Contribution
A compact, page-referenced summary of all four parts of Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009), with a favourable overall verdict. Its value to the record is as a second-hand index to where in the book Sen makes particular claims.
Key insight
On Zwolinski’s reading, the book has few core ideas, “repeated often”. The main one is that political philosophy should give comparative guidance on making the world less unjust, focused on the lives people can actually lead. It should not identify perfectly just institutions.
Assumptions
Premises and authorities (review adaptation):
- No outside sources. The review relies solely on the book, with page citations, and cites no secondary literature.
- The reviewer’s own position is not stated in the review. Per his CV and other publications, Zwolinski is a libertarian/classical-liberal political philosopher. That may bear on his approval of Sen’s claim that the state’s role in securing rights is contingent. This is my observation, not the review’s.
Key results
What The Idea of Justice claims, per Zwolinski (page references as he gives them)
This is second-hand for the book. Attribute it “per Zwolinski”.
- Overall. It is “Sen’s most sustained foray into political philosophy”, drawing on his earlier political philosophy and social choice theory. It is divided into four parts (p. 1 of the review).
- Part One, “The Demands of Justice”.
- Comparativism. A “plea for a more comparativist theory of justice”. Much contemporary political philosophy takes a “transcendental” approach, whose task is “identifying the perfectly just society”.
- Why that is unhelpful, reason 1. The “immense difficulties involved in reaching reasoned agreement on such an ideal state” (IoJ pp. 10–12).
- Why that is unhelpful, reason 2. “perfection is almost never relevant to the actual choices we face”. What is needed is guidance on making the world less unjust, and “knowing the nature of perfect justice is neither necessary nor particularly helpful” for that (IoJ pp. 95–102).
- Institutions. Philosophers err in treating justice as “largely or exclusively” a matter of getting institutions or the “basic structure” right. Institutions matter “only because and to the extent that they affect the sorts of lives people are able to lead”. A “realization focused” theory must attend to how institutions actually work, given the “moral and other failings” of those in their roles (IoJ pp. 20–22, 67–69).
- Part Two, “Forms of Reasoning”. Rationality and objectivity.
- Disagreement. Deep, persistent moral and political disagreement does not make objectivity hopeless.
- Positional objectivity. The objectivity available is “positional objectivity”: “person-invariant but position-relative” (IoJ p. 157).
- The impartial spectator. This supports following Adam Smith in taking up the position of the “impartial spectator”, “lest we mistake our own parochial view of the world for the universal truth”.
- Part Three, “The Materials of Justice”. Chapters on the capabilities approach and on equality and liberty.
- No capability content is reported.
- Pluralism. On liberty (ch. 14) and on moral reasons (ch. 9), Sen is a pluralist. There is no need to choose between positive and negative liberty, or between capability and non-domination conceptions. Freedom is “an inescapably plural idea”, and each type has value (IoJ p. 305).
- No cardinal sum. Hence the freedom-maximising policy cannot be found “by simply adding up freedoms on a cardinal scale”. Human reasoning “extends beyond the ability to count” (IoJ p. 240; the review presents this as a hope shared “with Sen”).
- Part Four, “Public Reasoning and Democracy”. Democracy and human rights.
- Rights and the state. That something is a human right does not entail that the state must provide or protect it. Whether the state or individuals or voluntary organisations best realise a right “is an empirical question” (IoJ p. 364).
- States. There is a “tyranny of ideas” in treating states as basic in moral and political philosophy (IoJ p. 143). The state’s significance “must be earned by their contribution to human welfare, and not merely assumed”. This last sentence reads as the reviewer’s gloss rather than a quotation.
- Not reported. The review reports none of the book’s account of democracy as “government by discussion”.
Zwolinski’s evaluations
- Style. The writing is “easy and enjoyable”, illustrated with anecdotes from history, literature and current events. Readers “should not be intimidated by its size”.
- Weight. The core ideas are “relatively few in number, and repeated often”, but “deeply important”. “Political philosophers should take heed, for the suggestions Sen makes have the potential to change their field for the better in a multitude of ways.”
- Part One. It contains “several of Sen’s most important and novel contributions”.
- Rights. Sen’s approach “reflects and does credit to his realization-focused approach”, and he “rightly points out” that rights need not be state-provided.
- No criticisms are offered.
