceiling, and that the circles are framed as similarity. |
| LIT-1713 | Responsibility to Future Generations: A Moral Reframing Strategy for Combatting Climate Change | Syropoulos, Kraft-Todd, Mah, Markowitz & Young (2023). Thirteen studies (six main, seven supplementary; N = 161,633) on felt responsibility to future generations (RFG). In Eurobarometer data from 34 European countries (N = 109,513), a majority in 33 agreed “We need to reform to benefit future generations even if that means making some sacrifices now”; agreement barely related to ideology, age or gender (meta-r .03 to .07) and weakly to subjective status (.13). In US samples RFG was endorsed more than responsibility to reduce one’s own contribution to climate change (RCC), correlated with conservatism half as strongly (meta-r −.21 against −.45), and predicted self-reported proenvironmental behaviour, concern and policy support. In a preregistered experiment (N = 3,175), five brief interventions (a letter to a person born today, legacy reflection, reflection on past generations’ sacrifices, a park video, a 385-word excerpt of What We Owe the Future) each raised RFG and proenvironmental intentions by small amounts (d = .14 to .54); only the letter raised donations. Reflection on past sacrifices raised RFG but not RCC. All outcomes are self-reports or a small donation. status_note: worth reading as the largest study of felt responsibility to future generations, its spread and its political neutrality, and as the record’s only experiment comparing legacy, reciprocity, a particular future person and an impersonal longtermist text as routes to it; read in place of Syropoulos and Markowitz 2021. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1293), in place of LIT-1741, which could not be reached; worth reading as the largest study of felt responsibility to future generations, its spread and its political neutrality, and as the record’s only experiment comparing legacy, reciprocity, a particular future person and an impersonal longtermist text as routes to it; read in place of Syropoulos and Markowitz 2021. |
| LIT-1714 | The Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life | Lifton (1979). A psychiatric account of “symbolic immortality”: a sense of continuity with what came before and what will come after, sought in five modes, biological (living on through one’s children and people), creative (one’s works and influence), theological, natural, and experiential transcendence. Its loss underlies much of the psychopathology of death. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher. The Internet Archive holds it only as a lending item; Lifton’s own 1973 restatement is closed. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Sturesteps 1992 (LIT-1689). |
| LIT-1716 | Legacies, Immortality, and the Future: The Psychology of Intergenerational Altruism | Wade-Benzoni (2006). Argues that intergenerational beneficence, sacrifice now for people who will live later and cannot reciprocate, is motivated in part by the desire to leave a legacy, a route to symbolic immortality, and that this motive can be engaged to promote decisions that favour future generations. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher; Scholars@Duke and Duke’s faculty pages list it without a file. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Wade-Benzoni, Sondak and Galinsky 2010 (LIT-1717). |
| LIT-1717 | Leaving a Legacy: Intergenerational Allocations of Benefits and Burdens | Six experiments (N = 76, 101, 64, 32, 131, 92; U.S. undergraduates, MBA students and university staff) on how the valence of what is passed on affects concern for one’s legacy and generosity to future others. Framing climate change as leaving burdens, rather than using up benefits, raised a generativity scale built from items about being remembered and living on (4.90 vs 4.10), direct concern with one’s legacy, felt responsibility and affinity toward future generations, and ethical concern; recalling one’s own past burden allocation raised moral emotions. In allocation tasks people favoured themselves more with benefits than with burdens. The difference appeared only when the recipient was in the future (not in a dictator-game version with a present recipient), and only when the allocator was a party to the trade-off (not when allocating between two other people). One item on ethical considerations statistically accounted for the first of these. The authors read the pattern as legacy concern, which they define as the wish to extend the self beyond death, engaged more by leaving burdens than by withholding benefits. Legacy concern was measured only in the attitude studies, never in the allocation studies. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1273), in place of LIT-1716, which could not be reached; worth reading as the legacy programme’s fullest experimental statement before the 2012 mortality studies, and as the record’s only second-hand source for Wade-Benzoni 2006 (LIT-1716). Read it knowing that legacy concern and generosity are never measured in the same study, and that the generosity effects sit in one cell: people keep more benefits for themselves when the other person will receive them later. |
| LIT-1719 | I Belong, therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias | Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino & Sacchi (2002). One experiment with 48 Italian students. Those who wrote about the emotions their own death aroused, rather than about reading a book, then identified more with Italians (6.19 vs 5.09), saw Italians as more of an entity (5.40 vs 4.77) and showed more in-group bias against Germans (1.01 vs 0.45), the last entirely through rating Italians higher. Identification and entitativity, which a factor analysis separates (r = .59), each mediated the effect on bias, through what they share. The authors propose, without testing it, that a group seen as a real, lasting entity lets people project themselves beyond their own death; the standard reading, defence of a worldview the group shares, is not ruled out. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1297) from the published version on co-author Yzerbyt’s UCLouvain page; worth reading as the study that joins terror management to social identity, and as the clearest statement of the idea that a group seen as a lasting entity lets the self outlive death. Read it knowing that it is one small study of an effect, mortality salience, whose replicability is now in question, and that it does not test its own proposal against the worldview-defence reading. |
