Source
Alexander Poltorak (2026), “Wave-Function Realism and the Scope of Physical Causal Closure”, LIT-164, PhilSci-Archive 30720, read in full in NOTE-112. No journal version exists.
What was actually shown
Two parameters (§2.2, pp. 5–6). C(D): every physical effect that has a cause has a basis wholly in D that is causally sufficient, deterministically or by fixing its chance. The domain D may be spatiotemporal (STC), the total ontology and laws of a complete fundamental theory (FPC), or a level (LRC, which is explanatory, not causal). The completeness relation may be dynamical, causal or explanatory. “Dynamical completeness therefore supports causal closure only together with a bridge principle.”
The Scope Argument (§4.1, p. 10). Seven premises and three conclusions. C1: wave-function realism undermines STC but not FPC. C2: there is a scope and criterion problem, not a trans-domain breach. C3: both tacit parameters must be made explicit. NOTE-112 rates C1 close to analytic once STC and FPC are defined.
Why no breach (§4.2). The step from “the wave function is not in spacetime” to “something non-physical causes spacetime events” needs the premise that a structure not instantiated in spacetime is a non-physical external cause (p. 11). That premise is what wave-function realists and theory-based physicalists deny.
Across ontologies (§5). Primitive ontology and Bohmian mechanics keep a spacetime domain with nonlocal dependence, “not influence from outside the physical”. Spacetime-state realism breaks pointillist STC but may keep a region-based one. Multi-field realism defeats the claim that realism about ψ forces a separate high-dimensional realm. Everett adds derivative branch structure only. NOTE-112 rates the generalization, that the finer the closure domain the likelier a quantum ontology violates it, as weak.
Mind (§6). Not being in spacetime does not entail not being physical. Stochastic dynamics leaves no “mental causal slot”: a mind-modulated collapse law is new dynamics and a rival hypothesis. Bell nonlocality with no-signalling gives nothing for controllable mental influence.
Limits of PBR (§3.2). ψ-ontic means only disjoint supports over λ. The theorem does not locate the ontology in a space or choose among readings.
What could have come out otherwise. A quantum ontology could have required a cause outside the total ontology of fundamental physics. On the paper’s reading, none of the ontologies it tests does.
What this does not say
- That physicalism is true, or dualism false. By its own account (§8.4) the paper does not establish either, defend wave-function realism, adjudicate interpretations, treat QFT fully or supply a theory of causation.
- That anyone made the argument it rebuts. The author “found no published argument that moves from wave-function realism to the conclusion that causal closure is breached” (p. 2), and concedes that sophisticated closure principles were never spacetime-restricted. Its target is “the picture from which closure borrows its intuitive force”.
- That FPC is secure. FPC needs a non-question-begging criterion of the physical and a bridge from dynamical to causal completeness. The paper says both are required. It supplies neither, and P7 is asserted with Ney (2016) cited.
- That theory-based physicalism excludes fundamental mentality. It resolves the quantum case but does not rule that out (§7.2).
- That its readings of the cited literature are accurate. NOTE-112 did not check them.
Connections
- Chen’s taxonomy (LIT-204) supplies the test cases. The point that nomological and dispositional readings separate ontic from causal status applies to Allori (LIT-200) and to Dorato’s powers reading (LIT-176).
- Its reading of PBR (LIT-062) matches the record’s reading of the theorem and of Hance et al. (LIT-090). Its remark that Hilbert-space realism “would be a further metaphysical thesis requiring its own argument” bears on Carroll (LIT-123) and on THEORY-017.
- On mental causation it adjoins Pernu’s treatment of causal exclusion (LIT-144). Both separate closure-type premises from what exclusion arguments need.
- Hazelwood (LIT-156, THEORY-612) is the record’s other account of when a dependence is causal, from the side of composition and intervention.