Source
Lattimore and Szepesvári (2019), LIT-1524, Theorem 1 of the arXiv preprint (Theorem 2 of the ALT text), read in NOTE-1162. They prove the √n upper bound for locally observable games (their Theorem 2, by NeighborhoodWatch2) and the n^{2/3} lower bound (their Theorem 4, Bartók et al.’s proof corrected). They cite the rest: the n^{2/3} upper bound to Cesa-Bianchi, Lugosi and Stoltz (2006), the √n lower bound to Antos et al. (2013), and the trivial case as immediate. The definitions are Bartók et al.’s (LIT-1528, NOTE-1164), with neighbours restricted to non-degenerate actions.
What was actually shown
Setting. K actions, E outcomes, a loss matrix L ∈ [0,1]^{K×E} and a feedback matrix Φ, both known. An oblivious adversary fixes i₁, …, i_n in advance. The learner sees Φ(A_t, i_t), never the loss, and its regret is max_a Σ_t (y_{tA_t} − y_{ta}). R*_n(G) is the minimax expected regret.
Definitions. The cell C_a is where a is optimal. A non-empty cell of dimension E − 1 makes a Pareto optimal, a smaller one makes it degenerate, an empty one makes it dominated, and ℓ_a = ℓ_b makes a and b duplicates. Non-degenerate a and b are neighbours if dim(C_a ∩ C_b) = E − 2, and N_ab = {c : C_a ∩ C_b ⊆ C_c}. With S_c the signal matrix of action c, a pair is globally observable if ℓ_a − ℓ_b ∈ Σ_{c∈[K]} Im S_cᵀ. Neighbours are locally observable if ℓ_a − ℓ_b ∈ Σ_{c∈N_ab} Im S_cᵀ. The game is globally or locally observable if every pair of neighbours is. These are the span conditions of THEORY-962 with D = [K] and D = N_ab. The paper states them as functions v(c, f) with Σ_c v(c, Φ_{ci}) = ℓ_{ai} − ℓ_{bi}, which is the same condition.
Re-derivation, class by class.
- Trivial: no neighbouring pair gives 0. Every u in the simplex lies in some Pareto cell. The union of the Pareto cells is closed, and the lower-dimensional cells have empty interior, so the Pareto cells cover the simplex. Suppose two Pareto actions had different loss vectors. A segment in general position between interior points of their cells avoids every intersection of dimension below E − 2. It crosses from one cell to the next only through common facets of dimension E − 2, so some pair would be neighbours. With no neighbours, then, all Pareto actions share one loss vector and its cell is the whole simplex. Playing it is optimal in hindsight against every sequence, so the regret is 0.
- Hopeless: a pair that is not globally observable gives linear regret. Take v in the kernel of every S_c with ⟨v, ℓ_a − ℓ_b⟩ = 1 (THEORY-962 with D = [K]), u the centroid of C_a ∩ C_b, and u_a = u − Δv, u_b = u + Δv for a small fixed Δ. Every action has the same signal law under both, so the whole interaction has the same law. For c ∈ N_ab, ⟨ℓ_c − ℓ_a, u_a⟩ + ⟨ℓ_c − ℓ_b, u_b⟩ = Δ, by the paper’s (21) and Lemma 1 (THEORY-961). Every other c costs at least ε/2 under each. Hence R(u_a) + R(u_b) ≥ n·min(Δ, ε/2), and one of them is linear in n. By Yao’s principle the minimax regret is too. The paper states this class as Ω(n) without proof.
- Hard: globally but not locally observable gives Ω(n^{2/3}). This is the paper’s Theorem 4, followed step by step. Let v be in the kernel of the stacked matrix S = (S_c){c∈N_ab} with ⟨v, ℓ_a − ℓ_b⟩ = 1. It exists by THEORY-962’s construction, because the pair is not locally observable. Put u_a = u − Δv ∈ C_a and u_b = u + Δv ∈ C_b. Every action in N_ab shows the same signal law under both. Each other action c has KL ≤ C_uΔ² per play and costs at least ε − 2Δ‖v‖∞ ≥ ε/2, where ε = min_{c∉N_ab} ⟨ℓ_c − ℓ_a, u⟩ > 0. With T̃ the number of plays outside N_ab, the chain rule and Pinsker’s high-probability form give R(u_a) + R(u_b) ≥ (ε/2)E[T̃] + (nΔ/8)·exp(−C_uΔ²E[T̃]). If E[T̃] > n^{2/3}, the first term is at least (ε/2)n^{2/3}. Otherwise Δ = (c/n)^{1/3} makes the exponent a constant and the second term of order n^{2/3}. The step that differs from Bartók et al. is the kernel: v must annihilate the signals of every action in N_ab (THEORY-961).
- Easy, lower bound: a neighbouring pair gives Ω(√n). This is cited to Antos et al. and re-derived here in outline only. Take any v with Σv_i = 0 and ⟨v, ℓ_a − ℓ_b⟩ = 1, and u_a, u_b as above. No signal is more informative than the outcome itself, so the KL between the two interactions is at most C nΔ². Setting Δ = n^{−1/2} keeps it bounded, and the second term of step 3 gives R(u_a) + R(u_b) ≥ c√n.
- Hard, upper bound: global observability gives O(n^{2/3}). This is cited to Cesa-Bianchi et al. and re-derived in outline only. Run exponential weights over the Pareto actions with uniform exploration γ. Global observability gives each loss difference, relative to a fixed reference action, an unbiased estimate v(A_t, Φ_t)/P_{tA_t} with |·| ≤ VK/γ. The exponential-weights bound γn + log K/η + ηnV²K/γ, with γ = n^{−1/3} and η = n^{−2/3}, is O(n^{2/3}). The constraint η|Ẑ| ≤ 1 holds for large n.