| LIT-1724 | How Will I Be Remembered? Conserving the Environment for the Sake of One’s Legacy | Zaval, Markowitz & Weber (2015). Legacy motivation, wanting to be remembered well, predicted pro-environmental intentions and donations, and writing about how one wants to be remembered increased donations to an environmental charity and pro-environmental intentions. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher. A PDF on the Wharton marketing department’s site was not used, since none of the authors is there; the authors’ own deposits at Columbia Academic Commons hold the study materials and data, not the article. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Wickersham et al. 2020 (LIT-1750). |
| LIT-1730 | Managing the Terror of Publication Bias: A Systematic Review of the Mortality Salience Hypothesis | A systematic review of the mortality-salience (MS) hypothesis of terror management theory, that reminders of death increase worldview defense. An uncorrected random-effects meta-analysis of 635 effects reproduces Burke et al.’s (2010) moderate effect (g = 0.81, about r = .37, against their r = .35 over 277 studies), but a funnel plot shows strong asymmetry. Bias corrections disagree. Selection models and WAAP-WLS give a small effect, about r = .18; PET-PEESE finds none. A p-curve of 825 focal tests shows that some studies test real effects, at an average power of 25%; z-curve gives an expected replication rate of 19% and an expected discovery rate of 8%, near the 5% of a literature of null effects. Five of nine preregistered replications succeeded, and Many Labs 4 did not. The authors conclude the literature holds some non-zero effects, much smaller and far more heterogeneous than published, and that most studies are underpowered. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1271), in place of LIT-1687, which could not be reached; worth reading as the current quantitative verdict on the mortality-salience hypothesis, and as the only source the record holds for Burke et al.’s figures. |
| LIT-1737 | Evolution, altruism and cognitive architecture: a critique of Sober and Wilson’s argument for psychological altruism | Stich (2006/2007). Restates Sober and Wilson’s argument that natural selection is unlikely to have made us pure egoists: for parental care, an ultimate desire for the child’s welfare is a more reliable mechanism than hedonism, which depends on beliefs linking helping to one’s own pleasure and pain. Stich rejects three of their four arguments outright. The fourth, that hedonism’s linking beliefs could be undermined by evidence, fails if the links are sticky sub-doxastic states. So the argument leaves egoism open; it does not show it true. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1282) from the published version on Stich’s own site; worth reading as a close restatement and critique of Sober and Wilson’s evolutionary argument for psychological altruism, read in place of Unto Others (LIT-1683, Unavailable), and for its definitions of egoism, altruism and ultimate desire, which the owner’s thesis (CLAIM-491) has to meet. |
| LIT-1741 | Perceived responsibility towards future generations and environmental concern: Convergent evidence across multiple outcomes in a large, nationally representative sample | Syropoulos & Markowitz (2021). In a large, nationally representative US sample, perceived responsibility towards future generations predicted environmental concern and pro-environmental intentions across several outcomes, beyond demographics and political ideology. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher; it is Elsevier subscription content, and OSF holds no preprint of it. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Syropoulos et al.’s 2023 preprint (LIT-1713). |
| LIT-1750 | The impact of place and legacy framing on climate action: A lifespan approach | Wickersham et al. (2020). An online experiment with 988 American adults aged 18 to 87, sampled evenly by age. Writing about what one wants future generations to remember one for (adapted from Zaval et al. 2015), or about a beloved place and climate change, raised pro-environmental intentions (η² = .030) and hypothetical donations to a tree-planting charity (η² = .009) against a scrambled-eggs control. Age did not moderate either effect. The legacy writing raised scores on an eight-item Legacy Motivation Scale, which statistically mediated part of its effect; but the place writing raised legacy motivation too, the legacy writing raised love of nature, and in a model with both mediators love of nature carried as much of the donation effect. The scale mixes wanting to be remembered with self-regard and felt responsibility to future generations, so the study does not show that wanting to be remembered is what moves people. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1316), in place of LIT-1724, which could not be reached; worth reading as the one open use of Zaval et al.’s legacy induction and Legacy Motivation Scale, with the scale’s items in print; it shows the scale bundles the wish to be remembered with caring about future generations. |
| LIT-1760 | It’s Only a Matter of Time: Death, Legacies, and Intergenerational Decisions | Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez & Larrick (2012). In experiments, reminders of death increased people’s allocations of resources to future generations, an effect the authors attribute to the desire to leave a positive legacy. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher; Scholars@Duke and the co-authors’ Duke pages list it without a file. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Hurlstone et al. 2020 (LIT-1785). |
| LIT-1771 | Social Influence and Group Identity | A review, by one of the SIDE model’s authors, of the self-categorization account of social influence. Group influence is not only compliance for approval (normative influence). Because a group can be a level of the self, influence from in-group members can be true private acceptance (“referent informational influence”). Classic findings are reread this way: Asch and Sherif conformity, Milgram obedience, minority influence, emergency crowds, bystander helping, emotional contagion and riots. Influence is moderated by identification, prototypicality, intergroup threat and context. Isolation and visual anonymity strengthen group influence rather than weakening it, as the SIDE model predicts. Crowd members do not lose the self; they switch to a group identity. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1268), in place of LIT-1726 and LIT-1731, which could not be reached; worth reading as the most recent overview, by an author of the SIDE model, of how self-categorization theory treats influence, norms and deindividuation, and as the record’s second-hand access to Postmes & Spears 1998. |
