Source
- Sen (1979), Equality of What?, LIT-289, pp. 197–220, as read in NOTE-258. This is the primary source and is read first-hand.
- Sen (1998), The Possibility of Social Choice, LIT-282, §VIII, pp. 191–195, as read in NOTE-263.
- Robeyns (2017), LIT-287, A3 (pp. 45–47) and C12, as read in NOTE-259.
- Robeyns & Byskov, SEP The Capability Approach, LIT-283, as read in NOTE-260.
- Nussbaum (2003), LIT-288, §I, as read in NOTE-256.
What was actually shown
Sen’s 1979 argument is a case-implication critique of three metrics, and the record holds it first-hand:
- Utilitarian equality. Sum-maximisation can give less income to a person who is worse off in both total and marginal utility. This holds under stated conditions, and it follows logically from them (pp. 203–204).
- Total-utility equality (leximin). A disabled person with a “low aspiration level” who is contented shows no utility deficit (p. 217).
- Rawls’s primary goods. The Difference Principle gives the disabled person “neither more nor less on grounds of his being a cripple” (p. 215). The index is “fetishist”: it takes goods “as the embodiment of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods” (p. 216).
“An adequate theory cannot be constructed even on the combined grounds of the three” (p. 197). Any mixture of utility and goods information still misses the contented disabled person (C7).
The two mechanisms are named in Sen’s own text, not only by his commentators:
- Conversion. In 1979 it is one asserted sentence: “The conversion of goods to capabilities varies from person to person substantially” (p. 219). In 1998 it becomes four named sources: personal heterogeneity, environmental diversity, social climate, and relative deprivation (pp. 194–195). These are examples, with no data.
- Adaptation. Desires adjust to deprivation, so mental-state utility understates it (1998, pp. 191, 197–198). The evidence is anecdotal: the Bengal widows and widowers survey and Kerala self-reported morbidity.
The curation entry of 2026-09-28 files conversion factors as second-hand. On the texts above they are first-hand, though as assertion and example.
Robeyns (LIT-287) makes conversion one of the eight compulsory “A-module” commitments of any capability theory (A3). Nussbaum (LIT-288) endorses the arguments against GNP, utility and resources while disputing everything Sen builds on them.
What this does not say
- It does not say capabilities are the right metric. Sen offers basic capability equality only as “a partial guide”, and says the negative thesis stands without it (p. 220). His index gives only a partial ordering, completed by conventions (p. 219). Which capabilities count and how to weight them is disputed in the record: Nussbaum wants a list, and the SEP says Sen “never explained in detail” his procedure.
- The decisive step is an intuition. The argument persuades only a reader who shares the intuition that the contented disabled person’s claim persists (NOTE-258, C7). It is not a proof that no resource index could track that claim.
- The Rawlsian reply is unread. Pogge’s resourcist critique is held by none of the nine texts. LIT-287 does not summarise it, although the scoping report said it did. LIT-283 reports only that Rawlsian replies “have not all been rebutted”.
- The empirical premise is second-hand and cross-sectional. LIT-287 cites India ranking 1st of 16 on GDP per capita and 9th–15th on listed functionings (Drèze & Sen 2013). None of it was re-analysed.
- Secondary sources misreport the argument. LIT-283 makes the disabled person the pleasure-wizard. In Sen the wizard is person B (pp. 203–204). Cite the 1979 text, not the overview.
Connections
- LIT-284 (Wells) presents conversion variation and adaptive preferences as two of Sen’s four motivating concerns. It softens the utilitarian argument by dropping its marginal-utility condition.
- LIT-202 (Pettigrew) discusses adaptive preferences in the context of consent. It cites Elster and Khader, not Sen, so the link is thematic.
- LIT-146 treats Nussbaum’s capabilities as a value theory for animals.
- THEORY-411 states what Sen puts in place of the metrics this account rejects: weights left to public reasoning, and a partial ordering where admissible weightings agree.
Note of 2026-10-29: what holds it back
Its promote_when is unmet: the resourcist reply (Pogge 2002, or Rawls on special needs) is unread, so whether a resource index specified without reference to individual conversion can register the contented disabled person’s claim is untested here, and no controlled comparison showing income and achieved functionings coming apart at the individual level has been read. It could be narrowed to Sen’s argument, which is held first-hand in NOTE-258, keeping the wide form as a Proposed THEORY under ADR-047’s kind 1, if a claim comes to need only that.