The inference
CLAIM-137: a communicative kind is identified by an invariant that does not depend on any one realization, “as a group character identifies a representation up to isomorphism”, so the invariant has classificatory priority over any realization. If the invariant is relational, the analogy is offered as showing that the relations make the act the kind of act it is, which is CLAIM-151.
Critical questions
- In what respect are they alike, and is that the respect the conclusion needs? A character and a communicative invariant both classify realizations up to isomorphism. The conclusion needs constitution, which is a different respect.
- What relevant difference is there? A198 §VI separates three senses of “essential”: “Representational independence … Classificatory sufficiency … Ontological constitution”. “Character theory can establish the first, and under suitable mathematical assumptions the second. Your non-eliminative OSR makes a claim about the third.”
- What transfers, and what does not? Classification transfers; constitution does not, and this is the question that fails. CLAIM-150: “the owner’s character analogy, at its strongest, gives classificatory priority (CLAIM-137) and not constitution.” A203 §35: “A mathematical character does not establish metaphysical constitution.”
Verdict
Rejected. CLAIM-150 undercuts it: an ontology of intrinsically individuated objects with relational properties can reproduce the same classifications, so identification underdetermines constitution. The route is also circular as filed: CLAIM-137 itself rests on CLAIM-151. A198 §VI leaves the three senses related: “we can formulate a coherent metaphysical position in which they reinforce one another.”
The third line CLAIM-150 named, predictive or interventional success, has no premise entry, because no experiment has been run. It stays in CLAIM-150’s body.