Source

Lattimore and Szepesvári (2019), LIT-1524, read in NOTE-1162: their Lemma 1 (from Bartók et al.’s Lemma 11), §1’s definitions, Remark 1, and footnote 2 to the proof of their Theorem 4. The proof corrected is Bartók et al.’s Theorem 4 (LIT-1528, NOTE-1164). The derivations below are the record’s.

What was actually shown

Lemma 1, re-derived. Let a and b be neighbours, F = C_a ∩ C_b, and d ∈ N_ab, so d is optimal on all of F. On F, ⟨ℓ_a, u⟩ = ⟨ℓ_b, u⟩ = ⟨ℓ_d, u⟩. F has affine dimension E − 2 inside the hyperplane Σu_i = 1, which misses the origin, so its linear span has dimension E − 1. The vectors orthogonal to that span form a line, and ℓ_b − ℓ_a ≠ 0 spans it. Hence ℓ_d = ℓ_a + β(ℓ_b − ℓ_a) for one β. If β < 0, then near F inside C_a, where ⟨ℓ_b − ℓ_a, u⟩ > 0, d is strictly better than a, which contradicts a’s optimality there. If β > 1, then ℓ_d − ℓ_b = (1 − β)(ℓ_a − ℓ_b), and d beats b inside C_b. So ℓ_d = αℓ_a + (1 − α)ℓ_b with α = 1 − β ∈ [0, 1]. When α ∈ (0, 1), ⟨ℓ_d, u⟩ ≥ min(⟨ℓ_a, u⟩, ⟨ℓ_b, u⟩), with equality only where the two tie, so C_d = F: d is degenerate. When α ∈ {0, 1}, d duplicates a or b.

What follows for the classification.

  • Such an action never makes a pair of neighbours, since neighbours are non-degenerate and duplicates share a cell. So it never moves a game out of the trivial class (THEORY-963).
  • Its signal matrix enters Σ_{c∈N_ab} Im S_cᵀ, so it can make the pair locally observable. The paper’s spam game, L = ((0, 1), (1, 0), (c, c)) with only the third action revealing, has that action degenerate at c = ½, with cell {(½, ½)} = C_1 ∩ C_2. It lies in N_12 and the game is locally observable (easy). At c > ½ the action is dominated and the game is hard. Computed, with the same result for CLAIM-446’s check variant at k = Hc/(H + c).
  • Its cost near the boundary is small. Under u_a = u − Δv, ℓ_d costs ⟨ℓ_d − ℓ_a, u_a⟩ = (1 − α)Δ, so it is an inexpensive source of information exactly where information matters.

The kernel step, corrected. Bartók et al.’s proof of their Theorem 4 reads: “ℓ₂ − ℓ₁ ∉ Im S₁ᵀ ⊕ Im S₂ᵀ … Thus, there exists a vector v such that v ∈ Ker S₁ ∩ Ker S₂ and (ℓ₂ − ℓ₁)ᵀv ≠ 0”. Later steps use the claim that no action in N₁ ∪ N₂ ∪ N₃, the latter the actions between the two, separates p₀ ± εv. That needs S_c v = 0 for those actions as well. The paper’s footnote: “The minor error in Bartók et al. [2014] appears in their definition of v, which is in the kernel of a different S constructed by stacking just S_a and S_b and not the degenerate/duplicate actions in between.” The repair: the pair is not locally observable, so ℓ_a − ℓ_b has a component w ≠ 0 in Ker S, S the stack over N_ab, and v = w/⟨w, ℓ_a − ℓ_b⟩ serves (THEORY-962’s construction with D = N_ab).

A game where it matters (three outcomes, computed). Take ℓ_a = (0, 1, ½), ℓ_b = (1, 0, ½), ℓ_d = (½, ½, ½) and ℓ_c = (1, 1, 1). Actions a and b show one symbol, d shows whether the outcome is 3, and c reveals it. Then d is degenerate with C_d = C_a ∩ C_b = {u₁ = u₂}, N_ab = {a, b, d}, and c is dominated. The pair is not locally observable but is globally observable, so the game is hard. The vector v = (−¼, ¾, −½) is in Ker S_a ∩ Ker S_b with ⟨v, ℓ_a − ℓ_b⟩ = 1, but S_d v = (½, −½) ≠ 0. Under u ± Δv, d’s symbol laws differ while d costs only Δ/2 per play, so the proof’s step fails for this choice. The kernel of the full stack gives v = (−½, ½, 0), with S_d v = 0, and the argument goes through. So the theorem stands and only the proof needed the change. In non-degenerate games N_ab = {a, b}, and the two choices coincide.

Forced exploration, as the paper says it. NeighborhoodWatch’s local games put no weight on a degenerate action, so it is played only through the γ/K exploration, “and non-adaptive forced exploration is not sufficient for O(√n) regret in partial monitoring” (§3). Their redistribution moves mass onto d from a and b. It gives d at least min(P̃_a, P̃_b)/(2K) and leaves the expected loss unchanged, because ℓ_d is the matching mixture of ℓ_a and ℓ_b (their Lemma 4). Remark 1 says why d should not get much more: its estimator’s variance is about max(1/P_a, 1/P_b). The loss-preserving property and Lemma 4 (a), (b), (d), and (c) for d, were checked on 200,000 random instances. A simulation on the degenerate spam game gave regret/√n flat with redistribution and growing without it (THEORY-963). That is evidence for the remark on one game, not a proof of it.

What this does not say

  • Not a rate for a degenerate game by itself. Which class a game is in is THEORY-963’s. This entry says how degenerate and duplicate actions enter that decision.
  • Not that forced exploration provably fails. That is the paper’s statement and the record’s simulation. No lower bound for γ/K exploration is proved.
  • Not that Bartók et al.’s Theorem 4 is false. The statement holds, and the proof needed the right kernel.
  • Not about dominated actions. A dominated action is outside every N_ab and contributes only to global observability, as the check does above its threshold.

Connections

  • THEORY-962. This is its span lemma applied with D = N_ab. The choice of D is the whole correction.
  • THEORY-964’s summary of the lower bound, “with v in the kernel of both signal matrices”, repeats the slip, and so does NOTE-1164’s Key results (“v in Ker S_1 ∩ Ker S_2”). Both are correct for non-degenerate games only.
  • CLAIM-446. Its check, at exactly k = Hc/(H + c), is a degenerate revealing action. Checking that costs exactly the value of not having to guess is cheap to learn from, and costing more is the hard case.