| LIT-1772 | Social identity theory | A textbook chapter. Social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from knowledge of membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value or emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978). The theory has two parts. In the first, categorization is always self-relevant, and the motive for a positive social identity drives comparison with out-groups. That identity serves needs for certainty, self-esteem and meaning. In the second, members of low-status groups choose individual mobility, collective action or social creativity, depending on the permeability of group boundaries and the legitimacy and stability of status differences. Identification has cognitive, affective and behavioural components. Applications: identification improves health behaviour and buffers stress; at work it matters more than instrumental interdependence and motivates volunteers. An imagined common in-group raised Italian children’s willingness to help an immigrant classmate. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1315), in place of LIT-1695, which could not be reached; worth reading as a current statement of social identity theory by two of its principal researchers, read in place of Tajfel & Turner 1979 (LIT-1695, Unavailable). It is the record’s clearest source that the theory builds caring into the definition of social identity while measuring it as a separate component. Uncritical, with no effect sizes. |
| LIT-1777 | A theory of generativity and its assessment through self-report, behavioral acts, and narrative themes in autobiography | McAdams & de St. Aubin (1992). Models Erikson’s generativity, concern for and commitment to the next generation, as seven features: cultural demand, inner desire (for symbolic immortality and to be needed), concern, belief in the species, commitment, action and narration. Introduces the Loyola Generativity Scale and a checklist of generative acts, with evidence from adult samples and autobiographies. | Unavailable — filed 2026-10-29; reading attempted the same day, no lawful copy reached. Unpaywall lists no open copy and a web search found none posted by an author, their institution or the publisher; a summary on a Notre Dame page was unreachable, Northwestern’s Foley Center pages return 404, and copies on Scribd and a commercial site were not used. No NOTE is filed. It stays Unavailable until a copy is supplied (ADR-041). Read in its place, and not a substitute for reading it: Kruse and Schmitt 2012 (LIT-1691) and Sandoval-Obando et al. 2026 (LIT-1693). |
| LIT-1779 | The Afterlife (Tanner Lectures I and II) | Scheffler’s 2012 Tanner Lectures, the source of the first two chapters of Death and the Afterlife. By “the afterlife” he means that other people will live on after one’s own death. Imagined reactions to a doomsday scenario (the earth destroyed thirty days after one’s death) and to P. D. James’s infertility scenario (no one dies early, but no one more is born) show that this matters to us in its own right and as a condition of other things mattering. Without it many projects, and perhaps even reading and eating well, would lose their point (the “afterlife conjecture”). So, in one respect, humanity’s survival matters more to us than our own or our loved ones’. Scheffler reads this as dependence on future people, not as unsuspected altruism toward them, and as showing that individual valuing presupposes humanity as an ongoing historical project. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1298), in place of LIT-1754, which could not be reached; worth reading as the exact statement of the afterlife conjecture and of what Scheffler does and does not infer from it: our dependence on future people, not altruism toward them. The third essay, the commentaries and the replies are in the book only. |
| LIT-1785 | Activating the legacy motive mitigates intergenerational discounting in the climate game | A laboratory climate game: 180 people in 30 groups of six, each with 0, 4 into a climate account. If the group reaches 45 endowment is saved; if not, it is lost with 90% probability. When the saved endowments were paid to the players the next day, 9 of 10 groups reached the target. When they went instead to planting trees for future generations, 2 of 10 did. When players in the tree-planting game also read three short messages meant to activate the legacy motive (death awareness, the powerlessness of future generations, and paying forward a past generation’s sacrifice), 7 of 10 did, and group investment rose from 105.20. All three messages raised investment over the matched rounds of the plain tree-planting game. Legacy induction made fair shares, not extra giving, the norm. There were no manipulation checks and no control message. The authors say people invest in legacies “for largely—although not entirely—selfish reasons”. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1279), in place of LIT-1760, which could not be reached; worth reading as a conceptual extension of the 2012 mortality-and-legacy result to group cooperation, and as the record’s nearest substitute for Wade-Benzoni et al. 2012 (LIT-1760). Read it knowing that its legacy induction bundles three mechanisms, one of them identification with past and future generations, so it cannot say which did the work. |
| LIT-1796 | Many Labs 4: Failure to Replicate Mortality Salience Effect With and Without Original Author Involvement | A preregistered multisite replication of Study 1 of Greenberg et al. (1994), the standard mortality-salience test: writing about one’s own death, against writing about watching television, was to raise preference for a pro-US over an anti-US essay author. Seventeen US university labs contributed 1,550 usable participants. Seven ran a protocol designed with the original authors; ten built their own. The pooled effect was Hedges’ g = 0.07 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.17), against the original d = 1.34, and no exclusion rule, protocol type or subset of TMT-knowledgeable labs produced a significant effect. Effects did not vary across labs more than chance allows, so the test of whether expert involvement helps replication was left without an effect to act on. | Active — read in full 2026-10-29 (NOTE-1322), in place of LIT-1687, which could not be reached; worth reading as the best-powered direct test of terror management theory’s worldview-defense prediction, and as the fullest record of how its original authors think the effect must be produced. |
