Source
- Valentini, “A Paradigm Shift in Theorizing about Justice? A Critique of Sen”, LIT-290 (Economics & Philosophy 27(3), 297–315, 2011), read in full in NOTE-262 from the Oxford CSSJ working paper of November 2010. Page numbers are the working paper’s.
- Zwolinski (2010), review of The Idea of Justice, LIT-286, read in NOTE-261. It is a page-referenced map of the book and corroborates the reconstruction of Sen’s Part One. It offers no criticism.
What was actually shown
Sen’s case, as reconstructed (per Valentini, with Zwolinski agreeing on content). The book lists six complaints against “transcendental institutionalism” (IoJ p. 90), which Valentini groups into three (p. 3, fn. 9). (A) An account of perfect justice is neither necessary for comparative judgements, since the “iniquities of hunger, illiteracy, torture” are recognised without one (IoJ p. 96), nor sufficient, since a metric of distance from the ideal is also needed (IoJ pp. 98–101). Zwolinski reports the same argument at IoJ pp. 95–102, and the realisation focus at pp. 20–22 and 67–69. (B) It is parochial. (C) It is inflexible: it reduces plural principles to “one tidy box” (IoJ p. 46).
The rebuttal.
- “Transcendental” (§II, pp. 5–6). Taken as “beyond human reach”, the label is false of Rawls, who builds in moderate scarcity, limited altruism and “realistic utopia”. Taken as categorical (“X is perfectly just iff…”), it is true but a poor label.
- “Institutionalist” (§II, pp. 6–7). Rawls’s principles apply to the basic structure, but the institutions that realise them vary with the society (affirmative action where there is prejudice). Per Pogge, Rawls assesses a basic structure by the distribution it would tend to produce in the actual social system.
- Sufficiency (§III, pp. 9–10). “Taken literally, this claim is false.” Lexical priority ranks violations of liberty above those of fair equality of opportunity above those of the difference principle, and the difference principle is comparative, as Sen himself concedes (IoJ p. 97). The reading rates this strong as a textual point. The true nearby claim is that the theory is incomplete.
- Necessity (§III, pp. 8–9). True but inconsequential. The obvious cases are the inputs of theory; theory is needed where intuitions diverge (Rawls, PL pp. 45–46).
- Scope (§IV, pp. 10–12). Rawls’s and Nagel’s denial of global distributive justice rests on the relational appropriateness of justice, not on transcendental institutionalism.
- Inflexibility (§V, pp. 12–14). Rawls’s method is reflective equilibrium, in which the fixed points and the original position’s conditions are revisable (TJ pp. 17–18, 42–43, 506–509), and later Rawls allows “many liberalisms” (PL pp. 223, 227). Rated strong as a textual point. The process Sen describes “turns out to be nothing other than reflective equilibrium” (p. 13).
What could have come out otherwise: Rawls’s principles could have been silent on non-ideal comparisons, or his method fixed. The texts cited show neither.
What this does not say
- That Sen’s comparative approach is mistaken. Valentini grants that his focus on advancing justice in the real world and on comparative judgement is “timely and laudable” (p. 14). The charge may fit Nozick better (fn. 47).
- That Rawls’s principles are right. The defence is of his method only (p. 14).
- That a complete account of perfect justice is needed. §III.A argues that knowing perfect justice matters because justice “may” have a cut-off point. It does not establish that it has one.
- That the reconstruction is first-hand. Every claim about The Idea of Justice here is per Valentini or per Zwolinski. The record has not read the book.
- That Sen’s open public reasoning collapses into Rawls’s. The dilemma of §IV (either near-empty or presupposing liberal moral equality) is not tested against Sen’s impartial spectator and positional objectivity, which Zwolinski reports as central to Part Two (IoJ p. 157).
- That the capability approach is touched. Valentini sets aside Sen’s “path-breaking contributions”, “whose value is not in dispute” (p. 2).
Connections
- Sen’s metric of justice, the capability approach, is the subject of THEORY-025 (the negative case against utility and resources) and THEORY-411 (partial agreement on weights). This account concerns his method, not his metric.
- Nussbaum’s demand for a threshold list of capabilities (LIT-288) asks for a partial categorical standard within capability theory. That points the same way as Valentini’s defence of categorical principles. Neither cites the other; the link is NOTE-262’s.