Source
Fricker (2003), LIT-1049, read in full in NOTE-860, and Fricker (2017), LIT-1048, read in full in NOTE-853. That these two papers hold the account is THEORY-327, which this entry extends. The book, LIT-1004, where the account is developed, has not been read.
The claim
Fricker offers her account as an account of the wrong, not only as a stipulation. Testimonial injustice “happens when a speaker receives the wrong degree of credibility from his hearer owing to a certain sort of unintended prejudice on the hearer’s part” (2003). “In testimonial injustice the absence of deliberate, conscious manipulation is definitive, at least in my conception” (2017), and she argues for it from the concept’s point: it brings into focus a class of epistemic misjudgements, and someone who deliberately discredits a speaker does not misjudge her. Deliberate manipulation is “a closely related but distinct injustice”. With Anderson she accepts a structural form, which can only be pre-emptive: when an un-refreshed list means some people’s views are never sought, “(through no one’s fault, let us add)”, that is testimonial injustice before anyone hears them.
Others use the term more widely and count deliberate manipulation of credibility (NOTE-1049). This entry is the thesis that Fricker’s narrower account marks out the wrong correctly.
What would settle it
The promote_when, carried over unchanged, which is also the “What would answer it” of QUESTION-322: a first-hand reading of the book’s chapters on testimonial injustice that confirms both parts as her account, with no case that is plainly a testimonial wrong to a speaker as a knower while deliberate and non-prejudiced. More secondary summaries cannot settle it.