| LIT-1853 | Investigating the “Flow” Experience: Key Conceptual and Operational Issues | Abuhamdeh (2020), Frontiers in Psychology 11:158. Across 42 recent studies flow was operationalized in 24 ways: mostly as a continuous score, 17 times without enjoyment, and often mixed with its proposed conditions. He argues flow should be measured as Csikszentmihalyi defined it, a discrete, highly enjoyable optimal state distinct from its conditions, and that lesser absorption is task involvement, which is not inherently enjoyable. He rejects the view that flow is emotionless. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1429), from the open-access published article (CC BY) in PubMed Central, PMC7033418, fetched as XML through the Europe PMC REST API. A conceptual review: 42 studies from 2014–2019 operationalized flow in 24 ways, 17 of them without enjoyment. Abuhamdeh argues that flow, as Csikszentmihalyi defined it, is a discrete and highly enjoyable state, distinct from its conditions, and that ordinary absorption is task involvement, “not inherently enjoyable”. It reports the dispute the record needs: Seligman’s “absence of emotion” in flow, and Csikszentmihalyi’s own remark that flow experiences may not be “particularly pleasurable at the time”. It answers them by definition and by appraisal theory, not with data on how flow feels during the episode. |
| LIT-1854 | Positive affect as informational feedback in goal pursuit | Orehek, Bessarabova, Chen & Kruglanski (2011), Motivation and Emotion 35(1):44–51. After promising to do something for someone close, students shown positive rather than neutral pictures had a less active goal (slower lexical decision on its word; weaker stated intentions) when competing goals had been made salient, and a more active one when they had not (n = 76 and 78). Positive affect is read as information that can signal either progress or commitment, and competing goals decide which. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1450), from the open-access published article (CC BY-NC) in PubMed Central, PMC3045658, fetched as XML through the Europe PMC REST API. Two laboratory experiments (n = 76, 78) in which students promised to do something for someone close to them, then saw positive or neutral pictures. With competing goals made salient, positive affect slowed recognition of the goal word and weakened stated intentions; with none, it sped recognition and strengthened intentions. The affect was incidental, induced by pictures and not by progress, and goal activation in Experiment 1 rests on one reaction time per person. For the record, positive affect lowers a goal’s priority only when another goal competes for it, and raises it otherwise. |
| LIT-1860 | Pushing and Coasting in Dynamic Goal Pursuit: Coasting Is Attenuated in Bipolar Disorder | Fulford, Johnson, Llabre & Carver (2010), Psychological Science 21(7):1021–1027. In 21 days of experience sampling on three self-chosen goals (n = 24), progress beyond what was expected was followed by less effort on that goal and progress short of it by more. People with bipolar I disorder in remission coasted less than controls. The paper states Carver’s (2003) view that positive affect lets a goal take lower priority, but measured no affect and no shift to other goals. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1442), from a JSTOR download of the published article posted on a Boston University research group’s page (https://sites.bu.edu/amplab/files/2024/06/Goal-pursuit.pdf), a copy that counts under ADR-064. An experience-sampling study of 24 people, 12 with bipolar I disorder in remission, rating effort, progress and expected progress on three of their own goals three times a day for 21 days. Progress beyond expectation was followed by less effort on that goal (coasting) and progress short of it by more (pushing); the BD group coasted significantly less. Affect was not measured: the paper restates Carver 2003 (LIT-1445) that positive affect lets a goal take lower priority, and tests only the progress-to-effort link it predicts. |
| LIT-1878 | On the mechanics of goal striving: Experimental evidence of coasting and shifting | Thürmer, Scheier & Carver (2019 online; Motivation Science 6(3):266–274, 2020). In a lexical decision task with a speed goal and an accuracy goal, false feedback that one goal was ahead of target lowered later performance on it (coasting) and raised it on the other (shifting), in 151 online workers and 222 students. Overshoot feedback left mood higher than undershoot feedback, and an if-then plan to ignore one’s feelings removed both effects. Small effects, one-tailed planned contrasts, and no manipulation check on the plan. | Active — read in full 2026-10-30 (NOTE-1438), from the NIH author manuscript in PubMed Central (PMC8022896), fetched as XML through NCBI’s E-utilities. Two online experiments with a lexical decision task and two goals, speed and accuracy. False feedback that one goal was ahead of target was followed by worse performance on that goal (coasting) and better on the other (shifting). In Experiment 1 (n = 151) the feedback moved self-rated mood; in Experiment 2 (n = 222) an if-then plan to “ignore my feelings” removed both effects. The record’s first experimental evidence that affect after running ahead lowers a goal’s hold on performance and moves it to a rival goal. Effects are small, tests one-tailed, and Experiment 2 has no check that the plan changed affect. |
| LIT-1949 v2 | Rethinking the value of choice: A cultural perspective on intrinsic motivation. | Iyengar and Lepper (1999), doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.3.349. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A2). The cultural challenge to the value of choice; discussed second-hand in NOTE-439 and NOTE-441. | Unavailable — sought 2026-11-03, no lawful copy reached. OpenAlex lists it closed with no repository copy; APA’s page is paywalled; web searches found only the separate 2000 paper “When choice is demotivating” on a course page; Iyengar’s Columbia pages (columbia.edu/~ss957) refuse this client with 403 throughout, so no address there could be confirmed; a CORE result (core.ac.uk/download/161434838.pdf) returned 403 and could not be identified. Its findings are held second-hand in Chirkov et al. 2003 (NOTE-1513, p. 97) as well as NOTE-439 and NOTE-441; a supplied copy returns it to reading. |