Claims
| id | claim | strength | support |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | IoJ argues for comparative over “transcendental” theory: reasoned agreement on the ideal is hard (pp. 10–12), and knowing perfect justice is neither necessary nor very helpful for reducing injustice (pp. 95–102) | moderate as a report (page-cited summary of the book; not quoted) | review p. 1 |
| C2 | IoJ holds institutions matter only through the lives they enable, and a realization-focused theory must model how institutions actually work (pp. 20–22, 67–69) | moderate as a report | review p. 2 |
| C3 | IoJ’s objectivity is “positional”: “person-invariant but position-relative” (p. 157), motivating Smith’s impartial spectator | moderate as a report (short quotation) | review p. 2 |
| C4 | IoJ is pluralist about freedom (“an inescapably plural idea”, p. 305) and about moral reasons (ch. 9); freedoms are not summed cardinally (p. 240) | moderate as a report (short quotation) | review pp. 2–3 |
| C5 | IoJ holds that whether the state should secure a human right is an empirical question (p. 364), and speaks of a “tyranny of ideas” in treating states as basic (p. 143) | moderate as a report | review p. 3 |
| C6 | The book’s ideas could change political philosophy “for the better in a multitude of ways” | weak (the reviewer’s assertion; no argument) | review p. 1 |
Concepts
As the review reports them from the book:
- Transcendental approach — theory whose task is identifying the perfectly just society.
- Comparativist / realization-focused theory — guidance on making the world less unjust, attending to how institutions actually work and the lives people can lead.
- Positional objectivity — “person-invariant but position-relative” objectivity (IoJ p. 157).
- Impartial spectator — Adam Smith’s device, adopted to avoid parochialism.
- Plurality of freedom — freedom as “an inescapably plural idea” (IoJ p. 305).
Connections
- Valentini, “A Paradigm Shift in Theorizing about Justice?” (2011). It reconstructs the same Part One argument in more detail and with more page references. On Rawls as institutionalist, she cites pp. 6–8, 67 and 46; on non-necessity and non-sufficiency, pp. 96–106; on the six complaints, p. 90.
- Where they agree. They agree on what the book says. Zwolinski’s pp. 95–102 and 67–69 overlap Valentini’s citations.
- Where they disagree. They disagree on its worth. Zwolinski finds the move field-changing. Valentini argues it misdescribes Rawls and warrants no paradigm shift.
- Different emphases. Zwolinski reports that reasoned agreement on the ideal is one of Sen’s grounds (pp. 10–12). Valentini’s reconstruction instead emphasises the plurality of principles (pp. 106–7, 46). These are compatible readings.
- Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements” (2003). Zwolinski reports Sen, in the book, still declining to rank freedoms on one scale and treating freedom as plural. The review does not say whether the book answers Nussbaum’s demand for a list. The review is silent on this.
- SEP (Robeyns & Byskov), IEP (Wells), Robeyns 2017. Those are the sources for what Part III says about capabilities. This review is not.
Bearing on the record
- A second-hand index. It can be cited, alongside Valentini, as a second-hand source for The Idea of Justice’s claims on comparativism, realisation focus, positional objectivity, plural freedom and rights not being necessarily state-provided. The page references are as given. Mark each “per Zwolinski”.
- Page-reference caveat. Two of its page references (pp. 10–12 and p. 240) are not echoed by Valentini, so they have a single secondary source only.
- ML practice. It carries nothing for ML practice.
Limitations
- Three pages, all summary. There is no critical engagement and no discussion of the capability chapters or of social choice.
- Paraphrase, not quotation. Most attributions are paraphrases. Only a few short phrases appear to be quoted from the book (“positional objectivity”, “person-invariant but position-relative”, “inescapably plural idea”, “tyranny of ideas”).
- Bibliographic details for the printed version are only from the author’s CV. The page range looks doubtful.
Open questions
- The print citation. What are the correct pages and issue month in The Review of Metaphysics, and did the printed text change? Settled by the printed issue (JSTOR).
Corrections to the seeded skim
- none (there was no seed or dossier)
- Scoping report: “stands in for reading the book”. Only partly true. The review gives one sentence to Part III’s capability chapters, “chapters on the capabilities approach and on the nature and moral significance of equality and liberty”, and reports no content from them. It is a stand-in for the book’s justice methodology, objectivity and rights themes, not for its treatment of capabilities.
- Scoping report: “even-handed”. It is favourable throughout and makes no criticism. The only reservation is implicit: its closing remark that plural freedoms cannot be added “on a cardinal scale” is presented as Sen’s view, not an objection.
- The review’s “(pp. 157)” is a typo for p. 157, as given for “person-invariant but position-relative”.