- Easy, upper bound: local observability gives O(√n). This is the paper’s Theorem 2. The non-degenerate, expected-regret case (§3 of the preprint) was followed step by step. P̃_t is the stationary distribution of the local exponential-weights matrices Q_t. The localisation bound, Lemma 2, turns regret into the sum over k of local regrets, with |H| ≤ K^K departure maps under a union bound. Each local regret is at most log K/η + ηΣ_t Σ_a Q_tka Ẑ²_tka. The variance term is at most 2V²P̃_tk/P_{tA_t}: if A_t = k, because P̃_tk ≤ 2P_tk; if A_t = a ≠ k, because stationarity gives P̃_tk Q_tka ≤ P̃_ta ≤ 2P_ta. Then E Σ_t 1/P_{tA_t} = nK, and with η ∝ √(log K/n) and γ = VKη the expected regret is O((KV/ε_G)√(n log K)), with a further √(nK log K) from the union bound. That has no log n factor. The degenerate case adds the redistribution and its Lemma 4. Parts (a), (b) and (d), and (c) for a degenerate action, were checked numerically on 200,000 random instances (THEORY-961). The high-probability argument through their Theorem 6, a generic Exp3.P analysis, was read and not checked line by line.
- Stochastic outcomes. Every lower bound above is proved for i.i.d. outcomes, and against i.i.d. outcomes E[max_a Σ_t(…)] ≥ max_a E[Σ_t(…)]. So the adversarial upper bounds bound the stochastic pseudo-regret, and the four classes hold for stochastic opponents too. This is the record’s inference. Bartók et al.’s Theorem 1 claims it for every game, but with the trivial-class wording corrected below.
What was checked numerically. The cells, neighbours, N_ab and observability were computed for each game. The paper’s spam game (its Example 1) is easy at c = 1/3, easy and degenerate at c = 1/2, and hard at c = 2/3, as the paper says. Its Example 2 is hopeless. Its Exhibit 3 is locally observable. CLAIM-446’s check variant with H = 5 and c = 1 is easy at k = 0.5, easy and degenerate at the threshold k = Hc/(H + c) = 5/6, and hard at k = 0.9.
NeighborhoodWatch2 was run on the degenerate spam game against stochastic adversaries u = (½ + D, ½ − D), with expected pseudo-regret maximised over D ∈ {2^{−2}, …, 2^{−11}} and averaged over 24 seeds. Max regret/√n stayed at 2.37, 2.36, 2.38, 2.39 and 2.27 for n = 10³ to 2.56·10⁵. The log-log slope was 0.49. The same algorithm without redistribution, so that the degenerate action gets only γ/K, gave 2.74, 2.92, 5.32, 6.82 and 9.48, with slope 0.72. This is a stylised check on one game and a stochastic adversary, not a proof of the rate.
The trivial class, worded. Bartók et al.’s Theorems 1 and 2 put a game in the trivial class when “K = 1”, K the number of non-dominated actions. Their §7 proof says “only one Pareto-optimal action”. The paper’s condition, no pair of neighbouring actions, is the one that is right whenever degenerate or duplicate actions are present. Two such games were computed. The first is L = ((0, 0), (0, 1)), where action 2 is degenerate, optimal only at one vertex. The second is two duplicate actions. In both, K = 2 and there are no neighbours, so the “K > 1, locally observable” clause (vacuously true) would place them in the easy class. But their minimax regret is 0. Lattimore and Szepesvári do not remark on the difference. The observation is the record’s.
What could have failed: a class with an intermediate exponent among degenerate games, which Bartók et al. could not rule out against adversaries. NeighborhoodWatch2 rules it out.
What this does not say
- Not about a constrained learner. As in THEORY-964, the class is the regret of the best policy that may play every action. A policy that never plays some action pays whatever that costs, linear when the action is sometimes needed.
- Not about constants or a finite horizon. C_G in the √n bound grows with 1/ε_G and V, which the paper calls “arbitrarily large game-dependent constants”. Its open problems ask whether they are real for large n.
- Not about adaptivity. An algorithm with √n regret when the adversary stays in a locally observable subgame of a hard game, and n^{2/3} otherwise, is posed as open. That is the adversarial counterpart of Bartók et al.’s Theorem 5.
- Not about which algorithm wins in a hopeless game. Linear regret is unavoidable there, but its coefficient depends on the algorithm. The paper leaves refining the regret for that as open.
- Not about adaptive adversaries, random signals, or feedback that changes during play. The adversary fixes its sequence in advance, and Φ is deterministic and known. Bartók et al.’s §6.3 random-signal case is not treated.
- Not Θ in the easy class as stated. The theorem says Θ̃(√n). The in-text expected bound carries no log n factor, and the published text’s spam example says Θ(n^{1/2}), but the theorem as stated keeps the tilde.
Connections
- THEORY-964 is the same classification as Bartók et al. stated it. This entry covers its ground and corrects its trivial clause. The proposal to the consolidator is that it be Superseded by this one (see NOTE-1162).
- THEORY-962 is the span condition beneath every class here. The hard and hopeless lower bounds are its kernel construction with D = N_ab and D = [K].
- THEORY-961 carries the role of degenerate and duplicate actions and the corrected kernel step.
- CLAIM-446. Its base game is easy. Suppressed feedback makes it hopeless. Its check variant is the paper’s spam game: hard above the threshold, easy below it, and easy at the threshold, which only this paper’s classification settles against adversaries.
- QUESTION-271. The classes say when feedback that depends on the action played costs more than full information, and by how much, now without the non-degeneracy proviso.