| LIT-1954 v2 | Psychological Need Thwarting in the Sport Context: Assessing the Darker Side of Athletic Experience | Bartholomew et al. (2011), doi:10.1123/jsep.33.1.75. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). The operational construct of need thwarting, which bears on QUESTION-131’s distinction between structural frustration and operative thwarting. | Unfetched — searched 2026-11-03 for a lawful full text; one exists but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The University of Birmingham repository holds the accepted manuscript at eprints.bham.ac.uk/602/1/Ntoumanis_2011_Journal_of_Sport_and_Exercise_Psychology.pdf (503, upstream timeout) and research.birmingham.ac.uk/files/2921594/Ntoumanis_2011_Journal_of_Sport_and_Exercise_Psychology.pdf, also at birmingham.elsevierpure.com (Cloudflare 403 challenge); core.ac.uk’s copy returned 403, and NTU’s repository a Cloudflare challenge. UEA’s and Curtin’s records hold no file. A browser fetch of the Birmingham address is the cheapest way to read it. Bartholomew’s 2011 Birmingham thesis (etheses.bham.ac.uk/1677) covers the same scale but is not this article and was not read. |
| LIT-1955 v2 | The general causality orientations scale: Self-determination in personality | Deci and Ryan (1985), Journal of Research in Personality 19. The General Causality Orientations Scale: twelve vignettes, each with an autonomy, a control and an impersonal response rated 1–7. In 636 students the subscales have α .69–.74 and are nearly independent (autonomy–control r = .03, autonomy–impersonal −.25, control–impersonal .27); two-month retest .71–.78 (n = 51). Autonomy tracks supporting children’s autonomy, ego development and self-esteem; impersonal tracks external locus of control, social anxiety, depression and low self-esteem; control tracks Type-A and public self-consciousness, in samples of 42 to 87. Behavioural results are weak (p < .07 and p = .06 for two of three). | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1531), from the scan on the SDT site. Worth reading as the founding instrument of causality orientations theory: three separately scored, nearly independent orientations with good reliability, whose validity in 1985 was a set of small-sample correlations, behaviour the weakest. |
| LIT-1960 v2 | The path taken: Consequences of attaining intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations in post-college life | Niemiec, Ryan and Deci (2009), J. Res. Pers. 43. 147 graduates surveyed one and two years after college. Valuing intrinsic or extrinsic aspirations predicted attaining them (β = .51, .67). With both attainments in the model, intrinsic attainment predicted well-being (β = .77) and ill-being (β = −.66), extrinsic attainment well-being β = .00 and ill-being β = .38; over the year, change in need satisfaction mediated intrinsic attainment’s link to change in well-being. All self-report and correlational; alone, extrinsic attainment correlates positively with well-being (mean r = .19). | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1520), from the PubMed Central author manuscript PMC2736104; worth reading as the direct longitudinal test of goal contents theory’s claim about attainment, and for what it shows that its citations drop: extrinsic attainment’s null is a unique-variance result, and alone it correlates positively with well-being. |
| LIT-1962 v2 | A meta-analysis of self-determination theory-informed intervention studies in the health domain: effects on motivation, health behavior, physical, and psychological health | Ntoumanis et al. (2020; Health Psychol. Rev. 15, 2021). A meta-analysis of 73 SDT-informed health interventions (58 RCTs, 30,088 participants). At the end of the intervention they raised perceived need support (g = 0.64), autonomy and competence satisfaction (0.37, 0.31), autonomous motivation (0.30), health behaviour (0.45) and psychological health (0.29); not relatedness, controlled motivation or amotivation. At follow-up behaviour (0.28) and physical health (0.28) held, psychological health did not (0.14, ns). Mediation was not tested and need frustration was not an outcome. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1526), from the open-access PDF in White Rose eprints; worth reading as the experimental evidence that manipulating need support moves need satisfaction, autonomous motivation and health behaviour. It does not give what THEORY-052’s promote_when asks: no need-frustration outcome, no mediation test, and a psychological-health effect that is gone at follow-up. |
| LIT-1964 v2 | Psychological need frustration as a transdiagnostic process in associations of self-critical perfectionism with depressive symptoms and eating pathology | Campbell, Boone, Vansteenkiste and Soenens (2018), Journal of Clinical Psychology 74(10). Belgian adolescents, a cross-sectional study (N = 284) and a two-wave study six months apart (N = 608). Need frustration, the twelve BPNSFS frustration items, mediates self-critical perfectionism’s link to depressive (CDI) and eating disorder (EDI-II) symptoms, and absorbs their association: cross-sectionally their latent correlation falls from .50 to .42 with perfectionism and to a non-significant .18 with frustration; in latent change models their correlated change falls from .43 to .39 and then .24. The authors call the findings correlational and ask for experiments, clinical samples and externalizing outcomes. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1533), from the publisher’s early-view PDF posted on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the study THEORY-052 cites, through LIT-561 p. 12, for need frustration as transdiagnostic, and as the strongest form of that claim in the record: frustration statistically absorbs the association between depressive and eating symptoms. Its longitudinal study is two waves of correlated change, so it shows no temporal order, and its measure is the BPNSFS frustration scale (THEORY-1322). |
