Why it is a question
THEORY-327 holds Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice as her 2003 paper (LIT-1049) and her 2017 retrospective (LIT-1048) state it, both read in full. The book (LIT-1004), where the account is developed, has not been read. Others use the term more widely, counting deliberate manipulation of credibility (NOTE-1049), so whether the account is right about the wrong is a further matter.
What would answer it
THEORY-327’s former promote_when, unchanged:
A first-hand reading of the book’s chapters on testimonial injustice (LIT-1004, chs. 1–2, with ch. 6 on pre-emptive testimonial injustice) that confirms both parts as Fricker’s account. First, testimonial injustice requires a prejudiced misjudgement that is not deliberate. Second, a speaker whose word is never sought because of prejudice suffers it pre-emptively, without anyone hearing her. It is refuted, as a statement of her account, if the book counts deliberate discrediting as testimonial injustice, or confines it to exchanges in which the speaker actually speaks. It is refuted as an account of the wrong by a case that is plainly a wrong to a speaker as a knower, of the testimonial kind, and fails both conditions: a deliberate, non-prejudiced discrediting that is no different in its wrong from the ingenuous one. More secondary summaries cannot settle it.