The claim
A271: “The normative problem is therefore not only whether each agent authentically governs itself, but whether their interacting exercises of agency …” It presupposes authenticity as the inward term of a three-direction taxonomy, so it falls with CLAIM-016.
Note of 2026-10-18: a second appearance, and a counter to its last clause
A25 of the exchange of 2026-10-17 re-raised this claim’s question (QUESTION-007) as the centre of a proposed fourth paper, without citing this claim. Its first move answers this claim’s last clause: “Likewise, demonstrating that B’s continued existence supports A’s viability does not establish that A has a moral duty to sustain B”, so “interdependence ⇏ obligation”. What one agent’s will does to another’s conditions “creates the circumstances for obligation, but not a complete justification of obligation.” That agrees with the audit’s reason for deferring this claim, that it “requires independent moral argument”, and is a counter to “that interaction is itself a normative object” if the clause is read as saying the interaction grounds the norm. It is not filed as a counter: the owner did not take the fourth paper up.
Material the record holds for any revival: THEORY-495 (Tomasello: obligation as internalized pressure from a joint “we”), THEORY-414 (Hindriks and Guala: institutions as rules in equilibrium, coordination without recognized standing), THEORY-075 (Korsgaard: obligations every agent has only through the humanity step) and THEORY-027 (Sen’s liberal paradox: a grounding between agents at one level must weaken sphere-control or unanimity). The claim stays Deferred.