| LIT-1966 v2 | What is satisfying about satisfying events? Testing 10 candidate psychological needs. | Sheldon, Elliot, Kim and Kasser (2001), JPSP 80. Three studies (USA; USA and South Korea; USA) rated ten candidate needs within participants’ most satisfying event of the last month, week or semester. Autonomy, competence, relatedness and self-esteem were the most salient and the strongest correlates of event affect; among all ten, self-esteem was the largest unique predictor in Studies 1 and 3 (β = .28, .38). The authors concluded there may be four needs. Security mattered in unsatisfying events; money–luxury came last. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1502), from the scan on selfdeterminationtheory.org, read as page images; worth reading because its own SDT authors concluded there may be four needs, self-esteem the fourth, and named the need-or-outcome ambiguity that QUESTION-369 asks about. |
| LIT-1967 v2 | We know this much is (meta-analytically) true: A meta-review of meta-analytic findings evaluating self-determination theory. | Ryan, Duineveld, Di Domenico, Ryan, Steward and Bradshaw (2022), Psychological Bulletin 148. A narrative synthesis of 60 meta-analyses of self-determination theory found to July 2021, not preregistered. Support is strongest for cognitive evaluation, organismic integration and basic needs theory, thin for causality orientations and goal contents, and absent for relationships motivation theory; no meta-analysis of need frustration exists, and integrated regulation is not separated from identified regulation (Howard et al. 2017; Van den Broeck et al. 2021). Most pooled effects are cross-sectional correlations with high, largely unexplained heterogeneity. No meta-analysis is re-pooled or graded. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1500), from the authors’ accepted manuscript on OSF; the online supplement was not read. Worth reading as the one map of SDT’s meta-analytic evidence: where it is strong (CET, OIT, BPNT), thin (COT, GCT) or absent (RMT, need frustration, integrated regulation). It is a narrative synthesis by the theory’s co-founder, not an independent audit. |
| LIT-1968 v2 | Daily Well-Being: The Role of Autonomy, Competence, and Relatedness | Reis et al. (2000), doi:10.1177/0146167200266002. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). Within-person evidence for the three needs, the design THEORY-052’s promote_when prefers to between-person correlation. | Unfetched — sought 2026-11-03; a lawful free copy is located and was not fetched. The co-author Shelly Gable’s lab page posts the article at https://labs.psych.ucsb.edu/gable/shelly/sites/labs.psych.ucsb.edu.gable.shelly/files/pubs/reis_et_al._2000.pdf (listed, per a web search, on https://labs.psych.ucsb.edu/gable/shelly/node/390). From this client the host failed TLS certificate verification through the session proxy and returned HTTP 503 to a second fetcher; a Wayback capture of 2024-07-03 exists, and web.archive.org is blocked by this session’s egress policy. Supplying that PDF returns it to reading. |
| LIT-1969 v2 | Interpersonal supports for basic psychological needs and their relations with motivation, well-being, and performance: A meta-analysis. | Slemp et al. (2024), JPSP 127. A psychometric meta-analysis of 881 samples (N = 443,556), over 70% cross-sectional and mostly recipient-reported. Perceived autonomy, competence and relatedness support each correlate with satisfaction of all three needs at ρ = .44–.62, with their frustration at −.20 to −.55, with autonomous motivation at about .4 and with performance at .14–.25. The supports intercorrelate .67–.71; in joint models competence and relatedness support add to autonomy support, and relatedness support carries relatedness satisfaction. Individualism moderated 2 of 18 relations. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1507), from the CC BY Online First PDF as posted on selfdeterminationtheory.org; supplementary tables not read. Worth reading as the largest synthesis of SDT’s contextual claim, 881 samples; its “effects” are correlations, mostly cross-sectional, and its three supports intercorrelate about .7. |
| LIT-1970 v2 | Relation of reward contingency and interpersonal context to intrinsic motivation: A review and test using cognitive evaluation theory. | Ryan, Mims and Koestner (1983), JPSP 45. A review sorting the reward experiments into task-non-contingent, task-contingent, performance-contingent and competitively contingent rewards, and an experiment (N = 96, n = 16 per cell): a $3 reward for doing well, given with controlling (“should”) feedback, left 117 s of free-choice play out of 360, against 229 s with informational feedback, F(1, 89) = 4.25; and rewarded groups played less than unrewarded groups given the same feedback (283 and 196 s), F(1, 89) = 4.34, with initial interest as covariate (about p = .07 without it). Felt pressure was higher under controlling conditions; the self-report interest measure did not reach significance; mediation was not tested. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1522), from the scan on the SDT site. Worth reading as the source of the reward-contingency taxonomy and the one experiment that gives the same performance-contingent reward in an informational and a controlling style, each against a no-reward group with the same feedback: the framing changed the effect, and the reward undermined in both styles. One study, n = 16 per cell, no mediation test. |
| LIT-1971 v2 | The role of need fulfillment in relationship functioning and well-being: A self-determination theory perspective. | Patrick, Knee, Canevello and Lonsbary (2007), JPSP 92. Three correlational studies of romantic relationships, mostly women students: eight pooled samples (N = 1,918), 66 couples, and a 10-day diary of 908 disagreements by 120 people. Perceived need fulfilment by the partner correlates with satisfaction (r = .72 corrected), commitment, secure attachment and less defensiveness; relatedness is the strongest unique predictor of relationship outcomes; the partner’s fulfilment predicts one’s own satisfaction beyond one’s own; and the relative autonomy of one’s reasons for being in the relationship carries fulfilment’s association with post-disagreement satisfaction. Autonomy and competence subscales correlate .96 after correction. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1515), from the article on the SDT site. Worth reading as the relationship-level test of all three needs: fulfilment by a partner goes with relationship quality, relatedness most, and the partner’s fulfilment adds to one’s own; but its measure does not separate autonomy from competence (r = .96 corrected), and all three studies are correlational self-report. |
| LIT-1973 v2 | Facilitating Internalization: The Self-Determination Theory Perspective | Deci et al. (1994), doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00797.x. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A2). THEORY-047 names it as the missing primary source for its internalization experiment, and THEORY-054 leans on the same study. Held second-hand only. | Unavailable — looked for 2026-11-03, no lawful copy found. OpenAlex (no email address sent) lists only the Wiley record and PubMed, closed; web searches found citing works and bibliographic records only; on the SDT site, which hosts many of its authors’ papers, about ten filenames on its SDT/documents/1994_… pattern returned 404, and its search pages are behind a Cloudflare check that was not passed. The experiment is held only as LIT-558 and LIT-559 report it, and Steingut et al.’s rationale meta-analysis (in LIT-1967) is the nearest evidence. |
| LIT-1974 v2 | Unhappy or unsatisfied: distinguishing the role of negative affect and need frustration in depressive symptoms over the academic year and during the COVID-19 pandemic | Levine, Brabander, Moore, Holding and Koestner (2021), Motivation and Emotion 46(1). Two cross-lagged panel studies of students at a Canadian university: three waves over 2018–19 (N = 379) and two waves six weeks apart at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (N = 235). Need frustration (nine BMPN items), negative affect (five adjectives) and depressive symptoms (CESD-R 10). Need frustration predicted later depression (β = .13, .17; .18) and later negative affect (.18, .16; .17); negative affect never predicted later depression; depression predicted later frustration at Study 1’s first lag (.20). Self-reported frustration predicted others’ reports of depression marginally (β = .14, p = .074). The authors call frustration an antecedent and a transdiagnostic risk factor; the design shows the first only in a traditional cross-lagged model and does not reach the second. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1510), from the version of record in PMC’s Open Access Subset via Europe PMC; worth reading as prospective evidence, in two student samples, that a need-frustration self-report predicts later depressive symptoms where negative affect does not (β .13–.18). It does not establish order (no random intercepts; the reverse path was as large at one lag) or a transdiagnostic role (THEORY-1349). |
| LIT-1976 v2 | Where do our preferences come from? How hard decisions shape our preferences | Voigt (2022), Front. Behav. Neurosci. 16: 956307, an Opinion article. When two items are liked equally, the value differential computed in vmPFC is too small to choose and dACC registers conflict. A tentative model holds that the tie is broken during the choice by fixation: precuneus allocates spatial attention bottom-up to the salient item, dlPFC holds it in working memory, and the fixated item gains value, so the choice becomes easy. The change lasts only for remembered choices, with hippocampus. The support is mainly the author’s 2019 study, in which fixation duration and dlPFC and precuneus activity predicted later preference change; it is correlational. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1517), from the publisher’s open-access PDF; worth reading as a short statement of the view that preferences form during hard choices, through fixation, rather than only after them through dissonance reduction. It is an Opinion article with a tentative model resting mainly on the author’s 2019 study, and its attentional step is bottom-up capture by salience. |
| LIT-1977 v2 | Further Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals | Kasser and Ryan (1996), PSPB 22. Two cross-sectional self-report studies, 100 community adults and 192 students. Seven aspirations form two factors, extrinsic (financial success, social recognition, appealing appearance) and intrinsic (self-acceptance, affiliation, community feeling, physical fitness). With overall importance controlled, extrinsic importance goes with less self-actualization (β = −.52, −.67) and vitality (−.60, −.34) and more physical symptoms (.46, .43), and intrinsic importance with the reverse; likelihood ratings parallel this, and the pattern survived social desirability with two effects becoming marginal. Reasons for pursuing the goals are not measured. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1525), from the scan on the SDT site. Worth reading as a primary source of goal contents theory: with overall striving held fixed, extrinsic aspirations go with lower and intrinsic with higher self-reported well-being, in an adult and a student sample. It does not test the “beyond the reasons” half of NOTE-439’s C4, which it names as an open question. |
| LIT-1978 v2 | The Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction and Frustration Scales probably do not validly measure need frustration. | Murphy, Watts, Baker, Don, Jolink and Algoe (2023), Psychological Assessment 35(2). The BPNSFS’s twelve “frustration” items carry almost no active-thwarting content, the defining part of need frustration since Vansteenkiste and Ryan (2013), and are the negatively keyed half of what Chen (2013) built as a satisfaction measure. In eight pooled samples (N = 3,692), factors sharing a keying direction correlate .64–.75 and satisfaction and frustration of the same need .17–.38; a higher-order model grouping the scales by keying fits better (RMSEA .052, CFI .950) than one grouping them by need (.064, .924; need correlations .94–1.11); and the frustration items’ excess correlation with ill-being follows the keying of the ill-being items. The authors conclude the split is “likely primarily” a keying artefact, while saying the confound cannot be resolved with existing data. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1530), from the PMC author manuscript; worth reading as the case that the dominant need-frustration measure separates frustration from satisfaction mostly by item keying, which undercuts the BPNSFS evidence THEORY-052 leans on. Shown: the items lack thwarting content and keying organizes the covariance more than need does (THEORY-1316). Argued, not settled: that the frustration scales are therefore keyed low satisfaction (THEORY-1311). |
| LIT-1979 v3 | Within-person variation in security of attachment: A self-determination theory perspective on attachment, need fulfillment, and well-being. | La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman and Deci (2000), JPSP 79: 367–384. In three studies of undergraduates (N = 136, 152, 160), between 19% and 44% of the variance in attachment security was between persons, the rest within persons across partners (mother, father, romantic partner, best friend, and in Study 2 roommate and another adult). Relationship-specific satisfaction of the three needs predicted relationship-specific security, also without the relatedness items; relatedness was the strongest unique predictor, then autonomy, then competence. Mean security predicted well-being and variability across partners mostly did not. Need satisfaction and security each partly mediated the other’s relation to well-being. All cross-sectional. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1523), from the typeset.io copy of the published article, at the owner’s direction. Worth reading as the source of the claim that need satisfaction varies by relationship and predicts attachment security relationship by relationship: most of the variance in attachment is within persons, across partners. Cross-sectional, and the authors say so: the direction is undetermined and probably runs both ways. |
| LIT-1980 v2 | Beyond the three basic needs: beneficence satisfaction and frustration as predictors of well- and ill-being in a Central European sample | Lubics et al. (2026), doi:10.1007/s11031-026-10216-7. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). A 2026 test of beneficence as a fourth need, against Martela and Ryan’s classification. | Unfetched — searched 2026-11-03 for a lawful full text; one exists but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. OpenAlex lists it as open access under CC BY at the publisher, link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11031-026-10216-7.pdf, which returned a client challenge (bot check) to curl and was not retried. No repository copy is listed and none was found. A browser fetch of the Springer address is the cheapest way to read it. |
| LIT-1983 v2 | Distinguishing between basic psychological needs and basic wellness enhancers: the case of beneficence as a candidate psychological need | Martela and Ryan (2019), doi:10.1007/s11031-019-09800-x. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A3). Held second-hand in NOTE-440: beneficence’s frustration adds no variance, so it is classed a wellness enhancer rather than a need. For QUESTION-369. | Unfetched — searched 2026-11-03 for a lawful full text; one exists but this client could not fetch it, so it is not read and no NOTE is filed. The article is open access under CC BY: the publisher’s PDF at link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11031-019-09800-x.pdf returned a client challenge (bot check) to curl, and the authors’ submitted version in Aalto University’s repository, research.aalto.fi/files/38294637/Martela_Ryan2019_Article_DistinguishingBetweenBasicPsyc.pdf, returned a Cloudflare “Just a moment” page. Neither host was retried. A web search found no other copy (selfdeterminationtheory.org holds the 2016 beneficence paper, not this one). A browser fetch of either address is the cheapest way to read it. Until then what the record holds of it is second-hand, in NOTE-440. |
| LIT-1989 v2 | Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being. | Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003), JPSP 84. 559 students in South Korea, Russia, Turkey and the USA rated their reasons for practices of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. For every type of practice, the relative autonomy of their reasons predicted a well-being composite (β = .24–.29), positive in all sixteen country-by-practice tests and with no country or gender interaction. Vertical practices were much less internalized than horizontal ones. Autonomy as volition is argued to be orthogonal to independence. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1513), from the published PDF on selfdeterminationtheory.org; worth reading as the primary study for SDT’s claim that autonomy is not individualism: autonomous enactment of collectivist and vertical practices predicts well-being in four countries. Cross-sectional, 94–195 students per country; “no moderation” is non-significant interactions. |
| LIT-1996 v2 | Testing a continuum structure of self-determined motivation: A meta-analysis. | Howard et al. (2017), doi:10.1037/bul0000125. Registered unread from the exchange “Assess SDT Coverage” of 2026-11-02 (A2). Bears on THEORY-054, whose promote_when asks for a measure of integrated regulation separable from identified regulation. A2 says the meta-analysis does not find integrated regulation as a distinct factor; that is unverified until read. | Unfetched — looked for 2026-11-03, not reached. A lawful free copy exists: the authors’ submitted version in Curtin University’s espace repository, https://espace.curtin.edu.au/bitstream/20.500.11937/69700/2/268067.pdf (OpenAlex’s green open-access location). From this client the address redirects to curate.curtin.edu.au and returns an AWS WAF challenge (HTTP 202, x-amzn-waf-action: challenge), so it was not fetched. The UWA research repository record lists no file; no copy was found on the SDT site. Its main finding is known here only as Ryan et al. 2022 (LIT-1967) report it. |
| LIT-2000 v2 | Basic psychological need satisfaction, need frustration, and need strength across four cultures | Chen et al. (2015), Motiv. Emot. 39, online 12 November 2014. Two cross-sectional studies, Belgium and China (N = 683) and Belgium, China, the USA and Peru (N = 1,051). They build the 24-item Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction and Frustration Scale: six factors fit better than three and are metric-invariant across the four countries. Satisfaction relates mainly to life satisfaction and vitality, frustration mainly to depressive symptoms, with no detectable country differences and no moderation by need valuation or need desire. All frustration items are negatively worded and all satisfaction items positively. | Active — read in full 2026-11-03 (NOTE-1527), from the publisher’s typeset copy in the ULB repository DI-fusion; worth reading as the source of the BPNSFS, the standard need-frustration scale, and for its test that need satisfaction helps regardless of how much a person values or desires the need. Its satisfaction/frustration split coincides with item direction by construction. |